Republic

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*](Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes, Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.) pretending not even to see[*](Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.) them, but inserting the sting of their money[*](Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, the poison of their money.τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, implanting madness. In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.) into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*](Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.) or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*](Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.) For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*](For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.) should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.) wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*](Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.) and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*](Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.) pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.) and sees him panting and helpless[*](For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.)—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*](The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.) of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*](Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep, Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.) from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*](Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile, with Tim. 89 B.) the one party bringing in[*](Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.) allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[*](στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, grievously ill of faction. Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.)?

Most emphatically.And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*](Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.) others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*](ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.) in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*](But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.)Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*](Cf. 551 B.) resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties. What, then, said I, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*](ἐξουσία: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.) to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*](κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.) for leading his own life in the way that pleases him. Obvious. All sorts[*](παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state. De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.) and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*](For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It,III. ii. 435 As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color, Faguet, Nineteenth CenturyLamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.) when they see bright-colored things. Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*](Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species. Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.) of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-C.) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*](Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*](διαγωγή: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.) for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*](Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.) of some convicted criminals exquisite[*](κομψή: cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.)? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*](For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.) like a revenant[*](His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering spirit, one returned from the dead (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates Geist) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.)? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[*](For οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία.) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*](σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—high-brow, top-lofty.) pronouncements[*](Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l’art, p. 46.) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*](For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*](μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*](In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.) and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people It is a noble[*](For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.) polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*](ἡδεῖα: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government,τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.) form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike Yes, he said, everybody knows that. Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*](Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.) oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.) our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*](Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.)? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ? Most assuredly.

Then we shall rightly use the word necessary of them?Rightly.And what of the desires from which a man could free himself by discipline from youth up, and whose presence in the soul does no good and in some cases harm? Should we not fairly call all such unnecessary?Fairly indeed.Let us select an example of either kind, so that we may apprehend the type.[*](Or grasp them in outline.)Let us do so.Would not the desire of eating to keep in health and condition and the appetite for mere bread and relishes[*](For ὄψον cf. on 372 C, Vol. I. p. 158, note a.) be necessary?I think so.The appetite for bread is necessary in both respects, in that it is beneficial and in that if it fails we die.Yes.And the desire for relishes, so far as it conduces to fitness?By all means.And should we not rightly pronounce unnecessary the appetite that exceeds these and seeks other varieties of food, and that by correction[*](For κολαζομένη cf. 571 B, Gorg. 505 B, 491 E, 507 D. For the thought cf. also 519 A-B.) and training from youth up can be got rid of in most cases and is harmful to the body and a hindrance to the soul’s attainment of intelligence and sobriety?Nay, most rightly.And may we not call the one group the spendthrift desires and the other the profitable,[*](Lit. money-making. Cf. 558 D.) because they help production?Surely.And we shall say the same of sexual and other appetites?The same.And were we not saying that the man whom we nicknamed the drone is the man who teems[*](For γέμοντα cf. 577 D, 578 A, 603 D, 611 B, Gorg. 525 A, 522 E, etc.) with such pleasures and appetites, and who is governed by his unnecessary desires, while the one who is ruled by his necessary appetites is the thrifty oligarchical man?Why, surely.To return, then, said I, we have to tell how the democratic man develops from the oligarchical type. I think it is usually in this way. How? When a youth, bred in the illiberal and niggardly fashion that we were describing, gets a taste of the honey of the drones and associates with fierce[*](αἴθων occurs only here in Plato. It is common in Pindar and tragedy. Ernst Maass, Die Ironie des Sokrates,Sokrates, 11, p. 94 Platon hat an jener Stelle des Staats, von der wir ausgingen, die schlimmen Erzieher gefährliche Fuchsbestien genannt. (Cf. Pindar, Ol. xi. 20.)) and cunning creatures who know how to purvey pleasures of every kind and variety[*](Cf. on 557 C, p. 286, note a.) and condition, there you must doubtless conceive is the beginning of the transformation of the oligarchy in his soul into democracy. Quite inevitably, he said. May we not say that just as the revolution in the city was brought about by the aid of an alliance from outside, coming to the support of the similar and corresponding party in the state, so the youth is revolutionized when a like and kindred[*](Cf. 554 D.) group of appetites from outside comes to the aid of one of the parties in his soul? By all means, he said.

