Republic

“Are you satisfied, then,” said I, “as before,[*](Supra 511 D-E.) to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,[*](Always avoid faith in translating Plato.) and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.): as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates[*](That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply.) and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,[*](There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato’s own writings.) Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” Well, he said, “I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account[*](Cf. on 531 E, p. 195, note f.) of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence[*](Cf. on 511 D, p. 117, note a.) about the matter?” “How could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not this true of the good likewise[*](This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the ἱκανόν must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the the eristic sophist. For the short cut, καὶ . . . ὡσαύτως, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.)—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet[*](It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (Cf. Theaet. 189 E, Phileb. 38 E, Soph. 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. Gorg. 506 C ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 C, Parman. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17.) of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping[*](Cf. Theaet. 160 D, Phileb. 45 A. The practical outcome=Laws 966 A-B, Phaedr. 278 C, Soph. 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation.) in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration[*](For εἰδώλου cf. on 532 B, p. 197, not e. This may be one of the sources of Epist. vii. 342 B.) of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?[*](For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 A. Note the touch of humor in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf. Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: There is really no clear-cut distinction between what is usually called sleeping and waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep.)” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you should ever nurture in fact your children[*](Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic rulers.) whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,[*](Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, Critias 106 A.) you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational[*](A slight touch of humor. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.) as the lines so called in geometry.” “Why, no,” he said. “Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer[*](A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι Gorg. 461 E, Charm. 166 D, Prot. 338 D, Alc. I. 106 B.) questions in the most scientific manner?” “I will so legislate,” he said, “in conjunction with you.”

“Do you agree, then,” said I, “that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone[*](For ὥσπερ θριγκός cf. Eur. Herc. Fur. 1280, Aesch. Ag. 1283: and Phileb. 38 C-D ff.)—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete[*](Cf. 541 B.)” “I do,” he said. “The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.” Clearly, he said. “Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection[*](Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.) of rulers?” “Of course,” he said. “In most respects, then,” said I, “you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising[*](Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, Prot. 350 B f.) are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.[*](Cf. Symp. 209 B-C, Phaedr. 252 E and Vol. I. p. 261 on 402 D. Ascham, The Schoolmaster, Bk. I. also approves of this qualification.) But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous[*](For βλοσυρούς Cf. Theaet. 149 A.) in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education.” “What qualities are you distinguishing?” “They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint[*](Cf. 504 A, 364 E, Gorg. 480 C, Protag. 326 C, Euthyphro 15 C.) in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body.” True, he said. “And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry[*](The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.) in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?” “No one could,” he said, “unless most happily endowed.” “Our present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,[*](Cf. 495 C ff., pp. 49-51.) caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards[*](Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de Ia philosophie.) but true scions.” “What do you mean?” he said. “In the first place,” I said, “the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[*](Cf. Laws 634 A, Tim. 44 C.) in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[*](Cf. 548 E, Lysis 206 C, Euthyd. 274 C, 304 C, and Vol. I. p. 515 on 475 D.) or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way.” “Most true,” he said. “Likewise in respect of truth,” I said, “we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[*](Cf. 382 A-B-C.) and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[*](Cf. Laws 819 D, Rep. 372 D, Politicus 266 C, and my note in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial ὗς γνοίη, Laches 196 D and Rivals 134 A; and Apelt’s emendation of Cratyl. 393 C, Progr. Jena, 1905, p. 19.)”

