Republic

“Are you satisfied, then,” said I, “as before,[*](Supra 511 D-E.) to call the first division science, the second understanding, the third belief,[*](Always avoid faith in translating Plato.) and the fourth conjecture or picture-thought—and the last two collectively opinion, and the first two intellection, opinion dealing with generation and intellection with essence, and this relation being expressed in the proportion[*](Cf. on 508 C, p. 103, note b.): as essence is to generation, so is intellection to opinion; and as intellection is to opinion, so is science to belief, and understanding to image-thinking or surmise? But the relation between their objective correlates[*](That is the meaning, though some critics will object to the phrase. Lit. the things over which these (mental states) are set, or to which they apply.) and the division into two parts of each of these, the opinable, namely, and the intelligible, let us dismiss,[*](There are two probable reasons for this: (1) The objective classification is nothing to Plato’s present purpose; (2) The second member of the proportion is lacking in the objective correlates. Numbers are distinguished from ideas not in themselves but only by the difference of method in dialectics and in mathematics. Cf. on 525 D, 526 A, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 83-84, and Class. Phil. xxii. (1927) pp. 213-218. The explicit qualifications of my arguments there have been neglected and the arguments misquoted but not answered. They can be answered only by assuming the point at issue and affirming that Plato did assign an intermediate place to mathematical conceptions, for which there is no evidence in Plato’s own writings.) Glaucon, lest it involve us in discussion many times as long as the preceding.” Well, he said, “I agree with you about the rest of it, so far as I am able to follow.” “And do you not also give the name dialectician to the man who is able to exact an account[*](Cf. on 531 E, p. 195, note f.) of the essence of each thing? And will you not say that the one who is unable to do this, in so far as he is incapable of rendering an account to himself and others, does not possess full reason and intelligence[*](Cf. on 511 D, p. 117, note a.) about the matter?” “How could I say that he does?” he replied. “And is not this true of the good likewise[*](This would be superfluous on the interpretation that the ἱκανόν must always be the idea of good. What follows distinguishes the dialectician from the the eristic sophist. For the short cut, καὶ . . . ὡσαύτως, cf. 523 E, 580 D, 585 D, 346 A, etc.)—that the man who is unable to define in his discourse and distinguish and abstract from all other things the aspect or idea of the good, and who cannot, as it were in battle, running the gauntlet[*](It imports little whether the objections are in his own mind or made by others. Thought is a discussion of the soul with itself (Cf. Theaet. 189 E, Phileb. 38 E, Soph. 263 E), and when the interlocutor refuses to proceed Socrates sometimes continues the argument himself by supplying both question and answer, e.g. Gorg. 506 C ff. Cf. further Phaedrus 278 C, Parman. 136 D-E, Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 17.) of all tests, and striving to examine everything by essential reality and not by opinion, hold on his way through all this without tripping[*](Cf. Theaet. 160 D, Phileb. 45 A. The practical outcome=Laws 966 A-B, Phaedr. 278 C, Soph. 259 B-C. Cf. Mill, Diss. and Disc. iv. p. 283: There is no knowledge and no assurance of right belief but with him who can both confute the opposite opinion and successfully defend his own against confutation.) in his reasoning—the man who lacks this power, you will say, does not really know the good itself or any particular good; but if he apprehends any adumbration[*](For εἰδώλου cf. on 532 B, p. 197, not e. This may be one of the sources of Epist. vii. 342 B.) of it, his contact with it is by opinion, not by knowledge; and dreaming and dozing through his present life, before he awakens here he will arrive at the house of Hades and fall asleep for ever?[*](For Platonic intellectualism the life of the ordinary man is something between sleep and waking. Cf. Apol. 31 A. Note the touch of humor in τελέως ἐπικαταδαρθάνειν. Cf. Bridges, Psychology, p. 382: There is really no clear-cut distinction between what is usually called sleeping and waking. In sleep we are less awake than in the waking hours, and in waking life we are less asleep than in sleep.)” “Yes, by Zeus,” said he, “all this I will stoutly affirm.” “But, surely,” said I, “if you should ever nurture in fact your children[*](Plato likes to affirm his ideal only of the philosophic rulers.) whom you are now nurturing and educating in word,[*](Cf. 376 D, 369 C, 472 E, Critias 106 A.) you would not suffer them, I presume, to hold rule in the state, and determine the greatest matters, being themselves as irrational[*](A slight touch of humor. Cf. the schoolgirl who said, These equations are inconsiderate and will not be solved.) as the lines so called in geometry.” “Why, no,” he said. “Then you will provide by law that they shall give special heed to the discipline that will enable them to ask and answer[*](A frequent periphrasis for dialectics. Cf. τὸ ἐρωτώμενον ἀποκρίνεσθαι Gorg. 461 E, Charm. 166 D, Prot. 338 D, Alc. I. 106 B.) questions in the most scientific manner?” “I will so legislate,” he said, “in conjunction with you.”

