Republic

Why, I said, the father habitually tries to resemble the child and is afraid of his sons, and the son likens himself to the father and feels no awe or fear of his parents,[*](A common conservative complaint. Cf. Isoc. Areop. 49, Aristoph. Clouds, 998, 1321 ff., Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10, Mem. iii. 5. 15; Newman i. pp. 174 and 339-340. Cf. also Renan, Souvenirs, xviii.-xx., on American vulgarity and liberty; Harold Lasswell, quoting Bryce, Modern Democracies, in Methods of Social Science, ed. by Stuart A. Rice, p. 376: The spirit of equality is alleged to have diminished the respect children owe to parents, and the young to the old. This was noted by Plato in Athens. But surely the family relations depend much more on the social, structural and religious ideas of a race than on forms of government; Whitman, Where the men and women think lightly of the laws . . . where children are taught to be laws to themselves . . . there the great city stands.) so that he may be forsooth a free man.[*](For the ironical ἵνα δή cf. on 561 B. Cf. Laws 962 E ἐλεύθερον δή, Meno 86 and Aristoph. Clouds 1414.) And the resident alien feels himself equal to the citizen and the citizen to him, and the foreigner likewise. Yes, these things do happen, he said. They do, said I, and such other trifles as these. The teacher in such case fears and fawns upon the pupils, and the pupils pay no heed to the teacher or to their overseers either. And in general the young ape their elders and vie with them in speech and action, while the old, accommodating[*](Cf. Protag. 336 A, Theaet. 174 A, 168 B.) themselves to the young, are full of pleasantry[*](For εὐτραπελίας cf. Isoc. xv. 296, vii. 49, Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1108 a 23. In Rhet. 1389 b 11 he defnes it as πεπαιδευμένη ὕβρις. Arnold once addressed the Eton boys on the word.) and graciousness, imitating the young for fear they may be thought disagreeable and authoritative. By all means, he said. And the climax of popular liberty, my friend, I said, is attained in such a city when the purchased slaves, male and female, are no less free[*](Cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 1. 10. τῶν δούλων δ’ αὖ καὶ τῶν μετοίκων πλείστη ἐστὶν Ἀθήνησιν ἀκολασία, Aristoph. Clouds init., and on slavery Laws 777 E, p. 249, note g on 547 C and 549 A.) than the owners who paid for them. And I almost forgot to mention the spirit of freedom and equal rights in the relation of men to women and women to men. Shall we not, then, said he, in Aeschylean phrase,[*](Nauck fr. 351. Cf. Plut. Amat. 763 C, Themist. Orat. iv. p. 52 B; also Otto, p. 39, and Adam ad loc.) say whatever rises to our lips? Certainly, I said, so I will. Without experience of it no one would believe how much freer the very beasts[*](Cf. 562 E, Julian, Misopogon, 355 B . . . μέχρι τῶν ὄνων ἐστὶν ἐλευθερία παρ’ αὐτοῖς καὶ τῶν καμήλων; ἄγουσί τοι καὶ ταύτας οἱ μισθωτοὶ διὰ τῶν στοῶν ὥσπερ τὰς νύμφας . . . what great independence exists among the citizens, even down to the very asses and camels? The men who hire them out lead even these animals through the porticoes as though they were brides. (Loeb tr.) Cf. Porphyry, Vit. Pythag.Teubner, p. 22, 23 μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων διικνεῖτο αὐτοῦ ἡ νουθέτησις ) subject to men are in such a city than elsewhere. The dogs literally verify the adage[*](Otto, p. 119. Cf. Like mistress, like maid.) and like their mistresses become. And likewise the horses and asses are wont to hold on their way with the utmost freedom and dignity, bumping into everyone who meets them and who does not step aside.[*](Eurip. Ion 635-637 mentions being jostled off the street by a worse person as one of the indignities of Athenian city life.) And so all things everywhere are just bursting with the spirit of liberty.[*](Cf. the reflections in Laws 698 f., 701 A-C, Epist. viii. 354 D, Gorg. 461 E; Isoc. Areop. 20, Panath. 131, Eurip. Cyclops 120 ἀκούει δ’ οὐδὲν οὐδεὶς οὐδενός, Aristot. Pol. 1295 b 15 f. Plato, by reaction against the excesses of the ultimate democracy, always satirizes the shibboleth liberty in the style of Arnold, Ruskin and Carlyle. He would agree with Goethe (Eckermann i. 219, Jan. 18, 1827) Nicht das macht frei, das vir nichts über uns erkennen wollen, sondern eben, dass wir etwas verehren, das über uns ist. Libby, Introd. to Hist. of Science, p. 273, not understanding the irony of the passage, thinks much of it the unwilling tribute of a hostile critic. In Gorg. 484 A Callicles sneers at equality from the point of view of the superman. Cf. also on 558 C, p. 291, note f; Hobbes, Leviathan xxi. and Theopompus’s account of democracy in Byzantium, fr. 65. Similar phenomena may be observed in an American city street or Pullman club car.) It is my own dream[*](Cf Callimachus, Anth. Pal. vi. 310, and xii. 148 μὴ λέγε . . . τοὐμὸν ὄνειρον ἐμοί, Cic. Att. vi. 9. 3, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 7 ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὐμὸν ἐνύπνιον ἰδών, Tennyson, Lucretius: That was mine, my dream, I knew it.) you are telling me, he said; for it often happens to me when I go to the country. And do you note that the sum total of all these items when footed up is that they render the souls of the citizens so sensitive[*](This sensitiveness, on which Grote remarks with approval, is characteristic of present-day American democracy. Cf. also Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 51 And so if he is stopped from making Hyde Park a bear garden or the streets impassable he says he is being butchered by the aristocracy.) that they chafe at the slightest suggestion of servitude[*](Cf. Gorg. 491 E δουλεύων ὁτῳοῦν, Laws 890 A.) and will not endure it? For you are aware that they finally pay no heed even to the laws[*](Cf. Laws 701 B νόμων ζητεῖν μὴ ὑπηκόοις εἶναι ) written or unwritten,[*](For unwritten law Cf. What Plato Said, p. 637, on Laws 793 A.) so that forsooth they may have no master anywhere over them. I know it very well, said he. This, then, my friend, said I, is the fine and vigorous root from which tyranny grows, in my opinion. Vigorous indeed, he said; but what next?

The same malady, I said, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[*](Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . etc.) to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,[*](For the generalization Cf. Symp. 188 A-B.) and most especially in political societies. Probably, he said. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state. Yes, that is probable. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[*](Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.) than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude. That is reasonable, he said. That, however, I believe, was not your question,[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.) but what identical[*](ταὐτόν implies the concept. Cf. Parmen. 130 D, Phileb. 34 E, 13 B, Soph. 253 D. Cf. also Tim. 83 C, Meno 72 C, Rep. 339 A.) malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it? You say truly, he replied. That then, I said, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[*](Cf. 555 D-E.) some equipped with stings and others stingless. And rightly too, he said. These two kinds, then, I said, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[*](Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., Soph. 227Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For φλέγμα Cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.) by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[*](μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, Apol. 34 A, Soph. 246 D.) to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all. Yes, by Zeus, he said, by all means. Then let us take it in this way, I said, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[*](For εὐκρινέστερον Cf. Soph. 246 D.) How? Let us in our theory make a tripartite[*](Cf. Phileb. 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.) division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state. That is so. But it is far fiercer in this state than in that. How so? There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a buzzing[*](Cf. 573 A.) and tolerates[*](ἀνέχεται cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337.) no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state. Quite so, he said. And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort. What sort? he said. When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest. It is likely. Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[*](For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.) Why, yes, he said, how could one squeeze it out of those who have little? The capitalistic[*](That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. the rich.) class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones. Pretty much so, he said.

And the third class,[*](For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97) composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*](ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.) cultivators of their own farms[*](αὐτουργοί: Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.) who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.) unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*](Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.) to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*](For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.) to keep the lion’s share for themselves[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.)? Why, yes, he said, it shares in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*](i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the disharmony between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.) Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*](So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.) but through misapprehension,[*](Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι’ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.) and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*](For τότ’ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.) whether they wish it or not,[*](So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.) they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*](Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.) and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain, said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.) and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*](Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.)? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have.

