Republic

There is no difference at all, he said. Of what sort will probably be the offspring of such parents? Will they not be bastard[*](It is probably fanciful to see in this an allusion to the half-Thracian Antisthenes. Cf. also Theaet. 150 C, and Symp. 212 A.) and base? Inevitably. And so when men unfit for culture approach philosophy and consort with her unworthily, what sort of ideas and opinions shall we say they beget? Will they not produce what may in very deed be fairly called sophisms, and nothing that is genuine or that partakes of true intelligence[*](Cf. Euthydem. 306 D.)? Quite so, he said. There is a very small remnant,[*](Cf. Phaedrus 250 A ὀλίγαι δὴ λείπονται, and 404 A and on 490 E.) then, Adeimantus, I said, of those who consort worthily with philosophy, some well-born and well-bred nature, it may be, held in check[*](Perhaps overtaken. Cf. Goodwin on Dem. De cor. 107.) by exile,[*](It is possible but unnecessary to conjecture that Plato may be thinking of Anaxagoras or Xenophon or himself or Dion.) and so in the absence of corrupters remaining true to philosophy, as its quality bids, or it may happen that a great soul born in a little town scorns[*](Cf. Theaet. 173 B, 540 D.) and disregards its parochial affairs; and a small group perhaps might by natural affinity be drawn to it from other arts which they justly disdain; and the bridle of our companion Theages[*](This bridle has become proverbial. Cf. Plut. De san. tuenda 126 B, Aelian, Var. Hist. iv. 15. For Theages cf. also Apol. 33 E and the spurious dialogue bearing is name.) also might operate as a restraint. For in the case of Theages all other conditions were at hand for his backsliding from philosophy, but his sickly habit of body keeping him out of politics holds him back. My own case, the divine sign,[*](The enormous fanciful literature on the daimonion does not concern the interpretation of Plato, who consistently treats it as a kind of spiritual tact checking Socrates from any act opposed to his true moral and intellectual interests. Cf. What Plato Said, pp. 456-457, on Euthyphro 3 B, Jowett and Campbell, p. 285.) is hardly worth mentioning—for I suppose it has happened to few or none before me. And those who have been of this little company[*](For τούτων . . . γενόμενοι cf. Aristoph. Clouds 107 τούτων γενοῦ μοι.) and have tasted the sweetness and blessedness of this possession and who have also come to understand the madness of the multitude sufficiently and have seen that there is nothing, if I may say so, sound or right in any present politics,[*](The irremediable degeneracy of existing governments is the starting-point of Plato’s political and social speculations. Cf. 597 B, Laws 832 C f., Epist. vii. 326 A; Byron, apud Arnold, Essays in Crit. ii. p. 195 I have simplified my politics into an utter detestation of all existing governments. This passage, Apol. 31 E ff. and Gorg. 521-522 may be considered Plato’s apology for not engaging in politics. Cf. J. V. Novak, Platon u. d. Rhetorik, p. 495 (Schleiermacher, Einl. z. Gorg. pp. 15 f.), Wilamowitz, Platon, i. 441-442 Wer kann hier die Klage über das eigene Los überhören? There is no probability that, as an eminent scholar has maintained, the Republic itself was intended as a programme of practical politics for Athens, and that its failure to win popular opinion is the chief cause of the disappointed tone of Plato’s later writings. Cf. Erwin Wolff in Jaeger’s Neue Phil. Untersuchungen, Heft 6, Platos Apologie, pp. 31-33, who argues that abstinence from politics is proclaimed in the Apology before the Gorgias and that the same doctrine in the seventh Epistle absolutely proves that the Apology is Plato’s own. Cf. also Theaet. 