Republic

Very good. We are agreed then, Glaucon, that the state which is to achieve the height of good government must have community[*](Strictly speaking, this applies only to the guardians, but Cf. Laws 739 C ff., Aristotle, Pol. 1261 a 6 and 1262 a 41, like many subsequent commentators, misses the point.) of wives and children and all education, and also that the pursuits of men and women must be the same in peace and war, and that the rulers or kings[*](Cf. 445 D and What Plato Said, p. 539, on Menex. 238 C-D.) over them[*](So Jowett. Adam ad loc. insists that the genitive is partitive, those of their number are to be kings.) are to be those who have approved themselves the best in both war and philosophy.We are agreed, he said. And we further granted this, that when the rulers are established in office they shall conduct these soldiers and settle them in habitations[*](Cf. 415 E.) such as we described, that have nothing private for anybody but are common for all, and in addition to such habitations we agreed, if you remember, what should be the nature of their possessions.[*](Cf. 416 C.) Why, yes, I remember, he said, that we thought it right that none of them should have anything that ordinary men[*](Cf. 429 A.) now possess, but that, being as it were athletes[*](Cf. on 403 E and 521 D. Polyb. i. 6. 6 ἀθληταὶ γεγονότες ἀληθινοὶ τῶν κατὰ τὸν πόλεμον ἔργων ) of war and guardians, they should receive from the others as pay[*](Cf. 416 E.) for their guardianship each year their yearly sustenance, and devote their entire attention to the care of themselves and the state. That is right, I said. But now that we have finished this topic let us recall the point at which we entered on the digression[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 424, note c, and What Plato Said, p. 640, on Laws 857 C.) that has brought us here, so that we may proceed on our way again by the same path. That is easy, he said; for at that time, almost exactly as now, on the supposition that you had finished the description of the city, you were going on to say[*](Cf. 449 A-B.) that you assumed such a city as you then described and the corresponding type of man to be good, and that too though, as it appears, you had a still finer city and type of man to tell of;

but at any rate you were saying that the others are aberrations,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1285 b 1-2, 1289 b 9.) if this city is right. But regarding the other constitutions, my recollection is that you said there were four species[*](Aristot. Pol. 1291-1292 censures the limitation to four. But cf. ibid, Introd. p. xlv. Cf. Laws 693 D, where only two mother-forms of government are mentioned, monarchy and democracy, with Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 40 δῆμος καὶ ὀλιγαρχία. Cf. also Eth. Nic. 1160 a 31 ff. The Politicus mentions seven (291 f., 301 f.). Isoc. Panath. 132-134 names three kinds—oligarchy, democracy, and monarchy—adding that others may say much more about them. See note ad loc. in Loeb Isocrates and Class. Phil. vol. vii. p. 91. Cf. Hobbes, Leviathan 19 Yet he that shall consider the particular commonwealths that have been and are in the world will not perhaps easily reduce them to three . . . as, for example, elective kingdoms, etc.) worth speaking of[*](For ὧν καὶ πέρι λόγον ἄξιον εἴη Cf. Laws 908 B ἃ καὶ διακρίσεως ἄξια, Laches 192 A οὗ καὶ πέρι ἄξιον λέγειν, Tim. 82 ἓν γένος ἐνὸν ἄξιον ἐπωνυμίας. Cf. also Euthydem. 279 C, Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 32, 1302 a 13, De part. an. 654 a 13, Demosth. v. 16, Isoc. vi. 56. and Vol. I. p. 420, note f, on 445 C.) and observing their defects[*](For the relative followed by a demonstrative cf. also 357 B.) and the corresponding types of men, in order that when we had seen them all and come to an agreement about the best and the worst man, we might determine whether the best is the happiest and the worst most wretched or whether it is otherwise.[*](Plato’s main point again. Cf. 545 A, 484 A-B and Vol. I. p.xii, note d.) And when I was asking what were the four constitutions you had in mind, Polemarchus and Adeimantus thereupon broke in, and that was how you took up the discussion again and brought to this point.[*](Cf. on 572 b, p. 339, note e.)Your memory is most exact, I said. A second time then, as in a wrestling-match, offer me the same hold,[*](Cf. Phileb. 13 D εἰς τὰς ὁμοίας Phaedr. 236 B, Laws 682 E, Aristoph. Clouds 551 (Blaydes), Knights 841, Lysist. 672.) and when I repeat my question try to tell me what you were then about to say. I will if I can, said I. And indeed, said he, I am eager myself to hear what four forms of government you meant. There will be no difficulty about that, said I. For those I mean are precisely those that have names[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 596, on Sophist 267 D.) in common usage: that which the many praised,[*](Cf. Crito 52 E, Norlin on Isoc. Nicocles 24 (Loeb), Laws 612 D-E, Aristot. Pol. 1265 b 32, Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15.) your[*](ἡ . . . αὔτη, ista. Cf. Midsummer Night’s Dream, I. ii. ad fin. and Gorg. 502 B, 452 E.) Cretan and Spartan constitution; and the second in place and in honor, that which is called oligarchy, a constitution teeming with many ills, and its sequent counterpart and opponent, democracy ; and then the noble[*](Of course ironical. Cf. 454 A, and What Plato Said, p. 592, on Soph. 231 B.) tyranny surpassing them all, the fourth and final malady[*](Cf. 552 C, Protag. 322 d, Isoc. Hel. 34, Wilamowitz on Eurip. Heracles 542. For the effect of surprise Cf. Rep. 334 A, 373 A, 555 A, Theaet. 146 A, Phileb. 46 A κακόν and 64 E συμφορά.) of a state. Can you mention any other type[*](ἰδέαν: cf. Introd. p. x.) of government, I mean any other that constitutes a distinct species[*](Cf. 445 C. For διαφανεῖ Cf. Tim. 60 A, 67 A, Laws 634 C, and on 548 C, p. 253, note g.)? For, no doubt, there are hereditary principalities[*](δυναστεῖαι Cf. Laws 680 B, 681 D. But the word usually has an invidious suggestion. See Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1272 b 10. Cf. ibid. 1292 b 5-10, 1293 a 31, 1298 a 32; also Lysias ii. 18, where it is opposed to democracy, Isoc. Panath. 148, where it is used of the tyranny of Peisistratus, ibid. 43 of Minos. Cf. Panegyr. 39 and Norlin on Panegyr. 105 (Loeb). Isocrates also uses it frequently of the power or sovereignty of Philip, Phil. 3, 6, 69, 133, etc. Cf. also Gorg. 492 B, Polit. 291 D.) and purchased[*](Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 35 thinks that Plato may have been thinking of Carthage. Cf. Polyb. vi. 56. 4.) kingships, and similar intermediate constitutions which one could find in even greater numbers among the barbarians than among the Greeks.[*](Plato, as often is impatient of details, for which he was rebuked by Aristotle. Cf. also Tim. 57 D, 67 C, and the frequent leaving of minor matters to future legislators in the Republic and Laws,Vol. I. p. 294, note b, on 412 B.) Certainly many strange ones are reported, he said. Are you aware, then, said I, that there must be as many types of character among men as there are forms of government[*](For the correspondence of individual and state cf. also 425 E, 445 C-D, 579 C and on 591 E. Cf. Laws 829 A, Isoc. Peace 120.)? Or do you suppose that constitutions spring from the proverbial oak or rock[*](Or stock or stone, i.e. inanimate, insensible things. For the quotation ἐκ δρυός ποθεν ἢ ἐκ πέτρας Cf. Odyssey xix. 163, Il. xxii. 126 aliter, Apol. 34 D and Thompson on Phaedrus 275 B; also Stallbaum ad loc.) and not from the characters[*](The mores, 45 E, 436 A. Cf. Bagehot, Physics and Politics, p. 206: A lazy nation may be changed into an industrious, a rich into a poor, a religious into a profane, as if by magic, if any single cause, though slight, or any combination of causes, however subtle, is strong enough to change the favorite and detested types of character.) of the citizens, which, as it were, by their momentum and weight in the scales[*](For the metaphor cf. also 550 E and on 556 E.) draw other things after them? They could not possibly come from any other source, he said. Then if the forms of government are five, the patterns of individual souls must be five also. Surely. Now we have already described the man corresponding to aristocracy[*](ἀριστοκρατία is used by both Plato and Aristotle some times technically, sometimes etymologically as the government of the best, whoever they may be. Cf. 445 D, and Menex. 238 C-D (What Plato Said, p. 539).) or the government of the best, whom we aver to be the truly good and just man.