And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*](Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.) does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*](Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.) but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*](For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.) a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*](The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another disharmony. Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.)—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*](Cf. 619 C.) that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*](Cf. 565 A.) Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*](Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.) of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*](For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.) for the friend of democracy. They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*](For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.) then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,

By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.

mighty with far-flung limbs,

And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?Obviously.And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[*](For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας.)?Yes, he is compelled to do so.And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?Of course.And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[*](ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126.) and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?Yes, it is likely.Then the tyrant must do away[*](Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim.) with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.Obviously.He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero,οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.)A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power. Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their way[*](Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.) to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again, an alien[*](Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.) and motley crew.[*](παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 C.) You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,[*](For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.) would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust.

Truly, said I, this tyrant business[*](For the idiomatic and colloquial χρῆμα cf. Herod. i. 36, Eurip. Androm. 181, Theaet. 209 E, Aristoph. Clouds 1, Birds 826, Wasps 933, Lysistr. 83, 1085, Acharn. 150, Peace 1192, Knights 1219, Frogs 1278.) is a blessed[*](For the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. p. 368, note a.) thing on your showing, if such are the friends and trusties he must employ after destroying his former associates. But such are indeed those he does make use of, he said. And these companions admire him, I said, and these new citizens are his associates, while the better sort hate and avoid him. Why should they not? Not for nothing,[*](For οὐκ ἐτός cf. 414 E. The idiom is frequent in Aristoph. Cf. e.g. Acharn. 411, 413, Birds 915, Thesm. 921, Plut. 404, 1166, Eccl. 245.) said I, is tragedy in general esteemed wise, and Euripides beyond other tragedians.[*](This is plainly ironical and cannot be used by the admirers of Euripides.) Why, pray? Because among other utterances of pregnant thought[*](Cf. πυκιναὶ φρένες Iliad xiv. 294, πυκινὸς νόος xv. 41 etc.) he said,

Tyrants are wise by converse with the wise.[*](Cf. Theages 125 B f. The line is also attributed to Sophocles. Cf. Stemplinger, Das Plagiat in der griechischen Literatur, p. 9; Gellius xiii. 18, F. Dümmler, Akademika, p. 16. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 119 thinks this an allusion to Euripides and Agathon at the court of Archelaus of Macedon. Isocrates ix. 40, like the poets, praises the tyrants, but ii. 3-5 contrasts their education unfavorably with that of the ordinary citizen. Throughout the passage he is plainly thinking of Plato.)

And what have you to say, I said, in case the people protests and says that it is not right that a grown-up son should be supported by his father, but the reverse, and that it did not beget and establish him in order that, when he had grown great, it, in servitude to its own slaves, should feed him and the slaves together with a nondescript rabble of aliens, but in order that, with him for protector, it might be liberated from the rule of the rich and the so-called better classes,[*](For καλῶν κἀγαθῶν cf. Aristoph. Knights 185, and Blaydes on 735. See also on 489 E, p. 27, note d.) and that it now bids him and his crew depart from the city as a father expels[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 123.) from his house a son together with troublesome revellers? The demos, by Zeus, he said, will then learn to its cost[*](For the threatening γνώσεται cf. 362 A, 466 C, Il. xviii. 270 and 125, Theocr. xxvi. 19 τάχα γνώσῃ, and Lucian, Timon 33 εἴσεται.) what it is and what[*](For the juxtaposition οἷος οἷον Cf. Symp. 195 A, Sophocles El. 751, Ajax 557, 923, Trach. 995, 1045.) a creature it begot and cherished and bred to greatness, and that in its weakness it tries to expel the stronger. What do you mean? said I; will the tyrant dare to use force against his father, and, if he does not yield, to strike him[*](Cf. on 574 C, pp. 346-347, note e.)? Yes, he said, after he has once taken from him his arms. A very parricide, said I, you make the tyrant out to be, and a cruel nurse of old age, and, as it seems, this is at last tyranny open and avowed, and, as the saying goes, the demos trying to escape the smoke of submission to the free would have plunged into the fire[*](As we say, Out of the frying-pan into the fire. Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 17. 5 ἐκ πυρὸς ὡς αἶνος ’πεσες ἐς φλόγα, Theodoret, Therap. iii. p. 773 καὶ τὸν καπνὸν κατὰ τὴν παροιμίαν, ὡς ἔοικε, φύγοντες, εἰς αὐτὸ δὴ τὸ πῦρ ἐμπεπτώκαμεν. See Otto, p. 137; also Solon 7 (17) (Anth. Lyr.,Bergk-Hiller, 9 in Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus, i. p. 122, Loeb Classical Library) εἰς δὲ μονάρχου δῆμος ἀιδρείῃ δουλοσύνην ἔπεσεν, Herod. iii. 81 τυράννου ὕβριν φεύγοντας ἄνδρας ἐς δήμου ἀκολάστου ὕβριν πεσεῖν, and for the idea Epist. viii. 354 D.) of enslavement to slaves, and in exchange for that excessive and unseasonable liberty[*](Cf. Epist. viii. 354 D.) has clothed itself in the garb of the most cruel and bitter servile servitude.[*](For the rhetorical style Cf. Tim. 41 θεοὶ θεῶν, Polit. 303 C σοφιστῶν σοφιστάς, and the biblical expressions, God of Gods and Lord of Lords, e.g. Deut. x. 17, Ps. cxxxvi. 2-3, Dan. xi. 36, Rev. xix. 16. Cf. Jebb on Soph. O. T. 1063 τρίδουλος.) Yes indeed, he said, that is just what happens. Well, then, said I, shall we not be fairly justified in saying that we have sufficiently described the transformation of a democracy into a tyranny and the nature of the tyranny itself? Quite sufficiently, he said.

There remains for consideration, said I, the tyrannical man himself—the manner of his development out of the democratic type and his character and the quality of his life, whether wretched or happy. Why, yes, he still remains, he said. Do you know, then, what it is that I still miss? What? In the matter of our desires I do not think we sufficiently distinguished their nature and number. And so long as this is lacking our inquiry will lack clearness. Well, said he, will our consideration of them not still be opportune[*](For ἐν καλῷ cf. Soph. El. 348, Eurip. Heracleid. 971, Aristoph. Eccl. 321, Thesm. 292.)? By all means. And observe what it is about them that I wish to consider. It is this. Of our unnecessary pleasures[*](Cf. on 558 D.) and appetites there are some lawless ones, I think, which probably are to be found in us all, but which, when controlled[*](For κολαζόμεναι cf. on 559 B, p. 293, note c.) by the laws and the better desires in alliance with reason, can in some men be altogether got rid of, or so nearly so that only a few weak ones remain, while in others the remnant is stronger and more numerous. What desires do you mean? he said. Those, said I, that are awakened in sleep[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 102 b 5 ff. ὁ δ’ ἀγαθὸς καὶ κακὸς ἥκιστα διάδηλοι καθ’ ὕπνον, etc.; also his Problem. 957 a 21 ff. Cic. De divin. i. 29 translates this passage. Cf. further Herod. vi. 107, Soph. O.T. 981-982. Hazlitt writes We are not hypocrites in our sleep, a modern novelist, In sleep all barriers are down. The Freudians have at last discovered Plato’s anticipation of their main thesis. Cf. Trotter, Instincts of the Herd in Peace and War. p. 74: It has been perhaps Freud’s most remarkable thesis that dreams are manifestations of this emergence of desires and memories from the unconscious into the conscious field. The barriers of the Freudian unconscious are less tightly closed during sleep sententiously observes an eminent modern psychologist. Cf. Valentine, The New Psychology of the Unconscious, p. xiii. and ibid. p. 93: Freud refers to Plato’s view that the virtuous man does in actual life, but I believe he nowhere shows a knowledge of the following passage in the Republic. . . . Cf. ibid. p. 95: The germ of several aspects of the Freudian view of dreams, including the characteristic doctrine of the censor, was to be found in Plato. The Freudian view becomes at once distinctly more respectable. Many of the ancients, like some superstitious moderns, exalted the unconscious which reveals itself in dreams, and made it the source of prophecy. Cf. commentators on Aesch. Eumen. 104, Pindar, fr. 131 (96) Loeb, p. 589: εὕδει δὲ πρασσόντων μελέων, ἀτὰρ εὑδόντεσσιν ἐν πολλοῖς ὀνείροις | δείκνυσι τέρπνων ἐφέρποισαν χαλεπῶν τε κρίσιν, but it sleepeth while the limbs are active; yet to them that sleep, in many a dream it giveth presage of a decision of things delightful or doleful. (Sandys, Loeb tr.) Cf. Pausan. ix. 23, Cic. De div. i. 30, Sir Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, pp. 105-107 (ed. J. A. Symonds). Plato did not share these superstitions. Cf. the irony of Tim. 71 D-E, and my review of Stewart’s Myths of Plato, Journal of Philos. Psychol. and Scientific Methods, vol. iii., 1906, pp. 495-498.) when the rest of the soul, the rational, gentle and dominant part, slumbers, but the beastly and savage part, replete with food and wine, gambols and, repelling sleep, endeavors to sally forth and satisfy its own instincts.[*](The Greeks had no good word for instinct, but there are passages in Plato where this translation is justified by the context for ἦθος, φύσις and such words.) You are aware that in such case there is nothing it will not venture to undertake as being released from all sense of shame and all reason. It does not shrink from attempting to lie with a mother in fancy or with anyone else, man, god or brute. It is ready for any foul deed of blood; it abstains from no food, and, in a word, falls short of no extreme of folly[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν ἐλλείπει cf. Soph. Trach. 90, Demosth. liv. 34. Cf. also 602 D and on 593 A, p. 200, note b.) and shamelessness. Most true, he said. But when, I suppose, a man’s condition is healthy and sober, and he goes to sleep after arousing his rational part and entertaining it with fair words and thoughts, and attaining to clear self-consciousness, while he has neither starved nor indulged to repletion his appetitive part, so that it may be lulled to sleep[*](Cf. Browning, Bishop Blougram’s Apology, And body gets its sop and holds its noise. Plato was no ascetic, as some have inferred from passages in the Republic, Laws, Gorgias and Phaedo. Cf. Herbert L. Stewart, Was Plato an Ascetic? Philos. Re., 1915, pp. 603-613; Dean Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 90: The asceticism of the true Platonist has always been sane moderate; the hallmark of Platonism is a combination of self-restraint and simplicity with humanism.) and not disturb the better part by its pleasure or pain, but may suffer that in isolated purity to examine and reach out towards and apprehend some of the things unknown to it, past, present or future;