“By all means,” he said. “And with reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and loftiness of soul[*](Cf. 487 A and vol. I. p. 261, note c on 402 C. The cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 E, vol. I. p. 346.) and all the parts of virtue,[*](Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling himself with the problem of Protag. 329 D (What Plato Said, p. 497) and Laws 633 A (What Plato Said, p. 624). Cf. also on 533 D.) we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random[*](πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι lit. for whatsoever they happen to of these (services). Cf. Symp. 181 B, Prot. 353 A, Crito 44 D and 45 D, Gorg. 522 C, Laws 656 C, Rep. 332 B, 561 D, Dem. iv. 46, Isoc. Panath. 25, 74, 239, Aristot. Mat. 1013 a 6.) for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It is so indeed,” he said. “But we,” I said, “must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find[*](Cf. 487 A. For δίκη cf. Hirzel, Dike, Themis und Verwandtes, p.116.) with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood[*](καταντλήσομεν: cf. 344 d.) of ridicule upon philosophy.” “That would indeed be shameful,” he said. “Most certainly,” said I: “but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous.” “In what way?” “I forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,[*](Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man’s game, Laws 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 C. Science in Tim. 59 D is παιδιά, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 D-E, ibid. 278 B. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601.) and I spoke with too great intensity.[*](For similar self-checks Cf. Laws 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C, Phaedr. 260 D, 279 B. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 969.) For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,[*](Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates’ many endeavors to imitate Platonic effects.) and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault.” “No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me[*](Cf. Soph. 226 C, Sophocles, Ajax 397.) as a hearer.” “But too much so for me as a speaker,” I said. “But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon’s[*](γηράσκω δ’ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, I grow old ever learning many things. Cf. Laches 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317.) word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young[*](Cf. Theaet. 146 B. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.) belong all heavy and frequent labors.” Necessarily, he said. “Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.[*](This and παίζοντας below (537 A) anticipate much modern Kindergarten rhetoric.)” “Why so?” Because, said I, “a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for while bodily labors[*](Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. 358, says Aristotle rejects this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.) performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind.” True, he said.

“Do not, then, my friend, keep children to their studies by compulsion but by play.[*](Cf. 424 E-425 A, Laws 819 B-C, 643 B-D, 797 A-B, Polit. 308 D. Cf. the naive statement in Colvin And Bagley, Human Behavior, p. 41: The discovery [sic!] by Karl Groos that play was actually a preparation for the business of later life was almost revolutionary from the standpoint of educational theory and practice.) That will also better enable you to discern the natural capacities of each.” “There is reason in that,” he said. “And do you not remember,” I said, “that we also declared[*](Cf. 467, vol. I. pp. 485-487.) that we must conduct the children to war on horseback to be spectators, and wherever it may be safe, bring them to the front and give them a taste of blood as we do with whelps?” “I do remember.” “And those who as time goes on show the most facility in all these toils and studies and alarms are to be selected and enrolled on a list.[*](ἐγκριτέον cf. 413 D, 377 C, 486 D, Laws 802 B, 820 D, 936 A, 952 A.)” “At what age?” he said. “When they are released from their prescribed gymnastics. For that period, whether it be two or three years, incapacitates them for other occupations.[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1339 a 7 f. ἅμα γὰρ τῇ τε διανοίᾳ καὶ τῷ σώματι διαπονεῖν οὐ δεῖ, etc.; Plut. De Ed. Puer. 11, De Tuenda San. C. 25, quoted by Newman, Aristot. Pol. I. p. 359, are irrelevant to this passage, but could be referred to the balancing of music and gymnastics in 410-412.) For great fatigue and much sleep are the foes of study, and moreover one of our tests of them, and not the least, will be their behavior in their physical exercises.