Republic

Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up[*](Polyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, Protrepticus 127 A, Job iv. 13-14. Tennyson, Vastness ix.—Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light.) even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope[*](The better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar Nem. xi. in fine, Sophocles Antigone 615, Thuc. 2.62, Thuc. 3.45.) ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar[*](Pindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition.) too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety

1. sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies
2. Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.

I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.[*](The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D.) But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit[*](Owing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere, Cicero De fin. iii. 18.) to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean that[*](Adam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because.) he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is due[*](In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.) and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil. It was a riddling[*](Cf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.) definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven’s name! said I, suppose[*](Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B.) someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.[*](Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?) What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art? Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,[*](Similarly Protagoras 312 A.) Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,[*](Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E.) then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician. And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

By no means.There is a use then even in peace for justice?Yes, it is useful.But so is agriculture, isn’t it?Yes.Namely, for the getting of a harvest?Yes.But likewise the cobbler’s art?Yes.Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.Certainly.Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?In engagements and dealings, Socrates.And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?Associations, of course.Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?The player.And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?By no means.Then what is the association[*](Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14.) in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?For money-dealings,[*](Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.) I think.Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so?Apparently.And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.It would seem so.What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle[*](Interest is ignored. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.)?Quite so.Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?It looks that way.And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?Apparently.And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.Necessarily.And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?It looks that way.Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth[*](A virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf Topics, vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, Met. 1046 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38.) if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against[*](The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.) a blow?Assuredly.Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?I think so.

But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march[*](The play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company, Much Ado, III. iii.) upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.Certainly.Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?It seems so.If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.The argument certainly points that way.[*](The qualified assent here marks the speaker’s perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc.)A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.[*](Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. Theaetetus 152 E.) For he regards with complacency Autolycus,[*](A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles (Winter’s Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (Hom. Od. 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s amoral standpoint (Cf. Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule help friends and harm enemies is on the same ethical plane. So in the Euthyphro, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of καπηλεία or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. Or. xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the Decay of Lying.) the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says

he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury.

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.Yes.So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to put it. Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?[*](After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.) Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses[*](For Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. Apology 30 C, Euthyphro 13 B-C, and on 451 C.) are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man?[*](The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf Apology 41 D, Crito 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D.) That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function[*](The special work (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 10, Idea of Good p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.De abstin. ii. 41, Courtney, Studies in Philosophy p. 125, Spencer, Data of Ethics 12.) of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man[*](Xenophon approves the doctrine (Memorabilia ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (Hiero 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.) and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias[*](For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, Protagoras 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle Physics 107. 30.) or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.

Do you know, said I, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies? To whom? he said. I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias[*](Cf. Thompson, Meno xl.) the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.[*](It is a Socratic paradox that doing as one likes is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. Gorgias 467 A, 577 D.) That is most true, he replied. Very well, said I, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?[*](Cf. Introduction pp. ix-x.) Now Thrasymachus,[*](Cf. Introduction.) even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst, What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,[*](Cf. Gorgias 483 A, Aristotle Soph. El. 183 b 7. Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know. For similar complaints cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, Theaetetus 150 C, Clitophon passim.) but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling me[*](Thrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. Clitophon 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books.) that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that! And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.[*](For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virgil Eclogues 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, N.H. viii. 34, Milton, Epitaphium Damonis 27 nisi me lupus ante videbit.) But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor: Thrasymachus, don’t be harsh[*](For similar irony Cf. Gorgias 461 C-D, 489 D.) with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while[*](For this type of a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, Crito 46 D, Laws 647 C, 931 C, Protagoras 325 B-C, Phaedo 68 A, Thompson on Meno 91 E.) if our quest were for gold[*](Cf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, King’s Treasuries The physical type of wisdom, gold, Psalms xix. 10.) we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony[*](Cf. Symposium 216 E, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers iii. p. 277.) of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him?Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity,[*](In American, nerve. Socrates’ statement that παθεῖν due him is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the Apology that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine. Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.) said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Why, how, I said, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be chary[*](Grudging. Cf. Laches 200 B.) of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks[*](Cf. Cratylus 391 B.) therefor. That I learn from others, I said, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.[*](Socrates’ poverty (Apology 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.) But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well. Hearken and hear then, said he. I affirm that the just is nothing else than[*](For this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. Theaetetus 151 E.) the advantage of the stronger.[*](To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, Laws 714 A; her seat is in the bosom of God (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior. Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force, Theaetetus 177 D. The formula justice is the advantage of the superior means, as explained in Laws 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, Pensees iv. 4, la commodite du souverain. Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!).) Well, why don’t you applaud? Nay, you’ll do anything but that. Provided only I first understand your meaning, said I; for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves[*](The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat.) is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just. You’re a buffoon,[*](The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 465, Theophrast.Char. xvii. (Jebb).) Socrates, and take my statement[*](Cf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, Meno 78 C, Euthydemus 295 C, Gorgias 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, Charmides 166 C, Meno 80 A, Theaetetus 167 E, Gorgias 461 B-C, 482 E.) in the most detrimental sense. Not at all, my dear fellow said I; I only want you to make your meaning plainer.[*](This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in Gorgias 451 E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, Laws 714 C. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.) Don’t you know then, said he, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?[*](These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, Pyth. ii. 86, Aeschines In Ctes. 6. See 445 D, Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 62.) Assuredly. And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery[*](κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. Menexenus 238 D, Xenophon Memorabilia 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, Meno 77 B, Lysis 215 B, where L. and S. miss the point.) in each—the ruling party? Certainly. And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviates[*](On this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 12; Cf. Gorgias 504 D). This is the doctrine of the Old Oligarch, [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws 713 ff.) and Aristotle Politics iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.: We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government etc.) from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer.