On the Estate of Hagnias

Isaeus

Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).

I am convinced that even had I agreed to let the child receive from me by the adjudication of the court a half of the inheritance, they would never have carried out this bargain or attempted to do so; they know perfectly well, that if, being outside the requisite degree of kinship, they had been in possession of anything which did not belong to them, they would have been easily deprived of it by the next-of-kin. For, as I said before, the law does not give any rights at all as next-of-kin to our children after us, but transfers them to the relatives of the deceased on his mother's side.

In the first place, then, Glaucon, the brother of Hagnias, would have come forward, against whom they could not urge a claim of closer relationship; on the contrary, they would have been clearly shown to be outside the requisite degree of kinship. Next, if Glaucon had been unwilling to come forward, the mother of Hagnias and Glaucon would have done so, since she possessed a claim of kinship to her son,[*](Not as his mother but as her son's cousin.) and so, if she had engaged in a suit against those who possessed no title as next-of-kin, she would clearly have been awarded half the estate by you, since justice and the laws have given her a right to it.

These, then, are the reasons why he did not bring an action, and it was not because he was prevented from doing so by me or by the laws; and these are the pretexts which he has invented for resorting to these vexatious proceedings against me, and it is upon the basis of them, that having brought a public indictment against me and slandering me, he hopes to obtain money and to deprive me of my guardianship. He thinks that he is managing very cleverly in employing these devices, because, if he is unsuccessful, he will lose nothing of his own, whereas, if he can carry out his wishes, he will henceforward be able to squander the child's property as well with impunity.

You must, therefore, not listen to his arguments nor tolerate his utterance of them, nor allow the custom to grow up of bringing public actions about matters for which the laws have prescribed private suits. For the rights of the case are perfectly simple and easy to understand. After dealing briefly with them and leaving them stored in your memory, I will then turn to the rest of my defence against the charges brought against me.

What then are the rights of the case and how do I define them? If my opponent declares that part of Hagnias's estate belongs to the child by right of kinship, let him bring an action before the archon claiming the half, and, if you decide in his favor, let him take it; for thus the laws ordain. But if he does not claim on these grounds but alleges that I agreed to give the child a share—though I declare that there is not a word of truth in his allegation—let him bring an action, and, if he can prove that I made such an agreement, let him secure the execution of it; for that is only right.

But if he declares that the child cannot either claim a share from me at law or sue me for breach of contract,[*](An action claiming property was described as πρός τινα, an action for breach of contract as κατά τινος.) let him name the law which prohibits this, and, if he can indicate it, let the child in these circumstances, too, receive the share of the estate. If, again, he contends that there is no need to have the half-share adjudicated or to go to law with me at all, but that this share already belongs to the child, let him make an application to the archon for its inclusion in the lease of the orphan's estate and let the lessee exact from me this portion as belonging to the child.

Such are the essential rights of the case, and such the provisions of the laws, which do not, thank heaven, oblige me to submit to criminal trials in matters about which they have instituted private suits nor to run any personal risk because I refuse to share with the child this estate, which I received by your verdict when I won my case against those who were in possession. If I were holding any property which admittedly belonged to the child and had maladministered it to his detriment, then he would be justified in bringing this criminal charge against me, but not, by heaven, when it is a question of my own property.

That my adversary has in this matter acted entirely unjustly, and that otherwise he has never spoken a word of truth, but has cleverly devised the whole plot from motives of self-interest, uttering calumnies, misinterpreting the laws and seeking to get the better both of you and of me contrary to justice—of all this, by heaven, you are, I think, well aware and all alike understand; and so I do not know what more I need say.

I notice, gentlemen, that most of his speech is taken up with a discussion of my fortune and of that of the child; he represents the circumstances of the child as embarrassed, while he attributes to me a position of wealth and accuses me of baseness on the ground that I cannot bring myself to provide any of the four daughters of Stratocles with a dowry, although, according to his account, I am in possession of the child's property.

I should like to deal with this point; for he hopes by his arguments to arouse in your minds a prejudice against me regarding the fortune which has accrued to me, and a feeling of pity in favor of the children, if they can be represented to you as reduced to poverty. You must not, therefore, be left in any ignorance on these points but must have an exact idea of them, so that you may understand that here, too, my opponent is lying, as he has lied about everything else. For, gentlemen, I would admit myself to be the basest of all men, if it could be shown that the affairs of Stratocles were left in a state of embarrassment at his death and that I, being myself in easy circumstances, gave not a thought to his children.

But if he left them a fortune more considerable and better secured than my own and sufficient to endow his daughters fittingly without sensibly diminishing his son's wealth, and if I am so managing the property as greatly to increase it, surely I cannot reasonably be blamed for not giving them my own money as well; I rather deserve to be praised for preserving and increasing their fortune. That these statements are true, I shall easily prove to you.