We have.Must we not, then, next after this, survey the inferior types, the man who is contentious and covetous of honor,[*](Cf. Phaedr. 256 C 1, 475 A, 347 B.) corresponding to the Laconian constitution, and the oligarchical man in turn, and the democratic and the tyrant, in order that,[*](Cf. on 544 A, p. 237, note g.) after observing the most unjust of all, we may oppose him to the most just, and complete our inquiry as to the relation of pure justice and pure injustice in respect of the happiness and unhappiness of the possessor, so that we may either follow the counsel of Thrasymachus and pursue injustice or the present argument and pursue justice?Assuredly, he said, that is what we have to do.[*](In considering the progress of degeneration portrayed in the following pages, it is too often forgotten that Plato is describing or satirizing divergences from ideal rather than an historical process. Cf. Rehm, Der Untergang Roms im abendländischen Denken, p. 11: Plato gibt eine zum Mythos gesteigerte Naturgeschichte des Staates, so wie Hesiod eine als Mythos zu verstehende Natur-, d.h. Entartungsgeschichte des Menschengeschlechts gibt. Cf. Sidney B. Fay, on Bury, The Idea of Progress, in Methods of Social Science, edited by Stuart A. Rice, p. 289: . . . there was a widely spread belief in an earlier golden age of simplicity, which had been followed by a degeneration and decay of the human race. Plato’s theory of degradation set forth a gradual deterioration through the successive stages of timocracy, oligarchy, democracy and despotism. The Greek theory of cycles, with its endless, monotonous iteration, excluded the possibility of permanent advance or progress. Kurt Singer, Platon der Gründer, p. 141, says that the timocratic state reminds one of late Sparta, the democratic of Athens after Pericles, the oligarchic is related to Corinth, and the tyrannical has some Syracusan features. Cicero, De div. ii., uses this book of the Republic to console himself for the revolutions in the Roman state, and Polybius’s theory of the natural succession of governments is derived from it, with modifications (Polyb. vi. 4. 6 ff. Cf. vi. 9. 10 αὕτη πολιτειῶν ἀνακύκλωσις). Aristotle objects that in a cycle the ideal state should follow the tyranny.) Shall we, then, as we began by examining moral qualities in states before individuals, as being more manifest there, so now consider first the constitution based on the love of honor? I do not know of any special name[*](Cf. on 544 C, p. 238, note b.) for it in use. We must call it either timocracy[*](In Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1160 a 33-34, the meaning is the rule of those who possess a property qualification.) or timarchy. And then in connection with this we will consider the man of that type, and thereafter oligarchy and the oligarch, and again, fixing our eyes on democracy, we will contemplate the democratic man: and fourthly, after coming to the city ruled by a tyrant and observing it, we will in turn take a look into the tyrannical soul,[*](Cf. 577 A-B.) and so try to make ourselves competent judges[*](Cf. 582 A ff.) of the question before us. That would be at least[*](For the qualified assent Cf. HamletI. i. 19 What? is Horatio there? A piece of him. It is very frequent in the Republic, usually with γοῦν. Cf. 442 D, 469 B, 476 C, 501 C, 537 C, 584 A, 555 B, 604 D,and Vol. I. p. 30, note a, on 334 A; also 460 C and 398 B, where the interlocutor adds a condition, 392 B, 405 B, 556 E, 581 B, and 487 A, where he uses the corrective μὲν οὖν.) a systematic and consistent way of conducting the observation and the decision, he said. Come, then, said I, let us try to tell in what way a timocracy would arise out of an aristocracy. Or is this the simple and unvarying rule, that in every form of government revolution takes its start from the ruling class itself,[*](For the idea that the state is destroyed only by factions in the ruling class cf. also Laws 683 E. Cf. 465 B, Lysias xxv. 21, Aristot. Pol. 1305 b, 1306 a 10 ὁμονοοῦσα δὲ ὀλιγαρχία οὐκ εὐδιάφθορος ἐξ αὑτῆς, 1302 a 10 Polybius, Teubner, vol. ii. p. 298 (vi. 57). Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 521, says that Aristotle does not remark on Plato’s observation . . . though he cannot have agreed with it. Cf. Halévy, Notes et souvenirs, p. 153 l’histoire est là pour démontrer clairement que, depuis un siècle, not gouvernements n’ont jamais été renversés que par eux-mêmes; Bergson, Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion, p. 303: Mais l’instinct résiste. Il ne commence à céder que lorsque Ia classe supérieure elle-même l’y invite.) when dissension arises in that, but so long as it is at one with itself, however small it be, innovation is impossible? Yes, that is so. How, then, Glaucon, I said, will disturbance arise in our city, and how will our helpers and rulers fall out and be at odds with one another and themselves? Shall we, like Homer, invoke the Muses[*](For the mock-heroic style of this invocation Cf. Phaedr. 237 A, Laws 885 C.) to tell

how faction first fell upon them,

Somewhat in this fashion. Hard in truth[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 E.) it is for a state thus constituted to be shaken and disturbed; but since for everything that has come into being destruction is appointed,[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 677 A; also Polyb. vi. 57, Cic. De rep. ii. 25.) not even such a fabric as this will abide for all time, but it shall surely be dissolved, and this is the manner of its dissolution. Not only for plants that grow from the earth but also for animals that live upon it there is a cycle of bearing and barrenness[*](Cf. Pindar, Mem. vi. 10-12 for the thought.) for soul and body as often as the revolutions of their orbs come full circle, in brief courses for the short-lived and oppositely for the opposite; but the laws of prosperous birth or infertility for your race, the men you have bred to be your rulers will not for all their wisdom ascertain by reasoning combined with sensation,[*](Cf. Tim. 28 A δόξῃ μετ’ αἰσθήσεως.) but they will escape them, and there will be a time when they will beget children out of season. Now for divine begettings there is a period comprehended by a perfect number,[*](For its proverbial obscurity cf. Cic. Ad att. vii. 13 est enim numero Platonis obscurius, Censorinus, De die natali xi. See ibid, Introd. p. xliv for literature on this number.) and for mortal by the first in which augmentations dominating and dominated when they have attained to three distances and four limits of the assimilating and the dissimilating, the waxing and the waning, render all things conversable[*](προσήγορα: Cf. Theaet. 146 A.) and commensurable with one another, whereof a basal four-thirds wedded to the pempad yields two harmonies at the third augmentation, the one the product of equal factors taken one hundred times, the other of equal length one way but oblong,—one dimension of a hundred numbers determined by the rational diameters of the pempad lacking one in each case, or of the irrational[*](Cf. 534 D; also Theaet. 202 B ῥητάς.) lacking two; the other dimension of a hundred cubes of the triad. And this entire geometrical number is determinative of this thing, of better and inferior births. And when your guardians, missing this, bring together brides and bridegrooms unseasonably,[*](Cf. 409 D.) the offspring will not be well-born or fortunate. Of such offspring the previous generation will establish the best, to be sure, in office, but still these, being unworthy, and having entered in turn[*](αὖ: cf. my note in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 285-287.) into the powers of their fathers, will first as guardians begin to neglect us, paying too little heed to music[*](This does not indicate a change in Plato’s attitude toward music, as has been alleged.) and then to gymnastics, so that our young men will deteriorate in their culture; and the rulers selected from them will not approve themselves very efficient guardians for testing Hesiod’s and our races of gold, silver, bronze and iron.[*](Cf. 415 A-B.)

