Republic

And did we not just now see that to feel neither pain nor pleasure is a quietude of the soul and an intermediate state between the two?Yes, we did.How, then, can it be right to think the absence of pain pleasure, or the absence of joy painful?In no way.This is not a reality, then, but an illusion, said I; in such case the quietude in juxtaposition[*](Cf. 586 C, and Phileb. 42 B and 41 E.) with the pain appears pleasure, and in juxtaposition with the pleasure pain. And these illusions have no real bearing[*](For οὐδὲν ὑγιές in this sense cf. on 523 B.) on the truth of pleasure, but are a kind of jugglery.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 C-D, Xen. Oecon. 1. 20 προσποιούμεναι ἡδοναὶ εἶναι, etc.) So at any rate our argument signifies, he said. Take a look, then, said I, at pleasures which do not follow on pain, so that you may not haply suppose for the present that it is the nature of pleasure to be a cessation from pain and pain from pleasure. Where shall I look, he said, and what pleasures do you mean? There are many others, I said, and especially, if you please to note them, the pleasures connected with smell.[*](For the idea that smells are not conditioned by pain Cf. Tim. 65 A, Phileb. 51 B and E, and Siebeck, Platon als Kritiker Aristotelischer Ansichten, p. 161.) For these with no antecedent pain[*](Cf. Gorg. 493-494, Phileb. 42 C ff., and Phaedr. 258 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 267 overlooks.) suddenly attain an indescribable intensity, and their cessation leaves no pain after them. Most true, he said. Let us not believe, then, that the riddance of pain is pure pleasure or that of pleasure pain. No, we must not. Yet, surely, said I, the affections that find their way through the body[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Phaedr. 258 E, Vol. I. p. 8, note a, on 328 D, and p. 8, note b.) to the soul[*](Cf. Tim. 45 D (of sensations)μέχρι τῆς ψυχῆς, Laws 673 A, Rep. 462 C πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν τεταμένη. Cf. also Phileb. 33 D-E, 34, 43 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 608.) and are called pleasures are, we may say, the most and the greatest of them, of this type, in some sort releases from pain.[*](Cf. Phileb. 44 B, 44 C λυπῶν . . . ἀποφυγάς, Protag. 354 B.)? Yes, they are. And is not this also the character of the anticipatory pleasures and pains that precede them and arise from the expectation of them? It is. Do you know, then, what their quality is and what they most resemble? What? he said. Do you think that there is such a thing in nature[*](For ἐν τῇ φύσει Cf. Parmen. 132 D.) as up and down and in the middle? I do. Do you suppose, then, that anyone who is transported from below to the center would have any other opinion than that he was moving upward[*](For the purposes of his illustration Plato takes the popular view of up and down, which is corrected in Tim. 62 C-D and perhaps by the ironical δή in Phaedo 112 C. Cf. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.)i. p. 428.)? And if he took his stand at the center and looked in the direction from which he had been transported, do you think he would suppose himself to be anywhere but above, never having seen that which is really above? No, by Zeus, he said, I do not think that such a person would have any other notion. And if he were borne back, I said, he would both think himself to be moving downward and would think truly. Of course. And would not all this happen to him because of his non-acquaintance with the true and real up and down and middle? Obviously.

Would it surprise you, then, said I, if similarly men without experience of truth and reality hold unsound opinions about many other matters, and are so disposed towards pleasure and pain and the intermediate neutral condition that, when they are moved in the direction of the painful, they truly think themselves to be, and really are, in a state of pain, but, when they move from pain to the middle and neutral state, they intensely believe that they are approaching fulfillment and pleasure, and just as if, in ignorance of white, they were comparing grey with black,[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 1011 b 30-31 and Eth. Nic. 1154 a 30 διὰ τὸ παρὰ τὸ ἐναντίον φαίνεσθαι.) so, being inexperienced in true pleasure, they are deceived by viewing painlessness in its relation to pain? No, by Zeus, he said, it would not surprise me, but far rather if it were not so. In this way, then, consider it.[*](The argument from the parallel of body and mind here belongs to what we have called confirmation. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 78 B, The figurative use of repletion and nutrition is not to be pressed in proof of contradictions with the Philebus or Gorgias. Cf. Matthew v. 6 Hunger and thirst after righteousness.) Are not hunger and thirst and similar states inanitions or emptinesses[*](For κενώσεις Cf. Phileb. 35 B, 42 C-D, Tim. 65 A.) of the bodily habit? Surely. And is not ignorance and folly in turn a kind of emptiness of the habit of the soul? It is indeed. And he who partakes of nourishment[*](For the figure of nourishment of the soul Cf. Protag. 313 D, Phaedr. 248 B, and Soph. 223 E.) and he who gets, wisdom fills the void and is filled? Of course. And which is the truer filling and fulfillment, that of the less or of the more real being? Evidently that of the more real. And which of the two groups or kinds do you think has a greater part in pure essence, the class of foods, drinks, and relishes and nourishment generally, or the kind of true opinion,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.) knowledge and reason,[*](Different kinds of intelligence are treated as synonyms because for the present purpose their distinctions are irrelevant. Cf. 511 A, C, and D διάνοια. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 43 and p. 47, n. 339. Plato does not distinguish synonyms nor virtual synonyms for their own sake as Prodicus did. Cf. Protag. 358 A-B.) and, in sum, all the things that are more excellent[*](Cf. Symp. 209 A φρόνησίν τε καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.)? Form your judgement thus. Which do you think more truly is, that which clings to what is ever like itself and immortal and to the truth, and that which is itself of such a nature and is born in a thing of that nature, or that which clings to what is mortal and never the same and is itself such and is born in such a thing? That which cleaves to what is ever the same far surpasses, he said. Does the essence of that which never abides the same partake of real essence any more than of knowledge? By no means. Or of truth and reality? Not of that, either. And if a thing has less of truth has it not also less of real essence or existence? Necessarily. And is it not generally true that the kinds concerned with the service of the body partake less of truth and reality than those that serve the soul? Much less. And do you not think that the same holds of the body itself in comparison with the soul? I do. Then is not that which is fulfilled of what more truly is, and which itself more truly is, more truly filled and satisfied than that which being itself less real is filled with more unreal things? Of course. If, then, to be filled with what befits nature is pleasure, then that which is more really filled with real things would more really and truly cause us to enjoy a true pleasure, while that which partakes of the less truly existent would be less truly and surely filled and would partake of a less trustworthy and less true pleasure. Most inevitably, he said.

Then those who have no experience of wisdom and virtue but are ever devoted to[*](For ξυνόντες see Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 1404.) feastings and that sort of thing are swept downward, it seems, and back again to the center, and so sway and roam[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 528, on Phaedo 79 C for πλανάω of error in thought. This is rather the errare of Lucretius ii. 10 and the post-Aristotelian schools.) to and fro throughout their lives, but they have never transcended all this and turned their eyes to the true upper region nor been wafted there, nor ever been really filled with real things, nor ever tasted[*](Cf. on 576 A ἄγευστος, and for the thought of the whole sentence cf. Dio Chrys. Or. xiii., Teubner, vol. i. p. 240.) stable and pure pleasure, but with eyes ever bent upon the earth[*](Cf. Milton, Comus, Ne’er looks to heaven amid its gorgeous feast, Rossetti, Nineveh, in fine, That set gaze never on the sky, etc. Cf. S. O. Dickermann, De Argumentis quibusdam ap. Xenophontem, Platonem, Aristotelem obviis e structura hominis et animalium petitis, Halle, 1909, who lists Plato’s Symp. 190 A, Rep. 586 A, Cratyl. 396 B, 409 C, Tim. 90 A, 91 E, and many other passages.) and heads bowed down over their tables they feast like cattle,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1095 b 20 βοσκημάτων βίον. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611, on Phileb., in fine.) grazing and copulating, ever greedy for more of these delights; and in their greed[*](Cf. 373 E, Phaedo 66 C ff., Berkeley, Siris 330 For these things men fight, cheat, and scramble.) kicking and butting one another with horns and hooves of iron they slay one another in sateless avidity, because they are vainly striving to satisfy with things that are not real the unreal and incontinent part[*](τὸ στέγον: Cf. Gorg. 493 B, Laws 714 A.) of their souls.You describe in quite oracular style,[*](Plato laughs at himself. Cf. 509 C and 540 B-C. The picturesque, allegorical style of oracles was proverbial. For χρησμῳδεῖν Cf. Crat. 396 D, Apol. 39 C, Laws 712 A.) Socrates, said Glaucon, the life of the multitude. And are not the pleasures with which they dwell inevitably commingled with pains, phantoms of true pleasure, illusions of scene-painting, so colored by contrary juxtaposition[*](Cf. on 584 A, p. 384, note a.) as to seem intense in either kind, and to beget mad loves of themselves in senseless souls, and to be fought for,[*](For περιμαχήτους cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1168 b 19, Eth. Eud. 1248 b 27, and on 521 A, p. 145, note e.) as Stesichorus says the wraith of Helen[*](For the Stesichorean legend that the real Helen remained in Egypt while only her phantom went to Troy Cf. Phaedr. 243 A-B, Eurip. Hel. 605 ff., Elect. 1282-1283, Isoc. Hel. 64, and Philologus 55, pp. 634 ff. Dümmler, Akademika p. 55, thinks this passage a criticism of Isoc. Helena 40. Cf. also Teichmüller, Lit. Fehden, i. pp. 113 ff. So Milton, Reason of Church Government, A lawny resemblance of her like that air-born Helena in the fables. For the ethical symbolism Cf. 520 C-D.) was fought for at Troy through ignorance of the truth? It is quite inevitable, he said, that it should be so. So, again, must not the like hold of the high-spirited element, whenever a man succeeds in satisfying that part of his nature—his covetousness of honor by envy, his love of victory by violence, his ill-temper by indulgence in anger, pursuing these ends without regard to consideration and reason? The same sort of thing, he said, must necessarily happen in this case too. Then, said I, may we not confidently declare that in both the gain-loving and the contentious part of our nature all the desires that wait upon knowledge and reason, and, pursuing their pleasures in conjunction with them,[*](Cf. Phaedo 69 B, and Theaet. 176 B μετὰ φρονήσεως.) take only those pleasures which reason approves,[*](ἐξηγῆται has a religious tone. See on ἐξηγητής427 C. Cf. 604 B.) will, since they follow truth, enjoy the truest[*](Cf. on 583 B, p. 380, note b.) pleasures, so far as that is possible for them, and also the pleasures that are proper to them and their own, if for everything that which is best may be said to be most its own[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 491, on Lysis 221 E.)? But indeed, he said, it is most truly its very own.

