Republic
Plato
Plato in Twelve Volumes, Vol. 5-6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1930-37.
And is it not true that in like manner a leader of the people who, getting control of a docile mob,[*](Note the difference of tone from 502 B. Cf. Phaedr. 260 C.) does not withhold his hand from the shedding of tribal blood,[*](Cf. Pindar, Pyth. ii. 32; Lucan i. 331: nullus semel ore receptus Pollutas patitur sanguis mansuescere fauces.) but by the customary unjust accusations brings a citizen into court and assassinates him, blotting out[*](For ἀφανίζων Cf. Gorg. 471 B.) a human life, and with unhallowed tongue and lips that have tasted kindred blood, banishes and slays and hints at the abolition of debts and the partition of lands[*](The apparent contradiction of the tone here with Laws 684 E could be regarded mistakenly as another disharmony. Grote iii. p. 107 says that there is no case of such radical measures in Greek history. Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. p. 374, says that the only case was that of Cleomenes at Sparta in the third century. See Georges Mathieu, Les Idées politiques d’Isocrate, p. 150, who refers to Andoc. De myst. 88, Plato, Laws 684, Demosth. Against Timocr. 149 (heliastic oath), Michel, Recueil d’inscriptions grecques, 1317, the oath at Itanos.)—is it not the inevitable consequence and a decree of fate[*](Cf. 619 C.) that such a one be either slain by his enemies or become a tyrant and be transformed from a man into a wolf?It is quite inevitable, he said. He it is, I said, who becomes the leader of faction against the possessors of property.[*](Cf. 565 A.) Yes, he. May it not happen that he is driven into exile and, being restored in defiance of his enemies, returns a finished tyrant? Obviously. And if they are unable to expel him or bring about his death by calumniating him to the people, they plot to assassinate him by stealth. That is certainly wont to happen, said he. And thereupon those who have reached this stage devise that famous petition[*](Cf Herod. i. 59, Aristot. Rhet. 1357 b 30 ff. Aristotle, Pol. 1305 a 7-15, says that this sort of thing used to happen but does not now, and explains why. For πολυθρύλητον Cf. Phaedo 100 B.) of the tyrant—to ask from the people a bodyguard to make their city safe[*](For the ethical dative αὐτοῖς cf. on 343 Vol. I. p. 65, note c.) for the friend of democracy. They do indeed, he said. And the people grant it, I suppose, fearing for him but unconcerned for themselves. Yes, indeed. And when he sees this, the man who has wealth and with his wealth the repute of hostility to democracy,[*](For μισόδημος cf. Aristoph. Wasps 474, Xen. Hell. ii. 3. 47, Andoc. iv. 16, and by contrast φιλόδημον, Aristoph. Knights 787, Clouds 1187.) then in the words of the oracle delivered to Croesus,
By the pebble-strewn strand of the Hermos Swift is his flight, he stays not nor blushes to show the white feather.Hdt. 1.55 No, for he would never get a second chance to blush. And he who is caught, methinks, is delivered to his death. Inevitably. And then obviously that protector does not lie prostrate,
mighty with far-flung limbs,Hom. Il. 16.776 in Homeric overthrow,[*](In Hom. Il. 16.776 Cebriones, Hector’s charioteer, slain by Patroclus,κεῖτο μέγας μεγαλωστί, mighty in his mightiness. (A. T. Murray, Loeb tr.)) but overthrowing many others towers in the car of state[*](For the figure Cf. Polit. 266 E. More common in Plato is the figure of the ship in this connection. Cf. on 488.) transformed from a protector into a perfect and finished tyrant. What else is likely? he said. Shall we, then, portray the happiness, said I, of the man and the state in which such a creature arises? By all means let us describe it, he said. Then at the start and in the first days does he not smile[*](Cf. Eurip. I. A. 333 ff., Shakes. Henry IV.Part I. I. iii. 246 This king of smiles, this Bolingbroke.) upon all men and greet everybody he meets and deny that he is a tyrant, and promise many things in private and public, and having freed men from debts, and distributed lands to the people and his own associates, he affects a gracious and gentle manner to all? Necessarily, he said. But when, I suppose, he has come to terms with some of his exiled enemies[*](Not foreign enemies as almost all render it. Cf. my note on this passage in Class. Rev. xix. (1905) pp. 438-439, 573 B ἔξω ὠθεῖ, Theognis 56, Thuc. iv. 66 and viii. 64.) and has got others destroyed and is no longer disturbed by them, in the first place he is always stirring up some war[*](Cf. Polit. 308 A, and in modern times the case of Napoleon.) so that the people may be in need of a leader. That is likely.
