Republic

By all means.And is it not obvious that the nature of the mimetic poet is not related to this better part of the soul and his cunning is not framed[*](For πέπηγεν cf. 530 D.) to please it, if he is to win favor with the multitude, but is devoted to the fretful and complicated type of character because it is easy to imitate?It is obvious.This consideration, then, makes it right for us to proceed to lay hold of him and set him down as the counterpart[*](ἀντίστροφον is used as in Aristot. Rhet. 1354 a 1.) of the painter; for he resembles him in that his creations are inferior in respect of reality; and the fact that his appeal is to the inferior part of the soul and not to the best part is another point of resemblance. And so we may at last say that we should be justified in not admitting him into a well-ordered state, because he stimulates and fosters this element in the soul, and by strengthening it tends to destroy the rational part, just as when in a state[*](Cf. p. 412, note d.) one puts bad men in power and turns the city over to them and ruins the better sort. Precisely in the same manner we shall say that the mimetic poet sets up in each individual soul a vicious constitution by fashioning phantoms far removed from reality, and by currying favor with the senseless element that cannot distinguish the greater from the less, but calls the same thing now one, now the other.By all means.But we have not yet brought our chief accusation against it. Its power to corrupt, with rare exceptions, even the better sort is surely the chief cause for alarm.How could it be otherwise, if it really does that? Listen and reflect. I think you know that the very best of us, when we hear Homer[*](Cf. p. 420, note a, on 595 B-C.) or some other of the makers of tragedy imitating one of the heroes who is in grief,[*](For ἐν πένθει cf. Soph. El. 290, 846, Herod. i. 46.) and is delivering a long tirade in his lamentations or chanting and beating his breast, feel pleasure,[*](Cf. Phileb. 48 A.) and abandon ourselves and accompany the representation with sympathy and eagerness,[*](See the description in Ion 535 E, and Laws 800 D.) and we praise as an excellent poet the one who most strongly affects us in this way.I do know it, of course.But when in our own lives some affliction comes to us, you are also aware that we plume ourselves upon the opposite, on our ability to remain calm and endure, in the belief that this is the conduct of a man, and what we were praising in the theatre that of a woman.[*](This is qualified in 387 E-388 A by οὐδὲ ταύταις σπουδαίαις. Cf. also 398 E.)I do note that.Do you think, then, said I, that this praise is rightfully bestowed when, contemplating a character that we would not accept but would be ashamed of in ourselves, we do not abominate it but take pleasure and approve? No, by Zeus, he said, it does not seem reasonable.

Oh yes,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 509, note b, on 473 E.) said I, if you would consider it in this way. In what way? If you would reflect that the part of the soul that in the former case, in our own misfortunes,[*](Cf. Isoc. Panegyr. 168 for a different application.) was forcibly restrained, and that has hungered for tears and a good cry[*](This contains a hint of one possible meaning of the Aristotelian doctrine of κάθαρσις, Poet. 1449 b 27-28. Cf. κουφίζεσθαι μεθ’ ἡδονῆς Pol. 1342 a 14, and my review of Finsler, Platon u. d. Aristot. Poetik, Class. Phil. iii. p. 462. But the tone of the Platonic passage is more like that of Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies: And the human nature of us imperatively requiring awe and sorrow of some kind, for the noble grief we should have borne with our fellows, and the pure tears we should have wept with them, we gloat over the pathos of the police court and gather the night dew of the grave.) and satisfaction, because it is its nature to desire these things, is the element in us that the poets satisfy and delight, and that the best element in our nature, since it has never been properly educated by reason or even by habit, then relaxes its guard[*](This anticipates the idea of the censor in modern psychology.) over the plaintive part, inasmuch as this is contemplating the woes of others and it is no shame to it to praise and pity another who, claiming to be a good man, abandons himself to excess in his grief; but it thinks this vicarious pleasure is so much clear gain,[*](Cf. τῇ δ’ ἀσφαλείᾳ κερδανεῖς Eurip. Herc. Fur. 604, which is frequently misinterpreted; Herod. viii. 60. 3.) and would not consent to forfeit it by disdaining the poem altogether. That is, I think, because few are capable of reflecting that what we enjoy in others will inevitably react upon ourselves.[*](For the psychology Cf. Laws 656 B and on 385 C-D.) For after feeding fat[*](Cf. 442 A.) the emotion of pity there, it is not easy to restrain it in our own sufferings. Most true, he said. Does not the same principle apply to the laughable,[*](Cf. Vol. I. p. 211, note f, La Bruyère, Des Ouvrages de l’esprit (Oeuvres, ed. M. G. Servois, i. p. 137): D’où vient que l’on rit si librement au théâtre, et que l’on a honte d’y pleurer?) namely,that if in comic representations,[*](In the Laws 816 D-E Plato says that the citizens must witness such performances since the serious cannot be learned without the laughable, nor anything without its opposite; but they may not take part in them. That is left to slaves and foreigners. Cf. also Vol. I. p. 239, note B, on 396 E.) or for that matter in private talk,[*](I.e. as opposed to public performances. Cf. Euthydem. 305 D ἐν δὲ ἰδίοις λόγοις, Theaet. 177 B, Soph. 232 C ἔν γε ταῖς ἰδίαις συνουσίαις, and Soph. 222 C προσομιλητικήν with Quintil. iii. 4. 4. Wilamowitz, Antigonos von Karystos, p. 285, fantastically says that it means prose and refers to Sophron. He compares 366 E. But see Laws 935 B-C.) you take intense pleasure in buffooneries that you would blush to practise yourself, and do not detest them as base, you are doing the same thing as in the case of the pathetic? For here again what your reason, for fear of the reputation of buffoonery, restrained in yourself when it fain would play the clown, you release in turn, and so, fostering its youthful impudence, let yourself go so far that often ere you are aware you become yourself a comedian in private. Yes, indeed, he said. And so in regard to the emotions of sex and anger, and all the appetites and pains and pleasures of the soul which we say accompany all our actions,[*](Cf. 603 C.) the effect of poetic imitation is the same. For it waters[*](Cf. 550 B.) and fosters these feelings when what we ought to do is to dry them up, and it establishes them as our rulers when they ought to be ruled, to the end that we may be better and happier men instead of worse and more miserable. I cannot deny it, said he. Then, Glaucon, said I, when you meet encomiasts of Homer who tell us that this poet has been the educator of Hellas,[*](Isocrates, Panegyr. 159, says Homer was given a place in education because he celebrated those who fought against the barbarians. Cf. also Aristoph. Frogs 1034 ff.) and that for the conduct and refinement[*](The same conjunction is implied in Protagoras’s teaching, Protag. 318 E and 317 B.) of human life he is worthy of our study and devotion, and that we should order our entire lives by the guidance of this poet, we must love[*](For the μέν Cf. Symp. 180 E, Herod. vii. 102.) and salute them as doing the best they can,[*](The condescending tone is that of Euthydem. 306 C-D.) and concede to them that Homer is the most poetic[*](Aristotle, Poet. 1453 a 29, says that Euripides is τραγικώτατος of poets.) of poets and the first of tragedians,[*](Cf. 605 C, 595 B-C.) but we must know the truth, that we can admit no poetry into our city save only hymns to the gods and the praises of good men.[*](Cf. Laws 801 D-E, 829 C-D, 397 C-D, 459 E, 468 D, Friedländer, Platon, i. p. 142, and my review of Pater, Plato and Platonism, in The Dial, 14 (1893) p. 211.)