Republic

For there is not, never has been and never will be,[*](Cf. Od. xvi. 437. See Friedländer, Platon, ii. 386 n. who says ἀλλοῖον γίγνεσθαι can only = ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, be made different.) a divergent type of character and virtue created by an education running counter to theirs[*](Cf. 429 C for the idiom, and Laws 696 A οὐ γὰρ μή ποτε γένηται παῖς καὶ ἀνὴρ καὶ γέρων ἐκ ταύτης τῆς τροφῆς διαφέρων πρὸς ἀρετήν.)—humanly speaking, I mean, my friend; for the divine, as the proverb says, all rules fail.[*](Cf. Symp. 176 C (of Socrates), Phaedr. 242 B, Theaet. 162 D-E.) And you may be sure that, if anything is saved and turns out well in the present condition of society and government, in saying that the providence of God[*](Cf. on 492 A, Apol. 33, Phaedo 58 E, Protag. 328 E, Meno 99 E, Phaedr. 244 C, Laws 642 C, 875 C, Ion 534 C.) preserves it you will not be speaking ill.Neither do I think otherwise, he said. Then, said I, think this also in addition. What? Each of these private teachers who work for pay, whom the politicians call sophists and regard as their rivals,[*](Cf. Arnold, Preface to Essays in Criticism; Phaedo 60 D, Laws 817 B, On Virtue 376 D.) inculcates nothing else than these opinions of the multitude which they opine when they are assembled and calls this knowledge wisdom. It is as if a man were acquiring the knowledge of the humors and desires of a great strong beast[*](Cf. Epist. v. 321 D ἔστιν γὰρ δή τις φωνὴ τῶν πολιτειῶν ἑκάστης καθάπερεί τινων ζῴων, each form of government has a sort of voice, as if it were a kind of animal (tr. L.A. Post). Hackforth says this is a clumsy imitation of the Republic which proves the letter spurious. Cf. Thomas Browne, Religio Medici, ii. 1 If there be any among those common objects of hatred I do contemn and laugh at, it is that great enemy of reason, virtue, and religion, the multitude . . . one great beast and a monstrosity more prodigious than Hydra, Horace, Epist. i. 1. 76 belua multorum es capitum. Also Hamilton’s Sir, your people is a great beast, Sidney, Arcadia, bk. ii. Many-headed multitude, Wallas, Human Nature in Politics, p. 172 . . . like Plato’s sophist is learning what the public is and is beginning to understand the passions and desires of that huge and powerful brute, Shakes. Coriolanus iv. i. 2 The beast with many heads Butts me away, ibid. ii. iii. 18 The many-headed multitude. For the idea cf. also Gorg. 501 B-C ff., Phaedr. 260 C 260 C, δόξας δὲ πλήθους μεμελετηκώς, having studied the opinions of the multitude, Isoc. ii. 49-50.) which he had in his keeping, how it is to be approached and touched, and when and by what things it is made most savage or gentle, yes, and the several sounds it is wont to utter on the occasion of each, and again what sounds uttered by another make it tame or fierce, and after mastering this knowledge by living with the creature and by lapse of time should call it wisdom, and should construct thereof a system and art and turn to the teaching of it, knowing nothing in reality about which of these opinions and desires is honorable or base, good or evil, just or unjust, but should apply all these terms to the judgements of the great beast, calling the things that pleased it good, and the things that vexed it bad, having no other account to render of them, but should call what is necessary just and honorable,[*](Cf. Class. Phil. ix. (1914) p. 353, n. 1, ibid. xxiii. (1928) p. 361 (Tim. 75 D), What Plato Said, p. 616 on Tim. 47 E, Aristot. Eth. 1120 b 1 οὐχ ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ’ ὡς ἀναγκαῖον, Emerson, Circle, Accept the actual for the necessary, Eurip, I. A. 724 καλῶς ἀναγκαίως τε. Mill iv. 299 and Grote iv. 221 miss the meaning. Cf. Bk I. on 347 C, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. pp. 113-114, Iamblichus, Protrept. Teubner 148 K. ἀγνοοῦντος . . . ὅσον διέστηκεν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ ἀναγκαῖα, not knowing how divergent have always been the good and the necessary.) never having observed how great is the real difference between the necessary and the good, and being incapable of explaining it to another. Do you not think, by heaven, that such a one would be a strange educator? I do, he said. Do you suppose that there is any difference between such a one and the man who thinks that it is wisdom to have learned to know the moods and the pleasures of the motley multitude in their assembly, whether about painting or music or, for that matter, politics? For if a man associates with these and offers and exhibits to them his poetry[*](Cf. Laws 659 B, 701 A, Gorg. 502 B.) or any other product of his craft or any political. service,[*](Cf. 371 C, Gorg. 517 B, 518 B.) and grants the mob authority over himself more than is unavoidable,[*](Plato likes to qualify sweeping statements and allow something to necessity and the weakness of human nature. Cf. Phaedo 64 E καθ’ ὅσον μὴ πολλὴ ἀνάγκη, 558 D-E, 500 D, 383 C.) the proverbial necessity of Diomede[*](The scholiast derives this expression from Diomedes’ binding Odysseus and driving him back to camp after the latter had attempted to kill him. The schol. on Aristoph. Eccl. 1029 gives a more ingenious explanation. See Frazer, Pausanias, ii. p. 264.) will compel him to give the public what it likes, but that what it likes is really good and honorable, have you ever heard an attempted proof of this that is not simply ridiculous[*](καταγέλαστον is a strong word. Make the very jack-asses laugh would give the tone. Cf. Carlyle, Past and Present, iv. impartial persons have to say with a sigh that . . . they have heard no argument advanced for it but such as might make the angels and almost the very jack-asses weep. Cf. also Isoc. Panegyr. 14, Phil. 84, 101, Antid. 247, Peace 36, and καταγέλαστος in Plato passim, e.g. Symp. 189 B.)? No, he said, and I fancy I never shall hear it either.