Then when the entire soul accepts the guidance of the wisdom-loving part and is not filled with inner dissension,[*](Cf. 352 A, 440 B and E, 442 D, 560 A, Phaedr. 237 E.) the result for each part is that it in all other respects keeps to its own task[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480 on Charm. 161 B.) and is just, and likewise that each enjoys its own proper pleasures and the best pleasures and, so far as such a thing is possible,[*](For εἰς τὸ δυνατόν cf. 500 D, 381 C, Laws 795 D, 830 B, 862 B, 900 C.) the truest.Precisely so.And so when one of the other two gets the mastery the result for it is that it does not find its own proper pleasure and constrains the others to pursue an alien pleasure and not the true.That is so, he said. And would not that which is furthest removed from philosophy and reason be most likely to produce this effect[*](What follows (587 B-588 A) is not to be taken too seriously. It illustrates the method of procedure by minute links, the satisfaction of Plato’s feelings by confirmations and analogies, and his willingness to play with mathematical symbolism. Cf. 546 B f. and William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 55: Finally the whole thing is a satire on the humbug of mystical number, but I need not add that the German commentators are seriously exercised. . . . See however A. G. Laird in Class. Phil. xi. (1916) pp. 465-468.)? Quite so, he said. And is not that furthest removed from reason which is furthest from law and order? Obviously. And was it not made plain that the furthest removed are the erotic and tyrannical appetites? Quite so. And least so the royal and orderly? Yes. Then the tyrant’s place, I think, will be fixed at the furthest remove[*](Cf. Polit. 257 B ἀφεστᾶσιν ) from true and proper pleasure, and the king’s at the least. Necessarily. Then the tyrant’s life will be least pleasurable and the king’s most. There is every necessity of that. Do you know, then, said I, how much less pleasurably the tyrant lives than the king? I’ll know if you tell me,[*](Cf. Vil. I. p. 282, note a, on 408 D and p. 344, note b, on 573 D.) he said. There being as it appears three pleasures, one genuine and two spurious, the tyrant in his flight from law and reason crosses the border beyond[*](For εἰς τὸ ἐπέκεινα Cf. Phaedo 112 B and 509 B.) the spurious, cohabits with certain slavish, mercenary pleasures, and the measure of his inferiority is not easy to express except perhaps thus. How? he said. The tyrant, I believe, we found at the third remove from the oligarch, for the democrat came between. Yes. And would he not also dwell with a phantom of pleasure in respect of reality three stages removed from that other, if all that we have said is true? That is so. And the oligarch in turn is at the third remove from the royal man if we assume the identity of the aristocrat and the king.[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 422, note b, on 445 D and Menex. 238 D.) Yes, the third. Three times three, then, by numerical measure is the interval that separates the tyrant from true pleasure. Apparently. The phantom[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C εἰδώλων, where Olympiodorus (Norvin, p. 36) takes it of the unreality of the lower pleasures.) of the tyrant’s pleasure is then by longitudinal mensuration a plane number. Quite so. But by squaring and cubing it is clear what the interval of this separation becomes. It is clear, he said, to a reckoner. Then taking it the other way about, if one tries to express the extent of the interval between the king and the tyrant in respect of true pleasure he will find on completion of the multiplication that he lives 729 times as happily and that the tyrant’s life is more painful by the same distance.[*](Cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, p. 14 Hence estimating life by multiplying its length into its breadth. For the mathematical jest Cf. Polit. 257 A-B.)

An overwhelming[*](Humorous as in 509 C ὑπερβολῆς.) and baffling calculation, he said, of the difference[*](Cf. Phileb. 13 A, 14 A, Parmen. 141 C, Theaet. 209 A and D.) between the just and the unjust man in respect of pleasure and pain! And what is more, it is a true number and pertinent to the lives of men if days and nights and months and years pertain to them. They certainly do, he said. Then if in point of pleasure the victory of the good and just man over the bad and unjust is so great as this, he will surpass him inconceivably in decency and beauty of life and virtue. Inconceivably indeed, by Zeus, he said. Very good, said I. And now that we have come to this point in the argument, let us take up again the statement with which we began and that has brought us to this pass.[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. 472 B, Phileb. 27 C, and p. 339 note e, on 572 B.) It was, I believe, averred that injustice is profitable to the completely unjust[*](Cf. 348 B, 361 A.) man who is reputed just. Was not that the proposition? Yes, that. Let us, then, reason with its proponent now that we have agreed on the essential nature of injustice and just conduct. How? he said. By fashioning in our discourse a symbolic image of the soul, that the maintainer of that proposition may see precisely what it is that he was saying. What sort of an image? he said. One of those natures that the ancient fables tell of, said I, as that of the Chimaera[*](Cf. Homer, Il. vi. 179-182, Phaedr. 229 D.) or Scylla[*](Od. xii. 85 ff.) or Cerberus,[*](Hesiod, Theog. 311-312.) and the numerous other examples that are told of many forms grown together in one. Yes, they do tell of them. Mould, then, a single shape of a manifold and many-headed beast[*](Stallbaum ad loc. gives a long list of writers who imitated this passage. Hesiod, Theog. 823 f., portrays a similar monster in Typhoeus, who had a hundred serpent-heads. For the animal in man c. Tim. 70 E, Charm. 155 D-E, Phaedr. 230 A, 246 A ff., Boethius, Cons. iv. 2-3, Horace Epist. i. 1. 76, Iamblichus, Protrept. chap. iii.) that has a ring of heads of tame and wild beasts and can change them and cause to spring forth from itself all such growths. It is the task of a cunning artist,[*](Cf. 596 C.) he said, but nevertheless, since speech is more plastic than wax[*](Cf. Cic. De or. iii. 45 sicut mollissimam ceram . . . fingimus. Otto, 80, says it is a proverb. For the development of this figure cf. Pliny, Epist. vii. 9 ut laus est cerae, mollis cedensque sequatur. For the idea that word is more precise or easy than deed Cf. 473 A, Phaedo 99 E, Laws 636 A, 736 B, Tim. 19 E.) and other such media, assume that it has been so fashioned. Then fashion one other form of a lion and one of a man and let the first be far the largest[*](Cf. 442 A.) and the second second in size. That is easier, he said, and is done. Join the three in one, then, so as in some sort to grow together. They are so united, he said. Then mould about them outside the likeness of one, that of the man, so that to anyone who is unable to look within[*](Cf. 577 A.) but who can see only the external sheath it appears to be one living creature, the man. The sheath is made fast about him, he said.

Let us, then say to the speaker who avers that it pays this man to be unjust, and that to do justice is not for his advantage, that he is affirming nothing else than that it profits him to feast and make strong the multifarious beast and the lion and all that pertains to the lion, but to starve the man[*](The whole passage illustrates the psychology of 440 B ff.) and so enfeeble him that he can be pulled about[*](Cf. Protag. 352 C περιελκομένης, with Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1145 b 24.) whithersoever either of the others drag him, and not to familiarize or reconcile with one another the two creatures but suffer them to bite and fight and devour one another.[*](Perhaps a latent allusion to Hesiod, Works and Days 278.)Yes, he said, that is precisely what the panegyrist of injustice will be found to say. And on the other hand he who says that justice is the more profitable affirms that all our actions and words should tend to give the man within us[*](Cf. the inward man, Romans vii. 22, 2 Cor. iv. 16, Ephes. iii. 16.) complete domination[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 10 Religion says: The kingdom of God is within you; and culture, in like manner, places human perfection in an internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as distinguished from our animality.) over the entire man and make him take charge[*](Cf. Gorg. 516 A-B.) of the many-headed beast—like a farmer[*](Cf. Theaet. 167 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 456, on Euthyphro 2 D.) who cherishes and trains the cultivated plants but checks the growth of the wild—and he will make an ally[*](Cf. 441 A.) of the lion’s nature, and caring for all the beasts alike will first make them friendly to one another and to himself, and so foster their growth. Yes, that in turn is precisely the meaning of the man who commends justice. From every point of view, then, the panegyrist of justice speaks truly and the panegyrist of injustice falsely. For whether we consider pleasure, reputation, or profit, he who commends justice speaks the truth, while there is no soundness or real knowledge of what he censures in him who disparages it. None whatever, I think, said he. Shall we, then, try to persuade him gently,[*](πράως: cf. the use of ἠρέμα476 E, 494 D.) for he does not willingly err,[*](Plato always maintains that wrong-doing is involuntary and due to ignorance. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 640 on Laws 860 D.) by questioning him thus: Dear friend, should we not also say that the things which law and custom deem fair or foul have been accounted so for a like reason— the fair and honorable things being those that subject the brutish part of our nature to that which is human in us, or rather, it may be, to that which is divine,[*](Cf. 501 B, Tennyson, Locksley Hall Sixty Years after, in fine, The highest Human Nature is divine.) while the foul and base are the things that enslave the gentle nature to the wild? Will he assent or not? He will if he is counselled by me. Can it profit any man in the light of this thought to accept gold unjustly if the result is to be that by the acceptance he enslaves the best part of himself to the worst? Or is it conceivable that, while, if the taking of the gold enslaved his son or daughter and that too to fierce and evil men, it would not profit him,[*](Cf. Matt. xvi.26, Mark viii. 36, What shall it profit a man if he shall gain the whole world and lose his own soul? A typical argumentum ex contrario. Cf. 445 A-B and Vol. I. p. 40, note c. On the supreme value of the soul Cf. Laws 726-728, 743 E, 697 B, 913 B, 959 A-B. Cf. 585 D.) no matter how large the sum, yet that, if the result is to be the ruthless enslavement of the divinest part of himself to the most despicable and godless part, he is not to be deemed wretched and is not taking the golden bribe much more disastrously than Eriphyle[*](Cf. Od. xi. 326, Frazer on Apollodorus iii. 6. 2 (Loeb). Stallbaum refers also to Pindar, Nem. ix. 37 ff, and Pausan. x. 29. 7.) did when she received the necklace as the price[*](For ἐπί in this sense cf. Thompson on Meno 90 D. Cf. Apol. 41 A ἐπὶ πόσῳ, Demosth. xlv. 66.) of her husband’s life?

