Republic

Plato

Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930-37.

But the figure of a man equilibrated and assimilated to virtue’s self perfectly, so far as may be, in word and deed, and holding rule in a city of like quality, that is a thing they have never seen in one case or in many. Do you think they have?By no means.Neither, my dear fellow, have they ever seriously inclined to hearken to fair and free discussions whose sole endeavor was to search out the truth[*](As the Platonic dialectic does (Phileb. 58 C-D, Cf. What Plato Said, p. 611) in contrast with the rhetorician, the lawyer (Theaet. 172 D-E) and the eristic (Euthydem. 272 B, Hipp. Maj. 288 D).) at any cost for knowledge’s sake, and which dwell apart and salute from afar[*](Cf. Eurip. Hippol. 102, Psalm cxxxviii. 6 the proud he knoweth afar off.) all the subtleties and cavils that lead to naught but opinion[*](Cf. Phaedrus 253 D with Theaetet. 187 C, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 48.) and strife in court-room and in private talk.They have not, he said. For this cause and foreseeing this, we then despite our fears[*](Cf. on 489 A.) declared under compulsion of the truth[*](Cf. Aristot. Met. 984 b 10, 984 a 19.) that neither city nor polity nor man either will ever be perfected until some chance compels this uncorrupted remnant of philosophers, who now bear the stigma of uselessness, to take charge of the state whether they wish it or not, and constrains the citizens to obey them, or else until by some divine inspiration[*](Cf. Laws 757 E. But we must not attribute personal superstition to Plato. See What Plato Said, index, s. v. Superstition.) a genuine passion for true philosophy takes possession[*](Cf. Laws 711 D, Thuc. vi. 24. 3; so iv. 4. 1 ὁρμὴ ἐπέπεσε.) either of the sons of the men now in power and sovereignty or of themselves. To affirm that either or both of these things cannot possibly come to pass is, I say, quite unreasonable. Only in that case could we be justly ridiculed as uttering things as futile as day-dreams are.[*](We might say, talking like vain Utopians or idly idealists. The scholiast says, p. 348, τοῦτο καὶ κενήν φασι μακαρίαν. cf. ibid, Vol. I. on 458 A, and for εὐχαί on 450 D, and Novotny on Epist. vii. 331 D.) Is not that so? It is. If, then, the best philosophical natures have ever been constrained to take charge of the state in infinite time past,[*](Cf. Laws 782 A, 678 A-B, and What Plato Said, p. 627 on Laws 676 A-B; Also Isoc. Panath. 204-205, seven hundred years seemed a short time.) or now are in some barbaric region[*](Cf. Phaedo 78 A.) far beyond our ken, or shall hereafter be, we are prepared to maintain our contention[*](For the ellipsis of the first person of the verb Parmen. 137 C, Laches 180 A. The omission of the third person is very frequent.) that the constitution we have described has been, is, or will be[*](Cf. 492 E, Laws 711 E, 739 C, 888 E.) realized[*](Cf. Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxii, and ibid. on 472 B, and What Plato Said, p. 564, also 540 D, Newman, Aristot. Pol. i. p. 377.) when this philosophic Muse has taken control of the state.[*](This is what I have called the ABA style. Cf. 599 E, Apol. 20 C, Phaedo 57 B, Laches 185 A, Protag. 344 C, Theaet. 185 A, 190 B, etc. It is nearly what Riddell calls binary structure, Apology, pp. 204-217.) It is not a thing impossible to happen, nor are we speaking of impossibilities. That it is difficult we too admit. I also think so, he said. But the multitude—are you going to say?—does not think so, said I. That may be, he said. My dear fellow, said I, do not thus absolutely condemn the multitude.[*](It is uncritical to find contradictions in variations of mood, emphasis, and expression that are broadly human and that no writer can avoid. Any thinker may at one moment and for one purpose defy popular opinion and for another conciliate it; at one time affirm that it doesn’t matter what the ignorant people think or say, and at another urge that prudence bids us be discreet. So St. Paul who says (Gal. i. 10) Do I seek to please men? for if I yet please men I should not be the servant of Christ, says also (Rom xiv. 16) Let no then your good be evil spoken of. Cf. also What Plato Said, p. 646 on Laws 950 B.) They will surely be of another mind if in no spirit of contention but soothingly and endeavoring to do away with the dispraise of learning you point out to them whom you mean by philosophers, and define as we recently did their nature and their pursuits so that the people may not suppose you to mean those of whom they are thinking.

