Republic

The same malady, I said, that, arising in oligarchy, destroyed it, this more widely diffused and more violent as a result of this licence, enslaves democracy. And in truth, any excess is wont to bring about a corresponding reaction[*](Cf. Lysias xxv. 27, Isoc. viii. 108, vii. 5, Cic. De rep. i. 44 nam ut ex nimia potentia principum oritur interitus principum, sic hunc nimis liberum . . . etc.) to the opposite in the seasons, in plants, in animal bodies,[*](For the generalization Cf. Symp. 188 A-B.) and most especially in political societies. Probably, he said. And so the probable outcome of too much freedom is only too much slavery in the individual and the state. Yes, that is probable. Probably, then, tyranny develops out of no other constitution[*](Cf. 565 D. The slight exaggeration of the expression is solemnly treated by ApeIt as a case of logical false conversion in Plato.) than democracy—from the height of liberty, I take it, the fiercest extreme of servitude. That is reasonable, he said. That, however, I believe, was not your question,[*](Plato keeps to the point. Cf. on 531 C, p. 193, note i.) but what identical[*](ταὐτόν implies the concept. Cf. Parmen. 130 D, Phileb. 34 E, 13 B, Soph. 253 D. Cf. also Tim. 83 C, Meno 72 C, Rep. 339 A.) malady arising in democracy as well as in oligarchy enslaves it? You say truly, he replied. That then, I said, was what I had in mind, the class of idle and spendthrift men, the most enterprising and vigorous portion being leaders and the less manly spirits followers. We were likening them to drones,[*](Cf. 555 D-E.) some equipped with stings and others stingless. And rightly too, he said. These two kinds, then, I said, when they arise in any state, create a disturbance like that produced in the body[*](Cf. the parallel of soul and body in 444 C f., Soph. 227Crito 47 D f., Gorg. 504 B-C, 505 B, 518 A, 524 D. For φλέγμα Cf. Tim. 83 C, 85 A-B.) by phlegm and gall. And so a good physician and lawgiver must be on his guard from afar against the two kinds, like a prudent apiarist, first and chiefly[*](μάλιστα μὲν . . . ἂν δέ: cf. 378 A, 414 C, 461 C, 473 B, Apol. 34 A, Soph. 246 D.) to prevent their springing up, but if they do arise to have them as quickly as may be cut out, cells and all. Yes, by Zeus, he said, by all means. Then let us take it in this way, I said, so that we may contemplate our purpose more distinctly.[*](For εὐκρινέστερον Cf. Soph. 246 D.) How? Let us in our theory make a tripartite[*](Cf. Phileb. 23 C, which Stenzel says argues an advance over the Sophist, because Plato is no longer limited to a bipartite division.) division of the democratic state, which is in fact its structure. One such class, as we have described, grows up in it because of the licence, no less than in the oligarchic state. That is so. But it is far fiercer in this state than in that. How so? There, because it is not held in honor, but is kept out of office, it is not exercised and does not grow vigorous. But in a democracy this is the dominating class, with rare exceptions, and the fiercest part of it makes speeches and transacts business, and the remainder swarms and settles about the speaker’s stand and keeps up a buzzing[*](Cf. 573 A.) and tolerates[*](ἀνέχεται cf. Isoc. viii. 14 ὅτι δημοκρατίας οὔσης οὐκ ἔστι παρρησία, etc. For the word cf. Aristoph. Acharn. 305 οὐκ ἀνασχήσομαι, Wasps 1337.) no dissent, so that everything with slight exceptions is administered by that class in such a state. Quite so, he said. And so from time to time there emerges or is secreted from the multitude another group of this sort. What sort? he said. When all are pursuing wealth the most orderly and thrifty natures for the most part become the richest. It is likely. Then they are the most abundant supply of honey for the drones, and it is the easiest to extract.[*](For βλίττεται cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 794.) Why, yes, he said, how could one squeeze it out of those who have little? The capitalistic[*](That is the significance of πλούσιοι here, lit. the rich.) class is, I take it, the name by which they are designated—the pasture of the drones. Pretty much so, he said.

And the third class,[*](For the classification of the population cf. Vol. I. pp. 151-163, Eurip. Suppl. 238 ff., Aristot. Pol. 1328 b ff., 1289 b 33, 1290 b 40 ff., Newman i. p. 97) composing the people, would comprise all quiet[*](ἀπράγμονες: cf. 620 C, Aristoph. Knights 261, Aristot. Rhet. 1381 a 25, Isoc. Antid. 151, 227. But Pericles in Thuc. ii. 40 takes a different view. See my note in Class. Phil. xv. (1920) pp. 300-301.) cultivators of their own farms[*](αὐτουργοί: Cf. Soph. 223 D, Eurip. Or. 920, Shorey in Class. Phil. xxiii. (1928) pp. 346-347.) who possess little property. This is the largest and most potent group in a democracy when it meets in assembly.Yes, it is, he said, but it will not often do that,[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1318 b 12.) unless it gets a share of the honey. Well, does it not always share, I said, to the extent that the men at the head find it possible, in distributing[*](Cf. Isoc. viii. 13 τοὺς τὰ τῆς πόλεως διανεμομένους.) to the people what they take from the well-to-do,[*](For τοὺς ἔχοντας cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Knights 1295. For the exploitation of the rich at Athens cf. Xen. Symp. 4. 30-32, Lysias xxi. 14, xix. 62, xviii. 20-21, Isoc. Areop. 32 ff., Peace 131, Dem. De cor. 105 ff., on his triarchic law; and also Eurip. Herc. Fur. 588-592.) to keep the lion’s share for themselves[*](Cf. Aristoph. Knights 717-718, 1219-1223, and Achilles in Il. ix. 363.)? Why, yes, he said, it shares in that sense. And so, I suppose, those who are thus plundered are compelled to defend themselves by speeches in the assembly and any action in their power. Of course. And thereupon the charge is brought against them by the other party, though they may have no revolutionary designs, that they are plotting against the people, and it is said that they are oligarchs.[*](i.e. reactionaries. Cf. on 562 D, p. 306, note b, Aeschines iii. 168, and 566 C μισόδημος. The whole passage perhaps illustrates the disharmony between Plato’s upperclass sympathies and his liberal philosophy.) Surely. And then finally, when they see the people, not of its own will[*](So the Attic orators frequently say that a popular jury was deceived. Cf. also Aristoph. Acharn. 515-516.) but through misapprehension,[*](Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1110 a 1, in his discussion of voluntary and involuntary acts, says things done under compulsion or through misapprehension (δι’ ἄγνοιαν) are involuntary.) and being misled by the calumniators, attempting to wrong them, why then,[*](For τότ’ ἢδη cf. 569 A, Phaedo 87 E, Gorg. 527 D, Laches 181 D, 184 A, and on 550 A, p. 259, note i.) whether they wish it or not,[*](So Aristot. Pol. 1304 b 30 ἠναγκάσθησαν σύσταντες καταλῦσαι τὸν δῆμον, Isoc. xv. 318 ὀλιγαρχίαν ὀνειδίζοντες . . . ἠνάγκασαν ὁμοίους γενέσθαι ταῖς αἰτίαις.) they become in very deed oligarchs, not willingly, but this evil too is engendered by those drones which sting them. Precisely. And then there ensue impeachments and judgements and lawsuits on either side. Yes, indeed. And is it not always the way of a demos to put forward one man as its special champion and protector[*](Cf. 562 D, Eurip. Or. 772 προστάτας, Aristoph. Knights 1128. The προστάτης τοῦ δήμου was the accepted leader of the democracy. Cf. Dittenberger, S. I. G. 2nd ed. 1900, no. 476. The implications of this passage contradict the theory that the oligarchy is nearer the ideal than the democracy. But Plato is thinking of Athens and not of his own scheme. Cf. Introd. pp. xlv-xlvi.) and cherish and magnify him? Yes, it is. This, then, is plain, said I, that when a tyrant arises he sprouts from a protectorate root[*](Cf. Aristot. Pol. 1310 b 14 οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν τυράννων γεγόνασιν ἐκ δημαγωγῶν, etc., ibid. 1304 b 20 ff.) and from nothing else. Very plain. What, then, is the starting-point of the transformation of a protector into a tyrant? Is it not obviously when the protector’s acts begin to reproduce the legend that is told of the shrine of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia[*](Cf. Frazer on Pausanias viii. 2 (vol. iv. p. 189) and Cook’s Zeus, vol. i. p. 70. The archaic religious rhetoric of what follows testifies to the intensity of Plato’s feeling. Cf. the language of the Laws on homicide, 865 ff.)? What is that? he said. The story goes that he who tastes of the one bit of human entrails minced up with those of other victims is inevitably transformed into a wolf. Have you not heard the tale? I have.