173 C ff., Hipp. Maj. 281 C, Euthydem. 306 B, Xen. Mem. i. 6. 15.) and that there is no ally with whose aid the champion of justice[*](Cf. 368 b, Apol. 32 E εἰ . . . ἐβοήθουν τοῖς δικαίοις and 32 A μαχούμενον ὑπὲρ τοῦ δικαίου.) could escape destruction, but that he would be as a man who has fallen among wild beasts,[*](Cf. Pindar, Ol. i. 64. For the antithetic juxtaposition cf. also εἷς πᾶσιν below; see too 520 B, 374 A, Menex. 241 B, Phaedr. 243 C, Laws 906 D, etc. More in the Utopia (Morley, Ideal Commonwealths, p. 84) paraphrases loosely from memory what he calls no ill simile by which Plato set forth the unreasonableness of a philosopher’s meddling with government) unwilling to share their misdeeds[*](Cf. Democrates fr. 38, Diels ii.3 p. 73 καλὸν μὲν τὸν ἀδικέοντα κωλύειν· εἰ δὲ μή, μὴ ξυναδικεῖν, it is well to prevent anyone from doing wrong, or else not to join in wrongdoing.) and unable to hold out singly against the savagery of all, and that he would thus, before he could in any way benefit his friends or the state come to an untimely end without doing any good to himself or others,—for all these reasons I say the philosopher remains quiet, minds his own affair, and, as it were, standing aside under shelter of a wall[*](Maximus of Tyre 21. 20 comments, Show me a safe wall. See Stallbaum ad loc. for references to this passage in later antiquity. Cf. Heracleit. fr. 44, Diels 3 i. 67, J. Stenzel, Platon der Erzieher, p. 114, Bryce, Studies in History and Jurisprudence, p. 33, Renan, Souvenirs, xvii., P. E. More, Shelburne Essays, iii. pp. 280-281 Cf. also Epist. vii. 331 D, Eurip. Ion 598-601.) in a storm and blast of dust and sleet and seeing others filled full of lawlessness, is content if in any way he may keep himself free from iniquity and unholy deeds through this life and take his departure with fair hope,[*](Cf. Vol. I on 331 A, 621 C-D, Marc. Aurel. xii. 36 and vi. 30 in fine. See my article Hope in Hasting’s Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics.) serene and well content when the end comes.

Well, he said, that is no very slight thing to have achieved before taking his departure. He would not have accomplished any very great thing either,[*](Cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1094 b 9 μεῖζόν γε καὶ τελεώτερον τὸ τῆς πόλεως φαίνεται καὶ λαβεῖν καὶ σώζειν, yet the good of the state seems a grander and more perfect thing both to attain and to secure (tr. F. H. Peters).) I replied, if it were not his fortune to live in a state adapted to his nature. In such a state only will he himself rather attain his full stature[*](For αὐξήσεται Cf. Theaet. 163 C ἵνα καὶ αὐξάνῃ and Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 68 As the Christian is said to be complete in Christ so the individual is said by Aristotle to be complete in the πόλις Spencer, Data of Ethics, xv. Hence it is manifest that we must consider the ideal man as existing in the ideal social state. Cf. also 592 A-B, 520 A-C and Introd. Vol. I. p. xxvii.) and together with his own preserve the common weal. The causes and the injustice of the calumniation of philosophy, I think, have been fairly set forth, unless you have something to add.[*](An instance of Socrates’ Attic courtesy. Cf 430 B, Cratyl. 427 D, Theaet. 183 C, Gorg. 513 C, Phaedr. 