Or even if they do look at them in that way, are you still going to deny that they will change their opinion and answer differently? Or do you think that anyone is ungentle to the gentle or grudging to the ungrudging if he himself is ungrudging[*](A recurrence to etymological meaning. Cf. ἄθυμον 411 B, Laws 888 A, εὐψυχίας Laws 791 C, Thompson on Meno 78 E, Aristot. Topics 112 a 32-38, Eurip. Heracleidae 730 ἀσθαλῶς, Shakes. Rich. III. v. v. 37 reduce these bloody days again.) and mild? I will anticipate you and reply that I think that only in some few and not in the mass of mankind is so ungentle or harsh a temper to be found.And I, you may be assured, he said, concur. And do you not also concur[*](For a similar teasing or playful repetition of a word cf. 517 C, 394 B, 449 C, 470 B-C.) in this very point that the blame for this harsh attitude of the many towards philosophy falls on that riotous crew who have burst in[*](For the figure of the κῶμος or revel rout cf. Theaet. 184A, Aesch. Ag. 1189, Eurip. Ion 1197, and, with a variation of the image, Virgil, Aen. i. 148.) where they do not belong, wrangling with one another,[*](Cf. Adam ad loc. and Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. 121.) filled with spite[*](Isoc. Antid. 260 seems to take this term to himself; Cf. Panath. 249, Peace 65, Lysias xxiv. 24 πολυπράγμων εἰμὶ καὶ θρασὺς καὶ φιλαπεχθήμων Demosth, xxiv, 6.) and always talking about persons,[*](i.e. gossip. cf. Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1125 a 5 οὐδ’ ἀνθρωπολόγος, Epictetus iii. 16. 4. Cf. also Phileb. 59 b, Theaet. 173 D, 174 C.) a thing least befitting philosophy? Least of all, indeed, he said. For surely, Adeimantus, the man whose mind is truly fixed on eternal realities[*](Cf. on 486 A, also Phileb. 58 D, 59 A, Tim. 90 D, and perhaps Tim. 47 A and Phaedo 79. This passage is often supposed to refer to the ideas, and ἐκεῖ in 500 D shows that Plato is in fact there thinking of them, though in Rep. 529 A-B ff. he protests against this identification. And strictly speaking κατὰ ταὐτὰ ἀεὶ ἔχοντα in C would on Platonic principles be true only of the ideas. Nevertheless poets and imitators have rightly felt that the dominating thought of the passage is the effect on the philosopher’s mind of the contemplation of the heavens. This confusion or assimilation is, of course, still more natural to Aristotle, who thought the stars unchanging. Cf. Met. 1063 a 16 ταὐτὰ δ’ αἰεὶ καὶ μεταβολῆς οὐδεμιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα. Cf. also Sophocles, Ajax 669 ff., and Shorey in Sneath, Evolution of Ethics, pp. 261-263, Dio Chrys. xl. (Teubner ii. p. 199), Boethius, Cons. iii. 8 respicite caeli spatium . . . et aliquando desinite vilia mirari.) has no leisure to turn his eyes downward upon the petty affairs of men, and so engaging in strife with them to be filled with envy and hate, but he fixes his gaze upon the things of the eternal and unchanging order, and seeing that they neither wrong nor are wronged by one another, but all abide in harmony as reason bids, he will endeavor to imitate them and, as far as may be, to fashion himself in their likeness and assimilate[*](ἀφομοιοῦσθαι suggests the ὁμοίωσις θέῳ Theaet. 176 B. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 578.) himself to them. Or do you think it possible not to imitate the things to which anyone attaches himself with admiration? Impossible, he said. Then the lover of wisdom associating with the divine order will himself become orderly and divine in the measure permitted to man.[*](Cf. on 493 D, and for the idea 383 C.) But calumny[*](Cf. HamletIII. i. 141 thou shalt not escape calumny, Bacchylides 12 (13). 202-203 βροτῶν δὲ μῶμος πάντεσσι μέν ἐστιν ἐπ’ ἔγοις.) is plentiful everywhere. Yes, truly. If, then, I said, some compulsion[*](The philosopher unwillingly holds office. Cf. on 345 E.) is laid upon him to practise stamping on the plastic matter of human nature in public and private the patterns that he visions there,[*](ἐκεῖ is frequently used in Plato of the world of ideas. Cf. Phaedrus 250 A. Phaedo 109 E.) and not merely to mould[*](For the word πλάττειν used of the lawgiver cf. 377 C, Laws 671 C, 712 B, 746 A, 800 B, Rep. 374 A, 377 c, 420 c, 466 A, 588 C, etc. For the idea that the ruler shapes the state according to the pattern Cf. 540 A-B. Plato apples the language of the theory of ideas to the social tissue here exactly as he apples it to the making of a tool in the Cratylus 389 C. In both cases there is a workman, the ideal pattern and the material in which it is more or less perfectly embodied. Such passages are the source of Aristotle’s doctrine f matter and form. Cf. Met. 1044 a 25 De part. an. 630 b 25-27, 640 b 24 f., 642 a 10 ff., De an. 403 b 3, Seller, Aristot. (Eng.) i. p. 356. Cf. also Gorg. 503 D-E, Polit. 306 C, 309 D and Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 31-32. Cf. Alcinous, Εἰσαγωγή ii. (Teubner vi. p. 153) ἃ κατὰ τὸν θεωρητικὸν βίον ὁρᾶται, μελετῆσαι εἰς ἀνθρώπων ἤθη.) and fashion himself, do you think he will prove a poor craftsman[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1329 a 21 ἀρετῆς δημιουργόν. Cf. also 1275 b 29 with Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 229. Cf. 395 C δημιουργοὺς ἐλευθερίας, Theages 125 A δημιουργὸν . . . τῆς σοφίας.) of sobriety and justice and all forms of ordinary civic virtue[*](Cf. Laws 968 A πρὸς ταῖς δημοσίαις ἀρεταῖς, Phaedo 82 A and ibid, Vol. I. on 430 C. Brochard, La Morale de Platon, L’Année Philosophique, xvi. (1905) p. 12 La justice est appelée une vertu populaire. This is a little misleading, if he means that justice itself is une vertu populaire.)? By no means, he said. But if the multitude become aware that what we are saying of the philosopher is true, will they still be harsh with philosophers, and will they distrust our statement that no city could ever be blessed unless its lineaments were traced[*](For διαγράψειαν cf. 387 B and Laws 778 A. See also Stallbaum ad loc.) by artists who used the heavenly model? They will not be harsh, he said, if they perceive that.