and when he has in like manner tamed his passionate part, and does not after a quarrel fall asleep[*](Cf. Ephesians iv. 26 Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.) with anger still awake within him, but if he has thus quieted the two elements in his soul and quickened the third, in which reason resides, and so goes to his rest, you are aware that in such case[*](ἐν τῷ τοιούτῳ: cf. 382 B, 465 A, 470 C, 492 C, 590 A, Lysis 212 C, Laws 625 D.) he is most likely to apprehend truth, and the visions of his dreams are least likely to be lawless.[*](This sentence contains 129 words. George Moore says, Pater’s complaint that Plato’s sentences are long may be regarded as Pater’s single excursion into humor. But Pater is in fact justifying his own long sentences by Plato’s example. He calls this passage Plato’s evening prayer.)I certainly think so, he said. This description has carried us too far,[*](Plato always returns to the point after a digression. Cf. 543 C, 471 C, 544 B, 568 D, 588 B, Phaedo 78 B, Theaet. 177 C, Protag. 359 A, Crat. 438 A, Polit. 287 A-B, 263 C, 302 B, Laws 682 E, 697 C, 864 C, and many other passages. Cf. also Lysias ii. 61 ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐξήχθην, Demosth. De cor. 211, Aristot. De an. 403 b 16, also p. 193, note i, and Plato’s carefulness in keeping to the point under discussion in 353 C, Theaet. 182 C, 206 C, Meno 93 A-B, Gorg. 479 D-E, 459 C-D, etc.) but the point that we have to notice is this, that in fact there exists in every one of us, even in some reputed most respectable,[*](For the irony of the expression Cf. Laws 693 D, Aesch. Eumen. 373.) a terrible, fierce and lawless brood of desires, which it seems are revealed in our sleep. Consider, then, whether there is anything in what I say, and whether you admit it. Well, I do. Now recall[*](Cf. 559 D f.) our characterization of the democratic man. His development was determined by his education from youth under a thrifty father who approved only the acquisitive appetites and disapproved the unnecessary ones whose object is entertainment and display. Is not that so? Yes. And by association with more sophisticated men, teeming with the appetites we have just described, he is impelled towards every form of insolence and outrage, and to the adoption of their way of life by his hatred of his father’s niggardliness. But since his nature is better than that of his corrupters, being drawn both ways he settles down in a compromise[*](εἰς μέσον: cf. p. 249, note f.) between the two tendencies, and indulging and enjoying each in moderation, forsooth,[*](Ironical. δή. See p. 300, note a. Cf. modern satire on moderate drinking and moderate preparedness.) as he supposes,[*](ὡς ᾤετο is another ironical formula like ἵνα δή, ὡς ἄρα, etc.) he lives what he deems a life that is neither illiberal nor lawless, now transformed from an oligarch to a democrat. That was and is our belief about this type. Assume,[*](θές: Cf. Theaet. 191 C, Phileb. 33 D.) then, again, said I, that such a man when he is older has a son bred in turn[*](This is the αὖ of the succession of the generations. Cf. p. 247, note f.) in his ways of life. I so assume. And suppose the experience of his father to be repeated in his case. He is drawn toward utter lawlessness, which is called by his seducers complete freedom. His father and his other kin lend support to[*](Cf. 559 E.) these compromise appetites while the others lend theirs to the opposite group.

And when these dread magi[*](An overlooked reference to the Magi who set up the false Smerdis. Cf. Herod. iii. 61 ff.) and king-makers come to realize that they have no hope of controlling the youth in any other way, they contrive to engender in his soul a ruling passion[*](Cf. Symp. 205 D.) to be the protector[*](προστάτην: cf. 562 D and 565 C-D.) of his idle and prodigal[*](For τὰ ἕτοιμα cf. 552 B, Symp. 200 D and E, and Horace, Odes i. 31. 17 frui paratis.) appetites, a monstrous winged[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E ἔρωτα ὑπόπτερον and the fragment of Eubulus (fr. 41, Kock ii. p. 178): τίς ἦν ὁ γράψας πρῶτος ἀνθρώπων ἄρα ἢ κηροπλαστήσας Ἔρωθ’ ὑπόπτερον ) drone. Or do you think the spirit of desire in such men is aught else?Nothing but that, he said. And when the other appetites, buzzing[*](Cf. 564 D.) about it, replete with incense and myrrh and chaplets and wine, and the pleasures that are released in such revelries, magnifying and fostering it to the utmost, awaken in the drone the sting of unsatisfied yearnings,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 E.) why then this protector of the soul has madness for his body-guard and runs amuck,[*](For οἰστρᾷ Cf. Phaedr. 240 D.) and if it finds in the man any opinions or appetites accounted[*](For ποιουμένας in this sense cf. 538 C, 498 A, 574 D.) worthy and still capable of shame, it slays them and thrusts them forth until it purges[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c.) him of sobriety, and fills and infects him with frenzy brought in from outside.[*](ἐπακτοῦ: cf. 405 B, Pindar, Pyth. vi. 10, Aesch. Seven against Thebes 583, Soph. Trach. 259.) A perfect description, he said, of the generation of the tyrannical man. And is not this analogy, said I, the reason why Love has long since been called a tyrant[*](Cf. 573 D, Eurip. Hippol. 538, Andromeda, fr. 136 (Nauck)θεῶν τύραννε . . . Ἔρως, and What Plato Said, p. 546 on Symp. 197 B.)? That may well be, he said. And does not a drunken man,[*](For drunkenness as a tyrannical mood Cf. Laws 649 B, 671 B, Phaedr, 238 B.) my friend, I said, have something of this tyrannical temper? Yes, he has. And again the madman, the deranged man, attempts and expects to rule over not only men but gods. Yes indeed, he does, he said. Then a man becomes tyrannical in the full sense of the word, my friend, I said, when either by nature or by habits or by both he has become even as the drunken, the erotic, the maniacal. Assuredly. Such, it seems, is his origin and character,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc., who insists it means his origin as well as that of others, and says his character is still to be described. But it has been in C and before.) but what is his manner of life? As the wits say, you shall tell me.[*](Cf. Phileb. 25 B and perhaps Rep. 427 E with 449 D. The slight jest is a commonplace today. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 351, says it is a fragment of an elegy. He forgets the Philebus. ) I do, I said; for, I take it, next there are among them feasts and carousals and revellings and courtesans[*](Cf. Vol. I. p 160, note a on 373 A. Emendations are superfluous.) and all the doings of those whose[*](ὦν ἄν: cf. 441 D-E ὅτου, etc., 583 A ἐν ᾧ and my review of Jowett and Campbell, A.J.P. xvi. p. 237.) souls are entirely swayed[*](Cf. Phaedr. 238 B-C.) by the indwelling tyrant Eros. Inevitably, he said. And do not many and dread appetites shoot up beside this master passion every day and night in need of many things? Many indeed. And so any revenues there may be are quickly expended. Of course.

