Republic

So, when wealth is honored in a state, and the wealthy, virtue and the good are less honored.Obviously.And that which men at any time honor they practise,[*](This sentence has been much quoted. Cf. Cic. Tusc. i. 2 honos alit artes . . . iacentque ea semper, quae apud quosque inprobantur. Themistius and Libanius worked it into almost every oration. Cf. Mrs. W. C. Wright, The Emperor Julian, p. 70, n. 3. Cf. also Stallbaum ad loc. For ἀσκεῖται cf. Pindar, Ol. viii. 22.) and what is not honored is neglected.It is so.Thus, finally, from being lovers of victory and lovers of honor they become lovers of gain-getting and of money, and they commend and admire the rich man and put him in office but despise the man who is poor.Quite so.And is it not then that they pass a law defining the limits[*](ὅρον: cf. 551 C, Laws 714 C, 962 D, 739 D, 626 B, Menex. 238 D, Polit. 293 E, 296 E, 292 C, Lysis 209 C, Aristot. Pol. 1280 a 7, 1271 a 35, and Newman i. p. 220, Eth. Nic. 1138 b 23. Cf. also τέλος Rhet. 1366 a 3. For the true criterion of office-holding see Laws 715 C-D and Isoc. xii. 131. For wealth as the criterion cf. Aristot. Pol. 1273 a 37.) of an oligarchical polity, prescribing[*](For ταξάμενοι cf. Vol. I. p. 310, note c, on 416 E.) a sum of money, a larger sum where it is more[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1301 b 13-14.) of an oligarchy, where it is less a smaller, and proclaiming that no man shall hold office whose property does not come up to the required valuation? And this law they either put through by force of arms, or without resorting to that they establish their government by terrorization.[*](Cf. 557 A.) Is not that the way of it?It is.The establishment then, one may say, is in this wise.Yes, he said, but what is the character of this constitution, and what are the defects that we said it had? To begin with, said I, consider the nature of its constitutive and defining principle. Suppose men should appoint the pilots[*](Cf. 488, and Polit. 299 B-C, What Plato Said, p. 521, on Euthydem. 291 D.) of ships in this way, by property qualification, and not allow[*](Stallbaum says that ἐπιτρέποι is used absolutely as in 575 D, Symp. 213 E, Lysis 210 B, etc. Similarly Latin permitto. Cf. Shorey on Jowett’s translation of Meno 92 A-B, A. J. P. xiii. p. 367. See too Diog. L. i. 65.) a poor man to navigate, even if he were a better pilot. A sorry voyage they would make of it, he said. And is not the same true of any other form of rule? I think so. Except of a city, said I, or does it hold for a city too? Most of all, he said, by as much as that is the greatest and most difficult[*](Men are the hardest creatures to govern. Cf. Polit. 292 D, and What Plato Said, p. 635, on Laws 766 A.) rule of all. Here, then, is one very great defect in oligarchy. So it appears. Well, and is this a smaller one? What? That such a city should of necessity be not one,[*](For the idea that a city should be a unity Cf. Laws 739 D and on 423 A-B. Cf. also 422 E with 417 A-B, Livy ii. 24 adeo duas ex una civitate discordia fecerat. Aristot. Pol. 1316 b 7 comments ἄτοπον δὲ καὶ τὸ φάναι δύο πόλεις εἶναι τὴν ὀλιγαρχικήν, πλουσίων καὶ πενήτων . . . and tries to prove the point by his topical method.) but two, a city of the rich and a city of the poor, dwelling together, and always plotting[*](Cf. 417 B.) against one another. No, by Zeus, said he, it is not a bit smaller. Nor, further, can we approve of this—the likelihood that they will not be able to wage war, because of the necessity of either arming and employing the multitude,[*](For the idea that the rulers fear to arm the people cf. Thuc. iii. 27, Livy iii. 15 consules et armare pIebem et inermem pati timebant.) and fearing them more than the enemy, or else, if they do not make use of them, of finding themselves on the field of battle, oligarchs indeed,[*](He plays on the word. In 565 C ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀλιγαρχικούς is used in a different sense. Cf. Symp. 181 A ὡς ἀληθῶς πάνδημος, Phaedo 80 D εἰς Ἅιδου ὡς ἀληθῶς.) and rulers over a few. And to this must be added their reluctance to contribute money, because they are lovers of money. No, indeed, that is not admirable.