Bearing all this in mind, recall our former question. Can the multitude possibly tolerate or believe in the reality of the beautiful in itself as opposed to the multiplicity of beautiful things, or can they believe in anything conceived in its essence as opposed to the many particulars?Not in the least, he said. Philosophy, then, the love of wisdom, is impossible for the multitude.[*](A commonplace of Plato and all intellectual idealists. Cf. 503 B, Polit. 292 E, 297 B, 300 E. Novotny, Plato’s Epistles, p. 87, uses this to support his view that Plato had a secret doctrine. Adam quotes Gorg. 474 A τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς οὐδὲ διαλέγομαι, which is not quite relevant. Cf. Renan, Etudes d’histoire relig. p. 403 La philosophie sera toujours le fait d’une imperceptible minorité, etc.) Impossible. It is inevitable,[*](It is psychologically necessary. Cf. ibid, Vol. 1. on 473 E. Cf. 527 A, Laws 655 E, 658 E, 681 C, 687 C, Phaedr. 239 C, 271 B, Crito 49 D.) then, that those who philosophize should be censured by them. Inevitable. And so likewise by those laymen who, associating with the mob, desire to curry favor[*](Cf. Gorg. 481 E, 510 D, 513 B.) with it. Obviously. From this point of view do you see any salvation that will suffer the born philosopher to abide in the pursuit and persevere to the end? Consider it in the light of what we said before. We agreed[*](In 487 A.) that quickness in learning, memory, courage and magnificence were the traits of this nature. Yes. Then even as a boy[*](Cf. 386 A. In what follows Plato is probably thinking of Alcibiades. Alc. I, 103 A ff, imitates the passage. Cf. Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) among boys such a one will take the lead in all things, especially if the nature of his body matches the soul. How could he fail to do so? he said. His kinsmen and fellow-citizens, then, will desire, I presume, to make use of him when he is older for their own affairs. Of course. Then they will fawn[*](For ὑποκείσονται Cf. Gorg. 510 C, 576 A ὑποπεσόντες Eurip. Orest. 670 ὑποτρέχειν, Theaet. 173 A ὑπελθεῖν.) upon him with petitions and honors, anticipating[*](i.e. endeavoring to secure the advantage of it for themselves by winning his favor when he is still young and impressionable.) and flattering the power that will be his. That certainly is the usual way. How, then, do you think such a youth will behave in such conditions, especially if it happen that he belongs to a great city and is rich and well-born therein, and thereto handsome and tall? Will his soul not be filled with unbounded ambitious hopes,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 104 B-C ff.) and will he not think himself capable of managing the affairs of both Greeks and barbarians,[*](Cf. Alc. I. 105 B-C.) and thereupon exalt himself, haughty of mien and stuffed with empty pride and void of sense[*](ὑψηλὸν ἐξαρεῖν, etc., seems to be a latent poetic quotation.) He surely will, he said. And if to a man in this state of mind[*](Or perhaps subject to these influences. Adam says it is while he is sinking into this condition.) someone gently[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 476 E. Cf. 533 D, Protag. 333 E, Phaedo 83 A, Crat. 413 A, Theaet. 154. E.) comes and tells him what is the truth, that he has no sense and sorely needs it, and that the only way to get it is to work like a slave[*](Cf. Phaedo 66 C, Symp. 184 C, Euthydem. 282 B.) to win it, do you think it will be easy for him to lend an ear[*](Cf. Epin. 990 A, Epist. vii. 330 A-B.) to the quiet voice in the midst of and in spite of these evil surroundings[*](Cf. Alc. I. 135 E.) Far from it, said he. And even supposing, said I, that owing to a fortunate disposition and his affinity for the words of admonition one such youth apprehends something and is moved and drawn towards philosophy, what do we suppose will be the conduct of those who think that they are losing his service and fellowship? Is there any word or deed that they will stick at[*](For πᾶν ἔργον cf. Sophocles, E. 615.) to keep him from being persuaded and to incapacitate anyone who attempts it,[*](Cf. 517 E.) both by private intrigue and public prosecution in the court?