And also that being impoverished by war-taxes they may have to devote themselves to their daily business and be less likely to plot against him?Obviously.And if, I presume, he suspects that there are free spirits who will not suffer his domination, his further object is to find pretexts for destroying them by exposing them to the enemy? From all these motives a tyrant is compelled to be always provoking wars[*](For ταράττειν in this sense cf. Dem. De cor. 151 ἐγκλήματα καὶ πόλεμος . . . ἐταράχθη, Soph. Antig. 795 νεῖκος . . . ταράξας.)?Yes, he is compelled to do so.And by such conduct will he not the more readily incur the hostility of the citizens?Of course.And is it not likely that some of those who helped to establish[*](ξυγκαταστησάντων is used in Aesch. Prom. 307 of those who helped Zeus to establish his supremacy among the gods. See also Xen Ages. 2.31, Isoc. 4.126.) and now share in his power, voicing their disapproval of the course of events, will speak out frankly to him and to one another—such of them as happen to be the bravest?Yes, it is likely.Then the tyrant must do away[*](Cf. Thucyd. viii. 70, Herod. iii. 80. δή, as often in the Timaeus, marks the logical progression of the thought. Cf. Tim. 67 C, 69 A, 77 C, 82 B, and passim.) with all such if he is to maintain his rule, until he has left no one of any worth, friend or foe.Obviously.He must look sharp to see, then, who is brave, who is great-souled, who is wise, who is rich and such is his good fortune that, whether he wishes it or not, he must be their enemy and plot against them all until he purge the city.[*](Cf. on 560 D, p. 299, note c. Aristotle says that in a democracy ostracism corresponds to this. Cf. Newman i. p. 262. For the idea that the tyrant fears good or able and outstanding men Cf. Laws 832 C, Gorg. 510 B-C, Xen. Hiero 5. I, Isoc. viii. 112, Eurip. Ion 626-628. But cf. Pindar, Pyth, iii, 71, of Hiero,οὐ φθονέων ἀγαθοῖς.)A fine purgation, he said. Yes, said I, just the opposite of that which physicians practise on our bodies. For while they remove the worst and leave the best, he does the reverse. Yes, for apparently he must, he said, if he is to keep his power. Blessed, then, is the necessity that binds him, said I, which bids him dwell for the most part with base companions who hate him, or else forfeit his life. Such it is, he said. And would he not, the more he offends the citizens by such conduct, have the greater need of more and more trustworthy bodyguards? Of course. Whom, then, may he trust, and whence shall he fetch them? Unbidden, he said, they will wing their way[*](Cf. Laws 952 E, Rep. 467 D.) to him in great numbers if he furnish their wage. Drones, by the dog, I said, I think you are talking of again, an alien[*](Cf. the Scottish guards of Louis XI. of France, the Swiss guards of the later French kings, the Hessians hired by George III. against the American colonies, and the Asiatics in the Soviet armies.) and motley crew.[*](παντοδαπούς: cf. on 557 C.) You think rightly, he said. But what of the home supply,[*](For αὐτόθεν cf. Herod. i. 64 τῶν μὲν αὐτόθεν, τῶν δὲ ἀπὸ Στρύμονος, Thuc. i. 11, Xen. Ages. 1. 28.) would he not choose to employ that? How? By taking their slaves from the citizens, emancipating them and enlisting them in his bodyguard. Assuredly, he said, since these are those whom he can most trust.