And what of the trait we found fault with long ago[*](Cf. 374 B, 434 A, 443 D-E. For the specialty of function Cf. What Plato Said, p. 480, on Charm. 161 E.)—the fact that in such a state the citizens are busy-bodies and jacks-of-all-trades, farmers, financiers and soldiers all in one? Do you think that is right?By no manner of means.Consider now whether this polity is not the first that admits that which is the greatest of all such evils.What?The allowing a man to sell all his possessions,[*](So in the Laws the householder may not sell his lot, Laws 741 B-C, 744 D-E. Cf. 755 A, 857 A, Aristot. Pol. 1270 a 19, Newman i. p. 376.) which another is permitted to acquire, and after selling them to go on living in the city, but as no part of it,[*](Cf Aristot. Pol. 1326 a 20, Newman i. pp. 98 and 109. Cf Leslie Stephen, Util. ii. 111 A vast populace has grown up outside of the old order.) neither a money-maker, nor a craftsman, nor a knight, nor a foot-soldier, but classified only as a pauper[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1266 b 13.) and a dependent.This is the first, he said. There certainly is no prohibition of that sort of thing in oligarchical states. Otherwise some of their citizens would not be excessively rich, and others out and out paupers. Right. But observe this. When such a fellow was spending his wealth, was he then of any more use to the state in the matters of which we were speaking, or did he merely seem to belong to the ruling class, while in reality he was neither ruler nor helper in the state, but only a consumer of goods[*](ἑτοίμωνthings ready at hand. Cf. 573 A, Polyb. vi. (Teubner, vol. ii. p. 237); Horace Epist. i. 2. 27 fruges consumere nati.)? It is so, he said; he only seemed, but was just a spendthrift. Shall we, then, say of him that as the drone[*](Cf. Laws 901 A, Hesiod, Works and Days 300 f., Aristoph. Wasps 1071 ff., Eurip. Suppl. 242, Xen. Oecon. 17. 15, and Virgil, Georg. iv. 168 ignavum fucos pecus a praesepibus arcent. the sentence was much quoted. Stallbaum refers to Ruhnken on Tim. 157 ff. for many illustration, and to Petavius ad Themist. Orat. xxiii. p. 285 D.) springs up in the cell, a pest of the hive, so such a man grows up in his home, a pest of the state? By all means, Socrates, he said. And has not God, Adeimantus, left the drones which have wings and fly stingless one and all, while of the drones here who travel afoot he has made some stingless but has armed others with terrible stings? And from the stingless finally issue beggars in old age,[*](Cf 498 A, Laws 653 A; also the modern distinction between defectives and delinquents.) but from those furnished with stings all that are denominated[*](κέκληνται: Cf. 344 B-C.) malefactors? Most true, he said. It is plain, then, said I, that wherever you see beggars in a city, there are somewhere in the neighborhood concealed thieves and cutpurses and temple-robbers and similar artists in crime. Clearly, he said. Well, then, in oligarchical cities do you not see beggars? Nearly all are such, he said, except the ruling class. Are we not to suppose, then, that there are also many criminals in them furnished with stings, whom the rulers by their surveillance forcibly[*](βίᾳ is so closely connected with κατέχουσιν that the double dative is not felt to be awkward. But Adam takes ἐπιμελείᾳ as an adverb.) restrain? We must think so, he said. And shall we not say that the presence of such citizens is the result of a defective culture and bad breeding and a wrong constitution of the state? We shall. Well, at any rate such would be the character of the oligarchical state, and these, or perhaps even more than these, would be the evils that afflict it. Pretty nearly these, he said.

