Republic

Or do you not know that they repeat the same procedure in the case of harmonies[*](This passage is often taken as another example of Plato’s hostility to science and the experimental method. It is of course not that, but the precise interpretation is difficult. Glaucon at first misapprehends (cf. p. 180, note a, on 529 A) and gives an amusing description of the mere empiricist in music. But Socrates says he does not mean these, but those who try to apply mathematics to the perception of sound instead of developing a (Kantian) a priori science of harmony to match the mathematical science of astronomy. Cf. also p. 193, note g, on 531 B, W. Whewell, Transaction of the Cabridge Philos. Soc. vol. ix. p. 389, and for music A. Rivaud, Platon et la musique, Rev. d’Histoire de la Philos. 1929, pp. 1-30; also Stallbaum ad loc., and E. Frank, Platon u. d. sog. Pyth., Anhang, on the history of Greek music. He expresses surprise (p. 199) that Glaucon knows nothing of Pythagorean theories of music. Others use this to prove Socrates’ ignorance of music.)? They transfer it to hearing and measure audible concords and sounds against one another,[*](This hints at the distinction developed in the Politicus between relative measurement of one thing against another and measurement by a standard. Cf. Polit. 283 E, 284 B-C, Theat. 186 A.) expending much useless labor just as the astronomers do.” “Yes, by heaven,” he said, “and most absurdly too. They talk of something they call minims[*](πυκνώματα (condensed notes). The word is technical. Cf. Adam ad loc. But, as ἄττα shows, Plato is using it loosely to distinguish a measure of sense perception from a mathematically determined interval.) and, laying their ears alongside, as if trying to catch a voice from next door,[*](Cf. Pater, Renaissance, p. 157. The phrase, ἐκ γειτόνων, is colloquial and, despite the protest of those who insist that it only means in the neighborhood, suggests overhearing what goes on next door—as often in the New Comedy.) some affirm that they can hear a note between and that this is the least interval and the unit of measurement, while others insist that the strings now render identical sounds,[*](Cf. Aldous Huxley, Jesting Pilate, p. 152: Much is enthusiastically taught about the use of quarter tones in Indian music. I listened attentively at Lucknow in the hope of hearing some new and extraordinary kind of melody based on these celebrated fractions. But I listened in vain. Gomprez, Greek Thinkers, iii. pp. 334-335, n. 85, thinks that Plato shrugs his shoulders at experiments. He refers to Plutarch, Life of Marcellus, xiv. 65, and Quaest. Conv. viii. 2. 1, 7, where Plato is represented as having been angry with Eudoxus and Archytas because they employed instruments and apparatus for the solution of a problem, instead of relying solely on reasoning.) both preferring their ears to their minds.[*](So Malebranche, Entretiens sur la métaphysique, 3, x.: Je pense que nous vous moquez de moi. C’est la raison et non les sens qu’il faut consulter.)” You, said I, “are speaking of the worthies[*](For χρηστός in this ironical sense cf. also 479 A, Symp. 177 B.) who vex and torture the strings and rack them[*](The language of the imagery confounds the torture of slaves giving evidence on the rack with the strings and pegs of a musical instrument. For the latter cf. Horace, A.P. 348, nam neque chorda sonum reddit quem vult manus et mens Poscentique gravem persaepe remittit acutum. Stallbaum says that Plato here was imitated by Aristaenetus, Epist. xiv. libr. 1 τί πράγματα παρέχετε χορδαῖς;) on the pegs; but—not to draw out the comparison with strokes of the plectrum and the musician’s complaints of too responsive and too reluctant strings[*](This also may suggest a reluctant and a too willing witness.)