Republic

Plato

Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930-37.

Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community[*](Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but Cf. Laws 739 C ff., Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.) of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings[*](Cf. 445 D and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menex. 238 C-D.) over them[*](So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is partitive, those of their number are to be kings.) are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy.We are agreed, he said. And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations[*](Cf. 415 E.) such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.[*](Cf. 416 C.) Why, yes, I remember, he said, that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men[*](Cf. 429 A.) now possess, but that, being as it were athletes[*](Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων ) of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay[*](Cf. 416 E.) for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state. That is right, I said. But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and What Plato Said, p. 640, on Laws 857 C.) that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path. That is easy, he said; for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say[*](Cf. 449 A-B.) that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of;

but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1285 b 1-2, 1289 b 9.) if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species[*](Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But cf. ibid, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 D, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note ad loc. in Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan 19 Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms, etc.) worth speaking of[*](For ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη Cf. Laws 908 B ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια, Laches 192 A οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, Tim. 82 ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας. Cf. also Euthydem. 279 C, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 56. and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 C.) and observing their defects[*](For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 B.) and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise.[*](Plato’s main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and Vol. I. p.xii, note d.) And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought to this point.[*](Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.)Your memory is most exact, I said. A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold,[*](Cf. Phileb. 13 D εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας Phaedr. 236 B, Laws 682 E, Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672.) and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say. I will if I can, said I. And indeed, said he, I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant. There will be no difficulty about that, said I. For those I mean are precisely those that have names[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 D.) in common usage: that which the many praised,[*](Cf. Crito 52 E, Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles 24 (Loeb), Laws 612 D-E, Aristot. Pol. 1265 b 32, Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15.) your[*](ἡ . . . αὔτη, ista. Cf. Midsummer Night’s Dream, I. ii. ad fin. and Gorg. 502 B, 452 E.) Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honor, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the noble[*](Of course ironical. Cf. 454 A, and What Plato Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 B.) tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady[*](Cf. 552 C, Protag. 322 d, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on Eurip. Heracles 542. For the effect of surprise Cf. Rep. 334 A, 373 A, 555 A, Theaet. 146 A, Phileb. 46 A κακόν and 64 E συμφορά.) of a state. Can you mention any other type[*](ἰδέαν: cf. Introd. p. x.) of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species[*](Cf. 445 C. For διαφανεῖ Cf. Tim. 60 A, 67 A, Laws 634 C, and on 548 C, p. 253, note g.)? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities[*](δυναστεῖαι Cf. Laws 680 B, 681 D. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. Cf. Panegyr. 39 and Norlin on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil. 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. Cf. also Gorg. 492 B, Polit. 291 D.) and purchased[*](Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.) kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.[*](Plato, as often is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 D, 67 C, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the Republic and Laws,Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 B.) Certainly many strange ones are reported, he said. Are you aware, then, said I, that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government[*](For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 425 E, 445 C-D, 579 C and on 591 E. Cf. Laws 829 A, Isoc. Peace 120.)? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock[*](Or stock or stone, i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας Cf. Odyssey xix. 163, Il. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 D and Thompson on Phaedrus 275 B; also Stallbaum ad loc.) and not from the characters[*](The mores, 45 E, 436 A. Cf. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 206: A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favorite and detested types of character.) of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales[*](For the metaphor cf. also 550 E and on 556 E.) draw other things after them? They could not possibly come from any other source, he said. Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also. Surely. Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy[*](ἀριστοκρατία is used by both Plato and Aristotle some times technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 D, and Menex. 238 C-D (What Plato Said, p. 539).) or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man.