Far more, said Glaucon, for I will answer you in his behalf. And do you not think that the reason for the old objection to licentiousness is similarly because that sort of thing emancipates that dread,[*](See Adam ad loc. on the asyndeton.) that huge and manifold beast overmuch? Obviously, he said. And do we not censure self-will[*](αὐθάδεια: Cf. 548 E.) and irascibility when they foster and intensify disproportionately the element of the lion and the snake[*](Not mentioned before, but, as Schleiermacher says, might be included in τὰ περὶ τὸν λέοντα. Cf. Adam ad loc. Or Plato may be thinking of the chimaera (Il. vi. 181 ).) in us? By all means. And do we not reprobate luxury and effeminacy for their loosening and relaxation of this same element when they engender cowardice in it? Surely. And flattery and illiberality when they reduce this same high-spirited element under the rule of the mob-like beast and habituate it for the sake of wealth and the unbridled lusts of the beast to endure all manner of contumely from youth up and become an ape[*](Cf. 620 C.) instead of a lion? Yes, indeed, he said. And why do you suppose that base mechanic[*](Cf. p. 49, note e.) handicraft is a term of reproach? Shall we not say that it is solely when the best part is naturally weak in a man so that it cannot govern and control the brood of beasts within him but can only serve them and can learn nothing but the ways of flattering them? So it seems, he said. Then is it not in order that such an one may have a like government with the best man that we say he ought to be the slave of that best man[*](For the idea that it is better to be ruled by a better man Cf. Alc. I. 135 B-C, Polit. 296 B-C, Democr. fr. 75 (Diels ii.3 p. 77), Xen. Mem. i. 5. 5 δουλεύοντα δὲ ταῖς τοιαύταις ἡδοναῖς ἱκετευτέον τοὺς θεοὺς δεσποτῶν ἀγαθῶν τυχεῖν, Xen. Cyr. viii. 1. 40 βελτίονας εἶναι. Cf. also Laws 713 D-714 A, 627 E, Phaedo 62 D-E, and Laws 684 C. Cf. Ruskin, Queen of the Air, p. 210 (Brantwood ed., 1891): The first duty of every man in the world is to find his true master, and, for his own good, submit to him; and to find his true inferior, and, for that inferior’s good, conquer him. Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 252: It is ordained in the eternal constitution of things, that men of intemperate minds cannot be free. Carlyle (apud M. Barton and O. Sitwell, Victoriana): Surely of all the rights of man the right of the ignorant man to be guided by the wiser, to be gently or forcibly held in the true course by him, is the indisputablest. Plato’s idea is perhaps a source of Aristotle’s theory of slavery, though differently expressed. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1254 b 16 f., Newman i. pp. 109-110, 144 f., 378-379, ii. p. 107. Cf. also Polit. 309 A f., Epist. vii. 335 D, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, iii. p. 106.) who has within himself the divine governing principle, not because we suppose, as Thrasymachus[*](Cf. 343 B-C.) did in the case of subjects, that the slave should be governed for his own harm, but on the ground that it is better for everyone to be governed by the divine and the intelligent, preferably indwelling and his own, but in default of that imposed from without, in order that we all so far as possible may be akin and friendly because our governance and guidance are the same? Yes, and rightly so, he said. And it is plain, I said, that this is the purpose of the law, which is the ally of all classes in the state,

and this is the aim of our control of children,[*](Cf. Lysis 207 E f., Laws 808 D, Isoc.xv. 290, Antiphon, fr. 61 (Diels ii.3 p. 303).) our not leaving them free before we have established, so to speak, a constitutional government within them[*](Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.) and, by fostering the best element in them with the aid of the like in ourselves, have set up in its place a similar guardian and ruler in the child, and then, and then only, we leave it free.Yes, that is plain, he said. In what way,[*](Cf. on 501 D, p. 74, note a.) then, Glaucon, and on what principle, shall we say that it profits a man to be unjust or licentious or do any shameful thing that will make him a worse man, but otherwise will bring him more wealth or power? In no way, he said. And how that it pays him to escape detection in wrongdoing and not pay the penalty[*](The paradoxes of the Gorgias are here seriously reaffirmed. Cf. especially Gorg. 472 E ff., 480 A-B, 505 A-B, 509 A f. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 187, 380 B οἱ δὲ ὠνίναντο κολαζόμενοι, and Laws 728 C; and for the purpose of punishment, What Plato Said, p. 495, on Protag. 324 A-B.)? Or is it not true that he who evades detection becomes a still worse man, while in the one who is discovered and chastened the brutish part is lulled and tamed and the gentle part liberated, and the entire soul, returning to its nature at the best, attains to a much more precious condition in acquiring sobriety and righteousness together with wisdom, than the body[*](The a fortiori argument from health of body to health of soul is one of the chief refutations of the immoralists. Cf. 445 D-E f., Gorg. 479 B, Crito 47 D-E. For the supreme importance of the soul cf. on 589 E.) does when it gains strength and beauty conjoined with health, even as the soul is more precious than the body? Most assuredly, he said. Then the wise man will bend all his endeavors[*](Cf. Gorg. 507 D, Isoc. Epist. vi. 9, Xen. Ages. 7. 1.) to this end throughout his life; he will, to begin with, prize the studies that will give this quality to his soul and disprize the others. Clearly, he said. And then, I said, he not only will not abandon the habit and nurture of his body to the brutish and irrational pleasure and live with his face set in that direction, but he will not even make health his chief aim,[*](Health in the familiar skolion (Cf. Gorg. 451 E, Laws 631 C, 661 A, 728 D-E, Euthydem. 279 A-B, Meno 87 E, Soph. frag. 356) is proverbially the highest of ordinary goods. Cf. Gorg. 452 A-B, Crito 47 D, Eryxias 393 C. In fact, for Plato as for modern scientific ethics, health in the higher sense—the health of the soul—may be said to be the ultimate sanction. Cf. Vol. I. Introd. pp. xvi and xxi, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 26, Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, pp. 192-194 f. But an idealistic ethics sometimes expresses itself in the paradox that not even health, highest of earthly goods, is of any value compared with the true interests of the soul. Cf. Laws 661 C-E ff., 728 D-E, 744 A, 960 D, Laches 195 C; and Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 17 Bodily health and vigor . . . have a more real and essential value . . . but only as they are more intimately connected with a perfect spiritual condition than wealth and population are. This idea may be the source of the story from which the Christian Fathers and the Middle Ages derived much edification, that Plato intentionally chose an unhealthy site for the Academy in order to keep down the flesh. Cf. Aelian, Var. Hist. ix. 10, perhaps the first mention, Porphyry, De abstinentia i. 36, Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1.4 416, n. 2; Camden on Cambridge, Gosse, Gossip in a Library, p. 23, and Himerius, Ecl. iii. 18 (Diels ii.3 p. 18)ἑκὼν δὲ ἐνόσει σῶμα Δημόκριτος, ἵνα ὑγιαίνῃ τὰ κρείττονα.) nor give the first place to the ways of becoming strong or healthy or beautiful unless these things are likely to bring with them soberness of spirit, but he will always be found attuning the harmonies of his body for the sake of the concord in his soul.[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 485, on Laches 188 D.) By all means, he replied, if he is to be a true musician.[*](Cf. Phaedo 61 A.) And will he not deal likewise with the ordering and harmonizing of his possessions? He will not let himself be dazzled[*](Cf. p. 355, note d, on 576 D.) by the felicitations of the multitude and pile up the mass[*](ὄγκον: cf. Horace’s use of acervus, Shorey on Odes ii. 2. 24.) of his wealth without measure,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 163, note g, Newman i. p. 136. For the evils of wealth Cf. Laws 831 C ff., 870 B-C, Rep. 434 B, 550 D ff., etc.) involving himself in measureless ills. No, I think not, he said. He will rather, I said, keep his eyes fixed on the constitution in his soul,[*](This analogy pervades the Republic. Cf. 570 C and p. 240, note b, on 544 D-E, Introd. Vol. I. p. xxxv. Cf. ὥσπερ ἐν πόλει 590 E, 605 B. For the subordination of everything to the moral life cf. also 443 D and p. 509, note d, on 618 C.) and taking care and watching lest he disturb anything there either by excess or deficiency of wealth,[*](As in the state, extremes of wealth and poverty are to be avoided. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 645, on Laws 915 B.) will so steer his course and add to or detract from his wealth on this principle, so far as may be. Precisely so, he said.