And this intermixture of the iron with the silver and the bronze with the gold will engender unlikeness[*](Cf. Theaet. 159 A.) and an unharmonious unevenness, things that always beget war and enmity wherever they arise.

Of this lineage, look you,

Yes.Such men, said I, will be avid of wealth, like those in an oligarchy, and will cherish a fierce secret lust for gold[*](This was said to be characteristic of Sparta. Cf. Newman on Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 13, Xen. Rep. Lac. 14, 203 and 7. 6, and the Chicago Dissertation of P. H. Epps, The Place of Sparta in Greek History and Civilization, pp. 180-184.) and silver, owning storehouses[*](Cf. 416 D.) and private treasuries where they may hide them away, and also the enclosures[*](Cf. Laws 681 A, Theaet. 174 E.) of their homes, literal private love-nests[*](νεοττιάς suggests Horace’s tu nidum servas (Epist. i. 10.6). Cf also Laws 776 A.) in which they can lavish their wealth on their women[*](Cf. Laws 806 A-C, 637 B-C, Aristot. Pol. 1269 b 3, and Newman ii. p. 318 on the Spartan women. Cf. Epps, op. cit. pp. 322-346.) and any others they please with great expenditure. Most true, he said. And will they not be stingy about money, since they prize it and are not allowed to possess it openly, prodigal of others’ wealth[*](φιλαναλωταί, though different, suggests Sallust’s alieni appetens sui profusus (Cat. 5). Cf. Cat. 52 publice egestatem, privatim opulentiam.) because of their appetites, enjoying[*](Cf. 587 A, Laws 636 D, Symp. 187 E, Phaedr. 251 E.) their pleasures stealthily, and running away from the law as boys from a father,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1270 b 34 with Newman’s note; and Euthyphro 2 C tell his mother the state.) since they have not been educated by persuasion[*](Cf. Laws 720 D-E. This is not inconsistent with Polit. 293 A, where the context and the point of view are different.) but by force because of their neglect of the true Muse, the companion of discussion and philosophy, and because of their preference of gymnastics to music? You perfectly describe, he said, a polity that is a mixture[*](This is of course not the mixed government which Plato approves Laws 691-692, 712 D-E, 759 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 629.) of good and evil. Why, yes, the elements have been mixed, I said, but the most conspicuous[*](For διαφανέστατον cf. 544 D. The expression διαφανέστατον . . . ἕν τι μόνον, misunderstood and emended by Apelt, is colored by an idea of Anaxagoras expressed by Lucretius i. 877-878: illud Apparere unum cuius sint plurima mixta. Anaxag. Fr. 12. Diels 1.3, p. 405 ἀλλ’ ὅτων πλεῖστα ἔνι, ταῦτα ἐνδηλότατα ἓν ἕκαστον ἐστι καὶ ἦν. Cf. Phaedr. 238 A, Cratyl. 393 misunderstood by Dümmler and emended (ἐναργής for ἐγκρατής) with the approval of Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 350.) feature in it is one thing only, due to the predominance of the high-spirited element, namely contentiousness and covetousness of honor.[*](There is no contradiction between this and Laws 870 C if the passage is read carefully.) Very much so, said he. Such, then, would be the origin and nature of this polity if we may merely outline the figure of a constitution in words and not elaborate it precisely, since even the sketch will suffice to show us the most just and the most unjust type of man, and it would be an impracticable task to set forth all forms[*](Cf. on 544 D, p. 240, note a.) of government without omitting any, and all customs and qualities of men. Quite right, he said. What, then, is the man that corresponds to this constitution? What is his origin and what his nature? I fancy, Adeimantus said, that he comes rather close[*](Cf. Phaedo 65 A, Porphyry, De abst. i. 27, Teubner, p. 59 ἐγγὺς τείνειν ἀποσιτίας.) to Glaucon here in point of contentiousness. Perhaps, said I, in that, but I do not think their natures are alike in the following respects. In what?