“Do you agree, then,” said I, “that we have set dialectics above all other studies to be as it were the coping-stone[*](For ὥσπερ θριγκός cf. Eur. Herc. Fur. 1280, Aesch. Ag. 1283: and Phileb. 38 C-D ff.)—and that no other higher kind of study could rightly be placed above it, but that our discussion of studies is now complete[*](Cf. 541 B.)” “I do,” he said. “The distribution, then, remains,” said I, “to whom we are to assign these studies and in what way.” Clearly, he said. “Do you remember, then, the kind of man we chose in our former selection[*](Cf. 412 D-E, 485-487, 503 A, C-E.) of rulers?” “Of course,” he said. “In most respects, then,” said I, “you must suppose that we have to choose those same natures. The most stable, the most brave and enterprising[*](Intellectually as well as physically. Cf. 357 A, Prot. 350 B f.) are to be preferred, and, so far as practicable, the most comely.[*](Cf. Symp. 209 B-C, Phaedr. 252 E and Vol. I. p. 261 on 402 D. Ascham, The Schoolmaster, Bk. I. also approves of this qualification.) But in addition we must now require that they not only be virile and vigorous[*](For βλοσυρούς Cf. Theaet. 149 A.) in temper, but that they possess also the gifts of nature suitable to this type of education.” “What qualities are you distinguishing?” “They must have, my friend, to begin with, a certain keenness for study, and must not learn with difficulty. For souls are much more likely to flinch and faint[*](Cf. 504 A, 364 E, Gorg. 480 C, Protag. 326 C, Euthyphro 15 C.) in severe studies than in gymnastics, because the toil touches them more nearly, being peculiar to them and not shared with the body.” True, he said. “And we must demand a good memory and doggedness and industry[*](The qualities of the ideal student again. Cf. on 487 A.) in every sense of the word. Otherwise how do you suppose anyone will consent both to undergo all the toils of the body and to complete so great a course of study and discipline?” “No one could,” he said, “unless most happily endowed.” “Our present mistake,” said I, “and the disesteem that has in consequence fallen upon philosophy are, as I said before,[*](Cf. 495 C ff., pp. 49-51.) caused by the unfitness of her associates and wooers. They should not have been bastards[*](Montaigne, i. 24 (vol. i. p. 73), les âmes boiteuses, les bastardes et vulgaires, sont indignes de Ia philosophie.) but true scions.” “What do you mean?” he said. “In the first place,” I said, “the aspirant to philosophy must not limp[*](Cf. Laws 634 A, Tim. 44 C.) in his industry, in the one half of him loving, in the other shunning, toil. This happens when anyone is a lover of gymnastics and hunting and all the labors of the body, yet is not fond of learning or of listening[*](Cf. 548 E, Lysis 206 C, Euthyd. 274 C, 304 C, and Vol. I. p. 515 on 475 D.) or inquiring, but in all such matters hates work. And he too is lame whose industry is one-sided in the reverse way.” “Most true,” he said. “Likewise in respect of truth,” I said, “we shall regard as maimed in precisely the same way the soul that hates the voluntary lie and is troubled by it in its own self and greatly angered by it in others, but cheerfully accepts the involuntary falsehood[*](Cf. 382 A-B-C.) and is not distressed when convicted of lack of knowledge, but wallows in the mud of ignorance as insensitively as a pig.[*](Cf. Laws 819 D, Rep. 372 D, Politicus 266 C, and my note in Class. Phil. xii. (1917) pp. 308-310. Cf. too the proverbial ὗς γνοίη, Laches 196 D and Rivals 134 A; and Apelt’s emendation of Cratyl. 393 C, Progr. Jena, 1905, p. 19.)”