We have.Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor,[*](Cf. Phaedr. 256 C 1, 475 A, 347 B.) corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,[*](Cf. on 544 A, p. 237, note g.) after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?Assuredly, he said, that is what we have to do.[*](In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken, p. 11: Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt. Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, The Idea of Progress, in Methods of Social Science, edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: . . . there was a widely spread belief in an earlier golden age of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato’s theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of cycles, with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or progress. Kurt Singer, Platon der Gründer, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius’s theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.) Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honor? I do not know of any special name[*](Cf. on 544 C, p. 238, note b.) for it in use. We must call it either timocracy[*](In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is the rule of those who possess a property qualification.) or timarchy. And then in connection with this we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man: and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,[*](Cf. 577 A-B.) and so try to make ourselves competent judges[*](Cf. 582 A ff.) of the question before us. That would be at least[*](For the qualified assent Cf. HamletI. i. 19 What? is Horatio there? A piece of him. It is very frequent in the Republic, usually with γοῦν. Cf. 442 D, 469 B, 476 C, 501 C, 537 C, 584 A, 555 B, 604 D,and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 A; also 460 C and 398 B, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 B, 405 B, 556 E, 581 B, and 487 A, where he uses the corrective μὲν οὖν.) a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision, he said. Come, then, said I, let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself,[*](For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also Laws 683 E. Cf. 465 B, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς, 1302 a 10 Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 521, says that Aristotle does not remark on Plato’s observation . . . though he cannot have agreed with it. Cf. Halévy, Notes et souvenirs, p. 153 l’histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, not gouvernements n’ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: Mais l’instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l’y invite.) when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible? Yes, that is so. How, then, Glaucon, I said, will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses[*](For the mock-heroic style of this invocation Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Laws 885 C.) to tell

how faction first fell upon them,
Hom. Il. 1.6 and say that these goddesses playing with us and teasing us as if we were children address us in lofty, mock-serious tragic[*](Cf. 413 B, Meno 76 E, Aristot. Meteorol. 353 b 1, Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 146.) style? How?

Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 E.) it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 677 A; also Polyb. vi. 57, Cic. De rep. ii. 25.) not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness[*](Cf. Pindar, Mem. vi. 10-12 for the thought.) for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,[*](Cf. Tim. 28 A δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως.) but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number,[*](For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cic. Ad att. vii. 13 est enim numero Platonis obscurius, Censorinus, De die natali xi. See ibid, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this number.) and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable[*](προσήγορα: Cf. Theaet. 146 A.) and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational[*](Cf. 534 D; also Theaet. 202 B ῥητάς.) lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably,[*](Cf. 409 D.) the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn[*](αὖ: cf. my note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-287.) into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music[*](This does not indicate a change in Plato’s attitude toward music, as has been alleged.) and then to gymnastics, so that our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod’s and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron.[*](Cf. 415 A-B.)

And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness[*](Cf. Theaet. 159 A.) and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise.

Of this lineage, look you,
Hom. Il. 6.211 we must aver the dissension to be, wherever it occurs and always.And rightly too, he said, we shall affirm that the Muses answer. They must needs, I said, since they are[*](γεvi termini Cf. 379 A-B.) Muses. Well, then, said he, what do the Muses say next? When strife arose, said I, the two groups were pulling against each other, the iron and bronze towards money-making and the acquisition of land and houses and gold and silver, and the other two, the golden and silvern, not being poor, but by nature rich in their souls,[*](Cf. 416 E-417 A, 521 A, Phaedrus 279 B-C.) were trying to draw them back to virtue and their original constitution, and thus, striving and contending against one another, they compromised[*](For εἰς μέσον Cf. Protag. 338 A; 572 D, 558 B.) on the plan of distributing and taking for themselves the land and the houses, enslaving and subjecting as perioeci and serfs[*](An allusion to Sparta. On slavery in Plato cf. Newman i. p. 143. Cf. 549 A, 578-579, Laws 776-777; Aristot. Pol. 1259 a 21 f., 1269 a 36 f., 1330 a 29.) their former friends[*](Cf. 417 A-B.) and supporters, of whose freedom they had been the guardians, and occupying themselves with war and keeping watch over these subjects. I think, he said, that this is the starting-point of the transformation. Would not this polity, then, said I, be in some sort intermediate between aristocracy and oligarchy ? By all means. By this change, then, it would arise. But after the change what will be its way of life? Is it not obvious that in some things it will imitate the preceding polity, in some the oligarchy, since it is intermediate, and that it will also have some qualities peculiar to itself? That is so, he said. Then in honoring its rulers and in the abstention of its warrior class from farming[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1328 b 41 and Newman i. pp. 107-108.) and handicraft and money-making in general, and in the provision of common public tables[*](Cf. 416 E, 458 C, Laws 666 B, 762 C, 780 A-B, 781 C, 806 E, 839 C, Critias 112 C.) and the devotion to physical training and expertness in the game and contest of war—in all these traits it will copy the preceding state? Yes. But in its fear to admit clever men to office, since the men it has of this kind are no longer simple[*](Cf. 397 E, Isoc. ii. 46 ἁπλοῦς δ’ ἡγοῦνται τοὺς νοῦν οὐκ ἔχοντας. Cf. the psychology of Thucyd. iii. 83.) and strenuous but of mixed strain, and in its inclining rather to the more high-spirited and simple-minded type, who are better suited for war than for peace, and in honoring the stratagems and contrivances of war and occupying itself with war most of the time—in these respects for the most part its qualities will be peculiar to itself?

