Republic

Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy[*](Cf. Laws 832 A πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 36 πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant, Shakes. Tempest I. ii. 112 so dry he was for sway. Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on Epist. vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, Phaedr. 279 C, and Epist. 355 C.) and suffer from unfulfilled desire.So it is, he said. And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms? It must indeed. And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city? By no means. And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions? How could it be so? he said. In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities. And was I not right? he said. Yes, indeed, said I. But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things? That he is far and away the most miserable of all, he said. I cannot admit, said I, that you are right in that too. How so? said he. This one, said I, I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.[*](Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.) Then who has? Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched. What one? The one, said I, who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out[*](Cf. Protag. 355 A, Alc. I. 104 E, 579 C.) his life in private station[*](Stallbaum quotes Plut. De virtut. et vit. p. 101 D, Lucian, Herm. 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3.) but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant. I infer from what has already been said, he replied, that you speak truly. Yes, said I, but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.[*](Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.) For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 A.) the good life or the bad life. Quite right, he replied. Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples. From which? From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.[*](Cf. Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.) Yes, they are. You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves? What should they fear? Nothing, I said; but do you perceive the reason why? Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen. You are right, I said. But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[*](Plato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.) and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,[*](Cf. Critias, fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her slaves.) do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves? The greatest in the world,[*](For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 A ἐν παντὶ εἴης, Euthyd. 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen. Hell. v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20 ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς. Cf. παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.) he said, if you ask me.

And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, Prot. 331 C, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.)? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.He would certainly have to, he said, or else perish. But now suppose, said I, that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[*](For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ’ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415.) but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands. I think, he said, that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies. And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy[*](Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf. Menander,Ἀσπίς (fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.) and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[*](Cf. Xen. Hiero 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 B ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.) that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[*](Cf. Laws 781 C, Gorg. 485 D.) envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing. Most certainly, he said. And does not such a harvest of ills[*](τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself[*](Cf. 580 C and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 D.) attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body[*](For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g.) should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons? Your analogy is most apt and true,[*](Cf. Soph. 252 C ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.) Socrates, he said. Is not that then, dear Glaucon, said I, a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant’s life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst? Precisely so, he said. Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,[*](Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b.) that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not? Yes, indeed, he said.

And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,[*](Cf. 576 B-C.) envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse[*](πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, an all-receptive grampus (Rogers).) of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy[*](On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine. In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 not easy for a tyrant to be pious; also Dio Chrys. Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . ) make all about him so?No man of sense will gainsay that, he said. Come then, said I, now at last, even as the judge of last instance[*](Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.) pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man. Nay, he said, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary. Shall we hire a herald,[*](Cf. Phileb. 66 A ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. Alc. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.25.) then, said I, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man[*](Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.) and the most righteous to be the happiest,[*](Cf. Laws 664 B-C. ) and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;[*](Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a.) and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state? Let it have been so proclaimed by you, he said. Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known[*](Cf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.)? Add that to the proclamation, he said. Very good, said I; this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it. What is it? Since, said I, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,[*](Cf. 435 B-C ff.) it will admit,[*](Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of ability to reckon, and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A.) I think, of another demonstration also. What is that? The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls. What do you mean? he said. One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,[*](Cf. Phileb. 26 C τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2.) we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,[*](Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen, approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D.) but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;

for we called it the appetitive part[*](Vol. I. 439 D.) because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.) because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.And rightly, he said. And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head[*](Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’s sake. See also p. 371, note e.) in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part? I, at any rate, think so, he said. And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute? Yes, indeed. And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor? Most appropriately. But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards[*](Or is bent on, τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D.) knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation. Much the least. Lover of learning[*](Cf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.) and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that. Quite so, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the ruling principle[*](Cf. 338 D, 342 C.) of men’s souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen? That is so, he said. And that is why we say that the primary classes[*](Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3). . . . Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and ibid, Introd. pp. liv-lv.) of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. Precisely so And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each? By all means. Are you aware, then said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,[*](For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ’ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ’ ἄνω τὰ δ’ αὖ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.) which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own[*](Cf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.)? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money. True, he said. And what of the lover of honor[*](Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.)? I said; does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.) and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s novel, Smoke. ) and moonshine? It is so, he said. And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth[*](Cf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic.) and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,[*](Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) and call[*](For the infinitive cf. 492 C καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν.) them literally[*](τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.) the pleasures of necessity,[*](Cf. 558 D f.) since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?

We may be sure of that, he said. Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable[*](This anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.) or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged[*](i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι’ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19.) rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion[*](Cf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.)? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,[*](The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157.) but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure. Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings. Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied[*](For the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.) by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement[*](Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.) is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussion[*](Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.) that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory? Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.How could it be otherwise? he said. At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life. And to what life and to what pleasure, I said, does the judge assign the second place? Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker. And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems. Surely, said he. That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour[*](The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 A, Phileb. 66 D, Laws 692 A, 960 C, Epist. vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il l’appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique. For the idea of a contest Cf. Phileb. passim.) and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real[*](Cf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p. 281.) or pure,[*](Cf. Phileb. 52 C καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 C καθαρὰ λύπης.) but is a kind of scene-painting,[*](Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266.) as I seem to have heard from some wise man[*](One of Plato’s evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.); and yet[*](For this rhetorical καίτοι cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, Gorg. 452 E, Laws 663 E, 690 C.) this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.[*](Cf. Phileb. 22 E, Aesch. Prom. 919, Soph. Antig. 1046.) Much the greatest. But what do you mean? I shall discover it, I said, if you will answer my questions while I seek. Ask, then, he said. Tell me, then, said I, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure? We certainly do. And is there not such a thing as a neutral state[*](If any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.) There is. Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,[*](For ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Phileb. 35 E.) being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it? It is that, said he. Do you not recall the things men say in sickness? What sort of things? Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,[*](Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 B, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24, and Heracleit. fr. 111, Diels i.3 p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ.) though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill. I remember, he said. And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering? I do. And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight. Yes, he said, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace. And so, I said, when a man’s delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful. It may be so, he said. What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure. It seems so Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both[*](Cf. Phileb. 43 E, Hipp. Maj. 300 B f.)? I think not. And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,[*](Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his Topics and De anima. ) are they not? Yes.

And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?Yes, we did.How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?In no way.This is not a reality, then, but an illusion, said I; in such case the quietude in juxtaposition[*](Cf. 586 C, and Phileb. 42 B and 41 E.) with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing[*](For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 B.) on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 C-D, Xen. Oecon. 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.) So at any rate our argument signifies, he said. Take a look, then, said I, at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure. Where shall I look, he said, and what pleasures do you mean? There are many others, I said, and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.[*](For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and E, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.) For these with no antecedent pain[*](Cf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 C ff., and Phaedr. 258 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks.) suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them. Most true, he said. Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain. No, we must not. Yet, surely, said I, the affections that find their way through the body[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Phaedr. 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b.) to the soul[*](Cf. Tim. 45 D (of sensations)μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 A, Rep. 462 C πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also Phileb. 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 608.) and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 B.)? Yes, they are. And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them? It is. Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble? What? he said. Do you think that there is such a thing in nature[*](For ἐν τῇ φύσει Cf. Parmen. 132 D.) as up and down and in the middle? I do. Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward[*](For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 C. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.)i. p. 428.)? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above? No, by Zeus, he said, I do not think that such a person would have any other notion. And if he were borne back, I said, he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly. Of course. And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle? Obviously.