Republic

This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,[*](Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (Hippias Major 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition.) the advantage of the stronger.Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling addition[*](Cf. Laches 182 C.) perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clear[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage[*](For Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.)—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,[*](This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.) we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said. I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just? I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible[*](The argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C.) or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enact[*](Cf. 338 E and Theaetetus 177 D.) must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course. Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What’s that you’re saying?[*](Τί λέγεις σύ; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes Clouds 1174. The supspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasymachus rude again. But Cf. Euthydemus 290 E.) he replied. What you yourself are saying,[*](Cf. Berkeley, Divine Visual Language, 13: The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions. See on 334 D, Alc. I. 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (Data of Ethics, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.) I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied. Then you will have to think,[*](Socrates is himself a little rude.) I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 D.) Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite[*](Cf. Laches 215 E, Phaedo 62 E.) of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, said Polemarchus, nothing could be more conclusive. Of course, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if you are his witness.[*](It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. Gorgias 472 A-B.) What need is there of a witness? Polemarchus said. Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this. That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders[*](τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form it is just to do what rulers bid. Polemarchus retorts: And (I was right), for he (also) . . .) of the rulers. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary. O well, said Cleitophon, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position. That isn’t what he said, replied Polemarchus. Never mind, Polemarchus, said I, but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from him[*](Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. Gorgias 491 B, 499 B, Protagoras 349 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 18.) in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning? Not in the least, he said.[*](Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician’s miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no sinister or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the economic man.) Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs? I certainly did suppose that you meant that, I replied, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes. That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician[*](For the idea cf. Rousseau’s Émile, i.: On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne donc sans le médecin. Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies this reasoning.) erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,[*](For the invidious associations of ἀκριβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle Met. 995 a 11, Cratylus 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19.) no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging? It does, he said. You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? I don’t think it, I know it, he said, and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the force[*](Cf. 365 D.) to beat me in debate. Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler[*](i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, Plat. Rep. 340d.) or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act? I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, he said. Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable. Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lion[*](A rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, Orat. Plat. ii. p. 143.) and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus? You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be.[*](καὶ ταῦτα = idque, normally precedes (cf. 404 C, 419 E, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristophanes Wasps 1184, Frogs 704, and Acharn. 168 allow this position. See my note in A.J.P. vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: though you failed in that too.) Something too much[*](Cf. 541 B, Euthyphro 11 E, Charmides 153 D.) of this sort of thing, said I. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such. A healer of the sick, he replied. And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor? A ruler of sailors. We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors. True, he said. Then for each of them[*](Plato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C τοῦτο, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C τεχνῶν, Protagoras 327 C.) is there not a something that is for his advantage? Quite so. And is it not also true, said I, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage? Yes, for this. Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possible[*](Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 242, fancifully cites this for art for art’s sake. See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, Lysis 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.)? What do you mean by that question? Just as if, I said, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

Correct, he said. But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not? It appears to be so, he said. Then medicine, said I, does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body? Yes. Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art. So it seems, he replied. But surely,[*](The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. Ruler is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics 244, Laws 875 C.) Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts. He conceded this but it went very hard. Then no art considers or enjoins[*](It is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. Politicus 260 A, C.) the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it. This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that? He assented. And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor? That was admitted. Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is. He assented reluctantly. Then, said I, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,[*](Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.) said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? What do you mean? said I. Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question? Because, he said, she lets her little snotty run about drivelling[*](κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι.) and doesn’t wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to know[*](Literally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare Taming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8 Knock me here soundly. Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 431, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 2. 1, Suetonius Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil . vol. i. p. 298.) the difference between the shepherd and the sheep. And what, pray, makes you think that? said I. Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,[*](Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.) differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his sheep[*](Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 1203 πρόβατ’ ἄλλως, Herrick, Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep.) or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out[*](This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.) concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice and the just are literally[*](τῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B, Philebus 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine (Pensieri xxvi.).) the other fellow’s good[*](Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.)—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs[*](For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. reipub. ger. 13) cited by Goodwin (Political Justice) in the form: God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies. Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.) falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.[*](The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.) For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed[*](The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides’ Bellerophon (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world.) not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.[*](Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense.) For it is not the fear of doing[*](The main issue of the Republic. Cf. 360 D, 358 E and Gorgias 469 B.) but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage.After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman[*](Cf. Theophrastus, Char. xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, Life in Ancient Athens, p. 134. For the metaphor cf. 536 B, Lysis 204 D, Aristophanes Wasps 483. Sudden, lit. all at once.) he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling[*](Cf. Euripides Alcestis 680 οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει.) such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter[*](Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, Gorgias 492 C, 500 C, Laches 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B.) that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?[*](Plainly a protesting question, Why, do I think otherwise? Cf. 339 D.) said Thrasymachus. You seem to, said I, or else[*](For the impossibility of J. and C.’s or rather see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234.) to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment[*](κείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, Rudens 939 bonis quod bene fit, haud perit.) for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable[*](Isocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the Hipparchus that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν.) than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.[*](Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and Gorgias 467 B.) But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,[*](Cf. 365 D.) all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.And how am I to persuade you?[*](Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson he cannot supply brains to understand it. Cf. Gorgias 489 C, 499 B, Meno 75 D.) he said. If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram[*](The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes Eccl. 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense.) it into your head? Heaven forbid! I said, don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,[*](Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorgias 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C.) or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd[*](The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. Crito 48 A.) surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule[*](Aristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 D.) in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers[*](See on 343 B, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.)—willingly hold office and rule? I don’t think, he said, I know right well they do.

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the argument may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on Meno 83 D, Campbell on Soph. 246 D.) Well, yes, he said, that is what renders it different. And does not each art also yield us benefit[*](As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.) that is peculiar to itself and not general,[*](Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, Politics i. 3 (1253 b 14).) as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? Assuredly. And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Of course not, he said. Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health. Surely not. But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? No, he said. And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it? So be it, he said. Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing. It seems so, he said. And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art. He assented reluctantly. Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft? Apparently not, he said. Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing? I’ll say he does. Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?