Yes.Such men, said I, will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold[*](This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14, 203 and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization, pp. 180-184.) and silver, owning storehouses[*](Cf. 416 D.) and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures[*](Cf. Laws 681 A, Theaet. 174 E.) of their homes, literal private love-nests[*](νεοττιάς suggests Horace’s tu nidum servas (Epist. i. 10.6). Cf also Laws 776 A.) in which they can lavish their wealth on their women[*](Cf. Laws 806 A-C, 637 B-C, Aristot. Pol. 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. pp. 322-346.) and any others they please with great expenditure. Most true, he said. And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others’ wealth[*](φιλαναλωταί, though different, suggests Sallust’s alieni appetens sui profusus (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.) because of their appetites, enjoying[*](Cf. 587 A, Laws 636 D, Symp. 187 E, Phaedr. 251 E.) their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 b 34 with Newman’s note; and Euthyphro 2 C tell his mother the state.) since they have not been educated by persuasion[*](Cf. Laws 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.) but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music? You perfectly describe, he said, a polity that is a mixture[*](This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves Laws 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 629.) of good and evil. Why, yes, the elements have been mixed, I said, but the most conspicuous[*](For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 D. The expression διαφανέστατον . . . ἕν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is colored by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: illud Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. Anaxag. Fr. 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405 ἀλλ’ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ ἦν. Cf. Phaedr. 238 A, Cratyl. 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended (ἐναργής for ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 350.) feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.[*](There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 C if the passage is read carefully.) Very much so, said he. Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms[*](Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.) of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men. Quite right, he said. What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature? I fancy, Adeimantus said, that he comes rather close[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας.) to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness. Perhaps, said I, in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects. In what?

He will have to be somewhat self-willed[*](αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 1937) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.) and lacking in culture,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 A little inaccessible to ideas and light, and pp. 54-55 The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them.) yet a lover of music and fond of listening[*](Cf. 475 D, 535 D, Lysis 206 C.) to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh,[*](Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 C.) not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor,[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλότιμος. Cf Phaedr. 256 C, Eurip. I. A. 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3, Agesil. 10. 4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. But if it be a sin to covet honor, Shakes. Henry V. iv. iii. 28.) not basing his claim to office[*](Cf. the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 A, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.) on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.[*](Cf. Arnold on the barbarians in Culture and Anarchy, pp. 78, 82, 84.)Why, yes, he said, that is the spirit of that polity.[*](For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31.) And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian? What guardian? said Adeimantus. Reason, said I, blended with culture,[*](The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For μουσική cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato’s opinions.) which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it. Well said, he replied. This is the character, I said, of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name. By all means. His origin[*](δέ γ’ marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.) is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc. Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει. Cf. πολυπραγμοσύνη 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 30, and 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. Knights 261.) and is willing to forbear something of his rights[*](ἐλαττοῦσθαι cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1198 b 26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3.) in order to escape trouble.[*](For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 A, Gorg. 467 D, Alc. I. 119 B, Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν, Rep. 505 A, 531 B, Theages 121 D, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102.) How does he originate? he said. Why, when, to begin with, I said, he hears his mother complaining[*](Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four Years in Germany, p. 115 Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins to nag him . . .) that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-absorbed[*](Cf. Symp. 174 D, Isoc. Antid. 227.) in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,[*](Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.) and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack[*](λίαν ἀνειμένος: one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 τίς ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος; Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.) and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women[*](Cf. Phaedo 60 A.For Plato’s attitude towards women Cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 631 D.) nag[*](ὑμνεῖν. Cf. Euthydem. 296 D, Soph. Ajax 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385.) in such cases. Many indeed, said Adeimantus, and after their kind.[*](Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.)