And in the matter of honors and office too this will be his guiding principle: He will gladly take part in and enjoy those which he thinks will make him a better man, but in public and private life he will shun those that may overthrow the established habit[*](Almost Aristotle’s use of ἕξις.) of his soul.Then, if that is his chief concern, he said, he will not willingly take part in politics.[*](Cf. pp. 52-55 on 496 D-E. The later schools debated the question whether the sage would take part in politics. Cf. Seneca, De otio. xxx. 2 f. and Von Arnim, Stoic Vet. Frag. i. p. 62. 22 f.: Zenon ait: accedet ad rempublicam (sapiens), nisi si quid impedierit; ibid. iii. p. 158. 31 ff.: consentaneum est huic naturae, ut sapiens velit gerere et administrare rempublicam atque, ut e natura vivat, uxorem adiungere et velle ex ea liberos; ibid. p. 174. 32: negant nostri sapientem ad quamlibet rempublicam accessurum; ibid. 37 ff.: praeterea, cum sapienti rempublicam ipso dignam dedimus, id est mundum, non est extra rempublicam, etiamsi recesserit; ibid. iii. p. 157. 40 ff. ἑπόμενον δὲ τούτοις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τὸ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφὸν καὶ μάλιστ’ ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις πολιτείαις ταῖς ἐμφαινούσαις τινὰ προκοπὴν πρὸς τὰς τελείας πολιτείας ibid. p. 172. 18 f. δεύτερον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύεσθαι γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον. . . ; ibid. 173. 19 ff. ἔφαμεν δ’ ὅτι καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον οἷον ἐστι. μὴ πολιτεύεσθαι δὲ ἐάν τι κωλύῃ καὶ μάλιστ’ ἂν μηδὲν ὠφφελεῖν μέλλη τὴν πατρίδα, κινδύνους δὲ παρακολουθεῖν ὑπολαμβάνῃ μεγάλους καὶ χαλεποὺς ἐκ τῆς πολιτείας; ibid. p. 175. 3 f. πολιτεύεσθαι φασὶ τὸν σοφὸν ἂν μή τι κωλύη, ὥς φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν πρώτῳ περὶ βίων; ibid. 6 ff. Χρύσιππος δὲ πάλιν ἐν τῷ Περὶ Ῥητορικῆς γράφων, οὕτω ῥντορεύσειν καὶ πολιτεύεσθαι τὸν σοφόν, ὡς καὶ τοῦ πλούτου ὄντος ἀγαθοῦ, καὶ τῆς δόξης καὶ τῆς ὑγείας) Yes, by the dog,[*](Cf. on 399 E, Phaedr. 228 B, Gorg. 466 C, 461 A, 482 B, Phaedo 98 E, 567 E.) said I, in his own city he certainly will, yet perhaps not in the city of his birth, except in some providential conjuncture.[*](θεία . . . τύχη. So θεῖα μοῖρα is often used to account for an exception, e.g.493 A, Laws 875 C, 642 C, Meno 99 E, etc. Cf. θεῖον . . . ἐξαιρῶμεν λόγου 492 E.) I understand, he said; you mean the city whose establishment we have described, the city whose home is in the ideal;[*](Lit. in words. This is one of the most famous passages in Plato, and a source of the idea of the City of God among both Stoics and Christians. Cf. Marc. Aurel. ix. 29 μηδὲ τὴν Πλάτωνος πολιτείαν ἔλπιζε, Justin Martyr’s επὶ γῆς διατρίβουσιν ἀλλ’ ἐν οὐρανῷ πολιτεύονται, which recalls Philippians iii. 20 ἡμῶν δὲ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει and also Heb. xii. 22, xi. 10 and 16, xiii. 14, Eph. ii. 19, Gal. iv. 26, Rev. iii. 12 and xxi. 2 ff. Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Platon, p. 24, compares Luke xvii. 21 the kingdom of God is within you. Cf. also John xviii. 36. Havet, Le Christianisme et ses origines, p. 207, says, Platon dit de sa République précisément ce qu’on a dit plus tard du royaume de Dieu, qu’elle n’est pas de ce monde. Cf. also Caird, Evolution of Theology in Greek Philosophy, ii. p. 170, Harnack, Hist. of Dogma(tr. Buchanan), vol. i. p. 332, ii. pp. 73-74 and 338, Proclus, Comm. 352 (Kroll i. 16); Pater, Marius the Epicurean, p. 212 Marcus Aurelius speaks often of that City on high, of which all other cities are but single habitations . . . , p. 213 . . . the vision of a reasonable, a divine order, not in nature, but in the condition of human affairs, that unseen Celestial City, Uranopolis, Callipolis . . . ;ibid. p. 158 thou hast been a citizen in this wide city, and pp. 192-193. Cf. further Inge, Christian Ethics, pp. 104-105, let us fly hence to our dear country, as the disciples of Plato have repeated one after another. There are a few people who are so well adjusted to their environment that they do not feel, or rarely feel, this nostalgia for the infinite . . . Somewhat different is the Stoic idea of a world state and of the sage as citizen of the world, e.g. Marc. Aurel. iv. 4, Sen. De otio 31, Cic. Nat. deor. ii. 62 (154). Cf. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 92; also ibid. pp. 87-88. For the identification of the πόλις with philosophy cf. Diog. Laert. vi. 15 and vii. 40, Lucian, Hermotim. 22, Sale of Lives 17, Ver. Hist. 17, Proclus i. 16 (Kroll). Diogenes Laertius, ii. 7, reports that, when Anaxagoras was reproached for not concerning himself with the affairs of his country, he replied, Indeed, I am greatly concerned with my country, and pointed to heaven.) for I think that it can be found nowhere on earth.[*](Cf. 499 C-D.) Well, said I, perhaps there is a pattern[*](Cf. Theaet. 176 E, which Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 179 says must refer to the Republic, Laws 739 D-E, 746 B, and What Plato Said, p. 458 on Euthyphro 6 E.) of it laid up in heaven for him who wishes to contemplate it and so beholding to constitute himself its citizen.[*](ἑαυτὸν κατοικίζειν: Adam found a city in himself. See his note ad loc. Cf. Jebb on Soph. Oed. Col. 1004.) But it makes no difference whether it exists now or ever will come into being.[*](Cf. 499 C-D, 472 B-E, and What Plato Said, p. 564.) The politics of this city only will be his and of none other. That seems probable, he said.

And truly, I said, many other considerations assure me that we were entirely right in our organization of the state, and especially, I think, in the matter of poetry.[*](In Book III. On the whole question see Introd. Max. Tyr. Diss. 23 Εἰ καλῶς Πλάτων Ὅμηρον τῆς Πολιτείας παρῃτήσατο, and 32 ἔστι καθ’ Ὅμηρον αἵρεσις. Strabo i. 2 3. Athenaeus v. 12. 187 says that Plato himself in the Symposium wrote worse things than the poets whom he banishes. Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 138, thinks that the return to the poets in Book X. is intended to justify the poetry of Plato’s dialogues. On the banishment of the poets and Homer cf. also Minucius Felix (Halm), pp. 32-33, Tertullian (Oehler), lib. ii. c. 7, Olympiodorus, Hermann vi. p. 367, Augustine, De civ. Dei, ii. xiv.) What about it? he said. In refusing to admit[*](Supra 394 D, 568 B, and on 398 A-B, 607 A.) at all so much of it as is imitative[*](In the narrower sense. Cf. Vol. I. p. 224, note c, on 392 D, and What Plato Said, p. 561.); for that it is certainly not to be received is, I think, still more plainly apparent now that we have distinguished the several parts[*](Lit. species. Cf. 435 B ff., 445 C, 580 D, 588 B ff., Phaedr. 271 D, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 42.) of the soul. What do you mean? Why, between ourselves[*](Cf. Gorg. 462 B, Protag. 309 A, 339 E.)—for you will not betray me to the tragic poets and all other imitators—that kind of art seems to be a corruption[*](Cf. 605 C, Meno 91 C, Laws 890 B.) of the mind of all listeners who do not possess, as an antidote[*](φάρμακον: this passage is the source of Plutarch’s view of literature in education; see Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat 15 C.) a knowledge of its real nature. What is your idea in saying this? he said. I must speak out, I said, though a certain love and reverence for Homer[*](Isoc. ii. 48-49 is perhaps imitating this. For Homer as a source of tragedy cf. also 598 D, 605 C-D, 607 A, 602 B, Theaet. 152 E, schol. Trendelenburg, pp. 75 ff.; Dryden, Discourse on Epic Poetry: The origin of the stage was from the epic poem . . . those episodes of Homer which were proper for the state the poets amplifies each into an action, etc. Cf. Aristot. Poet. 1448 b 35 f., Diog. Laert. iv. 40, and 393 A ff.) that has possessed me from a boy would stay me from speaking. For he appears to have been the first teacher and beginner of all these beauties of tragedy. Yet all the same we must not honor a man above truth,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 532, on Phaedo 91 C, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1096 a 16 ἄμφοιν γὰρ ὄντοιν φίλοιν ὅσιον προτιμᾶν τὴν ἀλήθειαν, Henri-Pierre Cazac, Polémique d’Aristote contre la théorie platonicienne des Idées, p. 11, n.: Platon lui-même, critiquant Homère, . . . fait une semblabe réflexion, On doit plus d’égards à la vérité qu’à un homme. Cousin croit, après Camérarius, que c’est là l’origine du mot célèbre d’Aristote. Cf. St. Augustine, De civ. Dei. x. 30 homini praeposuit veritatem.) but, as I say, speak our minds. By all means, he said. Listen, then, or rather, answer my question. Ask it, he said. Could you tell me in general what imitation is? For neither do I myself quite apprehend what it would be at. It is likely, then,[*](For ἦ που Cf. Phaedo 84 D.) he said, that I should apprehend!

