Republic

For if you grant admission to the honeyed muse[*](Cf. Laws 802 C τῆς γλυκείας Μούσης. See Finsler, Platon u. d. aristot. Poetik, pp. 61-62.) in lyric or epic, pleasure and pain will be lords of your city instead of law and that which shall from time to time have approved itself to the general reason as the best.Most true, he said. Let us, then, conclude our return to the topic of poetry and our apology, and affirm that we really had good grounds then for dismissing her from our city, since such was her character. For reason constrained us.[*](See on 604 C, p. 455, note h.) And let us further say to her, lest she condemn us for harshness and rusticity, that there is from of old a quarrel[*](For the quarrel between philosophy and poetry Cf. Laws 967 C-D, Friedländer, Platon, ii. p. 136. It still goes on in modern times.) between philosophy and poetry. For such expressions as

the yelping hound barking at her master and mighty in the idle babble

of fools,

the mob that masters those who are too wise for their own good,

But if not, my friend, even as men who have fallen in love, if they think that the love is not good for them, hard though it be,[*](βίᾳ μέν, ὅμως δέ: Cf. Epist. iii. 316 E, and vii. 325 A, and Raeder, Rhein. Mus. lxi. p. 470, Aristoph. Clouds 1363 μόλις μὲν ἀλλ’ ὅμως, Eurip. Phoen. 1421 μόλις μέν, ἐξέτεινε δ’, and also Soph. Antig. 1105, O.T. 998, Eurip. Bacch. 1027, Hec. 843, Or. 1023, El. 753, Phoen. 1069, I.A. 688, 904.) nevertheless refrain, so we, owing to the love of this kind of poetry inbred in us by our education in these fine[*](Ironical, as καλλίστη in 562 A.) polities of ours, will gladly have the best possible case made out for her goodness and truth, but so long as she is unable to make good her defence we shall chant over to ourselves[*](For ἐπᾴδοντες Cf. Phaedo 114 D, 77 E.) as we listen the reasons that we have given as a counter-charm to her spell, to preserve us from slipping back into the childish loves of the multitude; for we have come to see that we must not take such poetry seriously as a serious thing[*](Cf. 602 B.) that lays hold on truth, but that he who lends an ear to it must be on his guard fearing for the polity in his soul[*](Cf. on 591 E, p. 412, note d.) and must believe what we have said about poetry.By all means, he said, I concur. Yes, for great is the struggle,[*](Cf. Phaedo 114 C, 107 C, Phaedr. 247 B, Gorg. 526 E, Blaydes on Aristoph. Peace 276, and for the whole sentence Phaedo 83 B-C, 465 D, 618 B-C f. and p. 404, note d, on 589 E.) I said, dear Glaucon, a far greater contest than we think it, that determines whether a man prove good or bad, so that not the lure of honor or wealth or any office, no, nor of poetry either, should incite us[*](ἐπαρθέντα: cf. 416 C.) to be careless of righteousness and all excellence. I agree with you, he replied, in view of what we have set forth, and I think that anyone else would do so too. And yet, said I, the greatest rewards of virtue and the prizes proposed for her we have not set forth. You must have in mind an inconceivable[*](Cf. 404 C, 509 A, 548 B, 588 a, Apol. 41 C, Charm. 155 D.) magnitude, he replied, if there are other things greater than those of which we have spoken.[*](Clement, Strom. iv. p. 496 B ὁθούνεκ’ ἀρετὴ τῶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις μόνη οὐκ ἐκ θυραίων τἀπίχειρα λαμβάνει, αὐτὴ δ’ ἑαυτὴν ἆθλα τῶν πόνων ἔχει. )? For surely the whole time from the boy to the old man would be small compared with all time.[*](Cf. on 496 A, p. 9, mote f and 498 D.) Nay, it is nothing, he said. What then? Do you think that an immortal thing[*](For the colorless use of πρᾶγμα see What Plato Said, p. 497, on Protag. 330 C-D. Cf. Shakes. Hamlet,I. iv. 67 being a thing immortal as itself.) ought to be seriously concerned for such a little time, and not rather for all time? I think so, he said; but what is this that you have in mind? Have you never perceived, said I, that our soul is immortal and never perishes? And he, looking me full in the face[*](ἐμβλέψας: Cf. Charmides 155 C.) in amazement,[*](Glaucon is surprised in spite of 498 D. Many uncertain inferences have been drawn from the fact that in spite of the Phaedo and Phaedrus(245 C ff.) interlocutors in Plato are always surprised at the idea of immortality. Cf. ibid, Introd. p. lxiv.) said, No, by Zeus, not I; but are you able to declare this? I certainly ought to be,[*](For the idiomatic εἰ μὴ ἀδικῶ cf. 430 ECharm. 156 A, Menex. 236 B, 612 D.) said I, and I think you too can, for it is nothing hard. It is for me, he said; and I would gladly hear from you this thing that is not hard.[*](Cf. Protag. 341 A τὸ χαλεπὸν τοῦτο, which is a little different, Herod. vii. 11 τὸ δεινὸν τὸ πείσομαι.) Listen, said I. Just speak on, he replied. You speak of[*](See Vol. I. p. 90, note a and What Plato Said, p. 567, on Cratyl. 385 B.) good and evil, do you not? I do. Is your notion of them the same as mine? What is it? That which destroys and corrupts in every case is the evil; that which preserves and benefits is the good. Yes, I think so, he said.