Against Eratosthenes, who had been One of the Thirty: Spoken by Lysias Himself

For they sent many of the citizens into exile with the enemy; they unjustly put many of them to death, and then deprived them of burial; many who had full civic rights they excluded from the citizenship; and the daughters of many they debarred from in tended marriage.

And they have carried audacity to such a pitch that they come here ready to defend themselves, and state that they are guilty of no vile or shameful action. I myself could have wished that their statement were true; for my own share in that benefit would not have been of the smallest.

But in fact they have nothing of the sort to show in regard either to the city or to me: my brother, as I said before, was put to death by Eratosthenes, who was neither suffering under any private wrong himself, nor found him offending against the State, but merely sought to gratify his own lawless passions.

I propose to put him up on the dais and question him, gentlemen of the jury. For my feeling is this: even to discuss this man with another for his profit I consider to be an impiety, but even to address this man himself, when it is for his hurt,[*](There was risk of pollution in addressing an unpurified murderer; cf. Aesch. Eum. 448; Eur. Orest. 75.) I regard as a holy and pious action. So mount the dais, please, and answer the questions I put to you.

Did you arrest Polemarchus or not?—I was acting on the orders of the government, from fear.—Were you in the Council-chamber when the statements were being made about us?—I was.—Did you speak in support or in opposition of those who were urging the death sentence?—In opposition.—You were against taking our lives?—Against taking your lives.—In the belief that our fate was unjust, or just?—That it was unjust.

So then, most abandoned of mankind, you spoke in opposition to save us, but you helped in our arrest to put us to death! And when our salvation depended on the majority of your body, you assert that you spoke in opposition to those who sought our destruction; but when it rested with you alone to save Polemarchus or not, you arrested him and put him in prison. So then, because you failed to help him, as you say, by your speech in opposition, you claim to be accounted a good citizen, while for having apprehended him and put him to death you are not to give satisfaction to me and to this court!

And further, supposing he is truthful in asserting that he spoke in opposition, observe that there is no reason to credit his plea that he acted under orders. For I presume it was not where the resident aliens were concerned that they sought to put him to the proof.[*](After such opposition, they would surely test him by ordering him to arrest a citizen of standing.) And then, who was less likely to be given such orders than the man who was found to have spoken in opposition and to have declared his opinion? For who was likely to be less active in this service than the man who spoke in opposition to the object that they had at heart?

Again, the rest of the Athenians have a sufficient excuse, in my opinion, for attributing to the Thirty the responsibility for what has taken place; but if the Thirty actually attribute it to themselves, how can you reasonably accept that?

For had there been some stronger authority in the city, whose orders were given him to destroy people in defiance of justice, you might perhaps have some reason for pardoning him; but whom, in fact, will you ever punish, if the Thirty are to be allowed to state that they merely carried out the orders of the Thirty?

Besides, it was not in his house, but in the street, where he was free to leave both him and the decrees of the Thirty intact,[*](i.e., he could have let him escape there without any breach of the orders of the Thirty; but the people feel anger even against those who sought their victims indoors, where there was little possibility of conniving at their escape.) that he apprehended him and took him off to prison. You feel anger against everyone who entered your houses in search either of yourselves or of some member of your household:

yet, if there is to be pardon for those who have destroyed others to save themselves, you would be more justified in pardoning these intruders; for it was dangerous for them not to go where they were sent, and to deny that they had found the victims there. But Eratosthenes was free to say that he had not met his man, or else that he had not seen him for these were statements that did not admit of either disproof or inquisition; so that not even his enemies, however they might wish it, could have convicted him.

If in truth, Eratosthenes, you had been a good citizen, you ought far rather to have acted as an informant to those who were destined to an unjust death than to have laid hands on those who were to be unjustly destroyed. But the fact is that your deeds clearly reveal the man who, instead of feeling pain, took pleasure in what was being done; so that this court should take its verdict from your deeds, not from your words.

They should take what they know to have been done as evidence of what was said at the time, since it is not possible to produce witnesses of the latter. For we were restricted, not merely from attending their councils, but even from staying at home; and thus they have the licence, after doing all possible evil to the city, to say all possible good about themselves.

That one point, however, I do not contest; I admit, if you like, that you spoke in opposition. But I wonder what in the world you would have done if you had spoken in favour, when in spite of your alleged opposition you put Polemarchus to death. Now I would ask the court, even supposing that you had happened to be brothers or sons of this man, what would you have done? Acquitted him? For, gentlemen, Eratosthenes is bound to prove one of two things,—either that he did not arrest him, or that he did so with justice. But he has admitted that he laid hands on him unjustly,[*](By stating that he spoke against it.) so that he has made your verdict on himself an easy matter.

And besides, many foreigners as well as townsfolk have come here to know what is to be your judgement on these men. The latter sort, your fellow-citizens, will have learnt before they leave, either that they will be punished for their offences, or that, if they succeed in their aims, they will be despots of the city, but, if they are disappointed, will be on an equality with you. As for all the foreigners who are staying in town, they will know whether they are acting unjustly or justly in banning the Thirty from their cities. For if the very people who have suffered injury from them are to let them go when they have hold of them, of course they will consider it a waste of pains on their own part to keep watch on your behalf.

And how monstrous it would be, when you have punished with death the commanders who won the victory at sea[*](At Arginusae, 406 B.C.)—they said that a storm prevented them from picking up the men in the water, but you felt that you must make them give satisfaction to the I valor of the dead—if these men, who as ordinary persons used their utmost endeavors towards your defeat in the sea-fights,[*](It was suspected that both at Arginusae and at Aegospotami members of the oligarchic party had been working for the defeat of Athens by Sparta.) and then, once established in power, admit that of their own free will they put to death many of the citizens without a trial,—if these men, I say, and their children are not to be visited by you with the extreme penalty of the law!

Now I, gentlemen, might almost claim that the accusations you have heard are sufficient: for I consider that an accuser ought to go no further than to show that the defendant has committed acts that merit death; since this is the extreme penalty that we have power to inflict upon him. So I doubt if there is any need to prolong one’s accusation of such men as these; for not even if they underwent two deaths for each one of their deeds could they pay the penalty in full measure.

And note that he cannot even resort to the expedient, so habitual among our citizens, of saying nothing to answer the counts of the accusation, but making other statements about themselves which at times deceive you; they represent to you that they are good soldiers, or have taken many vessels of the enemy while in command of war-ships, or have won over cities from hostility to friendship.

Why, only tell him to point out where they killed as many of our enemies as they have of our citizens, or where they took as many ships as they themselves surrendered, or what city they enlisted to compare with yours which they enslaved.

Nay, indeed, did they despoil the enemy of as many arms as they stripped from you? Did they capture fortifications to compare with those of their own country which they razed to the ground? They are the men who pulled down the forts around Attica, and made it evident to you that even in dismantling the Peiraeus they were not obeying the injunctions of the Lacedaemonians, but were thinking to make their own authority the more secure.