It would be nothing strange, said I, since it often happens that the dimmer vision sees things in advance of the keener.[*](Perhaps a slight failure in Attic courtesy. Cf. Laws 715 D-E, and for ὀξύτερον βλεπόντων927 B, Euthydem. 281 D, Rep. 404 A, Themist. Orat. ii. p. 32 C. Cf. the saying πολλάκι καὶ κηποῦρος ἀνὴρ μάλα καίριον εἶπεν.) That is so, he said; but in your presence I could not even be eager to try to state anything that appears to me, but do you yourself consider it. Shall we, then, start the inquiry at this point by our customary procedure[*](Cf. Phaedo 76 D, 100 B, Phileb. 16 D, 479 E, Thompson on Meno 72 D. See Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1. p. 660. The intentional simplicity of Plato’s positing of the concept here (cf. 597 A), and his transition from the concept to the idea, has been mistaken for a primitive aspect of his thought by many interpreters. It is quite uncritical to use Aristot. Met. 991 b 6 ff. to prove that Plato’s later theory of ideas did not recognize ideas of artefacts, and therefore that this passage represents an earlier phase of the theory. He deliberately expresses the theory as simply as possible, and a manufactured object suits his purpose here as it does in Cratyl. 389. See also ibid, Introd. pp. xxii-xxiii.)? We are in the habit, I take it, of positing a single idea or form[*](Forms with a capital letter is even more misleading than ideas.) in the case of the various multiplicities to which we give the same name. Do you not understand? I do. In the present case, then, let us take any multiplicity you please; for example, there are many couches and tables. Of course. But these utensils imply, I suppose, only two ideas or forms, one of a couch and one of a table. Yes. And are we not also in the habit of saying that the craftsman who produces either of them fixes his eyes[*](Cf. Cratyl. 389 A-B. There is no contradiction, as many say, with 472 D.) on the idea or form, and so makes in the one case the couches and in the other the tables that we use, and similarly of other things? For surely no craftsman makes the idea itself. How could he? By no means. But now consider what name you would give to this craftsman. What one? Him who makes all the things[*](Cf. Emerson, The Poet: and therefore the rich poets—as Homer, Chaucer, Shakespeare and Raphael—have no limits to their riches except the limits of their lifetime, and resemble a mirror carried through the streets ready to render an image of every created thing. (Cf. 596 D-E κάτοπτρον περιφέρειν and Julian, Or. v. 163 D.) Empedocles, fr. 23 (Diels i.3 pp. 234-235): ὡς δ’ ὁπόταν γραφέες . . . δένδρεά τε κτίζοντε καὶ ἀνέρας ἠδὲ γυναῖκας . . . ) that all handicraftsmen severally produce. A truly clever and wondrous man you tell of. Ah, but wait,[*](Climax beyond climax. Cf. on 508 E p. 104, note c.) and you will say so indeed, for this same handicraftsman is not only able to make all implements, but he produces all plants and animals, including himself,[*](It is a tempting error to refer this to God, as I once did, and as Wilamowitz, Platon. i. p. 604 does. So Cudworth, True Intel. System of the Universe, vol. ii. p. 70: Lastly, he is called ὃς πάντα τά τε ἄλλα ἐργάζεται, καὶ ἑαυτόν, he that causeth or produceth both all other things, and even himself. But the producer of everything, including himself, is the imitator generalized and then exemplified by the painter and the poet. Cf. Soph. 234 A-B.) and thereto earth and heaven and the gods and all things in heaven and in Hades under the earth. A most marvellous sophist,[*](Eurip. Hippol. 921 δεινὸν σοφιστὴν εἶπας.) he said. Are you incredulous? said I. Tell me, do you deny altogether the possibility of such a craftsman, or do you admit that in a sense there could be such a creator of all these things, and in another sense not? Or do you not perceive that you yourself would be able to make all these things in a way? And in what way,[*](καὶ τίς is sceptical as in Aristoph. Acharn. 86.) I ask you, he said. There is no difficulty, said I, but it is something that the craftsman can make everywhere and quickly. You could do it most quickly if you should choose to take a mirror and carry it about everywhere. You will speedily produce the sun and all the things in the sky, and speedily the earth and yourself and the other animals and implements and plants and all the objects of which we just now spoke. Yes, he said, the appearance of them, but not the reality and the truth. Excellent, said I, and you come to the aid of the argument opportunely. For I take it that the painter too belongs to this class of producers, does he not? Of course. But you will say, I suppose, that his creations are not real and true. And yet, after a fashion, the painter[*](Art is deception. Diels ii.3 p. 339, Dialex. 3 (10) ἐν γὰρ τραγωιδοποιίᾳ καὶ ζωγραφίᾳ ὅστις κε πλεῖστα ἐξαπατῇ ὅμοια τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς ποιέων, οὗτος ἄριστος, Xen. Mem. iii. 10. 1 γραφική ἐστιν εἰκασία τῶν ὁρωμένων. Cf. Plut. Quomodo adolescens 17 F-18 A on painting and poetry. There are many specious resemblances between Plato’s ideas on art and morality and those of the lunatic fringe of Platonism. Cf. Jane Harrison, Ancient Art and Ritual, pp. 21-22, Charles F. Andrews, Mahatma Gandhi’s Ideas, p. 332. William Temple, Plato and Christianity, p. 89: In the tenth book of the Republic he says that, whereas the artificer in making any material object imitates the eternal idea, an artist only imitates the imitation (595 A-598 D); but in Book V he said that we do not blame an artist who depicts a face more beautiful than any actual human face either is or ever could be (472 D). But this does not affect Plato’s main point here, that the artist imitates the real world, not the world of ideas. The artist’s imitation may fall short of or better its model. But the model is not the (Platonic) idea.) too makes a couch, does he not? Yes, he said, the appearance of one, he too.

What of the cabinet-maker? Were you not just now saying that he does not make the idea or form which we say is the real couch, the couch in itself,[*](ὃ ἔστι belongs to the terminology of ideas. Cf. Phaedo 74 D, 75 B, 75 D, Rep. 507 B.) but only some particular couch?Yes, I was.Then if he does not make that which really is, he could not be said to make real being but something that resembles real being but is not that. But if anyone should say that being in the complete sense[*](τελέως . . . ὄν: Cf. 477 A, and Soph. 248 E παντελῶς ὄντι.) belongs to the work of the cabinet-maker or to that of any other handicraftsman, it seems that he would say what is not true.That would be the view, he said, of those who are versed[*](An indirect reference to Plato and his school like the friends of ideas in Soph. 248 A.) in this kind of reasoning. We must not be surprised, then, if this too is only a dim adumbration in comparison with reality. No, we must not. Shall we, then, use these very examples in our quest for the true nature of this imitator? If you please, he said. We get, then, these three couches, one, that in nature[*](Cf. 597 C, 598 A, 501 B φύσει, Phaedo 103 B, Parmen. 132 D.) which, I take it, we would say that God produces,[*](Proclus says that this is not seriously meant (apud Beckmann, Num Plato artifactorum Ideas statuerit, p. 12). Cf. Zeller, Phil. d. Gr. ii. 1, p. 666, who interprets the passage correctly; A. E. Taylor, in Mind, xii. p. 5 Plato’s meaning has been supposed to be adequately indicted by such half-jocular instances as that of the idea of a bed or table in Republic x., etc.) or who else? No one, I think. And then there was one which the carpenter made. Yes, he said. And one which the painter. Is not that so? So be it. The painter, then, the cabinet-maker, and God, there are these three presiding over three kinds of couches. Yes,three. Now God,whether because he so willed or because some compulsion was laid upon him[*](In Tim. 31 A the same argument is used for the creation of one world ἵνα . . . κατὰ τὴν μόνωσιν ὅμοιον ᾖ τῷ παντελεῖ ζώῳ. See my De Plat. Idearum doct. p. 39. Cf. Renan, Dialogues Phil. p. 25: Pour forger les premières tenailles, dit le Talmud, il fallut des tenailles. Dieu les créa.) not to make more than one couch in nature, so wrought and created one only,[*](The famous argument of the third man. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 585, on Parmen. 132 A and Introd. p. xxiii.) the couch which really and in itself is. But two or more such were never created by God and never will come into being. How so? he said. Because, said I, if he should make only two, there would again appear one of which they both would possess the form or idea, and that would be the couch that really is in and of itself, and not the other two. Right, he said. God, then, I take it, knowing this and wishing to be the real author of the couch that has real being and not of some particular couch, nor yet a particular cabinet-maker, produced it in nature unique. So it seems. Shall we, then, call him its true and natural begetter, or something of the kind? That would certainly be right, he said, since it is by and in nature[*](Cf. Soph. 265 E θήσω τὰ μὲν φύσει λεγόμενα ποιεῖσθαι θείᾳ τέχνῃ, Hooker, Eccles. Pol. i. 3. 4 those things which Nature is said to do are by divine art preformed, using nature as an instrument, Browne, apud J. Texte, Etudes de littérature européenne, p. 65 la nature est l’art de Dieu, Cic. De nat. deor. ii. 13 deoque tribuenda, id est mundo, De leg. i. 7. 21, Seneca, De benef. iv. 7 quid enim aliud est natura quam deus? Höffding, Hist. of Mod. Philos. ii. 115 Herder uses the word Nature in his book in order to avoid the frequent mention of the name of God.) that he has made this and all other things. And what of the carpenter? Shall we not call him the creator of a couch? Yes. Shall we also say that the painter is the creator and maker of that sort of thing? By no means. What will you say he is in relation to the couch? This, said he, seems to me the most reasonable designation for him, that he is the imitator of the thing which those others produce. Very good, said I; the producer of the product three removes[*](Cf. 587 C, Phaedr. 248 E, where the imitator is sixth in the scale.) from nature you call the imitator? By all means, he said. This, then, will apply to the maker of tragedies also, if he is an imitator and is in his nature three removes from the king and the truth, as are all other imitators. It would seem so.