Then, I said, let us regard as disposed of the constitution called oligarchy, whose rulers are determined by a property qualification.[*](Cf. on 550 C. p. 261, note h.) And next we are to consider the man who resembles it—how he arises and what after that his character is. Quite so, he said. Is not the transition from that timocratic youth to the oligarchical type mostly on this wise? How? When a son born to the timocratic man at first emulates his father, and follows in his footsteps[*](Cf. 410 B, Homer Od. xix. 436 ἴχνη ἐρευνῶντος, ii. 406, iii. 30, v. 193, vii. 38 μετ’ ἴχνια βαῖνε.) and then sees him suddenly dashed,[*](For πταίσαντα cf. Aesch. Prom. 926, Ag. 1624 (Butl. emend.).) as a ship on a reef,[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 1007, Eumen. 564, Thuc. vii. 25. 7, and Thompson on Phaedr. 255 D.) against the state, and making complete wreckage[*](Lit. spilling. Cf. Lucian, Timon 23.) of both his possessions and himself perhaps he has been a general, or has held some other important office, and has then been dragged into court by mischievous sycophants and put to death or banished[*](For ἐκπεσόντα cf. 560 A, 566 A. In Xen. An. vii. 5. 13 it is used of shipwreck. Cf. εκ̓βάλλοντες 488 C.) or outlawed and has lost all his property— It is likely, he said. And the son, my friend, after seeing and suffering these things, and losing his property, grows timid, I fancy, and forthwith thrusts headlong[*](Cf. Herod. vii. 136.) from his bosom’s throne[*](Cf. Aesch. Ag. 983. Cf. 550 B.) that principle of love of honor and that high spirit, and being humbled by poverty turns to the getting of money, and greedily[*](For γλίσχρως cf. on 488 A, Class. Phil. iv. p. 86 on Diog. L. iv. 59, Aelian, Epist. Rust. 18 γλίσχρως τε καὶ κατ’ ὀλίγον.) and stingily and little by little by thrift and hard work collects property. Do you not suppose that such a one will then establish on that throne the principle of appetite and avarice, and set it up as the great king in his soul, adorned with tiaras and collars of gold, and girt with the Persian sword? I do, he said. And under this domination he will force the rational and high-spirited principles to crouch lowly to right and left[*](ἔνθεν καὶ ἔνθεν: Cf. Protag. 315 B, Tim. 46 C, Critias 117 C, etc., Herod. iv. 175.) as slaves, and will allow the one to calculate and consider nothing but the ways of making more money from a little,[*](Cf. 554 A, 556 C, Xen. Mem. ii. 6. 4 μηδὲ πρὸς ἓν ἄλλο σχολὴν ποιεῖται ἢ ὁπόθεν αὐτός τι κερδανεῖ, and Aristot. Pol. 1257 b 407, and 330 C. See too Inge, Christian Ethics, p. 220: The Times obituary notice of Holloway (of the pills) will suffice. Money-making is an art by itself; it demands for success the devotion of the whole man, etc. For the phrase σκοπεῖν ὁπόθεν cf. Isoc. Areop. 83, Panegyr. 133-134 σκοπεῖν ἐξ ὧν.) and the other to admire and honor nothing but riches and rich men, and to take pride in nothing but the possession of wealth and whatever contributes to that? There is no other transformation so swift and sure of the ambitious youth into the avaricious type. Is this, then, our oligarchical man? said I. He is developed, at any rate, out of a man resembling the constitution from which the oligarchy sprang. Let us see, then, whether he will have a like character.