And if, I take it, a counter-alliance[*](For the metaphor cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24 ἐδυνάσθην ἐκείνῳ χρωμένω συμμάχῳ τῶν μὴ καλῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν κρατεῖν, they [Critias and Alcibiades] found in him [Socrates] an ally who gave them strength to conquer their evil passions. (Loeb tr.)) comes to the rescue of the oligarchical part of his soul, either it may be from his father or from his other kin, who admonish and reproach him, then there arises faction[*](Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.) and counter-faction and internal strife in the man with himself.Surely.And sometimes, I suppose, the democratic element retires before the oligarchical, some of its appetites having been destroyed and others[*](τινες . . . αἱ μὲν . . . αἱ δὲ. For the partitive apposition cf. 566 E, 584 D, Gorg. 499 C. Cf. also Protag. 330 A, Gorg. 450 C, Laws 626 E, Eurip. Hec. 1185-1186.) expelled, and a sense of awe and reverence grows up in the young man’s soul and order is restored.That sometimes happens, he said. And sometimes, again, another brood of desires akin to those expelled are stealthily nurtured to take their place, owing to the father’s ignorance of true education, and wax numerous and strong. Yes, that is wont to be the way of it. And they tug and pull back to the same associations and in secret intercourse engender a multitude. Yes indeed. And in the end, I suppose, they seize the citadel[*](Cf. Tim. 90 A.) of the young man’s soul, finding it empty and unoccupied by studies and honorable pursuits and true discourses, which are the best watchmen and guardians[*](For the idea of guardians of the soul Cf. Laws 961 D, 549 B Cf. also on Phaedo 113 D, What Plato Said, p. 536.) in the minds of men who are dear to the gods. Much the best, he said. And then false and braggart words[*](Cf. Phaedo 92 D.) and opinions charge up the height and take their place and occupy that part of such a youth. They do indeed. And then he returns, does he not, to those Lotus-eaters[*](Plato, like Matthew Arnold, liked to use nicknames for classes of people: Cf. Rep. 415 D γηγενεῖς, Theaet. 181 A ῥέοντας, Soph. 248 A εἰδῶν φίλους, Phileb. 44 E τοῖς δυσχερέσιν. So Arnold in Culture and Anarchy uses Populace, Philistines, Barbarians, Friends of Culture, etc., Friends of Physical Science, Lit. and Dogma, p. 3.) and without disguise lives openly with them. And if any support[*](βοήθεια: cf. Aristot. De an. 404 a 12.) comes from his kin to the thrifty element in his soul, those braggart discourses close the gates of the royal fortress within him and refuse admission to the auxiliary force itself, and will not grant audience as to envoys to the words of older friends in private life. And they themselves prevail in the conflict, and naming reverence and awe folly[*](Cf. 474 D, Thucyd. iii. 82 Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 435-436 says that Plato had not used Thucydides. But cf. Gomperz iii. 331, and What Plato Said, pp. 2-3, 6, 8. See Isoc. Antid. 284 σκώπτειν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι δυναμένους εὐφυεῖς καλοῦσι, etc., Areop. 20 and 49, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1180 b 25, Quintil. iii. 7. 25 and viii. 6. 36, Sallust, Cat.C 52 iam pridem equidem nos vera vocabula rerum amisimus, etc.) thrust it forth, a dishonored fugitive. And temperance they call want of manhood and banish it with contumely, and they teach that moderation and orderly expenditure are rusticity and illiberality, and they combine with a gang of unprofitable and harmful appetites to drive them over the border.[*](ὑπερορίζουσι: Cf. Laws 855 C ὑπερορίαν φυγάδα, 866 D.) They do indeed. And when they have emptied and purged[*](Cf. 567 C and 573 B where the word is also used ironically, and Laws 735, Polit. 293 D, Soph. 226 D.) of all these the soul of the youth that they have thus possessed[*](κατέχομαι is used of divine possession or inspiration in Phaedr. 244 E, Ion 533 E, 536 B, etc., Xen. Symp. 1. 10.) and occupied, and whom they are initiating with these magnificent and costly rites,[*](Plato frequently employs the language of the mysteries for literary effect. Cf. Gorg. 497 C, Symp. 210 A and 218 B, Theaet. 155 E-156 A, Laws 666 B, 870 D-E, Phaedr. 250 B-C, 249 C, Phaedo 81 A, 69 C, Rep. 378 A, etc., and Thompson on Meno 76 E.) they proceed to lead home from exile insolence and anarchy and prodigality and shamelessness, resplendent[*](Cf. Eurip. fr. 628. 5 (Nauck), Soph. El. 1130.) in a great attendant choir and crowned with garlands, and in celebration of their praises they euphemistically denominate insolence good breeding, licence liberty, prodigality magnificence, and shamelessness manly spirit.