And after this there are borrowings and levyings[*](For παραιρέσεις cf. Thuc. i. 122. 1, Aristot. Pol. 1311 a 12, 1315 a 38.) upon the estate?Of course.And when all these resources fail, must there not come a cry from the frequent and fierce nestlings[*](ἐννενεοττευμένας Cf. Alc. I. 135 E, Laws 776 A, 949 C, Aristoph. Birds 699, 1108.) of desire hatched in his soul, and must not such men, urged, as it were by goads, by the other desires, and especially by the ruling passion itself as captain of their bodyguard—to keep up the figure—must they not run wild and look to see who has aught that can be taken from him by deceit or violence?Most certainly.And so he is compelled to sweep it in from every source[*](Cf. Aesch. Eumen. 544.) or else be afflicted with great travail and pain.[*](Cf. Gorg. 494 A ἢ τὰς ἐσχάτας λυποῖτο λύπας.)He is.And just as the new, upspringing pleasures in him got the better of the original passions of his soul and robbed them, so he himself, though younger, will claim the right to get the better[*](Cf. Vol. I. 349 B f.) of his father and mother, and, after spending his own share, to seize and convert to his own use a portion of his father’s estate.Of course, he said, what else? And if they resist him, would he not at first attempt to rob and steal from his parents and deceive them? Certainly. And if he failed in that, would he not next seize it by force? I think so, he said. And then, good sir, if the old man and the old woman clung to it and resisted him, would he be careful to refrain from the acts of a tyrant? I am not without my fears, he said, for the parents of such a one. Nay, Adeimantus, in heaven’s name, do you suppose that, for the sake of a newly found belle amie bound to him by no necessary tie, such a one would strike the dear mother, his by necessity[*](The word ἀναγκαῖαν means both necessary and akin. Cf. Eurip. Androm. 671 τοιαῦτα λάσκεις τοὺς ἀναγκαίους φίλους.) and from his birth? Or for the sake of a blooming new-found bel ami, not necessary to his life, he would rain blows[*](For the idiom πληγαῖς . . . δοῦναι Cf. Phaedr. 254 E ὀδύναις ἔδωκεν with Thompson’s note. Cf. 566 C θανάτῳ δέδοται. For striking his father cf. 569 B, Laws 880 E ff., Aristoph. Clouds 1375 ff., 1421 ff.) upon the aged father past his prime, closest of his kin and oldest of his friends? And would he subject them to those new favorites if he brought them under the same roof? Yes, by Zeus, he said. A most blessed lot it seems to be, said I, to be the parent of a tyrant son. It does indeed, he said. And again, when the resources of his father and mother are exhausted[*](For ἐπιλείπῃ cf. 568 E, 573 E.) and fail such a one, and the swarm[*](Cf. Meno 72 A, Cratyl. 401 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 297.) of pleasures collected in his soul is grown great, will he not first lay hands on the wall[*](He becomes a τοιχωρύχος or a λωποδύτης (Aristoph. Frogs 772-773, Birds 497, Clouds 1327). Cf. 575 B, Laws 831 E.) of someone’s house or the cloak of someone who walks late at night, and thereafter he will make a clean sweep[*](νεωκορήσει is an ironical litotes. So ἐφάψεται in the preceding line.) of some temple, and in all these actions the beliefs which he held from boyhood about the honorable and the base, the opinions accounted just,[*](For ποιουμένας cf. 573 B. for the thought cf 538 C.) will be overmastered by the opinions newly emancipated[*](Cf. 567 E.) and released, which, serving as bodyguards of the ruling passion, will prevail in alliance with it—I mean the opinions that formerly were freed from restraint in sleep, when, being still under the control of his father and the laws, he maintained the democratic constitution in his soul.

But now, when under the tyranny of his ruling passion, he is continuously and in waking hours what he rarely became in sleep, and he will refrain from no atrocity of murder nor from any food or deed, but the passion that dwells in him as a tyrant will live in utmost anarchy and lawlessness, and, since it is itself sole autocrat, will urge the polity,[*](Cf. on 591 E.) so to speak, of him in whom it dwells[*](τὸν ἔχοντα: Cf. Phaedr. 239 C, Laws 837 B, Soph. Antig. 790 and also Rep. 610 C and E.) to dare anything and everything in order to find support for himself and the hubbub of his henchmen,[*](For the tyrant’s companions cf. Newman, i. p. 274, note 1.) in part introduced from outside by evil associations, and in part released and liberated within by the same habits of life as his. Is not this the life of such a one?It is this, he said. And if, I said, there are only a few of this kind in a city, and the others, the multitude as a whole, are sober-minded, the few go forth into exile and serve some tyrant elsewhere as bodyguard or become mercenaries in any war there may be. But if they spring up in time of peace and tranquillity they stay right there in the city and effect many small evils. What kind of evils do you mean? Oh, they just steal, break into houses, cut purses, strip men of their garments, plunder temples, and kidnap,[*](Cf. the similar lists of crimes in Gorg. 508 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 62.) and if they are fluent speakers they become sycophants and bear false witness and take bribes. Yes, small evils indeed,[*](So Shaw and other moderns argue in a somewhat different tone that crimes of this sort are an unimportant matter.) he said, if the men of this sort are few. Why, yes, I said, for small evils are relatively small compared with great, and in respect of the corruption and misery of a state all of them together, as the saying goes, don’t come within hail[*](οὐδ’ ἴκταρ βάλλει was proverbial, doesn’t strike near, doesn’t come within range. Cf. Aelian, N.A. xv. 29. Cf. also οὐδ’ ἐγγύς, Symp. 198 B, 221 D, Herod. ii. 121, Demosth. De cor. 97.) of the mischief done by a tyrant. For when men of this sort and their followers become numerous in a state and realize their numbers, then it is they who, in conjunction with the folly of the people, create a tyrant out of that one of them who has the greatest and mightiest tyrant in his own soul. Naturally, he said, for he would be the most tyrannical. Then if the people yield willingly—’tis well,[*](In the Greek the apodosis is suppressed. Cf. Protag. 325 D. Adam refers to Herwerden, Mn. xix. pp. 338 f.) but if the city resists him, then, just as in the previous case the man chastized his mother and his father, so now in turn will he chastize his fatherland if he can, bringing in new boon companions beneath whose sway he will hold and keep enslaved his once dear motherland[*](So also the Hindus of Bengal, The Nation,July 13, 1911, p. 28. Cf. Isoc. iv. 25 πατρίδα καὶ μητέρα, Lysias ii. 18 μητέρα καὶ πατρίδα, Plut. 792 E (An seni resp.) ἡ δὲ πατρὶς καὶ μητρὶς ὡς Κρῆτες καλοῦσι. Vol. I. p. 303, note e, on 414 E, Menex. 239 A.)—as the Cretans name her—and fatherland. And this would be the end of such a man’s desire.[*](Cf. the accidental coincidence of Swinburne’s refrain, This is the end of every man’s desire (Ballad of Burdens).) Yes, he said, this, just this.