Let us see.Would he not, in the first place, resemble it in prizing wealth above everything?Inevitably.And also by being thrifty and laborious, satisfying only his own necessary[*](Cf. on 558 D, p. 291, note i.) appetites and desires and not providing for expenditure on other things, but subduing his other appetites as vain and unprofitable?By all means.He would be a squalid[*](αὐχμηρός: Cf. Symp. 203 D.) fellow, said I, looking for a surplus of profit[*](For περιουσίαν cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 50 and Theaet. 154 E.) in everything, and a hoarder, the type the multitude approves.[*](Cf. Phaedr. 256 E, Meno 90 A-B by implication. Numenius (ed. Mullach iii. 159) relates of Lacydes that he was a bit greedy (ὑπογλισχρότερος) and after a fashion a thrifty manager (οἰκονομικός)—as the expression is—the sort approved by most people. Emerson, The Young American, they recommend conventional virtues, whatever will earn and preserve property. But this is not always true in an envious democracy: cf. Isoc. xv. 159-160 and America today.) Would not this be the character of the man who corresponds to such a polity? I certainly think so, he said. Property, at any rate, is the thing most esteemed by that state and that kind of man. That, I take it, said I, is because he has never turned his thoughts to true culture. I think not, he said, else he would not have made the blind[*](Plato distinctly refers to the blind god Wealth. Cf. Aristoph. Plutus,Eurip. fr. 773, Laws 631 C πλοῦτος οὐ τυφλός which was often quoted. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 624, Otto, p. 60.) one leader of his choir and first in honor.[*](Cf. Herod. iii. 34, vii. 107.) Well said, I replied. But consider this. Shall we not say that owing to this lack of culture the appetites of the drone spring up in him, some the beggarly, others the rascally, but that they are forcibly restrained by his general self-surveillance and self- control[*](Cf. 552 E ἐπιμελείᾳ βίᾳ. For ἄλλης cf. 368 B ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου τοῦ ὑμετέρου τρόπου.)? We shall indeed, he said. Do you know, then, said I, to what you must look to discern the rascalities of such men? To what? he said. To guardianships of orphans,[*](For the treatment of inferiors and weaker persons as a test of character Cf. Laws 777 D-E, Hesiod, Works and Days, 330, and Murray, Rise of the Greek Epic, pp. 84-85, who, however, errs on the meaning of αἰδώς. For orphans cf. also Laws 926-928, 766 C, 877 C, 909 C-D.) and any such opportunities of doing injustice with impunity. True. And is it not apparent by this that in other dealings, where he enjoys the repute of a seeming just man, he by some better[*](ἐπιεικεῖ is here used generally, and not in its special sense of sweet reasonableness.) element in himself forcibly keeps down other evil desires dwelling within,[*](For ἐνούσας Cf. Phileb. 16 D, Symp. 187 E.) not persuading them that it is better not[*](Cf. 463 D. For the idea here Cf. Phaedo 68-69, What Plato Said, p. 527.) nor taming them by reason, but by compulsion and fear, trembling for his possessions generally. Quite so, he said. Yes, by Zeus, said I, my friend. In most of them, when there is occasion to spend the money of others, you will discover the existence of drone-like appetites. Most emphatically. Such a man, then, would not be free from internal dissension.[*](For the idea at war with himself, Cf. 440 B and E (στάσις), Phaedr. 237 D-E, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1099 a 12 f.) He would not be really one, but in some sort a double[*](Cf. 397 E.) man. Yet for the most part, his better desires would have the upper hand over the worse. It is so. And for this reason, I presume, such a man would be more seemly, more respectable, than many others; but the true virtue of a soul in unison and harmony[*](Cf. on 443 D-E, Vol. I. p. 414, note e; also Phaedo 61 A, and What Plato Said, p. 485 on Laches 188 D.) with itself would escape him and dwell afar. I think so.