You are aware, then, said I, that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.[*](ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, Euthyd. 298 E, Protag. 326 A, Phaedo 58 D, 80 D, Symp. 201 E, etc.) Men who mind their own affairs[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 B.) in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs are honored and praised. Then it is[*](τότε δή cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, Phaedo 85 A, 96 B and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also τότ’ ἤδη, on 565 C.) that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle[*](Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.) in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate[*](For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.); and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,[*](Cf. the fragment of Menander,φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ’ ὁμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 A ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ’ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν.) under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise[*](Cf. p. 249, note f.) and turns over the government in his soul[*](Cf. 553 B-C, 608 B.) to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul[*](ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. I. A. 919.) and covetous of honor.[*](Cf. p. 255, note f.) You have, I think, most exactly described his origin. Then, said I, we have our second polity and second type of man. We have, he said. Shall we then, as Aeschylus: would say,

tell of another champion before another gate,
Aesch. Seven 451 [*](λέγ’ ἄλλον ἄλλαις ἐν πύλαις εἰληχότα.) or rather, in accordance with our plan,[*](Cf. Laws 743 C, and Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 345.) the city first? That, by all means, he said. The next polity, I believe, would be oligarchy. And what kind of a regime, said he, do you understand by oligarchy? That based on a property qualification,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33, Isoc. Panath. 131, Laws 698 B aliter.) said I, wherein the rich hold office and the poor man is excluded. I understand, said he. Then, is not the first thing to speak of how democracy passes over into this? Yes. And truly, said I, the manner of the change is plain even to the proverbial blind man.[*](Cf. 465 D, Soph. 241 D.) How so? That treasure-house[*](Cf. 548 A, 416 D.) which each possesses filled with gold destroys that polity; for first they invent ways of expenditure for themselves and pervert the laws to this end, and neither they nor their wives obey them. That is likely, he said. And then, I take it, by observing and emulating one another they bring the majority of them to this way of thinking. That is likely, he said. And so, as time goes on, and they advance[*](εἰς τὸ πρόσθεν: cf. 437 A, 604 B, Prot. 339 D, Symp. 174 D, Polit. 262 D, Soph. 258 C, 261 B, Alc. I. 132 B, Protag. 357 D where ἧς is plainly wrong, Aristoph. Knights 751.) in the pursuit of wealth, the more they hold that in honor the less they honor virtue. May not the opposition of wealth and virtue[*](Cf. 591 D, Laws 742 E, 705 B, 8931 C ff., 836 A, 919 B with Rep. 421 D; also Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37-38.) be conceived as if each lay in the scale[*](Cf. on 544 E, Demosth. v. 12.) of a balance inclining opposite ways? Yes, indeed, he said.

So, when wealth is honored in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored.Obviously.And that which men at any time honor they practise,[*](This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur. Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.) and what is not honored is neglected.It is so.Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor.Quite so.And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits[*](ὅρον: cf. 551 C, Laws 714 C, 962 D, 739 D, 626 B, Menex. 238 D, Polit. 293 E, 296 E, 292 C, Lysis 209 C, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, Eth. Nic. 1138 b 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 C-D and Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37.) of an oligarchical polity, prescribing[*](For ταξάμενοι cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 E.) a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14.) of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization.[*](Cf. 557 A.) Is not that the way of it?It is.The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.Yes, he said, but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had? To begin with, said I, consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots[*](Cf. 488, and Polit. 299 B-C, What Plato Said, p. 521, on Euthydem. 291 D.) of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow[*](Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, Symp. 213 E, Lysis 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s translation of Meno 92 A-B, A. J. P. xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65.) a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot. A sorry voyage they would make of it, he said. And is not the same true of any other form of rule? I think so. Except of a city, said I, or does it hold for a city too? Most of all, he said, by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult[*](Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit. 292 D, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 A.) rule of all. Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy. So it appears. Well, and is this a smaller one? What? That such a city should of necessity be not one,[*](For the idea that a city should be a unity Cf. Laws 739 D and on 423 A-B. Cf. also 422 E with 417 A-B, Livy ii. 24 adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat. Aristot. Pol. 1316 b 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.) but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting[*](Cf. 417 B.) against one another. No, by Zeus, said he, it is not a bit smaller. Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude,[*](For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 consules et armare pIebem et inermem pati timebant.) and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,[*](He plays on the word. In 565 C ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 A ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος, Phaedo 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.) and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money. No, indeed, that is not admirable.