He will have to be somewhat self-willed[*](αὐθαδέστερον. The fault of Prometheus (Aesch. P. V. 1034, 1937) and Medea must not be imputed to Glaucon.) and lacking in culture,[*](Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, who imitates or parodies Plato throughout, e.g. p. 83 A little inaccessible to ideas and light, and pp. 54-55 The peculiar serenity of aristocracies of Teutonic origin appears to come from their never having had any ideas to trouble them.) yet a lover of music and fond of listening[*](Cf. 475 D, 535 D, Lysis 206 C.) to talk and speeches, though by no means himself a rhetorician; and to slaves such a one would be harsh,[*](Cf. p. 249, note g, on 547 C, and Newman ii. p. 317. In i. p. 143, n. 3 he says that this implies slavery in the ideal state, in spite of 547 C.) not scorning them as the really educated do, but he would be gentle with the freeborn and very submissive to officials, a lover of office and of honor,[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18. Lysias xxi. portrays a typical φιλότιμος. Cf Phaedr. 256 C, Eurip. I. A. 527. He is a Xenophontic type. Cf Xen. Oecon. 14. 10, Hiero 7. 3, Agesil. 10. 4. Isoc. Antid. 141 and 226 uses the word in a good sense. Cf. But if it be a sin to covet honor, Shakes. Henry V. iv. iii. 28.) not basing his claim to office[*](Cf. the ἀξιώματα of Laws 690 A, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 8 ff., 1282 b 26, 1283-1284.) on ability to speak or anything of that sort but on his exploits in war or preparation for war, and he would be a devotee of gymnastics and hunting.[*](Cf. Arnold on the barbarians in Culture and Anarchy, pp. 78, 82, 84.)Why, yes, he said, that is the spirit of that polity.[*](For the ἦθος of a state cf. Isoc. Nic. 31.) And would not such a man be disdainful of wealth too in his youth, but the older he grew the more he would love it because of his participation in the covetous nature and because his virtue is not sincere and pure since it lacks the best guardian? What guardian? said Adeimantus. Reason, said I, blended with culture,[*](The Greek words λόγος and μουσική are untranslatable. Cf. also 560 B. For μουσική cf. 546 D. Newman i. p. 414 fancies that his is a return to the position of Book IV. from the disparagement of music in 522 A. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 4 on this supposed ABA development of Plato’s opinions.) which is the only indwelling preserver of virtue throughout life in the soul that possesses it. Well said, he replied. This is the character, I said, of the timocratic youth, resembling the city that bears his name. By all means. His origin[*](δέ γ’ marks the transition from the description of the type to its origin. Cf. 547 E, 553 C, 556 B, 557 B, 560 D, 561 E, 563 B, 566 E. Ritter, pp. 69-70, comments on its frequency in this book, but does not note the reason. There are no cases in the first five pages.) is somewhat on this wise: Sometimes he is the young son of a good father who lives in a badly governed state and avoids honors and office and law-suits and all such meddlesomeness[*](Cf. Lysias xix. 18 ἐκείνῳ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὰ ἑαυτοῦ πράττειν, with the contrasted type ἀνήλωσεν ἐπιθυμῶν τιμᾶσθαι, Isoc. Antid. 227 ἀπραγμονεστάτους μὲν ὄντας ἐν τῇ πόλει. Cf. πολυπραγμοσύνη 444 B, 434 B, Isoc. Antid. 48, Peace 108, 30, and 26, with Norlin’s note (Loeb). Cf. also Aristoph. Knights 261.) and is willing to forbear something of his rights[*](ἐλαττοῦσθαι cf. Thuc. i. 77. 1, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1198 b 26-32, Pol. 1319 a 3.) in order to escape trouble.