And again, the thrifty stingy man would be a feeble competitor personally in the city for any prize of victory or in any other honorable emulation. He is unwilling to spend money for fame and rivalries of that sort, and, fearing to awaken his prodigal desires and call them into alliance for the winning of the victory, he fights in true oligarchical[*](ὀλιγαρχικῶς keeps up the analogy between the man and the state. Cf. my Idea of Justice, Ethical Record,Jan. 1890, pp. 188, 191, 195.) fashion with a small part of his resources and is defeated for the most part and—finds himself richYes indeed, he said. Have we any further doubt, then, I said, as to the correspondence and resemblance[*](ὁμοιότητι: cf. 576 C.) between the thrifty and money-making man and the oligarchical state? None, he said. We have next to consider, it seems, the origin and nature of democracy, that we may next learn the character of that type of man and range him beside the others for our judgement.[*](Cf. Phileb. 55 C εἰς τὴν κρίσιν, Laws 856 C, 943 C.) That would at least be a consistent procedure. Then, said I, is not the transition from oligarchy to democracy effected in some such way as this—by the insatiate greed for that which it set before itself as the good,[*](The σκοπός or ὅρος. Cf. on 551 A, p. 263, note e, and Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 a 2.) the attainment of the greatest possible wealth? In what way? Why, since its rulers owe their offices to their wealth, they are not willing to prohibit by law the prodigals who arise among the youth from spending and wasting their substance. Their object is, by lending money on the property of such men, and buying it in, to become still richer and more esteemed. By all means. And is it not at once apparent in a state that this honoring of wealth is incompatible with a sober and temperate citizenship,[*](Ackermann, Das Christliche bei Plato, compares Luke xvi.13 Ye cannot serve God and Mammon. Cf. also Laws 742 D-E, 727 E f., 831 C.) but that one or the other of these two ideals is inevitably neglected. That is pretty clear, he said. And such negligence and encouragement of licentiousness[*](ἀκολασταίνεινCf. Gorg. 478 A, Phileb. 12 D.) in oligarchies not infrequently has reduced to poverty men of no ignoble quality.[*](Cf. Laws 832 A οὐκ ἀφυεῖς. For the men reduced to poverty swelling the number of drones cf. Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592, and Wilamowitz ad loc.) It surely has. And there they sit, I fancy, within the city, furnished with stings, that is, arms, some burdened with debt, others disfranchised, others both, hating and conspiring against the acquirers of their estates and the rest of the citizens, and eager for revolution.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1305 b 40-41, 1266 b 14.) ’Tis so.

But these money-makers with down-bent heads,[*](Cf. Persius, Sat. ii. 61 o curvae in terras animae, et caelestium inanes, Cf. 586 A κεκυφότες. Cf. also on 553 D for the general thought.) pretending not even to see[*](Cf. Euthyph. 5 C, Polit. 287 A, Aristoph. Peace 1051, Plut. 837, Eurip. Hippol. 119, I. T. 956, Medea 67, Xen. Hell. iv. 5. 6.) them, but inserting the sting of their money[*](Or, as Ast, Stallbaum and others take it, the poison of their money.τιτρώσκοντες suggests the poisonous sting, especially as Plato has been speaking of hives and drones. For ἐνιέντες cf. Eurip. Bacchae 851 ἐνεὶς . . . λύσσαν, implanting madness. In the second half of the sentence the figure is changed, the poison becoming the parent, i.e. the principal, which breeds interest,. cf. 507 A, p. 96.) into any of the remainder who do not resist, and harvesting from them in interest as it were a manifold progeny of the parent sum, foster the drone and pauper element in the state.They do indeed multiply it, he said. And they are not willing to quench the evil as it bursts into flame either by way of a law prohibiting a man from doing as he likes with his own,[*](Cf. on 552 A, Laws 922 E-923 A.) or in this way, by a second law that does away with such abuses. What law? The law that is next best, and compels the citizens to pay heed to virtue.