Archidamus

In all else I agree with them, but no man could ever persuade me that one should ever deem anything to be of greater consequence than justice;[*](For this Isocratean idealism cf. Isoc. 8.31-35.) for I see that our laws have been made to secure it, that men of character and reputation pride themselves upon practicing it, and that it constitutes the chief concern of all well-regulated states;

further, I observe that the wars of the past have in the end been decided, not in accordance with the strongest forces, but in accordance with justice; and that, in general, the life of man is destroyed by vice and preserved by virtue. Therefore those should not lack courage who are about to take up arms in a just cause, but far more those who are insolent and do not know how to bear their good fortune with moderation.[*](Cf. Isoc. 1.42 and Isoc. 12.31-32.)

Then, too, there is this point to consider: At present we are all agreed as to what is just, while we differ as to what is expedient. But now that two good things are set before us, the one evident, the other doubtful, how ridiculous you would make yourselves if you should reject that course which is acknowledged to be good and decide to take that which is debatable, especially when your choice is a matter of such importance!

For according to my proposal you would not relinquish a single one of your possessions nor fasten any disgrace upon the state; nay, on the contrary, you would have good hope that taking up arms in a just cause you would fight better than your foes. According to their proposal, on the other hand, you would withdraw at once from Messene, and, having first committed this wrong against yourselves, you would perhaps fail to secure both what is expedient and what is just—and everything else which you expect to gain.

For as yet it is by no means evident that if we do as we are bidden we shall henceforth enjoy lasting peace. For I think you are not unaware that all men are wont to discuss just terms with those who defend their rights, while in the case of those who are over-ready to do what they are commanded they keep adding more and more to the conditions which at first they intended to impose; and thus it happens that men of a warlike temper obtain a more satisfactory peace than those who too readily come to terms.

But lest I should seem to dwell too long on this point, I shall abandon all such considerations and turn at once to the simplest of my proofs. If no people, after meeting with misfortune, ever recovered themselves or mastered their enemies, then we cannot reasonably hope to win victory in battle; but if on many occasions it has happened that the stronger power has been vanquished by the weaker, and that the besiegers have been destroyed by those confined within the walls, what wonder if our own circumstances likewise should undergo a change?

Now in the case of Sparta I can cite no instance of this kind, for in times past no nation stronger than ourselves ever invaded our territory;[*](That is, before the Theban invasion of 369 B.C.) but in the case of other states there are many such examples which one might use, and especially is this true of the city of the Athenians.

For we shall find that as a result of dictating to others they lost repute with the Hellenes, while by defending themselves against insolent invaders they won fame among all mankind. Now if I were to recount the wars of old which they fought against the Amazons or the Thracians or the Peloponnesians[*](See Isoc. 4.56 and 70.) who under the leadership of Eurystheus invaded Attica, no doubt I should be thought to speak on matters ancient and remote from the present situation; but in their war against the Persians,[*](See Isoc. 4.71-98.) who does not know from what hardships they arose to great good-fortune?

For they alone of those who dwelt outside of the Peloponnesus, although they saw that the strength of the barbarians was irresistible, did not think it honorable to consider the terms imposed upon them,[*](These terms were to give earth and water, in token of submission, to the heralds of the Great King. Hdt. 7.133.) but straightway chose to see their city ravaged rather than enslaved. Leaving their own country,[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.96.) and adopting Freedom as their fatherland, they shared the dangers of war with us, and wrought such a change in their fortunes that, after being deprived of their own possessions for but a few days, they became for many years masters of the rest of the world.[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.72.)

Athens, however, is not the only instance by which one might show how great are the advantages of daring to resist one's enemies. There is also the case of the tyrant Dionysius, who, when he was besieged by the Carthaginians, seeing not a glimmer of hope for deliverance, but being hard pressed both by the war and by the disaffection of his citizens, was, for his part, on the point of sailing away, when one of his companions made bold to declare that “royalty is a glorious shroud.”[*](That is, it is a glorious thing to die a king. For the event, 396 B.C., See Dio. Sic. 14.58, and for the anecdote, Dio. Sic. 14.8.5 and Ael. Var. Hist. 4.8.)

Ashamed of what he had planned to do, and taking up the war afresh, he destroyed countless hosts of the Carthaginians,[*](Dio. Sic. 14.72.6, says the shore was strewn with corpses.) strengthened his authority over his subjects, acquired far greater dominion than he had possessed before, ruled with absolute power until his death,[*](Dionysius died in the spring of 367 B.C.) and left his son in possession of the same honors and powers as he himself had enjoyed.