[*](Cf. Laws 829 B-C.)” “Surely it is,” he said. “After this period,” I said, “those who are given preference from the twenty-year class will receive greater honors than the others, and they will be required to gather the studies which they disconnectedly pursued as children in their former education into a comprehensive survey[*](σύνοψιν: cf. 531 D. This thought is endlessly repeated by modern writers on education. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. 336; Bagley, The Educative Process, p. 180: The theory of concentration proposed by Ziller . . . seeks to organize all the subject matter of instruction into a unifies system, the various units of which shall be consciously related to one another in the minds of the pupils; Haldane, The Philosophy of Humanism, p. 94: There was a conference attended by representatives of various German Universities . . . which took place at Hanstein, not far from Göttingen in May 1921. . . . The purpose of the movement is nominally the establishment of a Humanistic Faculty. But in this connection faculty does not mean a separate faculty of humanistic studies. . . . The real object is to bring these subjects into organic relation to one another. Cf. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, vol. i. p. 4 So true is it that, as Plato puts it, the metaphysician is a synoptical man. Cf. also Aristot. Soph. El. 167 a 38 διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι συνορᾶν τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον. Stenzel, Dialektik, misuses the passage to support the view that Plato’s dialectic still looks for unity and not for divisions and distinctions, as in the Sophist. Cf. also ibid. p.72.) of their affinities with one another and with the nature of things.” “That, at any rate, he said, is the only instruction that abides with those who receive it.” “And it is also,” said I, “the chief test of the dialectical nature and its opposite. For he who can view things in their connection is a dialectician; he who cannot, is not.” “I concur,” he said. “With these qualities in mind,” I said, “it will be your task to make a selection of those who manifest them best from the group who are steadfast in their studies and in war and in all lawful requirements, and when they have passed the thirtieth year to promote them, by a second selection from those preferred in the first,[*](For the technical meaning of the word προκρίτων Cf. Laws 753 B-D.) to still greater honors, and to prove and test them by the power of dialectic[*](For this periphrasis cf. Phaedr. 246 D, Tim. 85 E. Cf. also on 509 A.) to see which of them is able to disregard the eyes and other senses[*](The reader of Plato ought not to misunderstand this now. Cf. on 532 A, pp. 196 f., note d, and 530 p. 187, note c.) and go on to being itself in company with truth. And at this point, my friend, the greatest care[*](Plato returns to an idea suggested in 498 A, and warns against the mental confusion and moral unsettlement that result from premature criticism of life by undisciplined minds. In the terminology of modern education, he would not encourage students to discuss the validity of the Ten commandments and the Constitution of the United States before they could spell, construe, cipher, and had learned to distinguish an undistributed middle term from a petitio principii. Cf. Phaedo 89 D-E. We need not suppose with Grote and others that this involves any reaction or violent change of the opinion he held when he wrote the minor dialogues that portray such discussions. In fact, the still later Sophist, 230 B-C-D, is more friendly to youthful dialectics. Whatever the effect of the practice of Socrates or the Sophists, Plato himself anticipates Grote’s criticism in the Republic by representing Socrates as discoursing with ingenuous youth in a more simple and edifying style. Cf. Lysis 207 D ff., Euthydem. 278 E-282 C, 288 D-290 D. Yet again the Charmides might be thought an exception. Cf. also Zeller, Phil. d. Griechen, ii. 1, p. 912, who seems to consider the Sophist earlier than the Republic. ) is requisite.” “How so?” he said. “Do you not note,” said I, “how great is the harm caused by our present treatment of dialectics?” “What is that?” he said. “Its practitioners are infected with lawlessness.[*](i.e. they call all restrictions on impulses and instincts tyrannical conventions. Cf. Gorg. 483-484, Aristoph. Clouds, passim, and on nature and law cf. Vol. I. p. 116, note a, on 359 C.)” “They are indeed.” “Do you suppose,” I said, “that there is anything surprising in this state of mind, and do you not think it pardonable[*](Cf. on 494 A, p. 43, note c.)?” “In what way, pray?” he said.