[*](Cf. Protag. 327 D ἀναγκάζουσα ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, Symp. 185 B, and for ἐπιμελεῖσθαι Cf. What Plato Said, p. 464, on Apol. 29 D-E.) For if a law commanded that most voluntary contracts[*](For refusing to enforce monetary contracts Cf. Laws 742 C, 849 E, 915 E, and Newman ii. p. 254 on Aristot. Pol. 1263 b 21.) should be at the contractor’s risk, the pursuit of wealth would be less shameless in the state and fewer of the evils of which we spoke just now would grow up there. Much fewer, he said. But as it is, and for all these reasons, this is the plight to which the rulers in the state reduce their subjects, and as for themselves and their off-spring, do they not make the young spoiled[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 483, on Laches 179 D, and Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 23.) wantons averse to toil of body and mind, and too soft to stand up against pleasure and pain,[*](Cf. 429 C-D, Laches 191 D-E, Laws 633 D.) and mere idlers? Surely. And do they not fasten upon themselves the habit of neglect of everything except the making of money, and as complete an indifference to virtue as the paupers exhibit? Little they care. And when, thus conditioned, the rulers and the ruled are brought together on the march, in wayfaring, or in some other common undertaking, either a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or, for that matter, in actual battle, and observe one another, then the poor are not in the least scorned by the rich, but on the contrary, do you not suppose it often happens that when a lean, sinewy, sunburnt[*](Cf. Tucker on Aesch. Suppl. 726.) pauper is stationed in battle beside a rich man bred in the shade, and burdened with superfluous flesh,[*](Cf. Soph. Ajax 758 περισσὰ κἀνόνητα σώματα.) and sees him panting and helpless[*](For a similar picture cf. Aristoph. Frogs 1086-1098. Cf. also Gorg. 518 C, and for the whole passage Xen. Mem. iii. 5. 15, Aristot. Pol. 1310 a 24-25.)—do you not suppose he will think that such fellows keep their wealth by the cowardice[*](The poor, though stronger, are too cowardly to use force. For κακίᾳ τῇ σφετέρᾳ cf. Lysias ii. 65 κακίᾳ τῇ αὑτῶν, Rhesus 813-814 τῇ Φρυγῶν κακανδρίᾳ, Phaedrus 248 B, Symp. 182 D, Crito 45 E, Eurip. Androm. 967, Aristoph. Thesm. 868 τῇ κοράκων πονηρίᾳ.) of the poor, and that when the latter are together in private, one will pass the word to another our men are good for nothing? Nay, I know very well that they do, said he. And just as an unhealthy body requires but a slight impulse[*](Cf. Soph. O. T. 961 σμικρὰ παλαῖα σώματ’ εὐνάζει ῥοπή a slight impulse puts aged bodies to sleep, Demosth. Olynth. ii. 9 and 21. Cf. 544 E.) from outside to fall into sickness, and sometimes, even without that, all the man is one internal war, in like manner does not the corresponding type of state need only a slight occasion,[*](Cf. Polyb. vi. 57. Montaigne, apud Höffding, i. 30 Like every other being each illness has its appointed time of development and close—interference is futile, with Tim. 89 B.) the one party bringing in[*](Cf. Thuc. i. 3, ii. 68, iv. 64, Herod. ii. 108.) allies from an oligarchical state, or the other from a democratic, to become diseased and wage war with itself, and sometimes even apart from any external impulse faction arises[*](στασιάζει is applied here to disease of body. Cf. Herod. v. 28 νοσήσασα ἐς τὰ μάλιστα στάσι, grievously ill of faction. Cf. on 554 D, p. 276, note c.)?

Most emphatically.And a democracy, I suppose, comes into being when the poor, winning the victory, put to death some of the other party, drive out[*](Cf. 488 C, 560 A, Gorg. 466 C, 468 D, Prot. 325 B. Exile, either formal or voluntary, was always regarded as the proper thing for the defeated party in the Athenian democracy. The custom even exists at the present time. Venizelos, for instance, has frequently, when defeated at the polls, chosen to go into voluntary exile. But that term, in modern as in ancient Greece, must often be interpreted cum grano salis.) others, and grant the rest of the citizens an equal share[*](ἐξ ἴσου: one of the watchwords of democracy. Cf. 561 B and C, 599 B, 617 C, Laws 919 D, Alc. I. 115 D, Crito 50 E, Isoc. Archid. 96, Peace 3.) in both citizenship and offices—and for the most part these offices are assigned by lot.[*](But Isoc. Areop. 22-23 considers the lot undemocratic because it might result in the establishment in office of men with oligarchical sentiments. See Norlin ad loc. For the use of the lot in Plato Cf. Laws 759 B, 757 E, 690 C, 741 B-C, 856 D, 946 B, Rep. 460 A, 461 E. Cf. Apelt, p. 520.)Why, yes, he said, that is the constitution of democracy alike whether it is established by force of arms or by terrorism[*](Cf. 551 B.) resulting in the withdrawal of one of the parties. What, then, said I, is the manner of their life and what is the quality of such a constitution? For it is plain that the man of this quality will turn out to be a democratic sort of man. It is plain, he said. To begin with, are they not free? and is not the city chock-full of liberty and freedom of speech? and has not every man licence[*](ἐξουσία: cf. Isoc. xii. 131 τὴν δ’ ἐξουσίαν ὅ τι βούλεται τις ποιεῖν εὐδαιμονίαν. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii. Doing as One Likes.) to do as he likes? So it is said, he replied. And where there is such licence, it is obvious that everyone would arrange a plan[*](κατασκευή is a word of all work in Plato. Cf. 419 A, 449 A, 455 A, Gorg. 455 E, 477 B, etc.) for leading his own life in the way that pleases him. Obvious. All sorts[*](παντοδαπός usually has an unfavorable connotation in Plato. Cf. 431 b-C, 561 D, 567 E, 550 D, Symp. 198 B, Gorg. 489 C, Laws 788 C, etc. Isoc. iv. 45 uses it in a favorable sense, but in iii. 16 more nearly as Plato does. for the mixture of things in a democracy cf. Xen. Rep. Ath. 2. 8 φωνῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ σχήματι . . . Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ κεκραμένῃ ἐξ ἁπάντων τῶν Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων; and Laws 681 D. Libby, Introduction to History of Science, p. 273, says Arnold failed in his analysis of American civilization to confirm Plato’s judgement concerning the variety of natures to be found in the democratic state. De Tocqueville also, and many English observers, have commented on the monotony and standardization of American life.) and conditions of men, then, would arise in this polity more than in any other? Of course. Possibly, said I, this is the most beautiful of polities as a garment of many colors, embroidered with all kinds of hues, so this, decked and diversified with every type of character, would appear the most beautiful. And perhaps, I said, many would judge it to be the most beautiful, like boys and women[*](For the idea that women and children like many colors cf. Sappho’s admiration for Jason’s mantle mingled with all manner of colors (Lyr. Graec. i. 196). For the classing together of women and boys Cf. Laws 658 D, Shakes. As You Like It,III. ii. 435 As boys and women are for the most part cattle of this color, Faguet, Nineteenth CenturyLamartine a été infiniment aimé des adolescents sérieux et des femmes distinguées.) when they see bright-colored things. Yes indeed, he said. Yes, said I, and it is the fit place, my good friend, in which to look for a constitution. Why so? Because, owing to this licence, it includes all kinds, and it seems likely that anyone who wishes to organize a state, as we were just now doing, must find his way to a democratic city and select the model that pleases him, as if in a bazaar[*](Cf. Plutarch, Dion 53. Burke says A republic, as an ancient philosopher has observed, is no one species of government, but a magazine of every species. Cf. Laws 789 B for an illustration of the point. Filmer, Patriarcha, misquotes this saying The Athenians sold justice . . . , which made Plato call a popular estate a fair where everything is to be sold.) of constitutions, and after making his choice, establish his own. Perhaps at any rate, he said, he would not be at a loss for patterns.