235 A. But in Gorg. 462 C it is ironical and perhaps in Hipp. Maj. 291 A.) No, he said, I have nothing further to offer on that point. But which of our present governments do you think is suitable for philosophy? None whatever, I said; but the very ground of my complaint is that no polity[*](κατάστασις = constitution in both senses. Cf. 414 A, 425 C, 464 A, 493 A, 426 C, 547 B. So also in the Laws. The word is rare elsewhere in Plato.) of today is worthy of the philosophic nature. This is just the cause of its perversion and alteration; as a foreign seed sown in an alien soil is wont to be overcome and die out[*](For ἐξίτηλον Cf. Critias 121 A.) into the native growth,[*](This need not be a botanical error. in any case the meaning is plain. Cf. Tim. 57 B with my emendation.) so this kind does not preserve its own quality but falls away and degenerates into an alien type. But if ever it finds the best polity as it itself is the best, then will it be apparent[*](For the idiom cf. αὐτὸ δείξει Phileb. 20 C, with Stallbaum’s note, Theaet. 200 E, Hipp. Maj. 288 B, Aristoph. Wasps 994, Frogs 1261, etc., Pearson on Soph. fr. 388. Cf. αὐτὸ σημανεῖ, Eurip. Bacch. 476, etc.) that this was in truth divine and all the others human in their natures and practices. Obviously then you are next, going to ask what is this best form of government. Wrong, he said[*](Plato similarly plays in dramatic fashion with the order of the dialogue in 523 B, 528 A, 451 B-C, 458 B.) I was going to ask not that but whether it is this one that we have described in our establishment of a state or another. In other respects it is this one, said I; but there is one special further point that we mentioned even then, namely that there would always have to be resident in such a state an element having the same conception of its constitution that you the lawgiver had in framing its laws.[*](Cf. on 412 A and What Plato Said, p. 647 on Laws 962; 502 D.) That was said, he replied. But it was not sufficiently explained, I said, from fear of those objections on your part which have shown that the demonstration of it is long and difficult. And apart from that the remainder of the exposition is by no means easy.[*](Cf. Soph. 224 C. See critical note.) Just what do you mean? The manner in which a state that occupies itself with philosophy can escape destruction. For all great things are precarious and, as the proverb truly says, fine things are hard.[*](So Adam. Others take τῷ ὄντι with χαλεπά as part of the proverb. Cf. 435 C, Crat. 384 A-B with schol.) All the same, he said, our exposition must be completed by making this plain. It will be no lack of will, I said, but if anything,[*](For the idiomatic ἀλλ’ εἴπερ Cf. Parmen. 150 B, Euthydem. 296 B, Thompson on Meno, Excursus 2, pp. 258-264, Aristot. An. Post. 91 b 33, Eth. Nic. 1101 a 12, 1136 b 25, 1155 b 30, 1168 a 12, 1174 a 27, 1180 b 27, Met. 1028 a 24, 1044 a 11, Rhet. 1371 a 16.) a lack of ability, that would prevent that. But you shall observe for yourself my zeal. And note again how zealously and recklessly I am prepared to say that the state ought to take up this pursuit in just the reverse of our present fashion.[*](What Plato here deprecates Callicles in the Gorgias recommends, 484 C-D. For the danger of premature study of dialectic cf. 537 D-E ff. Cf. my Idea of Education in Plato’s Republic, p. 11. Milton develops the thought with characteristic exuberance, Of Education: They present their young unmatriculated novices at first coming with the most intellective abstractions of logic and metaphysics . . . to be tossed an turmoiled with their unballasted wits in fathomless and unquiet deeds of controversy, etc.) In what way?