“By all means,” he said. “And with reference to sobriety,” said I, “and bravery and loftiness of soul[*](Cf. 487 A and vol. I. p. 261, note c on 402 C. The cardinal virtues are not rigidly fixed in Plato. Cf. on 427 E, vol. I. p. 346.) and all the parts of virtue,[*](Plato is using ordinary language and not troubling himself with the problem of Protag. 329 D (What Plato Said, p. 497) and Laws 633 A (What Plato Said, p. 624). Cf. also on 533 D.) we must especially be on our guard to distinguish the base-born from the true-born. For when the knowledge necessary to make such discriminations is lacking in individual or state, they unawares employ at random[*](πρὸς ὅ τι ἂν τύχωσι lit. for whatsoever they happen to of these (services). Cf. Symp. 181 B, Prot. 353 A, Crito 44 D and 45 D, Gorg. 522 C, Laws 656 C, Rep. 332 B, 561 D, Dem. iv. 46, Isoc. Panath. 25, 74, 239, Aristot. Mat. 1013 a 6.) for any of these purposes the crippled and base-born natures, as their friends or rulers.” “It is so indeed,” he said. “But we,” I said, “must be on our guard in all such cases, since, if we bring men sound of limb and mind to so great a study and so severe a training, justice herself will have no fault to find[*](Cf. 487 A. For δίκη cf. Hirzel, Dike, Themis und Verwandtes, p.116.) with us, and we shall preserve the state and our polity. But, if we introduce into it the other sort, the outcome will be just the opposite, and we shall pour a still greater flood[*](καταντλήσομεν: cf. 344 d.) of ridicule upon philosophy.” “That would indeed be shameful,” he said. “Most certainly,” said I: “but here again I am making myself a little ridiculous.” “In what way?” “I forgot,” said I, “that we were jesting,[*](Jest and earnest are never far apart in Plato. Fabling about justice is an old man’s game, Laws 685 A, 769 A. Life itself is best treated as play, Laws 803 C. Science in Tim. 59 D is παιδιά, like literature in the Phaedrus 276 D-E, ibid. 278 B. Cf. Friedländer, Platon, i. pp. 38 and 160, and What Plato Said, pp. 553 and 601.) and I spoke with too great intensity.[*](For similar self-checks Cf. Laws 804 B, 832 B, 907 B-C, Phaedr. 260 D, 279 B. For ἐντεινάμενος cf. Blaydes on Aristoph. Clouds 969.) For, while speaking, I turned my eyes upon philosophy,[*](Cf. Isoc. Busiris 49. Whatever the difficulties of the chronology it is hard to believe that this is not one of Isocrates’ many endeavors to imitate Platonic effects.) and when I saw how she is undeservedly reviled, I was revolted, and, as if in anger, spoke too earnestly to those who are in fault.” “No, by Zeus, not too earnestly for me[*](Cf. Soph. 226 C, Sophocles, Ajax 397.) as a hearer.” “But too much so for me as a speaker,” I said. “But this we must not forget, that in our former selection we chose old men, but in this one that will not do. For we must not take Solon’s[*](γηράσκω δ’ ἀεὶ πολλὰ διδασκόμενος, I grow old ever learning many things. Cf. Laches 188 A-B; Otto, p. 317.) word for it that growing old a man is able to learn many things. He is less able to do that than to run a race. To the young[*](Cf. Theaet. 146 B. This has been misquoted to the effect that Plato said the young are the best philosophers.) belong all heavy and frequent labors.” Necessarily, he said. “Now, all this study of reckoning and geometry and all the preliminary studies that are indispensable preparation for dialectics must be presented to them while still young, not in the form of compulsory instruction.[*](This and παίζοντας below (537 A) anticipate much modern Kindergarten rhetoric.)” “Why so?” Because, said I, “a free soul ought not to pursue any study slavishly; for while bodily labors[*](Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. 358, says Aristotle rejects this distinction, Pol. 1338 b 40 μέχρι μὲν γὰρ ἥβης κουφότερα γυμνάσια προσοιστέον, τὴν βίαιον τροφὴν καὶ τοὺς πρὸς ἀνάγκην πόνους ἀπείργοντας, ἵνα μηδὲν ἐμπόδιον ᾖ πρὸς τὴν αὔξησιν.) performed under constraint do not harm the body, nothing that is learned under compulsion stays with the mind.” True, he said.