And the freedom from all compulsion to hold office in such a city, even if you are qualified,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1271 a 12 δεῖ γὰρ καὶ βουλόμενον καὶ μὴ βουλόμενον ἄρχειν τὸν ἄξιον τῆς ἀρχῆς. Cf. 347 B-C.) or again, to submit to rule, unless you please, or to make war when the rest are at war,[*](Cf. Laws 955 B-C, where a penalty is pronounced for making peace or war privately, and the parody in Aristoph. Acharn. passim.) or to keep the peace when the others do so, unless you desire peace; and again, the liberty, in defiance of any law that forbids you, to hold office and sit on juries none the less, if it occurs to you to do so, is not all that a heavenly and delicious entertainment[*](διαγωγή: cf. 344 E, where it is used more seriously of the whole conduct of life. Cf. also Theaet. 177 A, Polit. 274 D, Tim. 71 D, Laws 806 E, Aristot. Met. 981 b 18 and 982 b 24 uses the word in virtual anaphora with pleasure. See too Zeller, Aristot. ii. pp. 307-309, 266, n. 5.) for the time being?Perhaps, he said, for so long. And is not the placability[*](Cf. 562 D. For the mildness of the Athenian democracy cf. Aristot. Ath. Pol. 22. 19, Demosth. xxi. 184, xxii. 51, xxiv. 51 Lysias vi. 34, Isoc. Antid. 20, Areopagit. 67-68, Hel. 27; also Menex. 243 E and also Euthydem. 303 D δημοτικόν τι καὶ πρᾷον ἐν τοῖς λόγοις. Here the word πρᾳότης is ironically transferred to the criminal himself.) of some convicted criminals exquisite[*](κομψή: cf. 376 A, Theaet. 171 A.)? Or have you never seen in such a state men condemned to death or exile who none the less stay on, and go to and fro among the people, and as if no one saw or heeded him, the man slips in and out[*](For περινοστεῖ cf. Lucian, Bis Acc. 6, Aristoph. Plut. 121, 494, Peace 762.) like a revenant[*](His being unnoticed accords better with the rendering spirit, one returned from the dead (a perfectly possible meaning for ἥρως. Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 435 translates Geist) than with that of a hero returning from the wars. Cf. Adam ad loc.)? Yes, many, he said. And the tolerance of democracy, its superiority[*](For οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία cf. on 532 B ἔτι ἀδυναμία.) to all our meticulous requirements, its disdain or our solemn[*](σεμνύνοντες here has an ironical or colloquial tone—high-brow, top-lofty.) pronouncements[*](Cf. 401 B-C, 374 C and on 467 A, Laws 643 B, Delacroix, Psychologie de l’art, p. 46.) made when we were founding our city, that except in the case of transcendent[*](For ὑπερβεβλημένη Cf. Laws 719 D, Eurip. Alcest. 153.) natural gifts no one could ever become a good man unless from childhood his play and all his pursuits were concerned with things fair and good,—how superbly[*](μεγαλοπρεπῶς is often ironical in Plato. Cf. 362 C, Symp. 199 C, Charm. 175 C, Theaet. 161 C, Meno 94 B, Polit. 277 B, Hipp. Maj. 291 E.) it tramples under foot all such ideals, caring nothing from what practices[*](In Aristoph. Knights 180 ff. Demosthenes tells the sausage-seller that his low birth and ignorance and his trade are the very things that fit him for political leadership.) and way of life a man turns to politics, but honoring him if only he says that he loves the people It is a noble[*](For the ironical use of γενναία cf. 544 C, Soph. 231 B, Theaet. 209 E.) polity, indeed! he said. These and qualities akin to these democracy would exhibit, and it would, it seems, be a delightful[*](ἡδεῖα: cf. Isoc. vii. 70 of good government,τοῖς χρωμένοις ἡδίους.) form of government, anarchic and motley, assigning a kind of equality indiscriminately to equals and unequals alike Yes, he said, everybody knows that. Observe, then, the corresponding private character. Or must we first, as in the case of the polity, consider the origin of the type? Yes, he said. Is not this, then, the way of it? Our thrifty[*](Cf. 572 C, Theogn. 915 f., Anth. Pal. x. 41, Democr. fr. 227 and 228, DieIs ii.3 p. 106, and Epicharm. fr. 45, Diels i.3 126.) oligarchical man would have a son bred in his father’s ways. Why not? And he, too, would control by force all his appetites for pleasure that are wasters and not winners of wealth, those which are denominated unnecessary. Obviously. And in order not to argue in the dark, shall we first define[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p.485, on Laches 190 B, and p. 551, on Phaedr. 237 E.) our distinction between necessary and unnecessary appetites[*](Cf. 554 A, 571 B, Phaedo 64 D-E, Phileb. 62 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1147 b 29. The Epicureans made much of this distinction. Cf. Cic. De fin. i. 13. 45, Tusc. v. 33, 93, Porphyry, De abst. i. 49. Ath. xii. 511 quotes this passage and says it anticipates the Epicureans.)? Let us do so. Well, then, desires that we cannot divert or suppress may be properly called necessary, and likewise those whose satisfaction is beneficial to us, may they not? For our nature compels us to seek their satisfaction. Is not that so ? Most assuredly.