We are in agreement, then, about the imitator. But tell me now this about the painter. Do you think that what he tries to imitate is in each case that thing itself in nature or the works of the craftsmen?The works of the craftsmen, he said. Is it the reality of them or the appearance? Define that further point.[*](Cf. Gorg. 488 D, Soph. 222 C.) What do you mean? he said. This: Does a couch differ from itself according as you view it from the side or the front or in any other way? Or does it differ not at all in fact though it appears different, and so of other things? That is the way of it, he said: it appears other but differs not at all. Consider, then, this very point. To which is painting directed in every case, to the imitation of reality as it is[*](Cf. Soph. 263 B, Cratyl. 385 B, Euthydem. 284 C.) or of appearance as it appears? Is it an imitation of a phantasm or of the truth? Of a phantasm,[*](Cf. 599 A, Soph. 232 A, 234 E, 236 B, Prot. 356 D.) he said. Then the mimetic art is far removed[*](Cf. 581 E.) from truth, and this, it seems, is the reason why it can produce everything, because it touches or lays hold of only a small part of the object and that a phantom[*](For εἴδωλον cf. p. 197, note e.); as, for example, a painter, we say, will paint us a cobbler, a carpenter, and other craftsmen, though he himself has no expertness in any of these arts,[*](Commentators sometimes miss the illogical idiom. So Adam once proposed to emend τεχνῶν to τεχνίτων, but later withdrew this suggestion in his note on the passage. Cf. 373 C, Critias 111 E, and my paper in T.A.P.A. xlvii. (1916) pp. 205-234.) but nevertheless if he were a good painter, by exhibiting at a distance his picture of a carpenter he would deceive children and foolish men,[*](Cf. Soph. 234 B.) and make them believe it to be a real carpenter. Why not? But for all that, my friend, this, I take it, is what we ought to bear in mind in all such cases: When anyone reports to us of someone, that he has met a man who knows all the crafts and everything else[*](So Dryden, Essay on Satire: Shakespeare . . . Homer . . . in either of whom we find all arts and sciences, all moral and natural philosophy without knowing that they ever studied them, and the beautiful rhapsody of Andrew Lang, Letters to Dead Authors, p. 238: They believe not that one human soul has known every art, and all the thoughts of women as of men, etc. Pope, pref. to his translation of the Iliad: If we reflect upon those innumerable knowledges, those secrets of nature and physical philosophy which Homer is generally supposed to have wrapped up in his allegories, what a new and ample scene of wonder may this consideration afford us. Cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 6. Brunetière, Epoques, p. 105, says: Corneille . . . se piquait de connaître à fond l’art de la politique et celui de la guerre. For the impossibility of universal knowledge Cf. Soph. 233 A, Charm. 170 B, Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 146 on Hipp. Min. 366 C ff. Cf. also Ion 536 E, 541 B, 540 B, and Tim. 19 D. Tate, Plato and Allegorical Interpretation, Class. Quarterly, Jan. 1930, p. 2 says: The true poet is for Plato philosopher as well as poet. He must know the truth. This ignores the ἄρα in 598 E. Plato there is not stating his own opinion but giving the arguments of those who claim omniscience for the poet. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 313 n. 1 completely misunderstands and misinterprets the passage. Cf. Class. Phil. xxvii. (1932) p. 85. E.E. Sikes, The Greek View of Poetry, p. 175, says Rymer held that a poet is obliged to know all arts and sciences. Aristotle from a different point of view says we expect the wise man to know everything in the sense in which that is possible, Met. 982 a 8.) that men severally know, and that there is nothing that he does not know[*](Cf. οὐδενὸς ὅτου οὐχί Charm. 175 C, οὐδὲν ὅτι οὐ Ala. I 105 E, Phil. 54 B, Phaedo 110 E, Euthyph. 3 C, Euthydem. 294 D, Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Herod. v. 97.) more exactly than anybody else, our tacit rejoinder must be that he is a simple fellow, who apparently has met some magician or sleight-of-hand man and imitator and has been deceived by him into the belief that he is all-wise,[*](πάσσοφος is generally ironical in Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 489, on Lysis 216 A.) because of his own inability to put to the proof and distinguish knowledge, ignorance[*](For ἀνεπιστημοσύνην Cf. Theaet. 199 E f.) and imitation. Most true, he said. Then, said I, have we not next to scrutinize tragedy and its leader Homer,[*](For Homer as tragedian cf. on 595 B-C, p. 420, note a.) since some people tell us that these poets know all the arts and all things human pertaining to virtue and vice, and all things divine? For the good poet, if he is to poetize things rightly, must, they argue, create with knowledge or else be unable to create.

So we must consider whether these critics have not fallen in with such imitators and been deceived by them, so that looking upon their works they cannot perceive that these are three removes from reality, and easy to produce without knowledge of the truth. For it is phantoms,[*](Cf. on 598 B.) not realities, that they produce. Or is there something in their claim, and do good poets really know the things about which the multitude fancy they speak well?We certainly must examine the matter, he said. Do you suppose, then, that if a man were able to produce both the exemplar and the semblance, he would be eager to abandon himself to the fashioning of phantoms[*](Cf. 598 B.) and set this in the forefront of his life as the best thing he had? I do not. But, I take it, if he had genuine knowledge of the things he imitates he would far rather devote himself to real things[*](Cf. Petit de Julleville, Hist. lit. francaise vii. p. 233, on the poet Lamartine’s desire to be a practical statesman, and ibid: Quand on m’apprendrait que le divin Homère a refusé les charges municipales de Smyrne ou de Colophon, je ne croirais jamais qu’il eût pu mieux mériter de la Grèce en administrant son bourg natal qu’en composant l’Iliade et l’Odyssée.) than to the imitation of them, and would endeavor to leave after him many noble deeds[*](But Cf. Symp. 209 D.) and works as memorials of himself, and would be more eager to be the theme of praise than the praiser. I think so, he said; for there is no parity in the honor and the gain. Let us not, then, demand a reckoning[*](For the challenge to the poet to specify his knowledge Cf. Ion 536 E f.) from Homer or any other of the poets on other matters by asking them, if any one of them was a physician and not merely an imitator of a physician’s talk, what men any poet, old or new, is reported to have restored to health as Asclepius did, or what disciples of the medical art he left after him as Asclepius did his descendants; and let us dismiss the other arts and not question them about them; but concerning the greatest and finest things of which Homer undertakes to speak, wars and generalship[*](Cf. Ion 541 A f.) and the administration of cities and the education of men, it surely is fair to question him and ask, Friend Homer, if you are not at the third remove from truth and reality in human excellence, being merely that creator of phantoms whom we defined as the imitator, but if you are even in the second place and were capable of knowing what pursuits make men better or worse in private or public life, tell us what city was better governed owing to you,[*](Cf. Gorg. 515 B, Laches 186 B.) even as Lacedaemon was because of Lycurgus,[*](Cf. Laws 630 D, 632 D, 858 E, Symp. 209 D, Phaedr. 258 B, Minos 318 C, Herod. i. 65-66, Xen. Rep. Lac. 1. 2 and passim, Plutarch, Life of Lycurgus. ) and many other cities great and small because of other legislators. But what city credits you with having been a good legislator and having benefited them? Italy and Sicily say this of Charondas and we of Solon.[*](Cf. Symp. 209 D, Phaedr. 258 B, 278 C, Charm. 155 A, 157 E, Prot. 343 A, Tim. 20 E ff., Herod. i. 29 ff. and 86, ii. 177, v. 113, Aristot. Ath. Pol. v. ff., Diog. Laert. i. 45 ff., Plutarch, Life of Solon,Freeman, The Work and Life of Solon. ) But who says it of you? Will he be able to name any? I think not, said Glaucon; at any rate none is mentioned even by the Homerids themselves.