[*](For πράγματα ἔχειν cf. 370 A, Gorg. 467 D, Alc. I. 119 B, Aristoph. Birds 1026, Wasps 1392. Cf. πράγματα παρέχειν, Rep. 505 A, 531 B, Theages 121 D, Herod. i. 155, Aristoph. Birds 931, Plutus 20, 102.) How does he originate? he said. Why, when, to begin with, I said, he hears his mother complaining[*](Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 434 with some exaggeration says that this is the only woman character in Plato and is probably his mother, Perictione. Pohlenz, Gött. Gel. Anz. 1921, p. 18, disagrees. For the complaints cf. Gerard, Four Years in Germany, p. 115 Now if a lawyer gets to be about forty years old and is not some kind of a Rat his wife begins to nag him . . .) that her husband is not one of the rulers and for that reason she is slighted among the other women, and when she sees that her husband is not much concerned about money and does not fight and brawl in private lawsuits and in the public assembly, but takes all such matters lightly, and when she observes that he is self-absorbed[*](Cf. Symp. 174 D, Isoc. Antid. 227.) in his thoughts and neither regards nor disregards her overmuch,[*](Cf. the husband in Lysias i. 6.) and in consequence of all this laments and tells the boy that his father is too slack[*](λίαν ἀνειμένος: one who has grown too slack or negligent. Cf. Didot, Com. Fr. p. 728 τίς ὧδε μῶρος καὶ λίαν ἀνειμένος; Porphyry, De abst. ii. 58.) and no kind of a man, with all the other complaints with which women[*](Cf. Phaedo 60 A.For Plato’s attitude towards women Cf. What Plato Said, p. 632, on Laws 631 D.) nag[*](ὑμνεῖν. Cf. Euthydem. 296 D, Soph. Ajax 292. Commentators have been troubled by the looseness of Plato’s style in this sentence. Cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. p. 385.) in such cases. Many indeed, said Adeimantus, and after their kind.[*](Cf. Aristoph. Thesm. 167 ὅμοια γὰρ ποιεῖν ἀνάγκη τῇ φύσει.)

You are aware, then, said I, that the very house-slaves of such men, if they are loyal and friendly, privately say the same sort of things to the sons, and if they observe a debtor or any other wrongdoer whom the father does not prosecute, they urge the boy to punish all such when he grows to manhood and prove himself more of a man than his father, and when the lad goes out he hears and sees the same sort of thing.[*](ἕτερα τοιαῦτα: cf. on 488 B; also Gorg. 481 E, 482 A, 514 D, Euthyd. 298 E, Protag. 326 A, Phaedo 58 D, 80 D, Symp. 201 E, etc.) Men who mind their own affairs[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 B.) in the city are spoken of as simpletons and are held in slight esteem, while meddlers who mind other people’s affairs are honored and praised. Then it is[*](τότε δή cf. 551 A, 566 C, 330 E, 573 A, 591 A, Phaedo 85 A, 96 B and D, Polit. 272 E. Cf. also τότ’ ἤδη, on 565 C.) that the youth, hearing and seeing such things, and on the other hand listening to the words of his father, and with a near view of his pursuits contrasted with those of other men, is solicited by both, his father watering and fostering the growth of the rational principle[*](Cf. on 439 D, Vol. I. p. 397, note d.) in his soul and the others the appetitive and the passionate[*](For these three principles of the soul cf. on 435 A ff., 439 D-E ff., 441 A.); and as he is not by nature of a bad disposition but has fallen into evil communications,[*](Cf. the fragment of Menander,φθείρουσιν ἤθη χρήσθ’ ὁμιλίαι κακαί, quoted in 1Cor. xv. 33 (Kock, C.A.F. iii. No. 218). Cf. also Phaedr. 250 A ὑπό τινων ὁμιλιῶν, Aesch. Seven Against Thebes 599 ἔσθ’ ὁμιλίας κακῆς κάκιον οὐδέν.) under these two solicitations he comes to a compromise[*](Cf. p. 249, note f.) and turns over the government in his soul[*](Cf. 553 B-C, 608 B.) to the intermediate principle of ambition and high spirit and becomes a man haughty of soul[*](ὑψηλόφρων is a poetical word. Cf. Eurip. I. A. 919.) and covetous of honor.[*](Cf. p. 255, note f.) You have, I think, most exactly described his origin. Then, said I, we have our second polity and second type of man. We have, he said. Shall we then, as Aeschylus: would say,

tell of another champion before another gate,