“Their case,” said I, “resembles that of a supposititious son reared in abundant wealth and a great and numerous family amid many flatterers, who on arriving at manhood should become aware that he is not the child of those who call themselves his parents, and should I not be able to find his true father and mother. Can you divine what would be his feelings towards the flatterers and his supposed parents in the time when he did not know the truth about his adoption, and, again, when he knew it? Or would you like to hear my surmise?” “I would.” “Well, then, my surmise is,” I said, “that he would be more likely to honor his reputed father and mother and other kin than the flatterers, and that there would be less likelihood of his allowing them to lack for anything, and that he would be less inclined to do or say to them anything unlawful, and less liable to disobey them in great matters than to disobey the flatterers—during the time when he did not know the truth.” “It is probable,” he said. “But when he found out the truth, I surmise that he would grow more remiss in honor and devotion to them and pay more regard to the flatterers, whom he would heed more than before[*](διαφερόντως ἢ πρότερον: Cf. Phaedo 85 B.) and would henceforth live by their rule, associating with them openly, while for that former father and his adoptive kin he would not care at all, unless he was naturally of a very good disposition.” “All that you say,” he replied, “would be likely to happen.[*](οἷά περ ἂν γένοιτο is the phrase Aristotle uses to distinguish the truth of poetry from the facts of history.) But what is the pertinency of this comparison to the novices of dialectic[*](That is the meaning. Lit. those who lay hold on discourse.)?” “It is this. We have, I take it, certain convictions[*](Plato’s warning apples to our day no less than to his own. Like the proponents of ethical nihilism in Plato’s Athens, much of our present-day literature and teaching questions all standards of morality and aesthetics, and confuses justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness. Cf. also on 537 D, p. 220, note a.) from childhood about the just and the honorable, in which, in obedience and honor to them, we have been bred as children under their parents.” “Yes, we have.” “And are there not other practices going counter to these, that have pleasures attached to them and that flatter and solicit our souls, but do not win over men of any decency; but they continue to hold in honor the teachings of their fathers and obey them?” “It is so” “Well, then,” said I, “when a man of this kind is met by the question,[*](The question is here personified, as the λόγος so often is, e.g. 503 A. Cf. What Plato Said on Protag. 361 A-B.) What is the honorable? and on his giving the answer which he learned from the lawgiver, the argument confutes him, and by many and various refutations upsets[*](A possible allusion to the καταβάλλοντες λόγοι of the sophist. Cf. Euthydem. 277 D, 288 A, Phaedo 88 C, Phileb. 15 E and What Plato Said, p. 518, on Crito 272 B.) his faith and makes him believe that this thing is no more honorable than it is base,[*](This is the oral counterpart of the intellectual skepticism or μισολογία of Phaedo 90 C-D. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 531, on Phaedo 89.) and when he has had the same experience about the just and the good and everything that he chiefly held in esteem, how do you suppose that he will conduct himself thereafter in the matter of respect and obedience to this traditional morality?” “It is inevitable,” he said, “that he will not continue to honor and obey as before.”

“And then,” said I, “when he ceases to honor these principles and to think that they are binding on him,[*](For οἰκεῖα Cf. 433 E, 433 D, and Class. Phil. xxiv. (1929) pp. 409-410.) and cannot discover the true principles, will he be likely to adopt any other way of life than that which flatters his desires[*](Cf. Laws 633 E and 442 A-B. Others render it, than the life of the flatterers (parasites). Why not both?)?” “He will not,” he said. “He will, then, seem to have become a rebel to law and convention instead of the conformer that he was.” Necessarily. “And is not this experience of those who take up dialectics in this fashion to be expected and, as I just now said, deserving of much leniency?” “Yes, and of pity too,” he said. “Then that we may not have to pity thus your thirty-year-old disciples, must you not take every precaution when you introduce them to the study of dialectics?” “Yes, indeed,” he said. “And is it not one chief safeguard not to suffer them to taste of it while young?