Well, then, is there any tradition of a war in Homer’s time that was well conducted by his command or counsel?None.Well, then, as might be expected of a man wise in practical affairs, are many and ingenious inventions[*](On the literature of inventions, εὑρήματα, see Newman ii. p. 382 on Aristot. Pol. 1274 b 4. Cf. Virgil, Aen. vi. 663 inventas aut qui vitam excoluere per artes, and Symp. 209 A.) for the arts and business of life reported of Homer as they are of Thales[*](Diog. Laert. i. 23-27.) the Milesian and Anacharsis[*](Diog. Laert. i. 105 says he was reported to be the inventor of the anchor and the potter’s wheel.) the Scythian?Nothing whatever of the sort.Well, then, if no public service is credited to him, is Homer reported while he lived to have been a guide in education to men who took pleasure in associating with him and transmitted to posterity a certain Homeric way of life[*](In the (spurious?) seventh epistle, 328 A, Plato speaks of the life and λόγος advocated by himself. Cf. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 168.) just as Pythagoras[*](Diels i3 pp. 27 f.) was himself especially honored for this, and his successors, even to this day, denominating a certain way of life the Pythagorean,[*](Cf. ὀρφικοὶ . . . βίοι Laws 782 C.) are distinguished among their contemporaries?No, nothing of this sort either is reported; for Creophylos,[*](Of the beef-clan. The scholiast says he was a Chian and an epic poet. See Callimachus’s epigram apud Sext. Empir., Bekker, p. 609 (Adv. Math. i. 48), and Suidas s. v. κρεώφυλος ) Socrates, the friend of Homer, would perhaps be even more ridiculous than his name[*](Modern Greeks also are often very sensitive to the etymology of proper names. Cf. also on 580 B, p. 369, note d.) as a representative of Homeric culture and education, if what is said about Homer is true. For the tradition is that Homer was completely neglected in his own lifetime by that friend of the flesh.Why, yes, that is the tradition, said I; but do you suppose, Glaucon, that, if Homer had really been able to educate men[*](See on 540 B, p. 230, note d.) and make them better and had possessed not the art of imitation but real knowledge, he would not have acquired many companions and been honored and loved by them? But are we to believe that while Protagoras[*](Cf. Prot. 315 A-B, 316 C.) of Abdera and Prodicus[*](See What Plato Said, p. 486, on Laches 197 D.) of Ceos and many others are able by private teaching to impress upon their contemporaries the conviction that they will not be capable of governing their homes or the city[*](For διοικεῖν Cf. Protag. 318 E.) unless they put them in charge of their education, and make themselves so beloved for this wisdom[*](See Thompson on Meno 70 B.) that their companions all but[*](On μόνον οὐκ Cf. Menex. 235 C, Ax. 365 B.) carry them about on their shoulders,[*](Stallbaum refers to Themist. Orat. xxii. p. 254 A ὃν ἡμεῖς διὰ ταύτην τὴν φαντασίαν μόνον οὐκ ἐπὶ ταῖς κεφαλαῖς περιφέρομεν, Erasmus, Chiliad iv. Cent. 7 n. 98 p. 794, and the German idiom einen auf den Händen tragen.) yet, forsooth, that Homer’s contemporaries, if he had been able to help men to achieve excellence,[*](Cf. Protag. 328 B.) would have suffered him or Hesiod to roam about rhapsodizing and would not have clung to them far rather than to their gold,[*](The article perhaps gives the word a contemptuous significance. So Meno 89 B τὸ χρυσίον.) and constrained them to dwell with them[*](οἴκοι εἶναι: J. J. Hartman, Ad Platonis Remp. 600 E, Mnem. 1916, p. 45, would change εἶναι to μεῖναι. But cf. Cic. Att. vii. 10 erimus una.) in their homes, or failing to persuade them, would themselves have escorted them wheresoever they went until they should have sufficiently imbibed their culture? What you say seems to me to be altogether true, Socrates, he said.

Shall we, then, lay it down that all the poetic tribe, beginning with Homer,[*](Cf. 366 E. Gorg. 471 C-D, Symp. 173 D.) are imitators of images of excellence and of the other things that they create,[*](Or about which they versify, playing with the double meaning of ποιεῖν.) and do not lay hold on truth? but, as we were just now saying, the painter will fashion, himself knowing nothing of the cobbler’s art, what appears to be a cobbler to him and likewise to those who know nothing but judge only by forms and colors[*](For the association of χρώματα and σχήματα Cf. Phileb. 12 E. 47 A, 51 B, Laws 669 A, Soph. 251 A, Meno 75 A with Apelt’s note, Cratyl. 431 C, Gorg. 465 B, Phaedo 100 D, Aristot. Poet. 1447 a 18-19.)?Certainly.And similarly, I suppose, we shall say that the poet himself, knowing nothing but how to imitate, lays on with words and phrases[*](Cf. Symp. 198 B, Apol. 17 C. The explicit discrimination of ὀνόματα as names of agents and ῥήματα as names of actions is peculiar to Soph. 262. But Cf. Cratyl. 431 B, 425 A, Theaet. 206 D. And in Soph. 257 B ῥήματι is used generally. See Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 56-57. Cf. Euthydem. 304 E with Symp. 187 A, Phaedr. 228 D, 271 C and my note in Class. Phil. xvii. (1922) p. 262.) the colors of the several arts in such fashion that others equally ignorant, who see things only through words,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 240 A.) will deem his words most excellent, whether he speak in rhythm, meter and harmony about cobbling or generalship or anything whatever. So mighty is the spell[*](Cf. 607 C, Laws 840 C, Protag. 315 A-B.) that these adornments naturally exercise; though when they are stripped bare of their musical coloring and taken by themselves,[*](Cf. Gorg. 502 C εἴ τις περιέλοι τῆς ποιήσεως πάσης τό τε μέλος καὶ τὸν ῥυθμόν, 392, Ion 530 b, Epicharmus apud Diog. Laert. iii. 17 περιδύσας τὸ μέτρον ὃ νῦν ἔχει, Aeschines, In Ctes. 136 περιελόντες τοῦ ποιητοῦ τὸ μέτρον, Isoc. Evag. 11 τὸ δὲ μέτρον διαλύσῃ with Horace, Sat. i. 4. 62 invenias etiam disiecti membra poetae, Aristot. Rhet. 1404 a 24 ἐπεὶ δ’ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγοντες εὐήθη διὰ τὴν λέξιν ἐδόκουν πορίσασθαι τήνδε τὴν δόξαν. Sext. Empir., Bekker, pp. 665-666 (Adv. Math. ii. 288), says that the ideas of poets are inferior to those of the ordinary layman. Cf. also Julian, Or. ii. 78 D, Coleridge, Table Talk: If you take from Virgil his diction and metre what do you leave him?) I think you know what sort of a showing these sayings of the poets make. For you, I believe, have observed them.I have, he said. Do they not, said I, resemble the faces of adolescents, young but not really beautiful, when the bloom of youth abandons them?[*](Aristot. Rhet. 1406 b 36 f. refers to this. Cf. Tyrtaeus 8 (6). 28 ὄφρ’ ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, Mimnermus i. 4 ἥβης ἄνθη γίγνεται ἁρπαλέα; Theognis 1305: παιδείας πλουηράτου ἄνθος ὠκύτερον σταδίου Xen. Symp. 8. 14 τὸ μὲν τῆς ὥρας ἄνθος ταχὺ δήπου παρακμάζει, Plato, Symp. 183 E τῷ τοῦ σώματος ἄνθει λήγοντι ) By all means, he said. Come, then, said I, consider this point: The creator of the phantom, the imitator, we say, knows nothing of the reality but only the appearance. Is not that so? Yes. Let us not, then, leave it half said but consider it fully. Speak on, he said. The painter, we say, will paint both reins and a bit. Yes. But the maker[*](The δέ γε has almost the effect of a retort.) will be the cobbler and the smith. Certainly. Does the painter, then, know the proper quality of reins and bit? Or does not even the maker, the cobbler and the smith, know that, but only the man who understands the use of these things, the horseman[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 10-11 καθάπερ ὑπὸ τὴν ἱππικὴν ἡ χαλινοποιικὴ. . .)? Most true. And shall we not say that the same holds true of everything? What do you mean? That there are some three arts concerned with everything, the user’s art,[*](For the idea that the user knows best see Cratyl. 390 B, Euthydem. 289 B, Phaedr. 274 E. Zeller, Aristotle(Eng.) ii. p. 247, attributes this pertinent observation to Aristotle. Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1277 b 30 αὐλητὴς ὁ χρώμενος. See 1282 a 21, 1289 a 17. Coleridge, Table Talk: In general those who do things for others know more about them than those for whom they are done. A groom knows more about horses than his master. But Hazlitt disagrees with Plato’s view.) the maker’s, and the imitator’s. Yes. Now do not the excellence, the beauty, the rightness[*](So in Laws 669 A-B, Plato says that the competent judge of a work of art must know three things, first, what it is, second, that it is true and right, and third, that it is good.) of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use[*](For the reference of beauty to use see Hipp. Maj. 295 C ff.) for which each is made or by nature adapted? That is so. It quite necessarily follows, then, that the user of anything is the one who knows most of it by experience, and that he reports to the maker the good or bad effects in use of the thing he uses. As, for example, the flute-player reports to the flute-maker which flutes respond and serve rightly in flute-playing, and will order the kind that must be made, and the other will obey and serve him. Of course. The one, then, possessing knowledge, reports about the goodness or the badness of the flutes, and the other, believing, will make them. Yes.

Then in respect of the same implement the maker will have right belief[*](πίστιν ὀρθήν is used because of πιστεύων above. It is a slightly derogatory synonym of δόξαν ὀρθήν below, 602 A. Cf. 511 E.) about its excellence and defects from association with the man who knows and being compelled to listen to him, but the user will have true knowledge.Certainly.And will the imitator from experience or use have knowledge whether the things he portrays are or are not beautiful and right, or will he, from compulsory association with the man who knows and taking orders from him for the right making of them, have right opinion[*](This does not contradict book V. 477-478. For right opinion and knowledge cf. 430 B and What Plato Said, p. 517, on Meno 98 A-B.)?Neither.Then the imitator will neither know nor opine rightly concerning the beauty or the badness of his imitations.It seems not.Most charming,[*](χαρίεις is ironical like χαριέντως in 426 A and καλόν in Theaet. 183 A, but Glaucon in his answer takes it seriously.) then, would be the state of mind of the poetical imitator in respect of true wisdom about his creations.Not at all.Yet still he will none the less[*](Note the accumulation of particles in the Greek. Similarly in 619 B, Phaedo 59 D, 61 E, 62 B, 64 A, Parmen. 127 D, Demosth. xxiii. 101, De cor. 282, Pind. Pyth. iv. 64 A, Isoc. Peace 1, Aristot. De gen. et corr. 332 a 3, Iliad vii. 360.) imitate, though in every case he does not know in what way the thing is bad or good. But, as it seems, the thing he will imitate will be the thing that appears beautiful to the ignorant multitude.Why, what else?On this, then, as it seems, we are fairly agreed, that the imitator knows nothing worth mentioning of the things he imitates, but that imitation is a form of play,[*](Cf. on 536 C, p. 214, note b.) not to be taken seriously,[*](Cf. 608 A.) and that those who attempt tragic poetry, whether in iambics or heroic verse,[*](For ἐν ἔπεσι cf. 607 A, 379 A, Meno 95 D.) are all altogether imitators.By all means.In heaven’s name, then, this business of imitation is concerned with the third remove from truth, is it not?Yes.And now again, to what element[*](The antithesis of περί and πρός marks the transition.) in man is its function and potency related?Of what are you speaking?Of this: The same magnitude, I presume, viewed from near and from far[*](Cf. Protag. 356 A, 523 C.) does not appear equal.Why, no.And the same things appear bent and straight[*](Cf. Tennyson (The Higher Pantheism) For all we have power to see is a straight staff bent in a pool. For the illusions of sense, and measurement as a means of correcting them Cf. Phileb. 41 E-42 A f., 55 E, Protag. 356 C-D, Euthyphro 7 C.) to those who view them in water and out, or concave and convex, owing to similar errors of vision about colors, and there is obviously every confusion of this sort in our souls. And so scene-painting in its exploitation[*](ἐπιθεμένη helps to personify σκιαγραφία. Cf. Gorg. 464 C.) of this weakness of our nature falls nothing short of witchcraft,[*](Adam’s leaves no magic art untried is misleading. ἀπολείπειν is here used as in 504 C. For the idiomatic οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει see p. 200, note b, on 533 A.) and so do jugglery and many other such contrivances.True.And have not measuring and numbering and weighing[*](Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 1. 9.) proved to be most gracious aids to prevent the domination in our soul of the apparently[*](Cf. Protag. 356 D ἡ τοῦ φαινομένου δύναμις ) greater or less or more or heavier, and to give the control to that which has reckoned[*](λογισάμενον: Cf. Laws 644 D, Crito 46 B.) and numbered or even weighed?Certainly.But this surely would be the function[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 36, note a. Of course some of the modern connotations of function are unknown to Plato.) of the part of the soul that reasons and calculates.[*](For λογιστικοῦ cf. on 439 D.)Why, yes, of that.And often when this has measured[*](See p. 448, note c, and my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.) and declares that certain things are larger or that some are smaller than the others or equal, there is at the same time an appearance of the contrary.Yes.And did we not say[*](436 B, Vol. I. p. 383.) that it is impossible for the same thing at one time to hold contradictory opinions about the same thing?And we were right in affirming that.

