On the Estate of Hagnias
Isaeus
Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).
Having thus described myself as the son of a cousin and having proved that these women were not within the requisite degree of kinship, I thus had the estate adjudicated to me by you; and her former success against those who claimed on the basis of the will was of no avail to the woman who was in possession of the inheritance, nor did it avail the other woman that she was mother of the deceased who left the estate, but those who were trying the case attached so much importance to justice and their oaths that they gave their verdict in favor of me, whose claim was in conformity with the law.
Yet since I thus triumphed over these women by proving that they were not within the requisite degree of kinship to Hagnias; and since my present opponent did not venture to go to law with me, claiming half the estate for the child; and since the sons of Stratius, who stand in the same degree of kinship as this child, do not even now think of bringing a suit against me for the estate; and since I am in possession of the estate by your adjudication; and since I can prove that my opponent even at the present time cannot state what relationship the child possesses which confers rights as next-of-kin to Hagnias—what further information do you require, and what more do you wish to hear on the subject? Since I regard you as men of good sense, I think that what I have said is sufficient.
My opponent, thinking nothing of telling any lie whatever and considering that his own rascality does him no harm, dares to utter many calumnies against me, with which I will deal presently. In particular, he now alleges that Stratocles and I made a compact, when we were about to engage in the suit about the inheritance, though of those who had prepared to put in a claim we were the only persons for whom such a mutual agreement was impossible.
The daughter of Eubulides and the mother of Hagnias, in an action against me, since they were not claiming on the same grounds, might have made an agreement, that if one of them were successful, she should give a share to the defeated claimant; for the votes accorded to each of them would be placed in different urns. But with us it was quite otherwise; we stood in the same relationship and were making two separate claims, each to have half the estate; and when two claimants found their claims on the same grounds, only one voting urn is employed, so that it would be impossible for one to be unsuccessful and the other successful, but we both ran the same risk, so we could not possibly have made any compact or agreement about the inheritance.
But when Stratocles died before the actions claiming half the estate, which we were each bringing, could come on, and so there was no further question of his participating in the estate, nor had this child of his any title owing to the law, but the whole inheritance devolved upon me as next-of-kin, if I could defeat those who are now in possession, then and not till then does my opponent devise and invent these fictions, expecting easily to mislead you by these stories. That no such compact was possible but that all the details of procedure are already provided for, can easily be seen from the law. Please take and read it to the court.
Law
Does it appear to you that the law gives any liberty for a concerted arrangement? Or are not its provisions in an exactly contrary sense, since, even if a previous arrangement existed, it expressly ordains that each party shall bring an action for his own share, and prescribes a single voting-urn, when the two parties base their claims on the same ground, and makes this the system of adjudication? But my opponent, in spite of these legal provisions and the impossibility of a preconcerted arrangement, has had the impudence to invent this lie against all common sense.
But he has not stopped there; he has also invented the most inconsistent story possible, to which, gentlemen, please give your close attention. He declares that I agreed, if I won my case against the present possessors of the estate, to give the child a half-share of the inheritance. Yet if the child had any right to a share in virtue of his relationship, as my opponent declares, what need was there for this agreement between me and them? For the half of the estate was adjudicable to them just as much as to me, if what they say is true.
If, on the other hand, they had no claim by right of kinship, why should I have agreed to give them a share, when the laws have given me the right of succession to the whole estate? Was it then impossible for me to make my claim without their consent? But the law gives full liberty to anyone who likes to make a claim, so that they could not possibly make this allegation. Did I then require some evidence from them material to my case, in default of which I was unlikely to secure the adjudication of the estate? No, I was claiming by right of kinship, not of testamentary disposition, so that I had no need of witnesses.
And indeed, if it was impossible for me to have made an arrangement with Stratocles in his lifetime; if his father did not bequeath the estate to him, since he never had any of it adjudicated to him; if it was unlikely that I should have agreed to give the child half the inheritance; and since you awarded me the estate by your adjudication and my opponents brought no action at the time and have never yet thought of disputing the estate—how can you believe their allegations to be true? In my opinion you cannot possibly do so.
Seeing that you might reasonably be astonished that they did not at the time bring a suit claiming half the estate, my opponent pretends that I was the cause of their not bringing a suit against the other parties, because I had agreed to give them a share and so they did not make the necessary deposit, while they allege that the laws forbade them to bring a suit against me on the ground that orphans may not bring actions against their guardians. Both these statements are untrue.
For my opponent could not point to any law which forbids him to bring a private action against me on behalf of the child; for no law exists which is opposed to such a proceeding, but, just as the law has granted the right to bring a public indictment against me, so it has created the opportunity either for me or the child to bring a private suit. Again, it was not because I agreed to give them a share that they failed to bring an action against the other parties who were in possession of the estate, but because they had absolutely no right to this money.