And what of the trait we found fault with long ago[*](Cf. 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 E.)—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?By no manner of means.Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils.What?The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,[*](So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot, Laws 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.) which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,[*](Cf Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf Leslie Stephen, Util. ii. 111 A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order.) neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 b 13.) and a dependent.This is the first, he said. There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers. Right. But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods[*](ἑτοίμωνthings ready at hand. Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 fruges consumere nati.)? It is so, he said; he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift. Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone[*](Cf. Laws 901 A, Hesiod, Works and Days 300 f., Aristoph. Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent. the sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustration, and to Petavius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 D.) springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state? By all means, Socrates, he said. And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,[*](Cf 498 A, Laws 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.) but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated[*](κέκληνται: Cf. 344 B-C.) malefactors? Most true, he said. It is plain, then, said I, that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. Clearly, he said. Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars? Nearly all are such, he said, except the ruling class. Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly[*](βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ as an adverb.) restrain? We must think so, he said. And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state? We shall. Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it. Pretty nearly these, he said.

Then, I said, let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.[*](Cf. on 550 C. p. 261, note h.) And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is. Quite so, he said. Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise? How? When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps[*](Cf. 410 B, Homer Od. xix. 436 ἴχνη ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ’ ἴχνια βαῖνε.) and then sees him suddenly dashed,[*](For πταίσαντα cf. Aesch. Prom. 926, Ag. 1624 (Butl. emend.).) as a ship on a reef,[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Eumen. 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on Phaedr. 255 D.) against the state, and making complete wreckage[*](Lit. spilling. Cf. Lucian, Timon 23.) of both his possessions and himself perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished[*](For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. εκ̓βάλλοντες 488 C.) or outlawed and has lost all his property— It is likely, he said. And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong[*](Cf. Herod. vii. 136.) from his bosom’s throne[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983. Cf. 550 B.) that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily[*](For γλίσχρως cf. on 488 A, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον.) and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword? I do, he said. And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left[*](ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: Cf. Protag. 315 B, Tim. 46 C, Critias 117 C, etc., Herod. iv. 175.) as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,[*](Cf. 554 A, 556 C, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ, and Aristot. Pol. 1257 b 407, and 330 C. See too Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 220: The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man, etc. For the phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν cf. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134 σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν.) and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that? There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type. Is this, then, our oligarchical man? said I. He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang. Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character.

Let us see.Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?Inevitably.And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary[*](Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.) appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?By all means.He would be a squalid[*](αὐχμηρός: Cf. Symp. 203 D.) fellow, said I, looking for a surplus of profit[*](For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and Theaet. 154 E.) in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 256 E, Meno 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 159) relates of Lacydes that he was a bit greedy (ὑπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (οἰκονομικός)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people. Emerson, The Young American, they recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property. But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America today.) Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity? I certainly think so, he said. Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man. That, I take it, said I, is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture. I think not, he said, else he would not have made the blind[*](Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. Plutus,Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 C πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624, Otto, p. 60.) one leader of his choir and first in honor.[*](Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.) Well said, I replied. But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self- control[*](Cf. 552 E ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ. For ἄλλης cf. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου.)? We shall indeed, he said. Do you know, then, said I, to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men? To what? he said. To guardianships of orphans,[*](For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character Cf. Laws 777 D-E, Hesiod, Works and Days, 330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans cf. also Laws 926-928, 766 C, 877 C, 909 C-D.) and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity. True. And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better[*](ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of sweet reasonableness.) element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within,[*](For ἐνούσας Cf. Phileb. 16 D, Symp. 187 E.) not persuading them that it is better not[*](Cf. 463 D. For the idea here Cf. Phaedo 68-69, What Plato Said, p. 527.) nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally. Quite so, he said. Yes, by Zeus, said I, my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites. Most emphatically. Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.[*](For the idea at war with himself, Cf. 440 B and E (στάσις), Phaedr. 237 D-E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 f.) He would not be really one, but in some sort a double[*](Cf. 397 E.) man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse. It is so. And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony[*](Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also Phaedo 61 A, and What Plato Said, p. 485 on Laches 188 D.) with itself would escape him and dwell afar. I think so.