The part of the soul, then, that opines in contradiction of measurement could not be the same with that which conforms to it.Why, no.But, further, that which puts its trust in measurement and reckoning must be the best part of the soul.Surely.Then that which opposes it must belong to the inferior elements of the soul.Necessarily.This, then, was what I wished to have agreed upon when I said that poetry, and in general the mimetic art, produces a product that is far removed from truth in the accomplishment of its task, and associates with the part in us that is remote from intelligence, and is its companion and friend[*](Cf. 604 D, Phaedr. 253 D and E.) for no sound and true purpose.[*](Cf. Lysias ix. 4 ἐπὶ μηδενὶ ὑγιεῖ and for the idiom οὐδὲν ὑγιές on 523 B, p. 153, note f.)By all means, said he. Mimetic art, then, is an inferior thing cohabiting with an inferior and engendering inferior offspring.[*](Cf. 496 A, and on 489 D, p. 26, note b.) It seems so. Does that, said I, hold only for vision or does it apply also to hearing and to what we call poetry? Presumably, he said, to that also. Let us not, then, trust solely to the plausible analogy[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D διὰ τῶν εἰκότων.) from painting, but let us approach in turn that part of the mind to which mimetic poetry appeals and see whether it is the inferior or the nobly serious part. So we must. Let us, then, put the question thus: Mimetic poetry, we say, imitates human beings acting under compulsion or voluntarily,[*](Cf. 399 A-B, Laws 655 D, 814 E ff., Aristot. Poet. 1448 A 1-2 ἐπεὶ δὲ μιμοῦνται οἱ μιμούμενοι πράττοντας ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτους ἢ σπουδαίους ἢ φαύλους εἶναι, ibid. 1449 b 36-37 f.) and as a result of their actions supposing themselves to have fared well or ill and in all this feeling either grief or joy. Did we find anything else but this? Nothing. Is a man, then, in all this of one mind with himself, or just as in the domain of sight there was faction and strife and he held within himself contrary opinions at the same time about the same things,[*](See What Plato Said, p. 505, on Gorg. 482 A-B.) so also in our actions there is division and strife[*](Cf. 554 D, and p. 394, note e, on 586 E.) of the man with himself? But I recall that there is no need now of our seeking agreement on this point, for in our former discussion[*](439 B ff.) we were sufficiently agreed that our soul at any one moment teems with countless such self-contradictions. Rightly, he said. Yes, rightly, said I; but what we then omitted[*](Plato sometimes pretends to remedy an omission or to correct himself by an afterthought. So in Book V. 449 B-C ff., and Tim. 65 C.) must now, I think, be set forth. What is that? he said. When a good and reasonable man, said I, experiences such a stroke of fortune as the loss of a son or anything else that he holds most dear, we said, I believe, then too,[*](387 D-E.) that he will bear it more easily than the other sort. Assuredly. But now let us consider this: Will he feel no pain, or, since that is impossible, shall we say that he will in some sort be moderate[*](This suggests the doctrine of μετριοπάθεια as opposed to the Stoic ἀπάθεια. Joel ii. 161 thinks the passage a polemic against Antisthenes. Seneca, Epist. xcix. 15 seems to agree with Plato rather than with the Stoics: inhumanitas est ista non virtus. So Plutarch, Cons. ad Apol. 3 (102 cf.). See also ibid. 22 (112 E-F). Cf. Horace, Odes ii. 3. 1 aequam memento rebus in arduis servare mentem, and also Laws 732 C, 960 A.) in his grief? That, he said, is rather the truth.

Tell me now this about him: Do you think he will be more likely to resist and fight against his grief when he is observed by his equals or when he is in solitude alone by himself?He will be much more restrained, he said, when he is on view. But when left alone, I fancy, he will permit himself many utterances which, if heard by another, would put him to shame, and will do many things which he would not consent to have another see him doing. So it is, he said. Now is it not reason and law that exhorts him to resist, while that which urges him to give way to his grief is the bare feeling itself? True. And where there are two opposite impulses[*](Cf. Laws 645 A, Phaedr. 238 C, and for the conflict in the soul also Rep. 439 B ff.) in a man at the same time about the same thing we say that there must needs be two things[*](The conflict proves that for practical purposes the soul has parts. Cf. 436 B ff.) in him. Of course. And is not the one prepared to follow the guidance of the law as the law leads and directs? How so? The law, I suppose, declares that it is best to keep quiet as far as possible in calamity and not to chafe and repine, because we cannot know what is really good and evil in such things[*](Cf. Apology, in fine.) and it advantages us nothing to take them hard, and nothing in mortal life is worthy of great concern,[*](Cf. Laws 803 B and Class. Phil. ix. p. 353, n. 3, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 143.) and our grieving checks[*](Höffding, Outlines of Psychology, p. 99, refers to Saxo’s tale of the different effect which the news of the murder of Regner Lodbrog produced on his sons: he in whom the emotion was the weakest had the greatest energy for action.) the very thing we need to come to our aid as quickly as possible in such case. What thing, he said, do you mean? To deliberate,[*](Cf. Herod. i. 20 πρὸς τὸ παρεὸν βουλεύηται.) I said, about what has happened to us, and, as it were in the fall of the dice,[*](Cf. Eurip. Electra 639 and fr. 175 πρὸς τὸ πῖπτον, Iph. Aul. 1343 and Hippol. 718 πρὸς τὰ νῦν πεπτωκότα, Epictet. ii. 5. 3. See also Stallbaum ad loc.) to determine the movements of our affairs with reference to the numbers that turn up, in the way that reason indicates[*](Cf. 440 B, 607 B, Herod. i. 132.) would be the best, and, instead of stumbling like children, clapping one’s hands to the stricken spot[*](Cf. Demosthenes’ description of how barbarians box iv. 40 (51), ἀεὶ τῆς πληγῆς ἔχεται.) and wasting the time in wailing, ever to accustom the soul to devote itself at once to the curing of the hurt and the raising up of what has fallen, banishing threnody[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 582 θρηνεῖν ἐπῳδὰς πρὸς τομῶντι πήματι with Ovid, Met. i. 190: sed immedicabile vulnus Ense recidendum est.) by therapy. That certainly, he said, would be the best way to face misfortune and deal with it. Then, we say, the best part of us is willing to conform to these precepts of reason. Obviously. And shall we not say that the part of us that leads us to dwell in memory on our suffering and impels us to lamentation, and cannot get enough of that sort of thing, is the irrational and idle part of us, the associate of cowardice[*](Cf. on 603 B, p. 450, note a.)? Yes, we will say that. And does not the fretful part of us present[*](ἔχει in the sense of involves, admits of, as frequently in Aristotle’s Metaphysics. ) many and varied occasions for imitation, while the intelligent and temperate disposition, always remaining approximately the same, is neither easy to imitate nor to be understood when imitated, especially by a nondescript mob assembled in the theater? For the representation imitates a type that is alien to them.

By all means.And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed[*](For πέπηγεν cf. 530 D.) to please it, if he is to win favor with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?It is obvious.This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart[*](ἀντίστροφον is used as in Aristot. Rhet. 1354 a 1.) of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state[*](Cf. p. 412, note d.) one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other.By all means.But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm.How could it be otherwise, if it really does that? Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer[*](Cf. p. 420, note a, on 595 B-C.) or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief,[*](For ἐν πένθει cf. Soph. El. 290, 846, Herod. i. 46.) and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure,[*](Cf. Phileb. 48 A.) and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness,[*](See the description in Ion 535 E, and Laws 800 D.) and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way.I do know it, of course.But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman.[*](This is qualified in 387 E-388 A by οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις. Cf. also 398 E.)I do note that.Do you think, then, said I, that this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve? No, by Zeus, he said, it does not seem reasonable.