—I drop the figure,[*](Cf. on 489 A, p. 23, note d.) and tell you that I do not mean these people, but those others[*](He distinguishes from the pure empirics just satirized those who apply their mathematics only to the data of observation. This is perhaps one of Plato’s rare errors. For though there may be in some sense a Kantian a priori mechanics of astronomy, there can hardly be a purely a priori mathematics of acoustics. What numbers are consonantly harmonious must always remain a fact of direct experience. Cf. my Platonism and the History of Science, p. 176.) whom we just now said we would interrogate about harmony. Their method exactly corresponds to that of the astronomer; for the numbers they seek are those found in these heard concords, but they do not ascend[*](Cf. Friedländer, Platon, p. 108, n. 1.) to generalized problems and the consideration which numbers are inherently concordant and which not and why in each case.” “A superhuman task,” he said. “Say, rather, useful,[*](Cf. Tim. 47 C-D. Plato always keeps to his point—Cf. 349 B-C, 564 A-B—or returns to it after a digression. Cf. on 572 B, p. 339, note e.) said I, for the investigation of the beautiful and the good,[*](Cf. on 505 B, p. 88, note a.) but if otherwise pursued, useless.” “That is likely,” he said. “And what is more,” I said, I take it that if the investigation[*](μέθοδος, like πραγματείαν in D, is used almost in the later technical sense of treatise or branch of study. Cf. on 528 D, p. 178, note a.) of all these studies goes far enough to bring out their community and kinship[*](Cf. on 537 C, Epin. 991 E.) with one another, and to infer their affinities, then to busy ourselves with them contributes to our desired end, and the labor taken is not lost; but otherwise it is vain.” “I too so surmise,” said he; “but it is a huge task of which you speak, Socrates.” “Are you talking about the prelude,[*](Plato is fond of this image. It suggests here also the preamble of a law, as the translation more explicitly indicates. Cf. 532 D, anticipated in 457 C, and Laws 722 D-E, 723 A-B and E, 720 D-E, ;772 E, 870 D, 854 A, 932 A and passim.)” I said, “or what? Or do we not know that all this is but the preamble of the law itself, the prelude of the strain that we have to apprehend? For you surely do not suppose that experts in these matters are reasoners and dialecticians[*](Cf. Theaet. 146 B, and perhaps Euthyd. 290 C. Though mathematics quicken the mind of the student, it is, apart from metaphysics, a matter of common experience that mathematicians are not necessarily good reasoners on other subjects. Jowett’s wicked jest, I have hardly ever known a mathematician who could reason, misled an eminent professor of education who infers that Plato disbelieved in mental discipline (Yale Review, July 1917). Cf. also Taylor, Note in Reply to Mr. A. W. Benn, Mind, xii. (1903) p. 511; Charles Fox, Educational Psychology pp. 187-188: . . . a training in the mathematics may produce exactness of thought . . . provided that the training is of such a kind as to inculcate an ideal which the pupil values and strives to attain. Failing this, Glaucon’s observation that he had hardly ever known a mathematician who was capable of reasoning is likely to be repeated. On the text cf. Wilamowitz, Platon, ii. pp. 384-385, and Adam ad loc.)? “ “No, by Zeus,” he said, “except a very few whom I have met.” “But have you ever supposed,” I said, “that men who could not render and exact an account[*](λόγον . . . δοῦναι A commonplace Platonic plea for dialectics. Cf. 534 B, Prot. 336 C, Polit. 286 A, Theaet. 202 C, 175 C, 183 D, Soph. 230 A, Phaedo 78 C-D, 95 D, Charm. 165 B, Xen. Oecon. 11. 22. Cf. also λόγον λαβεῖν Rep. 402 A, 534 B, Soph. 246 C, Theaet. 208 D, and Thompson on Meno 76 D.) of opinions in discussion would ever know anything of the things we say must be known?” “No is surely the answer to that too.”