But tell me, what is the manner of that sketch you have in mind?They will take the city and the characters of men, as they might a tablet, and first wipe it clean—[*](Cf. Vol. I. on 426 B. This is one of the passages that may be used or misused to class Plato with the radicaIs. Cf. Laws 736 A-B, Polit. 293 D, Euthyphro 2 D-3 A. H. W. Schneider, The Puritan Mind, p. 36, says, Plato claimed that before his Republic could be established the adult population must be killed off. Cf. however Vol. I. Introd. p. xxxix, What Plato Said, p. 83, and infra, p. 76, note a on 502 B.) no easy task. But at any rate you know that this would be their first point of difference from ordinary reformers, that they would refuse to take in hand either individual or state or to legislate before they either received a clean slate or themselves made it clean.And they would be right, he said. And thereafter, do you not think that they would sketch the figure of the constitution? Surely. And then, I take it, in the course of the work they would glance[*](The theory of ideas frequently employs this image of the artist looking off to his model and back again to his work. Cf. on 484 C, and What Plato Said, p. 458, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 37.) frequently in either direction, at justice, beauty, sobriety and the like as they are in the nature of things,[*](i.e. the idea of justice. For φύσις and the theory of ideas Cf. 597 C, Phaedo 103 b, Parmen. 132 D, Cratyl. 389 C-D, 390 E.) and alternately at that which they were trying to reproduce in mankind, mingling and blending from various pursuits that hue of the flesh, so to speak, deriving their judgement from that likeness of humanity[*](For ἀνδρείκελον Cf. Cratyl. 424 E.) which Homer too called when it appeared in men the image and likeness of God.[*](Il. i. 131, Od. iii. 416. Cf. 589 D, 500 C-D, Laws 818 B-C, and What Plato Said, p. 578 on Theaet. 176 B, Cic. Tusc. i. 26. 65 divina mallem ad not. Cf. also Tim. 90 A, Phaedr. 249 C. The modern reader may think of Tennyson, In Mem. cviii. What find I in place But mine own phantom chanting hymns? Cf. also Adam ad loc.) Right, he said. And they would erase one touch or stroke and paint in another until in the measure of the possible[*](Cf. 500 D and on 493 D.) they had made the characters of men pleasing and dear to God as may be. That at any rate[*](For γοῦν cf. ibid, vol. I. on 334 A.) would be the fairest painting. Are we then making any impression on those who you said[*](Cf. 474 A.) were advancing to attack us with might and main? Can we convince them that such a political artist of character and such a painter exists as the one we then were praising when our proposal to entrust the state to him angered them, and are they now in a gentler mood when they hear what we are now saying? Much gentler, he said, if they are reasonable. How can they controvert it[*](Cf. 591 A. This affirmation of the impossibility of denial or controversy is a motif frequent in the attic orators. Cf. Lysias xxx. 26, xxxi. 24, xiii. 49, vi. 46, etc.)? Will they deny that the lovers of wisdom are lovers of reality and truth? That would be monstrous, he said. Or that their nature as we have portrayed it is akin to the highest and best? Not that either. Well, then, can they deny that such a nature bred in the pursuits that befit it will be perfectly good and philosophic so far as that can be said of anyone? Or will they rather say it of those whom we have excluded? Surely not. Will they, then, any longer be fierce with us when we declare that, until the philosophic class wins control, there will be no surcease of trouble for city or citizens nor will the polity which we fable[*](Cf. 376 D, Laws 632 E, 841 C, Phaedr. 276 E. Frutiger, Les Mythes de Platon, p. 13, says Plato uses the word μῦθος only once of his own myths, Polit. 268 E.) in words be brought to pass in deed? They will perhaps be less so, he said.