And is it not in some such way as this, said I, that in his youth the transformation takes place from the restriction to necessary desires in his education to the liberation and release of his unnecessary and harmful desires? Yes, your description is most vivid, said he. Then, in his subsequent life, I take it, such a one expends money and toil and time no more on his necessary than on his unnecessary pleasures. But if it is his good fortune that the period of storm and stress does not last too long, and as he grows older the fiercest tumult within him passes, and he receives back a part of the banished elements and does not abandon himself altogether to the invasion of the others, then he establishes and maintains all his pleasures on a footing of equality, forsooth,[*](For the ironical δή cf. 562 D, 563 B, 563 D, 374 B, 420 E and on 562 E, p. 307, note h.) and so lives turning over the guard-house[*](Cf. Phaedr. 241 A μεταβαλὼν ἄλλον ἄρχοντα ἐν αὑτῷ. For this type of youth Cf. Thackeray’s Barnes Newcome. For the lot cf. ibid, p. 285, note d, on 557 A.) of his soul to each as it happens along until it is sated, as if it had drawn the lot for that office, and then in turn to another, disdaining none but fostering them all equally.[*](Notice the frequency of the phrase ἐξ ἴσου in this passage. Cf. 557 A.) Quite so. And he does not accept or admit into the guard-house the words of truth when anyone tells him that some pleasures arise from honorable and good desires, and others from those that are base,[*](An obvious reference to the Gorgias. Cf. Gorg. 494 E, Phileb. 13 B ff., Protag. 353 D ff., Laws 733.) and that we ought to practise and esteem the one and control and subdue the others; but he shakes his head[*](The Greek Says throws back his head—the characteristic negative gesture among Greeks. In Aristoph. Acharn. 115 the supposed Persians give themselves away by nodding assent and dissent in Hellenic style, as Dicaeopolis says.) at all such admonitions and avers that they are all alike and to be equally esteemed. Such is indeed his state of mind and his conduct. And does he not, said I, also live out his life in this fashion, day by day indulging the appetite of the day, now wine-bibbing and abandoning himself to the lascivious pleasing of the flute[*](For the word καταυλούμενος cf. 411 A, Laws 790 E, Lucian, Bis acc. 17, and for the passive Eur. I. T. 367. Cf. also Philetaerus, Philaulus, fr. 18, Kock ii. p. 235, Eur. fr. 187. 3 μολπαῖσι δ’ ἡσθεὶς τοῦτ’ ἀεὶ θηρεύεται. For the type cf. Theophrastus, Char. 11, Aristoph. Wasps 1475 ff.) and again drinking only water and dieting; and at one time exercising his body, and sometimes idling and neglecting all things, and at another time seeming to occupy himself with philosophy. And frequently he goes in for politics and bounces up[*](Cf. Protag. 319 D.) and says and does whatever enters his head.[*](For ὅ τι ἂν τύχῃ cf. on 536 A, p. 213, note f,ὅταν τύχῃEurip. Hippol. 428, I. T. 722, Eurip. Fr. 825 (Didot),ὅπου ἂν τύχωσινXen. Oec. 20. 28,ὃν ἂν τύχῃςEurip. Tor. 68.) And if military men excite his emulation, thither he rushes, and if moneyed men, to that he turns, and there is no order or compulsion in his existence, but he calls this life of his the life of pleasure and freedom and happiness and cleaves to it to the end. That is a perfect description, he said, of a devotee of equality. I certainly think, said I, that he is a manifold[*](παντοδαπόν: cf. on 557 C.) man stuffed with most excellent differences, and that like that city[*](Cf. 557 D.) he is the fair and many-colored one whom many a man and woman would count fortunate in his life, as containing within himself the greatest number of patterns of constitutions and qualities. Yes, that is so, he said.