[*](See on 498 A-B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon(Morley, A Miscellany, pp. 49-50): But the contemporaries of our age negligently apply a few years of ardent youth, burning by turns with the fire of vice; and when they have attained the acumen of discerning a doubtful truth, they immediately become involved in extraneous business, retire, and say farewell to the schools of philosophy; they sip the frothy must of juvenile wit over the difficulties of philosophy, and pour out the purified old wine with economical care.) For I fancy you have not failed to observe that lads, when they first get a taste of disputation, misuse it as a form of sport, always employing it contentiously, and, imitating confuters, they themselves confute others.[*](Cf. Apol. 23 C, Phileb. 15 E, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 46, Isoc. xii. 26 and x. 6; also Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 568.) They delight like spies in pulling about and tearing with words all who approach them.” “Exceedingly so,” he said. “And when they have themselves confuted many and been confuted by many, they quickly fall into a violent distrust of all that they formerly held true; and the outcome is that they themselves and the whole business of philosophy are discredited with other men.” “Most true,” he said. “But an older man will not share this craze,[*](But in another mood or from another angle this is the bacchic madness of philosophy which all the company in the Symposium have shared, 218 A-B. Cf. also Phaedr. 245 B-C, 249 C-E, Sophist 216 D, Phileb. 15 D-E, and What Plato Said, p. 493 on Protag. 317 D-E.)” said I, “but rather choose to imitate the one who consents to examine truth dialectically than the one who makes a jest[*](Cf. Gorg. 500 B-C. Yet the prevailing seriousness of Plato’s own thought does not exclude touches of humor and irony, and he vainly warns the modern reader to distinguish between jest and earnest in the drama of disputation in his dialogues. Many misinterpretations of Plato’s thought are due to the failure to heed this warning. Cf. e.g . Gorgias 474 A (What Plato Said, p. 504), which Robin, L’Année Philos. xxi. p. 29, and others miss, Rep. 376 B, Symp. 196 C, Protag. 339 f., Theaet. 157 A-B, 160 B,165 B,and passim. Cf. also on 536 C, p. 214, note b.) and a sport of mere contradiction, and so he will himself be more reasonable and moderate, and bring credit rather than discredit upon his pursuit.” Right, he said. “And were not all our preceding statements made with a view to this precaution our requirement that those permitted to take part in such discussions must have orderly and stable natures, instead of the present practice[*](For the idiom μὴ ὡς νῦν etc. Cf. on 410 B οὐχ ὥσπερ; also 610 D, Gorg. 522 A, Symp. 179 E, 189 C, Epist. vii. 333 A, Aristoph. Knights 784, Eurip. Bacchae 929, Il. xix. 493, Od. xxiv. 199, xxi. 427, Dem. iv. 34, Aristot. De an. 414 A 22.) of admitting to it any chance and unsuitable applicant?” “By all means,” he said. “Is it enough, then, to devote to the continuous and strenuous study of dialectics undisturbed by anything else, as in the corresponding discipline in bodily exercises, twice as many years as were allotted to that?” “Do you mean six or four?” he said.

Well, I said, “set it down as five.[*](It is very naive of modern commentators to cavil at the precise time allotted to dialectic, and still more so to infer that there was not much to say about the ideas. Dialectic was not exclusively or mainly concerned with the metaphysics of the ideas. It was the development of the reasoning powers by rational discussion.) For after that you will have to send them down into the cave[*](Cf. 519 C ff., pp. 139-145.) again, and compel them to hold commands in war and the other offices suitable to youth, so that they may not fall short of the other type in experience[*](Xen. Cyrop. i. 2. 13 seems to copy this. Cf. on 484 D. Critics of Plato frequently overlook the fact that he insisted on practical experience in the training of his rulers. Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 5 points out that this experience takes the place of special training in political science.) either. And in these offices, too, they are to be tested to see whether they will remain steadfast under diverse solicitations or whether they will flinch and swerve.[*](Cf. ὑποκινήσαντ’, Aristoph. Frogs 643.)” “How much time do you allow for that?” he said. “Fifteen years,” said I, “and at the age of fifty[*](An eminent scholar quaintly infers that Plato could not have written this page before he himself was fifty years old.) those who have survived the tests and approved themselves altogether the best in every task and form of knowledge must be brought at last to the goal. We shall require them to turn upwards the vision of their souls[*](Plato having made his practical meaning quite clear feels that he can safely permit himself the short cut of rhetoric and symbolism in summing it up. He reckoned without Neoplatonists ancient and modern. Cf. also on 519 B, p. 138, note a.) and fix their gaze on that which sheds light on all, and when they have thus beheld the good itself they shall use it as a pattern[*](Cf. 500 D-E. For παράδειγμα cf. 592 B and What Plato Said, p. 458, on Euthyphro 6 E, and p. 599, on Polit. 