That is inevitable, he said. Is there any possibility of such a one continuing to philosophize? None at all, he said. Do you see, then, said I, that we were not wrong in saying that the very qualities that make up the philosophical nature do, in fact, become, when the environment and nurture are bad, in some sort the cause of its backsliding,[*](For ἐκπεσεῖν cf. 496 C.) and so do the so-called goods—[*](Cf. on 591 C. p. 32, note a.) riches and all such instrumentalities[*](Cf. Lysis 220 A; Arnold’s machinery, Aristotle’s χορηγία)? No, he replied, it was rightly said. Such, my good friend, and so great as regards the noblest pursuit, is the destruction and corruption[*](Cf. 491 B-E, Laws 951 B ἀδιάφθαρτος, Xen. Mem. i. 2. 24.) of the most excellent nature, which is rare enough in any case,[*](For καὶ ἄλλως Cf. Il. ix. 699.) as we affirm. And it is from men of this type that those spring who do the greatest harm to communities and individuals, and the greatest good when the stream chances to be turned into that channel,[*](Cf. on 485 D ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα.) but a small nature[*](Cf. on 491 E, p. 33, note d.) never does anything great to a man or a city. Most true, said he. Those, then, to whom she properly belongs, thus falling away and leaving philosophy forlorn and unwedded, themselves live an unreal and alien life, while other unworthy wooers[*](Cf. on 489 D, and Theaet. 173 C.) rush in and defile her as an orphan bereft of her kin,[*](Cf. Taine, à Sainte-Beuve, Aug. 14, 1865: Comme Claude Bernard, il dépasse sa spécialité et c’est ches des spécialistes comme ceux-là que la malheureuse philosophie livée aux mains gantées et parfumées d’eau bénite va trouver des maris capables de lui faire encore des enfants. cf. Epictet. iii. 21. 21. The passage is imitated by Lucian 3. 2. 287, 294, 298. For the shame that has befallen philosophy Cf. Euthydem. 304 ff., Epist. vii. 328 E, Isoc. Busiris 48, Plutarch 1091 E, Boethius, Cons. i. 3. There is no probability that this is aimed at Isocrates, who certainly had not deserted the mechanical arts for what he called philosophy. Rohde Kleine Schriften, i. 319, thinks Antisthenes is meant. But Plato as usual is generalizing. See What Plato Said, p. 593 on Soph. 242 C.) and attach to her such reproaches as you say her revilers taunt her with, declaring that some of her consorts are of no account and the many accountable for many evils. Why, yes, he replied, that is what they do say. And plausibly, said I; for other mannikins, observing that the place is unoccupied and full of fine terms and pretensions, just as men escape from prison to take sanctuary in temples, so these gentlemen joyously bound away from the mechanical[*](Cf. the different use of the idea in Protag. 318 E.) arts to philosophy, those that are most cunning in their little craft.[*](τεχνίον is a contemptuous diminutive, such as are common in Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius. Cf. also ἀνθρωπίσκοι in C, and ψυχάριον in 519 A.) For in comparison with the other arts the prestige of philosophy even in her present low estate retains a superior dignity; and this is the ambition and aspiration of that multitude of pretenders unfit by nature, whose souls are bowed and mutilated[*](Cf. 611 C-D, Theaet. 173 A-B.) by their vulgar occupations[*](For the idea that trade is ungentlemanly and incompatible with philosophy Cf. 522 B and 590 C, Laws 919 C ff., and What Plato Said, p. 663 on Rivals 137 B. Cf. Richard of Bury, Philobiblon, Prologue, Fitted for the liberal arts, and equally disposed to the contemplation of Scripture, but destitute of the needful aid, they revert, as it were, by a sort of apostasy, to mechanical arts. Cf also Xen. Mem. iv. 2. 3, and Ecclesiasticus xxxviii. 25 f. How can he get wisdom that holdeth the plough and glorieth in the goad . . . and whose talk is of bullocks? . . . so every carpenter and workmaster . . . the smith . . . the potter . . . ) even as their bodies are marred by their arts and crafts. Is not that inevitable? Quite so, he said. Is not the picture which they present, I said, precisely that of a little bald-headed tinker[*](For a similar short vivid description Cf. Erastae 134 B, Euthyphro 2 B. Such are common in Plautus, e.g. Mercator 639.) who has made money and just been freed from bonds and had a bath and is wearing a new garment and has got himself up like a bridegroom and is about to marry his master’s daughter who has fallen into poverty and abandonment?