Republic

Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nic. 1154 a 30 διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.) so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain? No, by Zeus, he said, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so. In this way, then, consider it.[*](The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 Hunger and thirst after righteousness.) Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses[*](For κενώσεις Cf. Phileb. 35 B, 42 C-D, Tim. 65 A.) of the bodily habit? Surely. And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul? It is indeed. And he who partakes of nourishment[*](For the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. Protag. 313 D, Phaedr. 248 B, and Soph. 223 E.) and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled? Of course. And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being? Evidently that of the more real. And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.) knowledge and reason,[*](Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D διάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.) and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent[*](Cf. Symp. 209 A φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.)? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing? That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses, he said. Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge? By no means. Or of truth and reality? Not of that, either. And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence? Necessarily. And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul? Much less. And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul? I do. Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things? Of course. If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure. Most inevitably, he said.

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to[*](For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1404.) feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 C for πλανάω of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.) to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted[*](Cf. on 576 A ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240.) stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth[*](Cf. Milton, Comus, Ne’er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast, Rossetti, Nineveh, in fine, That set gaze never on the sky, etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis, Halle, 1909, who lists Plato’s Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A, Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.) and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine.) grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed[*](Cf. 373 E, Phaedo 66 C ff., Berkeley, Siris 330 For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble.) kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part[*](τὸ στέγον: Cf. Gorg. 493 B, Laws 714 A.) of their souls.You describe in quite oracular style,[*](Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For χρησμῳδεῖν Cf. Crat. 396 D, Apol. 39 C, Laws 712 A.) Socrates, said Glaucon, the life of the multitude. And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition[*](Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.) as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,[*](For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1168 b 19, Eth. Eud. 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e.) as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen[*](For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. Phaedr. 243 A-B, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64, and Philologus 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, Akademika p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. Helena 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason of Church Government, A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables. For the ethical symbolism Cf. 520 C-D.) was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth? It is quite inevitable, he said, that it should be so. So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason? The same sort of thing, he said, must necessarily happen in this case too. Then, said I, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,[*](Cf. Phaedo 69 B, and Theaet. 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως.) take only those pleasures which reason approves,[*](ἐξηγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής427 C. Cf. 604 B.) will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest[*](Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.) pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its own[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 E.)? But indeed, he said, it is most truly its very own.

Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,[*](Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, Phaedr. 237 E.) the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480 on Charm. 161 B.) and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,[*](For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, Laws 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.) the truest.Precisely so.And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.That is so, he said. And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect[*](What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.)? Quite so, he said. And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order? Obviously. And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites? Quite so. And least so the royal and orderly? Yes. Then the tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove[*](Cf. Polit. 257 B ἀφεστᾶσιν ) from true and proper pleasure, and the king’s at the least. Necessarily. Then the tyrant’s life will be least pleasurable and the king’s most. There is every necessity of that. Do you know, then, said I, how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king? I’ll know if you tell me,[*](Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.) he said. There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond[*](For εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα Cf. Phaedo 112 B and 509 B.) the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus. How? he said. The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between. Yes. And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true? That is so. And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and Menex. 238 D.) Yes, the third. Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure. Apparently. The phantom[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C εἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.) of the tyrant’s pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number. Quite so. But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes. It is clear, he said, to a reckoner. Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.[*](Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth. For the mathematical jest Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.)

An overwhelming[*](Humorous as in 509 C ὑπερβολῆς.) and baffling calculation, he said, of the difference[*](Cf. Phileb. 13 A, 14 A, Parmen. 141 C, Theaet. 209 A and D.) between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain! And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them. They certainly do, he said. Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue. Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus, he said. Very good, said I. And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, Phileb. 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B.) It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust[*](Cf. 348 B, 361 A.) man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition? Yes, that. Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct. How? he said. By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying. What sort of an image? he said. One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, said I, as that of the Chimaera[*](Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 D.) or Scylla[*](Od. xii. 85 ff.) or Cerberus,[*](Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.) and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one. Yes, they do tell of them. Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast[*](Stallbaum ad loc. gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c. Tim. 70 E, Charm. 155 D-E, Phaedr. 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii.) that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths. It is the task of a cunning artist,[*](Cf. 596 C.) he said, but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax[*](Cf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus. Otto, 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur. For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, Phaedo 99 E, Laws 636 A, 736 B, Tim. 19 E.) and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned. Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest[*](Cf. 442 A.) and the second second in size. That is easier, he said, and is done. Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together. They are so united, he said. Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within[*](Cf. 577 A.) but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man. The sheath is made fast about him, he said.

Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man[*](The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff.) and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about[*](Cf. Protag. 352 C περιελκομένης, with Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1145 b 24.) whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.[*](Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.)Yes, he said, that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say. And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us[*](Cf. the inward man, Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16.) complete domination[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 Religion says: The kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality.) over the entire man and make him take charge[*](Cf. Gorg. 516 A-B.) of the many-headed beast—like a farmer[*](Cf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D.) who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally[*](Cf. 441 A.) of the lion’s nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth. Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice. From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it. None whatever, I think, said he. Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,[*](πράως: cf. the use of ἠρέμα476 E, 494 D.) for he does not willingly err,[*](Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640 on Laws 860 D.) by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,[*](Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, Locksley Hall Sixty Years after, in fine, The highest Human Nature is divine.) while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not? He will if he is counselled by me. Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,[*](Cf. Matt. xvi.26, Mark viii. 36, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. Laws 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D.) no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle[*](Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7.) did when she received the necklace as the price[*](For ἐπί in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 A ἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66.) of her husband’s life?

Far more, said Glaucon, for I will answer you in his behalf. And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,[*](See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton.) that huge and manifold beast overmuch? Obviously, he said. And do we not censure self-will[*](αὐθάδεια: Cf. 548 E.) and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake[*](Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc. Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (Il. vi. 181 ).) in us? By all means. And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it? Surely. And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape[*](Cf. 620 C.) instead of a lion? Yes, indeed, he said. And why do you suppose that base mechanic[*](Cf. p. 49, note e.) handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them? So it seems, he said. Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man[*](For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. Alc. I. 135 B-C, Polit. 296 B-C, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 D-714 A, 627 E, Phaedo 62 D-E, and Laws 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior’s good, conquer him. Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest. Plato’s idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f., Epist. vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106.) who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus[*](Cf. 343 B-C.) did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? Yes, and rightly so, he said. And it is plain, I said, that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state,

and this is the aim of our control of children,[*](Cf. Lysis 207 E f., Laws 808 D, Isoc.xv. 290, Antiphon, fr. 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303).) our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them[*](Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.) and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.Yes, that is plain, he said. In what way,[*](Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a.) then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power? In no way, he said. And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty[*](The paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B, 509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 B οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι, and Laws 728 C; and for the purpose of punishment, What Plato Said, p. 495, on Protag. 324 A-B.)? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body[*](The a fortiori argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. 445 D-E f., Gorg. 479 B, Crito 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E.) does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body? Most assuredly, he said. Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors[*](Cf. Gorg. 507 D, Isoc. Epist. vi. 9, Xen. Ages. 7. 1.) to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others. Clearly, he said. And then, I said, he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,[*](Health in the familiar skolion (Cf. Gorg. 451 E, Laws 631 C, 661 A, 728 D-E, Euthydem. 279 A-B, Meno 87 E, Soph. frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. Gorg. 452 A-B, Crito 47 D, Eryxias 393 C. In fact, for Plato as for modern scientific ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that not even health, highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. Laws 661 C-E ff., 728 D-E, 744 A, 960 D, Laches 195 C; and Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 17 Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are. This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i. 36, Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1.4 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, Gossip in a Library, p. 23, and Himerius, Ecl. iii. 18 (Diels ii.3 p. 18)ἑκὼν δὲ ἐνόσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.) nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 D.) By all means, he replied, if he is to be a true musician.[*](Cf. Phaedo 61 A.) And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled[*](Cf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D.) by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass[*](ὄγκον: cf. Horace’s use of acervus, Shorey on Odes ii. 2. 24.) of his wealth without measure,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. Laws 831 C ff., 870 B-C, Rep. 434 B, 550 D ff., etc.) involving himself in measureless ills. No, I think not, he said. He will rather, I said, keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul,[*](This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 570 C and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C.) and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth,[*](As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B.) will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be. Precisely so, he said.