277 D.) for the right ordering of the state and the citizens and themselves throughout the remainder of their lives, each in his turn,[*](Cf. 520 D.) devoting the greater part of their time to the study of philosophy, but when the turn comes for each, toiling in the service of the state and holding office for the city’s sake, regarding the task not as a fine thing but a necessity[*](Cf. 347 C-D, 520 E.); and so, when each generation has educated others[*](Plato’s guardians, unlike Athenian statesmen, could train their successors. Cf. Protag. 319 E-320 B, Meno 99 B. Also ἄλλους ποιεῖν Meno 100 A, Gorg. 449 B, 455 C, Euthyph. 3 C, Phaedr. 266 C, 268 B, Symp. 196 E, Protag. 348 E, Isoc. Demon. 3, Panath. 28, Soph. 13, Antid. 204, Xen. Oecon. 15. 10, and παιδεύειν ἀνθρώπους, generally used of the sophists, Gorg. 519 E, Protag. 317 B, Euthyd. 306 E, Laches 186 D, Rep. 600 C.) like themselves to take their place as guardians of the state, they shall depart to the Islands of the Blest[*](Cf. p. 139, note d. Plato checks himself in mid-flight and wistfully smiles at his own idealism. Cf. on 536 B-C, also 540 C and 509 C. Frutiger, Mythes de Platon, p. 170.) and there dwell. And the state shall establish public memorials[*](Cf. Symp. 209 E.) and sacrifices for them as to divinities if the Pythian oracle approves[*](For this caution cf. 461 E and Vol. I. p. 344, note c, on 427 C.) or, if not, as to divine and godlike men.[*](Plato plays on the words δαίμων and εὐδαίμων. Cf. also Crat. 398 b-C.)” “A most beautiful finish, Socrates, you have put upon your rulers, as if you were a statuary.[*](Cf. 361 D.)” “And on the women[*](Lit. female rulers.) too, Glaucon,” said I; “for you must not suppose that my words apply to the men more than to all women who arise among them endowed with the requisite qualities.” “That is right,” he said, “if they are to share equally in all things with the men as we laid it down.” “Well, then,” said I, “do you admit that our notion of the state and its polity is not altogether a daydream,[*](Cf. on 450 D and 499 C.) but that though it is difficult,[*](Cf. 499 D.) it is in a way possible[*](Cf. What Plato Said, p. 564 on Rep. 472 B-E, and p. 65, not h, on 499 D.) and in no other way than that described—when genuine philosophers,[*](Cf. 463 C-D, 499 B-C.) many or one, becoming masters of the state scorn[*](Cf. 521 B, 516 C-D.) the present honors, regarding them as illiberal and worthless, but prize the right[*](τὸ ὀρθόν: Cf. Theaet. 161 C, Meno 99 A.) and the honors that come from that above all things, and regarding justice as the chief and the one indispensable thing, in the service and maintenance of that reorganize and administer their city?” “In what way?” he said.

“All inhabitants above the age of ten,” I said, “they will send out into the fields, and they will take over the children,[*](This is another of the passages in which Plato seems to lend support to revolutionaries. Cf. p. 71, note g. Cf. Laws 752 C, where it is said that the children would accept the new laws if the parents would not. Cf. 415 D, and also What Plato Said, p. 625, on Laws 644 A and p. 638, on 813 D. There is some confusion in this passage between the inauguration and the normal conduct of the ideal state, and Wilamowitz, Platon, i. p. 439 calls the idea ein hingeworfener Einfall. But Plato always held that the reformer must have or make a clean slate. Cf. 501 A, Laws 735 E. And he constantly emphasizes the supreme importance of education;Rep. 377 A-B, 423 E, 416 C, Laws 641 B, 644 A-B, 752 C, 765 E-766 A, 788 C, 804 D. For παραλαβόντες Cf. Phaedo 82 E παραλαβοῦσα.) remove them from the manners and habits of their parents, and bring them up in their own customs and laws which will be such as we have described. This is the speediest and easiest way in which such a city and constitution as we have portrayed could be established and prosper and bring most benefit to the people among whom it arises.” “Much the easiest,” he said, “and I think you have well explained the manner of its realization if it should ever be realized.” Then, said I, “have we not now said enough[*](Cf. 535 A.) about this state and the corresponding type of man—for it is evident what our conception of him will be?” “It is evident,” he said, “and, to answer your question, I think we have finished.”