At present, said I, those who do take it up are youths, just out of boyhood,[*](Cf. 386 A, 395 C, 413 C, 485 D, 519 A, Demosth. xxi. 154, Xen. Ages. 10.4, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1103 b 24, 1104 b 11, Isoc. xv. 289.) who in the interval[*](Cf. 450 C.) before they engage in business and money-making approach the most difficult part of it, and then drop it—and these are regarded forsooth as the best exemplars of philosophy. By the most difficult part I mean discussion. In later life they think they have done much if, when invited, they deign to listen[*](Cf. 475 D, Isoc. xii. 270 ἀλλ’ οὐδ’ ἄλλου δεικνύοντος καὶ πονήσαντος ἠθέλησεν ἀκροατὴς γενέσθαι would not even be willing to listen to one worked out and submitted by another (tr. Norlin in L.C.L.).) to the philosophic discussions of others. That sort of thing they think should be by-work. And towards old age,[*](Cf. Antiphon’s devotion to horsemanship in the Parmenides, 126 C. For πρὸς τὸ γῆρας cf. 552 D, Laws 653 A.) with few exceptions, their light is quenched more completely than the sun of Heracleitus,[*](Diels i. 3 p. 78, fr. 6. Cf. Aristot. Meteor. ii. 2. 90, Lucretius v. 662.) inasmuch as it is never rekindled. And what should they do? he said. Just the reverse. While they are lads and boys they should occupy themselves with an education and a culture suitable to youth, and while their bodies are growing to manhood take right good care of them, thus securing a basis and a support[*](Cf. 410 C and What Plato Said, p. 496 on Protag. 326 B-C.) for the intellectual life. But with the advance of age, when the soul begins to attain its maturity, they should make its exercises more severe, and when the bodily strength declines and they are past the age of political and military service, then at last they should be given free range of the pasture[*](Like cattle destined for the sacrifice. A favorite figure with Plato. Cf. Laws 635 A, Protag. 320 A. It is used literally in Critias 119 D.) and do nothing but philosophize,[*](Cf. 540 A-B, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 329-330. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 207-208, fancies that 498 C to 502 A is a digression expressing Plato’s personal desire to be the philosopher in Athenian politics.) except incidentally, if they are to live happily, and, when the end has come, crown the life they have lived with a consonant destiny in that other world. You really seem to be very much in earnest, Socrates, he said; yet I think most of your hearers are even more earnest in their opposition and will not be in the least convinced, beginning with Thrasymachus. Do not try to breed a quarrel between me and Thrasymachus, who have just become friends and were not enemies before either. For we will spare no effort until we either convince him and the rest or achieve something that will profit them when they come to that life in which they will be born gain[*](A half-playful anticipation of the doctrine of immortality reserved for Bk. x. 608 D ff. It involves no contradiction and justifies no inferences as to the date and composition of the Republic. Cf. Gomprez iii. 335. Cf. Emerson, Experience, in fine, which in his passage into new worlds he will carry with him. Bayard Taylor (American Men of Letters, p. 113), who began to study Greek late in life, remarked, Oh, but I expect to use it in the other world. Even the sober positivist Mill says (Theism, pp. 249-250) The truth that life is short and art is long is from of old one of the most discouraging facts of our condition: this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life even when seemingly useless in this.) and meet with such discussions as these. A brief time[*](For εἰς here cf. Blaydes on Clouds 1180, Herod. vii. 46, Eurip. Heracleidae 270.) your forecast contemplates, he said. Nay, nothing at all, I replied, as compared with eternity.[*](Cf. on 486 A. see too Plut. Cons. Apol. 17. 111 C a thousand, yes, ten thousand years are only an ἀόριστος point, nay, the smallest part of a point, as Simonides says. Cf. also Lyra Graeca (L. C. L.), ii. p. 338, Anth. Pal. x. 78.) However, the unwillingness of the multitude to believe what you say is nothing surprising. For of the thing here spoken they have never beheld a token,[*](γενόμενον . . . λεγόμενον. It is not translating to make no attempt to reproduce Plato’s parody of polyphonic prose. The allusion here to Isocrates and the Gorgian figure of παρίσωσις and παρομοίωσις is unmistakable. The subtlety of Plato’s style treats the accidental occurrence of a Gorgian between the artificial style and insincerity of the sophists and the serious truth of his own ideals. Cf. Isoc. x. 18 λεγόμενος . . . γενόμενος What Plato Said, p. 544 on Symp. 185 C, F. Reinhardt, De Isocratis aemulis, p. 39, Lucilius, bk. v. init. hoc nolueris et debueris te si minu delectat, quod τεχνίον Isocrateium est, etc.) but only the forced and artificial chiming of word and phrase, not spontaneous and accidental as has happened here.