Archidamus

Similar to this was the career of Amyntas, king of the Macedonians. Worsted in battle by the neighboring barbarians, and robbed of all Macedonia, he at first proposed to quit the country and save his life, but hearing someone praise the remark made to Dionysius, and, like Dionysius, repenting of his decision, Amyntas seized a small fortified post, sent out thence for reinforcements, recovered the whole of Macedonia within three months, spent the remainder of his days on the throne, and finally died of old age.[*](Amyntas, defeated by the Illyrians, won such a victory in 393 B.C. See Dio. Sic. 14.92.3. Amyntas was father of Philip, and reigned from 394 to 370 B.C.)

But we should both grow weary, you with listening and I with speaking, if we were to examine every incident of this sort; nay, if we were to recall also our experience with Thebes, while we should be grieved over past events, we should gain better hopes for the future. For when they ventured to withstand our inroads and our threats,[*](Of Agesilaus in 394, 378, and 377 B.C.; of Phoebidas in 382, and of Cleombrotus in 378 and 376 B.C.) fortune so completely reversed their situation that they, who at all other times have been in our power, now assert their right to dictate to us.

Seeing, then, that such great reversals have taken place, he is a very foolish person who thinks that they will fail to occur in our case; nay, we must endure for the present and be of good courage with regard to the future, knowing that states repair such disasters by the aid of good government and experience in warfare; and on this point no one would dare contradict me when I say that we have greater experience in military matters than any other people, and that government as it ought to be exists among us alone. With these two advantages on our side, we cannot fail to prove more successful in our undertakings than those who have paid but slight attention to either government or war.

There are those who condemn war and dwell on its precariousness, employing many other proofs, but particularly our own experiences, and express surprise that men should see fit to rely on an expedient so difficult and hazardous. But I know of many who through war have acquired great prosperity, and many who have been robbed of all they possessed through keeping the peace;

for nothing of this kind is in itself absolutely either good or bad, but rather it is the use we make of circumstances and opportunities which in either case must determine the result. Those who are prosperous should set their hearts on peace, for in a state of peace they can preserve their present condition for the greatest length of time; those, however, who are unfortunate should give their minds to war, for out of the confusion and innovation resulting from it they can more quickly secure a change in their fortunes. But we, I fear, will be seen to have pursued exactly the opposite course;

for when we might have lived at ease, we made more wars than were necessary, but now, when we have no choice but to risk battle, we desire tranquility and deliberate about our own security. And yet those who wish to be free ought to shun a peace whose terms are dictated by the enemy as being not far removed from slavery, and should make treaties only when they have defeated their adversaries, or when they have made their forces equal to those of the enemy; for the kind of peace which each side will obtain will be decided by the manner in which they conclude the war.

Bearing these facts in mind, you must not rashly commit yourselves to shameful terms, nor let it appear that you are more remiss in your deliberations about your country than about the rest of the world. Let me recall to your minds that formerly, if a single Lacedaemonian gave aid to one of our allied cities when it was pressed by siege, all men would concede that its deliverance was due to him. Now the older among you could name the greater number of these men, but I, too, can recount the most illustrious of them:

Pedaritus,[*](Harmost of Chios in 412 B.C., who was successful against the Athenians for a time, but was defeated and slain in 412 B.C. See Thucyd. viii. 55. 3.) sailing to Chios, saved that city; Brasidas entered Amphipolis and, having rallied about him a few of those who were under siege, defeated the besiegers[*](Brasidas entered Amphipolis in 422 B.C., and in command of 150 hoplites sallied out against Cleon, the Athenian general. The greater part of the besieged forces was commanded by Clearidas. Brasidas lost his life in the engagement which followed, and became after his death a local hero at Amphipolis. See Thucyd. v. 8-11.) in battle in spite of their numbers; Gylippus, by bringing aid to the Syracusans, not only saved them from destruction, but also captured the entire armament of the enemy, which dominated them both by land and by sea.[*](In the memorable Sicilian expedition of 414 B.C. Gylippus defeated the Athenian general Nicias and took his entire forces captive.)

And yet is it not shameful that in those days single men among us were strong enough to protect the cities of others, but now all of us together are not able, nor do we attempt, to save our own city? Is it not shameful that, when we fought for others, we filled Europe and Asia with trophies, but now, when our own country is so openly outraged, we cannot show that we have fought in her behalf a single battle worthy of note?[*](That is, since the battle of Leuctra. In addition to others mentioned above, Agesilaus, father of Archidamus, had won many victories in Asia Minor (396-394 B.C.).)

Is it not shameful, finally, that other cities have endured the last extremities of siege to preserve our empire,[*](For example, Thespiae. See Xen. Hell. 6.3. For other examples see Paus. 9.14, and Dio. Sic. 15.57 and 69.) while we ourselves see no reason why we should bear even slight hardships to prevent our being forced to do anything contrary to our just rights, but are to be seen even at this moment feeding teams of ravenous horses,[*](Horses were kept for racing, and were regarded as an expensive luxury.) although, like men reduced to the direst extremities and in want of their daily bread, we sue for peace in this fashion?

But it would be of all things the most outrageous if we who are accounted the most energetic of the Hellenes should be more slack than the rest in our deliberations upon this question. What people do we know, worth mentioning at all, who after a single defeat and a single invasion of their country have in so cowardly a fashion agreed to do everything demanded of them? How could such men hold out against a long season of misfortune?