Then, said I, is not this the character of such men in private life and before they rule the state: to begin with they associate with flatterers, who are ready to do anything to serve them, or, if they themselves want something, they themselves fawn[*](ὑποπεσόντες: cf. on 494 C ὑποκείσονται.) and shrink from no contortion[*](σχήματα was often used for the figures of dancing. Cf. Laws 669 D, Aristoph. Peace 323, Xen. Symp. 7. 5, Eurip. Cyclops 221. Isoc. Antid. 183 uses it of gymnastics.) or abasement in protest of their friendship, though, once the object gained, they sing another tune.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A ἄλλος γεγονώς, Demosth. xxxiv. 13 ἕτερος ἤδη . . . καὶ οὐχ ὁ αὐτός.) Yes indeed, he said. Throughout their lives, then, they never know what it is to be the friends of anybody. They are always either masters or slaves, but the tyrannical nature never tastes freedom[*](Cf. Lucian, Nigrinus 15 ἄγευστος μὲν ἐλευθερίας, ἀπείρατος δὲ παρρησίαςAristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 b 19, 1179 b 15.) or true friendship. Quite so. May we not rightly call such men faithless[*](Cf. Laws 730 C, 705 A.)? Of course. Yes, and unjust to the last degree, if we were right in our previous agreement about the nature of justice. But surely, he said, we were right. Let us sum up,[*](Cf. Phaedr. 239 D ἓν κεφάλαιον ) then, said I, the most evil type of man. He is, I presume, the man who, in his waking hours, has the qualities we found in his dream state. Quite so. And he is developed from the man who, being by nature most of a tyrant, achieves sole power, and the longer he lives as an actual tyrant the stronger this quality becomes. Inevitably, said Glaucon, taking up the argument. And shall we find, said I, that the man who is shown to be the most evil will also be the most miserable, and the man who is most of a tyrant for the longest time is most and longest miserable[*](Cf. Gorgias 473 C-E.) in sober truth? Yet the many have many opinions.[*](Cf. the defiance of 473 A and 579 D κἂν εἰ μή τῳ δοκεῖ, Phaedr. 277 E οὐδὲ ἂν ὁ πᾶς ὄχλος αὐτὸ ἐπαινέσῃ, and Phileb. 67 B, also Gorg. 473 E you say what nobody else would say, and perhaps 500 D διαβολὴ δ’ ἐν πᾶσι πολλή. Cf. Schopenhauer’s The public has a great many bees in its bonnet.) That much, certainly, he said, must needs be true. Does not the tyrannical man, said I, correspond to the tyrannical state in similitude,[*](Cf. Tim. 75 D, Rep. 555 A, Parmen. 133 A. For the analogy of individual and state cf. on 591 E.) the democratic to the democratic and the others likewise? Surely. And may we not infer that the relation of state to state in respect of virtue and happiness is the same as that of the man to the man? Of course. What is, then, in respect of virtue, the relation of a city ruled by a tyrant to a royal city as we first described it? They are direct contraries, he said; the one is the best, the other the worst. I’ll not ask which is which, I said, because that is obvious. But again in respect of happiness and wretchedness, is your estimate the same or different? And let us not be dazzled[*](Cf. 577 A, 591 D, 619 A ἀνέκπληκτος, Crat. 394 B, Gorg. 523 D, Protag. 355 B. Cf. also Epictet. iii. 22. 28 ὑπὸ τῆς φαντασίας περιλαμπομένοις, and Shelley, . . . accursed thing to gaze on prosperous tyrants with a dazzled eye.) by fixing our eyes on that one man, the tyrant, or a few[*](εἴ τινες: Cf. Gorg. 521 B ἐάν τι ἔχω.) of his court, but let us enter into and survey the entire city, as is right, and declare our opinion only after we have so dived to its uttermost recesses and contemplated its life as a whole. That is a fair challenge, he said, and it is clear to everybody that there is no city more wretched than that in which a tyrant rules, and none more happy than that governed by a true king.[*](For the contrast of tyranny and kingdom cf. 587 B, Polit. 276 E. It became a commonplace in later orations on the true king. Cf. Dümmler, Prolegomena, pp. 38-39.)

And would it not also be a fair challenge, said I, to ask you to accept as the only proper judge of the two men the one who is able in thought to enter with understanding into the very soul and temper of a man, and who is not like a child viewing him from outside, overawed by the tyrants’ great attendance,[*](The word προστάσεως is frequent in Polybius. Cf. also Boethius iv. chap. 2. Cf. 1Maccabees xv. 32, When he saw the glory of Simon, and the cupboard of gold and silver plate, and his great attendance [παράστασιν]. Cf. also Isoc. ii. 32 ὄψιν, and Shakes. Measure for MeasureII. ii. 59 ceremony that to great ones ’longs,Henry V.IV. i. 280 farced title running ’fore the king.) and the pomp and circumstance which they assume[*](For σχηματίζονται cf. Xen. Oecon. 2. 4. σὸν σχῆμα ὁ σὺ περιβέβλησαι, Dio Cass. iii. fr. 13. 2 σχηματίσας . . . ἑαυτόν and σχηματισμός, Rep. 425 B, 494 D.) in the eyes of the world, but is able to see through it all? And what if I should assume, then, that the man to whom we ought all to listen is he who has this capacity of judgement and who has lived under the same roof with a tyrant[*](It is easy conjecture that Plato is thinking of himself and Dionysius I. Cf. Laws 711 A.) and has witnessed his conduct in his own home and observed in person his dealings with his intimates in each instance where he would best be seen stripped[*](Cf. Thackeray on Ludovicus and Ludovicus rex, Hazlitt, Strip it of its externals and what is it but a jest? also Gory. 523 E, Xen. Hiero 2. 4, Lucian, Somnium seu Gallus 24 ἢν δὲ ὑποκύψας ἴδῃς τὰ γ’ ἔνδον . . . , Boethius, Cons. iii. chap. 8 (Loeb, p. 255), and for the thought Herod. i. 99.) of his vesture of tragedy,[*](Cf. Longinus, On the Sublime 7 τὸ ἔξωθεν προστραγῳδούμενον, and Dümmler, Akademika p. 5.) and who had likewise observed his behavior in the hazards of his public life—and if we should ask the man who has seen all this to be the messenger to report on the happiness or misery of the tyrant as compared with other men? That also would be a most just challenge, he said. Shall we, then, make believe, said I, that we are of those who are thus able to judge and who have ere now lived with tyrants, so that we may have someone to answer our questions? By all means. Come, then, said I, examine it thus. Recall the general likeness between the city and the man, and then observe in turn what happens to each of them. What things? he said. In the first place, said I, will you call the state governed by a tyrant free or enslaved, speaking of it as a state? Utterly enslaved, he said. And yet you see in it masters and freemen. I see, he said, a small portion of such, but the entirety, so to speak, and the best part of it, is shamefully and wretchedly enslaved.[*](In Menex. 238 E Plato says that other states are composed of slaves and master, but Athens of equals.) If, then, I said, the man resembles the state, must not the same proportion[*](For τάξιν cf. 618 B ψυχῆς δὲ τάξιν.) obtain in him, and his soul teem[*](γέμειν: cf. 544 C, 559 C, Gorg. 522 E, 525 A.) with boundless servility and illiberality, the best and most reasonable parts of it being enslaved, while a small part, the worst and the most frenzied, plays the despot? Inevitably, he said. Then will you say that such a soul is enslaved or free? Enslaved, I should suppose. Again, does not the enslaved and tyrannized city least of all do what it really wishes[*](Cf. 445 B, Gorg. 467 B, where a verbal distinction is drawn with which Plato does not trouble himself here. In Laws 661 B ἐπιθυμῇ is used. Cf. ibid. 688 B τἀναντία ταῖς βουλήσεσιν, and Herod. iii. 80.)? Decidedly so. Then the tyrannized soul— to speak of the soul as a whole[*](Cf. Cratyl. 392 C ὡς τὸ ὅλον εἰπεῖν γένος.)—also will least of all do what it wishes, but being always perforce driven and drawn by the gadfly of desire it will be full of confusion and repentance.[*](Cf. Julian, Or. ii. 50 C. In the Stoic philosophy the stultus repents, and omnis stultitia fastidio laborat sui. Cf. also Seneca, De benef. iv. 34 non mutat sapiens consilium . . . ideo numquam illum poenitentia subit, Von Arnim, Stoic. Vet. Frag. iii. 147. 21, 149. 20 and 33, Stob. Ec. ii. 113. 5, 102. 22, and my emendation of Eclogues ii. 104. 6 W. in Class. Phil. xi. p. 338.) Of course. And must the tyrannized city be rich or poor? Poor.