“This, then, at last, Glaucon,” I said, “is the very law which dialectics[*](Cf. Phileb. 58 D, Meno 75 C-D, Charm. 155 A, Cratyl. 390 C, and on 533 B, pp. 200 f., note f.) recites, the strain which it executes, of which, though it belongs to the intelligible, we may see an imitation in the progress[*](This is not a literal rendering, but gives the meaning.) of the faculty of vision, as we described[*](Cf. 516 A-B. Plato interprets his imagery again here and in B infra.) its endeavor to look at living things themselves and the stars themselves and finally at the very sun. In like manner, when anyone by dialectics attempts through discourse of reason and apart from all perceptions of sense[*](Cf. p. 180, note a, and p. 187, note c. Cf. also 537 D, and on 476 A ff. Cf. Bergson, Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 9: Metaphysics, then, is the science which claims to dispense with symbols; E. S. Robinson, Readings in General Psych. p. 295: A habit of suppressing mental imagery must therefore characterize men who deal much with abstract ideas; and as the power of dealing easily and firmly with these ideas is the surest criterion of a high order if intellect . . . ; Pear, Remembering and Forgetting, p. 57: He (Napoleon) is reported to have said that there are some who, from some physical or moral peculiarity of character, form a picture (tableau) of everything. No matter what knowledge, intellect, courage, or good qualities they may have, these men are unfit to command; A. Bain, Mind, 1880, p. 570: Mr. Galton is naturally startled at finding eminent scientific men, by their own account, so very low in the visualizing power. His explanation, I have no doubt, hits the mark; the deficiency is due to the natural antagonism of pictorial aptitude and abstract thought.; Judd, Psychology of High School Subjects, p. 921: It did not appear on superficial examination of the standings of students that those who can draw best are the best students from the point of view of the teacher of science.) to find his way to the very essence of each thing and does not desist till he apprehends by thought itself the nature of the good in itself, he arrives at the limit of the intelligible, as the other in our parable, came to the goal of the visible.” “By all means,” he said. “What, then, will you not call this progress of thought dialectic?” Surely. “And the release from bonds,” I said, “and the conversion from the shadows to the images[*](εἴδωλα: cf. my Idea of Good in Plato’s Republic, p. 238; also 516 A, Theaet. 150 C, Soph. 240 A, 241 E, 234 C, 266 B with 267 C, and Rep. 517 D ἀγαλμάτων.) that cast them and to the light and the ascent[*](ἐπάνοδος became almost technical in Neoplatonism. Cf. also 517 A, 529 A, and p. 124, note b.) from the subterranean cavern to the world above,[*](Lit. sun, i.e. the world illumined by the sun, not by the fire in the cave.) and there the persisting inability[*](See crit. note. The text of Iamblichus is the only reasonable one. The reading of the manuscripts is impossible. For the adverb modifying a noun cf. 558 B οὐδ’ ὁπωστιοῦν σμικρολογία, Laws 638 B σφόδρα γυναικῶν, with England’s note, Theaet. 183 E πάνυ πρεσβύτης, Laws 791 C παντελῶς παίδων, 698 C σφόδρα φιλία, Rep. 564 A ἄγαν δουλείαν, with Stallbaum’s note.) to look directly at animals and plants and the light of the sun, but the ability to see the phantasms created by God[*](θεῖα because produced by God or nature and not by man with a mirror or a paintbrush. See crit. note and Class. Review, iv. p. 480. I quoted Sophist 266 B-D, and Adam with rare candor withdrew his emendation in his Appendix XIII. to this book. Apelt still misunderstands and emends, p.296 and note.) in water and shadows of objects that are real and not merely, as before, the shadows of images cast through a light which, compared with the sun, is as unreal as they—all this procedure of the arts and sciences that we have described indicates their power to lead the best part of the soul up to the contemplation of what is best among realities, as in our parable the clearest organ in the body was turned to the contemplation of what is brightest in the corporeal and visible region.” “I accept this,” he said, “as the truth; and yet it appears to me very hard to accept, and again, from another point of view, hard to reject.[*](This sentence is fundamental for the understanding of Plato’s metaphysical philosophy generally. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 30, n. 192, What Plato Said, p. 268 and 586 on Parmen. 135 C. So Tennyson says it is hard to believe in God and hard not to believe.) Nevertheless, since we have not to hear it at this time only, but are to repeat it often hereafter, let us assume that these things are as now has been said, and proceed to the melody itself, and go through with it as we have gone through the prelude. Tell me, then, what is the nature of this faculty of dialectic? Into what divisions does it fall? And what are its ways? For it is these, it seems, that would bring us to the place where we may, so to speak, rest on the road and then come to the end of our journeying.”