And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[*](ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my Idea of Justice, Ethical Record,Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.) fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself rich![*](i.e. he saves the cost of a determined fight. For the effect of surprise cf. on 544 C, p. 239, note f.)Yes indeed, he said. Have we any further doubt, then, I said, as to the correspondence and resemblance[*](ὁμοιότητι: cf. 576 C.) between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state? None, he said. We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[*](Cf. Phileb. 55 C εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 C, 943 C.) That would at least be a consistent procedure. Then, said I, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[*](The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.) the attainment of the greatest possible wealth? In what way? Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed. By all means. And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[*](Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke xvi.13 Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Cf. also Laws 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.) but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected. That is pretty clear, he said. And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[*](ἀκολασταίνεινCf. Gorg. 478 A, Phileb. 12 D.) in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[*](Cf. Laws 832 A οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.) It surely has. And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.) ’Tis so.

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*](Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes, Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.) pretending not even to see[*](Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.) them, but inserting the sting of their money[*](Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, the poison of their money.τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, implanting madness. In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.) into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*](Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.) or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*](Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.) For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*](For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.) should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.) wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*](Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.) and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*](Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.) pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.) and sees him panting and helpless[*](For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.)—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*](The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.) of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*](Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep, Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.) from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*](Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile, with Tim. 89 B.) the one party bringing in[*](Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.) allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[*](στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, grievously ill of faction. Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.)?

Most emphatically.And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*](Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.) others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*](ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.) in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*](But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.)Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*](Cf. 551 B.) resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties. What, then, said I, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*](ἐξουσία: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.) to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*](κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.) for leading his own life in the way that pleases him. Obvious. All sorts[*](παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state. De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.) and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*](For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It,III. ii. 435 As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color, Faguet, Nineteenth CenturyLamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.) when they see bright-colored things. Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*](Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species. Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.) of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-C.) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*](Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*](διαγωγή: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.) for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*](Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.) of some convicted criminals exquisite[*](κομψή: cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.)? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*](For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.) like a revenant[*](His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering spirit, one returned from the dead (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates Geist) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.)? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[*](For οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία.) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*](σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—high-brow, top-lofty.) pronouncements[*](Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l’art, p. 46.) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*](For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*](μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*](In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.) and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people![*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 732 f., 741 and passim. Andoc. iv. 16 εὔνους τῷ δήμῳ. Emile Faguet, Moralistes, iii. p. 84, says of Tocqueville, Il est bien je crois le premier qui ait dit que la démocratie abaisse le niveau intellectuel des gouvernements. For the other side of the democratic shield see Thucyd. ii. 39.) It is a noble[*](For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.) polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*](ἡδεῖα: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government,τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.) form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike![*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 634, on Laws 744 B-C, and ibid. p. 508 on Gorg. 508 A, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1131 a 23-24, Newman, i. p. 248, Xen. Cyr. ii. 2. 18.) Yes, he said, everybody knows that. Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*](Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.) oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.) our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*](Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.)? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ? Most assuredly.

Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them?Rightly.And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?Fairly indeed.Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[*](Or grasp them in outline.)Let us do so.Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes[*](For ὄψον cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.) be necessary?I think so.The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.Yes.And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?By all means.And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[*](For κολαζομένη cf. 571 B, Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.) and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and sobriety?Nay, most rightly.And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[*](Lit. money-making. Cf. 558 D.) because they help production?Surely.And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?The same.And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[*](For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.) with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?Why, surely.To return, then, said I, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way. How? When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[*](αἴθων occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, Die Ironie des Sokrates,Sokrates, 11, p. 94 Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt. (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)) and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[*](Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.) and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. Quite inevitably, he said. May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[*](Cf. 554 D.) group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul? By all means, he said.