Then the tyrant soul also must of necessity always be needy[*](Cf. Laws 832 A πεινῶσι τὴν ψυχήν, Xen. Symp. 4. 36 πεινῶσι χρημάτων, Oecon. xiii. 9 πεινῶσι γὰρ τοῦ ἐπαίνου, Aristot. Pol. 1277 a 24 Jason said he was hungry when he was not a tyrant, Shakes. Tempest I. ii. 112 so dry he was for sway. Cf. Novotny, p. 1902, on Epist. vii. 335 B, also Max. Tyr. Diss. iv. 4 τί γὰρ ἂν εἴη πενέστερον ἀνδρὸς ἐπιθυμοῦντος διηνεκῶς . . . ; Julian, Or. ii. 85 B, Teles (Hense), pp. 32-33. for the thought see also Gorg. 493-494. cf. also 521 A with 416 E, Phaedr. 279 C, and Epist. 355 C.) and suffer from unfulfilled desire.So it is, he said. And again, must not such a city, as well as such a man, be full of terrors and alarms? It must indeed. And do you think you will find more lamentations and groans and wailing and anguish in any other city? By no means. And so of man, do you think these things will more abound in any other than in this tyrant type, that is maddened by its desires and passions? How could it be so? he said. In view of all these and other like considerations, then, I take it, you judged that this city is the most miserable of cities. And was I not right? he said. Yes, indeed, said I. But of the tyrant man, what have you to say in view of these same things? That he is far and away the most miserable of all, he said. I cannot admit, said I, that you are right in that too. How so? said he. This one, said I, I take it, has not yet attained the acme of misery.[*](Cf. on 508 E, p. 104, note c.) Then who has? Perhaps you will regard the one I am about to name as still more wretched. What one? The one, said I, who, being of tyrannical temper, does not live out[*](Cf. Protag. 355 A, Alc. I. 104 E, 579 C.) his life in private station[*](Stallbaum quotes Plut. De virtut. et vit. p. 101 D, Lucian, Herm. 67 ἰδιώτην βίον ζῆν, Philo, Vit. Mos. 3.) but is so unfortunate that by some unhappy chance he is enabled to become an actual tyrant. I infer from what has already been said, he replied, that you speak truly. Yes, said I, but it is not enough to suppose such things. We must examine them thoroughly by reason and an argument such as this.[*](Adam ad loc. emends τῷ τοιούτῳ to τῶ τοιοῦτω, insisting that the MS. reading cannot be satisfactorily explained.) For our inquiry concerns the greatest of all things,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 71, note f on 344 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 484, on Laches 185 A.) the good life or the bad life. Quite right, he replied. Consider, then, if there is anything in what I say. For I think we must get a notion of the matter from these examples. From which? From individual wealthy private citizens in our states who possess many slaves. For these resemble the tyrant in being rulers over many, only the tyrant’s numbers are greater.[*](Cf. Polit. 259 B. But Plato is not concerned with the question of size or numbers here.) Yes, they are. You are aware, then, that they are unafraid and do not fear their slaves? What should they fear? Nothing, I said; but do you perceive the reason why? Yes, because the entire state is ready to defend each citizen. You are right, I said. But now suppose some god should catch up a man who has fifty or more slaves[*](Plato’s imaginary illustration is one of his many anticipations of later history, and suggests to an American many analogies.) and waft him with his wife and children away from the city and set him down with his other possessions and his slaves in a solitude where no freeman could come to his rescue. What and how great would be his fear,[*](Cf. Critias, fr. 37 Diels ii.3 p. 324, on Sparta’s fear of her slaves.) do you suppose, lest he and his wife and children be destroyed by the slaves? The greatest in the world,[*](For ἐν παντί cf. 579 B, Symp. 194 A ἐν παντὶ εἴης, Euthyd. 301 A ἐν παντὶ ἐγενόμην ὑπὸ ἀπορίας, Xen. Hell. v. 4. 29, Thucyd. vii. 55, Isoc. xiii. 20 ἐν πᾶσιν . . κακοῖς. Cf. παντοῖος εἶναι (γίννεσθαι) Herod. ix. 109, vii. 10. 3, iii. 124, Lucian, Pro lapsu 1.) he said, if you ask me.

And would he not forthwith find it necessary to fawn upon some of the slaves and make them many promises and emancipate them, though nothing would be further from his wish[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν δεόμενος cf. 581 E, 367 A-B, 410 B, 405 C, Prot. 331 C, and Shorey in Class. Journ. ii. p. 171.)? And so he would turn out to be the flatterer of his own servants.He would certainly have to, he said, or else perish. But now suppose, said I, that god established round about him numerous neighbors who would not tolerate the claim of one man to be master of another,[*](For ancient denials of the justice of slavery cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 140 ff., Philemon, fr. 95 (Kock ii. p. 508)κἂν δοῦλος ἐστί, σάρκα τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει, φύσει γὰρ οὐδεὶς δοῦλος ἐγενήθη ποτέ. ἡ δ’ αὖ τύχη τὸ σῶμα κατεδουλώσατο, and Anth. Pal. vii. 553 with Mackail’s note, p. 415.) but would inflict the utmost penalties on any such person on whom they could lay their hands. I think, he said, that his plight would be still more desperate, encompassed by nothing but enemies. And is not that the sort of prison-house in which the tyrant is pent, being of a nature such as we have described and filled with multitudinous and manifold terrors and appetites? Yet greedy[*](Cf. p. 360, note a. For the tyrant’s terrors cf. Menander,Ἀσπίς (fr. 74, Kock iii p. 24), Tacitus, Ann. vi. 6, 579 E and Xen. Hiero 6.8. The tyrant sees enemies everywhere.) and avid of spirit as he is, he only of the citizens may not travel abroad or view any of the sacred festivals[*](Cf. Xen. Hiero 1. 12 οἱ δὲ τύραννοι οὐ μάλα ἀμφὶ θεωρίας ἔχουσιν· οὔτε γὰρ ἰέναι αὐτοῖς ἀσφαλές. Cf. Crito 52 B ἐπὶ θεωρίαν.) that other freemen yearn to see, but he must live for the most part cowering in the recesses of his house like a woman,[*](Cf. Laws 781 C, Gorg. 485 D.) envying among the other citizens anyone who goes abroad and sees any good thing. Most certainly, he said. And does not such a harvest of ills[*](τοῖς τοιούτοις κακοῖς is the measure of the excess of the unhappiness of the actual tyrant over that of the tyrannical soul in private life. Cf. my review of Jowett, A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) measure the difference between the man who is merely ill-governed in his own soul, the man of tyrannical temper, whom you just now judged to be most miserable, and the man who, having this disposition, does not live out his life in private station but is constrained by some ill hap to become an actual tyrant, and while unable to control himself[*](Cf. 580 C and What Plato Said, p. 506, on Gorg. 491 D.) attempts to rule over others, as if a man with a sick and incontinent body[*](For the analogy of soul and body cf. 591 B and on 564 D, p. 313, note g.) should not live the private life but should be compelled to pass his days in contention and strife with other persons? Your analogy is most apt and true,[*](Cf. Soph. 252 C ὅμοιόν τε καὶ ἀληθές.) Socrates, he said. Is not that then, dear Glaucon, said I, a most unhappy experience in every way? And is not the tyrant’s life still worse than that which was judged by you to be the worst? Precisely so, he said. Then it is the truth, though some may deny it,[*](Cf. on 576 C, p. 354, note b.) that the real tyrant is really enslaved to cringings and servitudes beyond compare, a flatterer of the basest men, and that, so far from finding even the least satisfaction for his desires, he is in need of most things, and is a poor man in very truth, as is apparent if one knows how to observe a soul in its entirety; and throughout his life he teems with terrors and is full of convulsions and pains, if in fact he resembles the condition of the city which he rules; and he is like it, is he not? Yes, indeed, he said.