Shall we definitely assert, then, that such a man is to be ranged with democracy and would properly be designated as democratic?Let that be his place, he said. And now, said I, the fairest[*](For the irony cf. 607 E τῶν καλῶν πολιτειῶν, 544 C γενναία, 558 C ἡδεῖα.) polity and the fairest man remain for us to describe, the tyranny and the tyrant. Certainly, he said. Come then, tell me, dear friend, how tyranny arises.[*](τίς τρόπος . . . γίγνεται is a mixture of two expressions that need not be pressed. Cf. Meno 96 D, Epist. vii. 324 B. A. G. Laird, in Class. Phil., 1918, pp. 89-90 thinks it means What τρόπος (of the many τρόποι in a democracy) develops into a τρόπος of tyranny; for that tyranny is a transformation of democracy is fairly evident. That would be a recognition of what Aristotle says previous thinkers overlook in their classification of polities.) That it is an outgrowth of democracy is fairly plain. Yes, plain. Is it, then, in a sense, in the same way in which democracy arises out of oligarchy that tyranny arises from democracy? How is that? The good that they proposed to themselves[*](Their idea of good. Cf. 555 b προκειμένου ἀγαθοῦ. Cf. Laws 962 E with Aristot. Pol. 1293 b 14 ff. Cf. also Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 20 αἱ μὲν οὖν δημοκρατίαι μάλιστα μεταβάλλουσι διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν. Cf. also p. 263, note e on 551 B (ὅρος) and p. 139, note c on 519 C (σκοπός).) and that was the cause of the establishment of oligarchy—it was wealth,[*](Cf. 552 B, and for the disparagement of wealth p. 262, note b, on 550 E.) was it not? Yes. Well, then, the insatiate lust for wealth and the neglect of everything else for the sake of money-making was the cause of its undoing. True, he said. And is not the avidity of democracy for that which is its definition and criterion of good the thing which dissolves it[*](Zeller, Aristot. ii. p. 285, as usual credits Aristotle with the Platonic thought that every form of government brings ruin on itself by its own excess.) too? What do you say its criterion to be? Liberty,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, p. 43 The central idea of English life and politics is the assertion of personal liberty.) I replied; for you may hear it said that this is best managed in a democratic city, and for this reason that is the only city in which a man of free spirit will care to live.[*](Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 29 says life would be impossible in Plato’s Republic. ) Why, yes, he replied, you hear that saying everywhere. Then, as I was about to observe,[*](ᾖα . . . ἐρῶν: cf. 449 A, Theaet. 180 C.) is it not the excess and greed of this and the neglect of all other things that revolutionizes this constitution too and prepares the way for the necessity of a dictatorship? How? he said. Why, when a democratic city athirst for liberty gets bad cupbearers for its leaders[*](Or protectors, tribunes,προστατούντων. Cf. on 565 C, p. 318, note d.) and is intoxicated by drinking too deep of that unmixed wine,[*](Cf. Livy xxxix. 26 velut ex diutina siti nimis avide meram haurientes libertatem, Seneca, De benefic. i. 10 male dispensata libertas, Taine, Letter,Jan. 2, 1867 nous avons proclamé et appliqué l’égalité . . . C’est un vin pur et généreux; mais nous avons bu trop du nôtre.) and then, if its so-called governors are not extremely mild and gentle with it and do not dispense the liberty unstintedly,it chastises them and accuses them of being accursed[*](μιαρούς is really stronger, pestilential fellows. Cf. Apol. 23 D, Soph. Antig. 746. It is frequent in Aristophanes.) oligarchs.[*](For the charge of oligarchical tendencies cf. Isoc. Peace 51 and 133, Areop. 57, Antid. 318, Panath. 158.) Yes, that is what they do, he replied. But those who obey the rulers, I said, it reviles as willing slaves[*](Cf. Symp. 184 C, 183 A. Cf. the essay of Estienne de la Boétie, De la servitude volontaire. Also Gray, Ode for Music, 6 Servitude that hugs her chain.) and men of naught,[*](For οὐδὲν ὄντας cf. 341 C, Apol. 41 E, Symp. 216 E, Gorg. 512 C, Erastae 134 C, Aristoph. Eccles. 144, Horace, Sat. ii. 7. 102 nil ego, Eurip. I. A. 371, Herod. ix. 58 οὐδένες ἐόντες.) but it commends and honors in public and private rulers who resemble subjects and subjects who are like rulers. Is it not inevitable that in such a state the spirit of liberty should go to all lengths[*](Cf. Laws 699 E ἐπὶ πᾶσαν ἐλευθερίαν, Aristoph. Lysistr. 543 ἐπὶ πᾶν ἰέναι, Soph. El. 615 εἰς πᾶν ἔργον.)? Of course. And this anarchical temper, said I, my friend, must penetrate into private homes and finally enter into the very animals.[*](Cf. 563 C, Laws 942 D.) Just what do we mean by that? he said.