And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[*](For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. (Loeb tr.)) comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[*](Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.) and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself.Surely.And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[*](τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, Gorg. 499 C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450 C, Laws 626 E, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.) expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.That sometimes happens, he said. And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong. Yes, that is wont to be the way of it. And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude. Yes indeed. And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[*](Cf. Tim. 90 A.) of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians[*](For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. Laws 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on Phaedo 113 D, What Plato Said, p. 536.) in the minds of men who are dear to the gods. Much the best, he said. And then false and braggart words[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D.) and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth. They do indeed. And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[*](Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. Rep. 415 D γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181 A ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέσιν. So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.) and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[*](βοήθεια: cf. Aristot. De an. 404 a 12.) comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe folly[*](Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat.C 52 iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus, etc.) thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call want of manhood and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are rusticity and illiberality, and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[*](ὑπερορίζουσι: Cf. Laws 855 C ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 D.) They do indeed. And when they have emptied and purged[*](Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 D, Soph. 226 D.) of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[*](κατέχομαι is used of divine possession or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 E, Ion 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.) and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[*](Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 C, Symp. 210 A and 218 B, Theaet. 155 E-156 A, Laws 666 B, 870 D-E, Phaedr. 250 B-C, 249 C, Phaedo 81 A, 69 C, Rep. 378 A, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 E.) they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[*](Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.) in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence good breeding, licence liberty, prodigality magnificence, and shamelessness manly spirit.

And is it not in some such way as this, said I, that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires? Yes, your description is most vivid, said he. Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,[*](For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.) and so lives turning over the guard-house[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. ibid, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.) of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[*](Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.) Quite so. And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[*](An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 E, Phileb. 13 B ff., Protag. 353 D ff., Laws 733.) and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[*](The Greek Says throws back his head—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.) at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct. And does he not, said I, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[*](For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, Laws 790 E, Lucian, Bis acc. 17, and for the passive Eur. I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. 3 μολπαῖσι δ’ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.) and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[*](Cf. Protag. 319 D.) and says and does whatever enters his head.[*](For ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f,ὅταν τύχῃEurip. Hippol. 428, I. T. 722, Eurip. Fr. 825 (Didot),ὅπου ἂν τύχωσινXen. Oec. 20. 28,ὃν ἂν τύχῃςEurip. Tor. 68.) And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end. That is a perfect description, he said, of a devotee of equality. I certainly think, said I, that he is a manifold[*](παντοδαπόν: cf. on 557 C.) man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[*](Cf. 557 D.) he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. Yes, that is so, he said.

Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?Let that be his place, he said. And now, said I, the fairest[*](For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, 544 C γενναία, 558 C ἡδεῖα.) polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant. Certainly, he said. Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[*](τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 D, Epist. vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident. That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.) That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain. Yes, plain. Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy? How is that? The good that they proposed to themselves[*](Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. Cf. Laws 962 E with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note c on 519 C (σκοπός).) and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[*](Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.) was it not? Yes. Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. True, he said. And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[*](Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.) too? What do you say its criterion to be? Liberty,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.) I replied; for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[*](Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato’s Republic. ) Why, yes, he replied, you hear that saying everywhere. Then, as I was about to observe,[*](ᾖα . . . ἐρῶν: cf. 449 A, Theaet. 180 C.) is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship? How? he said. Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders[*](Or protectors, tribunes,προστατούντων. Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.) and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[*](Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem, Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 male dispensata libertas, Taine, Letter,Jan. 2, 1867 nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.) and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[*](μιαρούς is really stronger, pestilential fellows. Cf. Apol. 23 D, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.) oligarchs.[*](For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. Peace 51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 158.) Yes, that is what they do, he replied. But those who obey the rulers, I said, it reviles as willing slaves[*](Cf. Symp. 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 Servitude that hugs her chain.) and men of naught,[*](For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 C, Apol. 41 E, Symp. 216 E, Gorg. 512 C, Erastae 134 C, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ii. 7. 102 nil ego, Eurip. I. A. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες ἐόντες.) but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths[*](Cf. Laws 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr. 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.)? Of course. And this anarchical temper, said I, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[*](Cf. 563 C, Laws 942 D.) Just what do we mean by that? he said.