And in addition, shall we not further attribute to him all that we spoke of before, and say that he must needs be, and, by reason of his rule, come to be still more than he was,[*](Cf. 576 B-C.) envious, faithless, unjust, friendless, impious, a vessel and nurse[*](πανδοκεύς is a host or inn-keeper; Cf. Laws 918 B.Here the word is used figuratively. Cf. Aristoph. Wasps 35 φάλαινα πανδοκεύτρια, an all-receptive grampus (Rogers).) of all iniquity, and so in consequence be himself most unhappy[*](On the wretched lot of the tyrant cf. Xen. Hiero passim, e.g. 4. 11, 6. 4, 8, 15. the Hiero is Xenophon’s rendering of the Socratico-Platonic conception of the unhappy tyrant. Cf. 1. 2-3. See too Gerhard Heintzeler, Das Bild des Tyrannen bei Platon, esp. pp. 43 ff. and 76 f.; Cic. De amicit. 15, Isoc. Nic. 4-5, Peace 112, Hel. 32 ff. But in Euag. 40 Isocrates says all men would admit that tyranny is the greatest and noblest and most coveted of all good things, both human and divine. In Epist. 6. 11. ff. he agrees with Plato that the life of a private citizen is better than the tyrant’s But in 2. 4 he treats this as a thesis which many maintain. Cf. further Gorg. 473 E, Alc. I. 135 B, Phaedr. 248 E, Symp. 182 C, Eurip. Ion 621 ff., Suppl. 429 ff., Medea 119 ff., I.A. 449-450, Herodotus iii. 80, Soph. Ajax 1350 not easy for a tyrant to be pious; also Dio Chrys. Or. iii. 58 f., Anon. Iambl. fr. 7. 12, Diels ii.3 p. 333, J. A. K. Thomson, Greek and Barbarian, pp. 111 ff., Dümmler, Prolegomena, p. 31, Baudrillart, J. Bodin et son temps, p. 292-293 Bodin semble . . . se souvenir de Platon flétrissant le tyran. . . . ) make all about him so?No man of sense will gainsay that, he said. Come then, said I, now at last, even as the judge of last instance[*](Adam has an exhaustive technical note on this.) pronounces, so do you declare who in your opinion is first in happiness and who second, and similarly judge the others, all five in succession, the royal, the timocratic, the oligarchic, the democratic, and the tyrannical man. Nay, he said, the decision is easy. For as if they were choruses I judge them in the order of their entrance, and so rank them in respect of virtue and vice, happiness and its contrary. Shall we hire a herald,[*](Cf. Phileb. 66 A ὑπό τε ἀγγέλων πέμπων, etc., Eurip. Alc. 737 κηρύκων ὕπο. Grote and other liberals are offended by the intensity of Plato’s moral conviction. See What Plato Said, p. 364, Laws 662-663, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p.25.) then, said I, or shall I myself make proclamation that the son of Ariston pronounced the best man[*](Plato puns on the name Ariston. For other such puns Cf. Gorg. 463 E, 481 D, 513 B, Rep. 600 B, 614 B, Symp. 174 B, 185 C, 198 C.) and the most righteous to be the happiest,[*](Cf. Laws 664 B-C. ) and that he is the one who is the most kingly and a king over himself;[*](Cf. on 570 C, p. 367, note a.) and declared that the most evil and most unjust is the most unhappy, who again is the man who, having the most of the tyrannical temper in himself, become, most of a tyrant over himself and over the state? Let it have been so proclaimed by you, he said. Shall I add the clause alike whether their character is known to all men and gods or is not known[*](Cf. 367 E, 427 D, 445 A, 612 B.)? Add that to the proclamation, he said. Very good, said I; this, then, would be one of our proofs, but examine this second one and see if there is anything in it. What is it? Since, said I, corresponding to the three types in the city, the soul also is tripartite,[*](Cf. 435 B-C ff.) it will admit,[*](Practically all editors reject τὸ λογιστικόν. But Apelt, p. 525, insists that δέξεται cannot be used without a subject on the analogy of 453 D ἔοικεν, 497 C δηλώσει and δείξει, hence we must retain λογιστικόν, in the sense of ability to reckon, and he compares Charm. 174 B and the double sense of λογιστικόν in Rep. 525 B, 587 D, 602 E. He says it is a mild mathematical joke, like Polit. 257 A.) I think, of another demonstration also. What is that? The following: The three parts have also, it appears to me, three kinds of pleasure, one peculiar to each, and similarly three appetites and controls. What do you mean? he said. One part, we say, is that with which a man learns, one is that with which he feels anger. But the third part, owing to its manifold forms,[*](Cf. Phileb. 26 C τὸ . . . πλῆθος. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 492, n. 2.) we could not easily designate by any one distinctive name,[*](Here again the concept is implied (Cf. on 564 B, p. 313, note e and Introd. pp. x-xi). Cf. Parmen. 132 C, 135 B, Phileb. 16 D, 18 C-D, 23 E, 25 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1130 b 2 ἑνὶ ὀνόματι περιλαβεῖν, and εἰς ἓν κεφάλαιον ἀπερειδοίμεθα, 581 A, Schleiermacher’s interpretation of which, so würden wir uns in der Erklärung doch auf ein Hauptstück stützen, approved by Stallbaum, misses the point. For the point that there is no one name for it Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Soph. 267 D.) but gave it the name of its chief and strongest element;

for we called it the appetitive part[*](Vol. I. 439 D.) because of the intensity of its appetites concerned with food and drink and love and their accompaniments, and likewise the money-loving part,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 380, note b.) because money is the chief instrument for the gratification of such desires.And rightly, he said. And if we should also say that its pleasure and its love were for gain or profit, should we not thus best bring it together under one head[*](Since there is no one specific name for the manifold forms of this part (580 D-E), a makeshift term is to be used for convenience’s sake. See also p. 371, note e.) in our discourse so as to understand each other when we speak of this part of the soul, and justify our calling it the money-loving and gain-loving part? I, at any rate, think so, he said. And, again, of the high-spirited element, do we not say that it is wholly set on predominance and victory and good repute? Yes, indeed. And might we not appropriately designate it as the ambitious part and that which is covetous of honor? Most appropriately. But surely it is obvious to everyone that all the endeavor of the part by which we learn is ever towards[*](Or is bent on, τέταται. Cf. 499 A ζητεῖν . . . τὸ ἀληθὲς συντεταμένως, Symp. 222 A and Bury ad loc., Symp. 186 B ἐπὶ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς τείνει. For the thought cf. also Phileb. 58 D.) knowledge of the truth of things, and that it least of the three is concerned for wealth and reputation. Much the least. Lover of learning[*](Cf. Phaedo 67 B τοὺς ὀρθῶς φιλομαθεῖς.) and lover of wisdom would be suitable designations for that. Quite so, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the ruling principle[*](Cf. 338 D, 342 C.) of men’s souls is in some cases this faculty and in others one of the other two, as it may happen? That is so, he said. And that is why we say that the primary classes[*](Cf. my review of Jowett in A.J.P. xiii. p. 366, which Adam quotes and follows and Jowett and Campbell (Republic) adopt. For the three types of men cf. also Phaedo 68 C, 82 C. Stewart, Aristot. Eth. Nic. p. 60 (1095 b 17), says, The three lives mentioned by Aristotle here answer to the three classes of men distinguished by Plato (Rep. 581). . . . Michelet and Grant point out that this threefold division occurs in a metaphor attributed to Pythagoras by Heracleides Ponticus (apud Cic. Tusc. v. 3). . . . Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1097 a-b (i. 5. 1), also Diog. L. vii. 130 on Stoics, Plutarch, De liber. educ. x. (8 A), Renan, Avenir de Ia science, p. 8. Isoc. Antid. 217 characteristically recognizes only the three motives, pleasure, gain, and honor. For the entire argument cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 31, 1177 a 10, and ibid, Introd. pp. liv-lv.) of men also are three, the philosopher or lover of wisdom, the lover of victory and the lover of gain. Precisely so And also that there are three forms of pleasure, corresponding respectively to each? By all means. Are you aware, then said I, that if you should choose to ask men of these three classes, each in turn,[*](For ἐν μέρει cf. 468 B, 520 C and D, 577 C, 615 A, Gorg. 496 B, Laws 876 B, 943 A, 947 C, Polit. 265 A; Contrasted with ἐν τῷ μέρει, Meno 92 E, Gorg. 462 A, 474 A. The two expressions, similar in appearance, illustrate how a slight change alters an idiom. So e.g. καινὸν οὐδέν (Gorg. 448 A) has nothing to do with the idiom οὐδὲν καινόν (Phaedo 100 B);τοῦ λόγου ἕνεκα (Rep. 612 C) is different from λόγου ἕνεκα (Theaet. 191 C—dicis causa);πάντα τἀγαθά (Laws 631 B) has no connection with the idiomatic πάντ’ ἀγαθά (Rep. 471 C, Cf. supra ad loc.); nor Pindar’s πόλλ’ ἄνω τὰ δ’ αὖ κάτω (Ol. xii. 6) with ἄνω κάτω as used in Phaedo 96 B, Gorg. 481 D, etc. Cf. also ἐν τέχνῃ Prot. 319 C with ἐν τῇ τέχνῃ317 C,νῷ ἔχειν Rep. 490 A with ἐν νῷ ἔχειν344 D, etc.,τοῦ παντὸς ἡμάρτηκεν Phaedr. 235 E with παντὸς ἁμαρτάνειν237 C. The same is true of words—to confuse καλλίχορος with καλλίχοιρος would be unfortunate; and the medieval debates about ὁμοουσία and ὁμοιουσία were perhaps not quite as ridiculous as they are generally considered.) which is the most pleasurable of these lives, each will chiefly commend his own[*](Cf. Laws 658 on judging different kinds of literature.)? The financier will affirm that in comparison with profit the pleasures of honor or of learning area of no value except in so far as they produce money. True, he said. And what of the lover of honor[*](Cf. p. 255, note f, on 549 A. Xenophon is the typical φιλότιμος. In Mem. iii. 3. 13 he says that the Athenians excel others in love of honor, which is the strongest incentive to deeds of honor and renown (Marchant, Loeb tr.). Cf. Epist. 320 A, Symp. 178 D, and also Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 1, Mem. iii. i. 10.)? I said; does he not regard the pleasure that comes from money as vulgar[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 16, and on 528 E.) and low, and again that of learning, save in so far as the knowledge confers honor, mere fume[*](Cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 920, and Turgeniev’s novel, Smoke. ) and moonshine? It is so, he said. And what, said I, are we to suppose the philosopher thinks of the other pleasures compared with the delight of knowing the truth[*](Cf. Phileb. 58 C on dialectic.) and the reality, and being always occupied with that while he learns? Will he not think them far removed from true pleasure,[*](Cf. 598 B, Epist. iii. 315 C, Marc. Aurel. viii. 1 πόρρω φιλοσοφίας. Hermann’s text or something like it is the only idiomatic one, and τῆς ἡδονῆς οὐ πάνυ πόρρω must express the philosopher’s opinion of the pleasurableness of the lower pleasures as compared with the higher. Cf. A.J.P. xiii. p. 366.) and call[*](For the infinitive cf. 492 C καὶ φήσειν, 530 B καὶ ζητεῖν.) them literally[*](τῷ ὄντι marks the etymological use of ἀναγκαίας. Cf. on 511 B and 551 E, p. 266, note a.) the pleasures of necessity,[*](Cf. 558 D f.) since he would have no use for them if necessity were not laid upon him?