“You will not be able, dear Glaucon, to follow me further,[*](This is not mysticism or secret doctrine. It is, in fact, the avoidance of dogmatism. but that is not all. Plato could not be expected to insert a treatise on dialectical method here, or risk an absolute definition which would only expose him to misinterpretation. The principles and methods of such reasoning, and the ultimate metaphysical conclusions to which they may lead, cannot be expounded in a page or a chapter. They can only be suggested to the intelligent, whose own experience will help them to understand. As the Republic and Laws entire explain Plato’s idea of social good, so all the arguments in the dialogues illustrate his conception of fair and unfair argument. Cf. What Plato Said, Index s. v. Dialectics, and note f below.) though on my part there will be no lack of goodwill.[*](For the idiom οὐδὲν προθυμίας ἀπολίποι Cf. Symp. 210 A, Meno 77 A, Laws 961 C, Aesch. Prom. 343, Thucyd. viii. 22. 1, Eurip. Hippol. 285.) And, if I could, I would show you, no longer an image and symbol of my meaning, but the very truth, as it appears to me—though whether rightly or not I may not properly affirm.[*](On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.) But that something like this is what we have to see, I must affirm.[*](On Plato’s freedom from the dogmatism often attributed to him Cf. What Plato Said, p. 515 on Meno 86 B.) Is not that so?” Surely. “And may we not also declare that nothing less than the power of dialectics could reveal[*](The mystical implications of φήνειεν are not to be pressed. It is followed, as usual in Plato, by a matter-of-fact statement of the essential practical conclusion (γοῦν)that no man can be trusted to think straight in large matters who has not been educated to reason and argue straight.) this, and that only to one experienced[*](Plato anticipates the criticism that he neglects experience.) in the studies we have described, and that the thing is in no other wise possible?” “That, too,” he said, “we may properly affirm.” “This, at any rate,” said I, “no one will maintain in dispute against us[*](i.e. dispute our statement and maintain. The meaning is plain. It is a case of what I have called illogical idiom. Cf. T.A.P.A. vol. xlvii. pp. 205-234. The meaning is that of Philebus 58 E, 59 A. Other science may be more interesting or useful, but sound dialectics alone fosters the disinterested pursuit of truth for its own sake. Cf. Soph. 295 C, Phaedr. 265-266. Aristotle, Topics i. 2. 6, practically comes back to the Platonic conception of dialectics. The full meaning of dialectics in Plato would demand a treatise. It is almost the opposite of what Hegelians call by that name, which is represented in Plato by the second part of the Parmenides. The characteristic Platonic dialectic is the checking of the stream of thought by the necessity of securing the understanding and assent of an intelligent interlocutor at every step, and the habit of noting all relevant distinctions, divisions, and ambiguities, in ideas and terms. When the interlocutor is used merely to relieve the strain on the leader’s voice or the reader’s attention, as in some of the later dialogues, dialectic becomes merely a literary form.): that there is any other way of inquiry[*](Cicero’s via et ratione. περὶ παντός is virtually identical with αὐτοῦ γε ἑκάστου πέρι. It is true that the scientific specialist confines himself to his specialty. The dialectician, like his base counterfeit the sophist (Soph. 231 A), is prepared to argue about anything, Soph. 232 cf., Euthyd. 