Republic

There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*](For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.)? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*](Cf. on 558 D.) and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*](For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.) when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*](The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.) You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.) and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*](Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*](Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*](ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*](This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humor. But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening prayer.)I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*](Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*](For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373.) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do. Now recall[*](Cf. 559 D f.) our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*](εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.) between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*](Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness.) as he supposes,[*](ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.) he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*](θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.) then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*](This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.) in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*](Cf. 559 E.) these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*](An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.) and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*](Cf. Symp. 205 D.) to be the protector[*](προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.) of his idle and prodigal[*](For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis.) appetites, a monstrous winged[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον ) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*](Cf. 564 D.) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*](For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted[*](For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*](ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.) A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*](Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.)? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*](For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.) my friend, I said, have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal. Assuredly. Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.) but what is his manner of life? As the wits say, you shall tell me.[*](Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus. ) I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*](Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.) and all the doings of those whose[*](ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) souls are entirely swayed[*](Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.) by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this there are borrowings and levyings[*](For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.) upon the estate?Of course.And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*](ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.) of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?Most certainly.And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*](Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 544.) or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*](Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.)He is.And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*](Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.) of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[*](The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.) and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*](For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.) upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*](For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.) and fail such a one, and the swarm[*](Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.) of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*](He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.) of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*](νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.) of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*](For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.) will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*](Cf. 567 E.) and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[*](Cf. on 591 E.) so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[*](τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E.) to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[*](For the tyrant’s companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.) in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?It is this, he said. And if, I said, there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils. What kind of evils do you mean? Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[*](Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.) and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes. Yes, small evils indeed,[*](So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.) he said, if the men of this sort are few. Why, yes, I said, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail[*](οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, doesn’t strike near, doesn’t come within range. Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97.) of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul. Naturally, he said, for he would be the most tyrannical. Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,[*](In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.) but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[*](So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.)—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.[*](Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, This is the end of every man’s desire (Ballad of Burdens).) Yes, he said, this, just this.

Then, said I, is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn[*](ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 C ὑποκείσονται.) and shrink from no contortion[*](σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. Laws 669 D, Aristoph. Peace 323, Xen. Symp. 7. 5, Eurip. Cyclops 221. Isoc. Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics.) or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A ἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.) Yes indeed, he said. Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom[*](Cf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίαςAristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.) or true friendship. Quite so. May we not rightly call such men faithless[*](Cf. Laws 730 C, 705 A.)? Of course. Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice. But surely, he said, we were right. Let us sum up,[*](Cf. Phaedr. 239 D ἓν κεφάλαιον ) then, said I, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state. Quite so. And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes. Inevitably, said Glaucon, taking up the argument. And shall we find, said I, that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable[*](Cf. Gorgias 473 C-E.) in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.[*](Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, Phaedr. 277 E οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E you say what nobody else would say, and perhaps 500 D διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf. Schopenhauer’s The public has a great many bees in its bonnet.) That much, certainly, he said, must needs be true. Does not the tyrannical man, said I, correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,[*](Cf. Tim. 75 D, Rep. 555 A, Parmen. 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.) the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise? Surely. And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man? Of course. What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it? They are direct contraries, he said; the one is the best, the other the worst. I’ll not ask which is which, I said, because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled[*](Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A ἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 B, Gorg. 523 D, Protag. 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye.) by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few[*](εἴ τινες: Cf. Gorg. 521 B ἐάν τι ἔχω.) of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole. That is a fair challenge, he said, and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.[*](For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, Polit. 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.)

And would it not also be a fair challenge, said I, to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,[*](The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32, When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν]. Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. Measure for MeasureII. ii. 59 ceremony that to great ones ’longs,Henry V.IV. i. 280 farced title running ’fore the king.) and the pomp and circumstance which they assume[*](For σχηματίζονται cf. Xen. Oecon. 2. 4. σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 B, 494 D.) in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant[*](It is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A.) and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped[*](Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest? also Gory. 523 E, Xen. Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24 ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ’ ἔνδον . . . , Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.) of his vesture of tragedy,[*](Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7 τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον, and Dümmler, Akademika p. 5.) and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men? That also would be a most just challenge, he said. Shall we, then, make believe, said I, that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions? By all means. Come, then, said I, examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them. What things? he said. In the first place, said I, will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state? Utterly enslaved, he said. And yet you see in it masters and freemen. I see, he said, a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.[*](In Menex. 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.) If, then, I said, the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion[*](For τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν.) obtain in him, and his soul teem[*](γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, Gorg. 522 E, 525 A.) with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot? Inevitably, he said. Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free? Enslaved, I should suppose. Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes[*](Cf. 445 B, Gorg. 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661 B ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 B τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.)? Decidedly so. Then the tyrannized soul— to speak of the soul as a whole[*](Cf. Cratyl. 392 C ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.)—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.[*](Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui. Cf. also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit, Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.) Of course. And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor? Poor.