We may be sure of that, he said. Since, then, there is contention between the several types of pleasure and the lives themselves, not merely as to which is the more honorable or the more base, or the worse or the better, but which is actually the more pleasurable[*](This anticipates Laws 663 A, 733 A-B, 734 A-B.) or free from pain, how could we determine which of them speaks most truly? In faith, I cannot tell, he said. Well, consider it thus: By what are things to be judged, if they are to be judged[*](i.e. what is the criterion? Cf. 582 D δι’ οὗ, Sext. Empir. Bekker, p. 60 (Pyrrh. Hypotyp. ii. 13-14) and p. 197 (Adv. Math. vii. 335). Cf. Diog. L. Prologue 21, and Laches 184 E. For the idea that the better judge cf. also Laws 663 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1176 a 16-19.) rightly? Is it not by experience, intelligence and discussion[*](Cf. 582 D, On Virtue 373 D, Xen. Mem. iii. 3. 11.)? Or could anyone name a better criterion than these? How could he? he said. Observe, then. Of our three types of men, which has had the most experience of all the pleasures we mentioned? Do you think that the lover of gain by study of the very nature of truth has more experience of the pleasure that knowledge yields than the philosopher has of that which results from gain? There is a vast difference, he said; for the one, the philosopher, must needs taste of the other two kinds of pleasure from childhood; but the lover of gain is not only under no necessity of tasting or experiencing the sweetness of the pleasure of learning the true natures of things,[*](The force of οὐ extends through the sentence. Cf. Class. Phil. vi. (1911) p. 218, and my note on Tim. 77 a in A.J.P. p. 74. Cf. Il. v. 408, xxii, 283, Pindar, Nem. iii. 15, Hymn Dem. 157.) but he cannot easily do so even if he desires and is eager for it. The lover of wisdom, then, said I, far surpasses the lover of gain in experience of both kinds of pleasure. Yes, far. And how does he compare with the lover of honor? Is he more unacquainted with the pleasure of being honored than that other with that which comes from knowledge? Nay, honor, he said, if they achieve their several objects, attends them all; for the rich man is honored by many and the brave man and the wise, so that all are acquainted with the kind of pleasure that honor brings; but it is impossible for anyone except the lover of wisdom to have savored the delight that the contemplation of true being and reality brings. Then, said I, so far as experience goes, he is the best judge of the three. By far. And again, he is the only one whose experience will have been accompanied[*](For the periphrasis γεγονὼς ἔσται Cf. Charm. 174 D ἀπολελοιπὸς ἔσται.) by intelligence. Surely. And yet again, that which is the instrument, or ὄργανον, of judgement[*](Cf. 508 B, 518 C, 527 D.) is the instrument, not of the lover of gain or of the lover of honor, but of the lover of wisdom. What is that? It was by means of words and discussion[*](Cf. on 582 A, p. 376, note d.) that we said the judgement must be reached; was it not? Yes. And they are the instrument mainly of the philosopher. Of course. Now if wealth and profit were the best criteria by which things are judged, the things praised and censured by the lover of gain would necessarily be truest and most real. Quite necessarily. And if honor, victory and courage, would it not be the things praised by the lover of honor and victory? Obviously. But since the tests are experience and wisdom and discussion, what follows? Of necessity, he said, that the things approved by the lover of wisdom and discussion are most valid and true.

There being, then, three kinds of pleasure, the pleasure of that part of the soul whereby we learn is the sweetest, and the life of the man in whom that part dominates is the most pleasurable.How could it be otherwise? he said. At any rate the man of intelligence speaks with authority when he commends his own life. And to what life and to what pleasure, I said, does the judge assign the second place? Obviously to that of the warrior and honor-loving type, for it is nearer to the first than is the life of the money-maker. And so the last place belongs to the lover of gain, as it seems. Surely, said he. That, then, would be two points in succession and two victories for the just man over the unjust. And now for the third in the Olympian fashion to the saviour[*](The third cup of wine was always dedicated to Zeus the Saviour, and τρίτος σωτήρ became proverbial. Cf. Charm. 167 A, Phileb. 66 D, Laws 692 A, 960 C, Epist. vii. 334 D, 340 A. Cf. Hesychius s. v. τρίτος κρατήρ. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, missing the point, says, Voici enfin un troisième argument qui paraît à Platon le plus décisif puisqu’il l’appelle une vicoire vraiment olympique. For the idea of a contest Cf. Phileb. passim.) and to Olympian Zeus—observe that other pleasure than that of the intelligence is not altogether even real[*](Cf. Phileb. 36 C, 44 D ἡδοναὶ ἀληθεῖς. For the unreality of the lower pleasures Cf. Phileb. 36 A ff. and esp. 44 C-D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 23-25, What Plato Said, pp. 322-323 and 609-610, Introd. pp. lvi-lix, Rodier, Remarques sur le Philèbe, p. 281.) or pure,[*](Cf. Phileb. 52 C καθαρὰς ἡδονάς, and 53 C καθαρὰ λύπης.) but is a kind of scene-painting,[*](Cf. Laws 663 C, Phaedo 69 B, 365 C, 523 B, 602 D, 586 B, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266.) as I seem to have heard from some wise man[*](One of Plato’s evasions. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 513, on Meno 81 A, Phileb. 44 B. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 266 misses the point and says that by the wise man Plato means himself.); and yet[*](For this rhetorical καίτοι cf. 360 C, 376 B, 433 B, 440 D, Gorg. 452 E, Laws 663 E, 690 C.) this would be the greatest and most decisive overthrow.[*](Cf. Phileb. 22 E, Aesch. Prom. 919, Soph. Antig. 1046.) Much the greatest. But what do you mean? I shall discover it, I said, if you will answer my questions while I seek. Ask, then, he said. Tell me, then, said I, do we not say that pain is the opposite of pleasure? We certainly do. And is there not such a thing as a neutral state[*](If any inference could he drawn from the fact that in the Philebus 42 D ff. and 32 E the reality of the neutral state has to be proved, it would be that the Philebus is earlier, which it is not.) There is. Is it not intermediate between them, and in the mean,[*](For ἐν μέσῳ Cf. Phileb. 35 E.) being a kind of quietude of the soul in these respects? Or is not that your notion of it? It is that, said he. Do you not recall the things men say in sickness? What sort of things? Why, that after all there is nothing sweeter than to be well,[*](Cf. perhaps Phileb. 45 B, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 a 24, and Heracleit. fr. 111, Diels i.3 p. 99 νοῦσος ὑγιείην ἐποίησεν ἡδύ.) though they were not aware that it is the highest pleasure before they were Ill. I remember, he said. And do you not hear men afflicted with severe pain saying that there is no greater pleasure than the cessation of this suffering? I do. And you perceive, I presume, many similar conditions in which men while suffering pain praise freedom from pain and relief from that as the highest pleasure, and not positive delight. Yes, he said, for this in such cases is perhaps what is felt as pleasurable and acceptable—peace. And so, I said, when a man’s delight comes to an end, the cessation of pleasure will be painful. It may be so, he said. What, then,we just now described as the intermediate state between the two—this quietude—will sometimes be both pain and pleasure. It seems so Is it really possible for that which is neither to become both[*](Cf. Phileb. 43 E, Hipp. Maj. 300 B f.)? I think not. And further, both pleasure and pain arising in the soul are a kind of motion,[*](Aristotle attacks this doctrine with captious dialectic in his Topics and De anima. ) are they not? Yes.