272 A-B.) that attempts systematically and in all cases to determine what each thing really is. But all the other arts have for their object the opinions and desires of men or are wholly concerned with generation and composition or with the service and tendance of the things that grow and are put together, while the remnant which we said[*](Cf. 525 C, 527 B.) did in some sort lay hold on reality—geometry and the studies that accompany it— are, as we see, dreaming[*](The interpreters of Plato must allow for his Emersonian habit of hitting each nail in turn as hard as he can. There is no real contradiction between praising mathematics in comparison with mere loose popular thinking, and disparaging it in comparison with dialectics. There is no evidence and no probability that Plato is here proposing a reform of mathematics in the direction of modern mathematical logic, as has been suggested. Cf. on 527 A. It is the nature of mathematics to fall short of dialectics.) about being, but the clear waking vision[*](Cf. Phileb. 20 B and on 520 C, p. 143, note g.) of it is impossible for them as long as they leave the assumptions which they employ undisturbed and cannot give any account[*](Cf. on 531 E.) of them. For where the starting-point is something that the reasoner does not know, and the conclusion and all that intervenes is a tissue of things not really known,[*](The touch of humor is the expression may be illustrated by Lucian, Hermotimus 74, where it is used to justify Lucian’s skepticism even of mathematics, and by Hazlitt’s remark on Coleridge, Excellent talker if you allow him to start from no premises and come to no conclusion.) what possibility is there that assent[*](Or admission. Plato thinks of even geometrical reasoning as a Socratic dialogue. Cf. the exaggeration of this idea by the Epicureans in Cic. De fin. i. 21 quae et a falsis initiis profecta, vera esse non possunt: et si essent vera nihil afferunt quo iucundius, id est, quo melius viveremus. Dialectic proceeds διὰ συγχωρήσεων, the admission of the interlocutor. Cf. Laws 957 D, Phaedr. 237 C-D, Gorg. 487 E, Lysis 219 C, Prot. 350 E, Phileb. 12 A, Theaet. 162 A, 169 D-E, 164 C, Rep. 340 B. But such admissions are not valid unless when challenged they are carried back to something satisfactory—ἱκανόν—(not necessarily in any given case to the idea of good). But the mathematician as such peremptorily demands the admission of his postulates and definitions. Cf. 510 B-D, 511 B.) in such cases can ever be converted into true knowledge or science?” None, said he. Then, said I, “is not dialectics the only process of inquiry that advances in this manner, doing away with hypotheses, up to the first principle itself in order to find confirmation there? And it is literally true that when the eye of the soul[*](Cf. on 519 B, p. 138, note a.) is sunk in the barbaric slough[*](Orphism pictured the impious souls as buried in mud in the world below; cf. 363 D. Again we should not press Plato’s rhetoric and imagery either as sentimental Platonists or hostile critics. See Newman, Introd. Aristot. Pol. p. 463, n. 3.) of the Orphic myth, dialectic gently draws it forth and leads it up, employing as helpers and co-operators in this conversion the studies and sciences which we enumerated, which we called sciences often from habit,[*](All writers and philosophers are compelled to speak with the vulgar. Cf. e.g. Meyerson, De l’explication dans les sciences, i. p. 329: Tout en sachant que la couleur n’est pas réellement une qualité de l’object, à se servir cependant, dans la vie de tous les jours, d’une locution qui l’affirme.) though they really need some other designation, connoting more clearness than opinion and more obscurity than science. Understanding,[*](Cf. on 511 D, pp. 116-117, note c.) I believe, was the term we employed. But I presume we shall not dispute about the name[*](This unwillingness to dispute about names when they do not concern the argument is characteristic of Plato. Cf. What Plato Said, p. 516 on Meno 78 B-C for numerous instances. Stallbaum refers to Max. Tyr. Diss. xxvii. p. 40 ἐγὼ γάρ τοι τά τε ἄλλα, καὶ ἐν τῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐλευθερίᾳ πείθομαι Πλάτωνι.) when things of such moment lie before us for consideration.” “No, indeed,” he said.[*](The next sentence is hopelessly corrupt and is often considered an interpolation. The translation omits it. See Adam, Appendix XVI. to Bk. VII., Bywater, Journal of Phil. (Eng.) v. pp. 122-124.)---