Republic

That the man who both seems and is good is the friend, but that he who seems but is not really so seems but is not really the friend. And there will be the same assumption about the enemy.Then on this view it appears the friend will be the good man and the bad the enemy.Yes.So you would have us qualify our former notion of the just man by an addition. We then said it was just to do good to a friend and evil to an enemy, but now we are to add that it is just to benefit the friend if he is good and harm the enemy if he is bad?By all means, he said, that, I think, would be the right way to put it. Is it then, said I, the part of a good man to harm anybody whatsoever?[*](After the word-fence the ethical idea is reached which Plato was the first to affirm.) Certainly it is, he replied; a man ought to harm those who are both bad and his enemies. When horses[*](For Socratic comparison of animals and men Cf. Apology 30 C, Euthyphro 13 B-C, and on 451 C.) are harmed does it make them better or worse? Worse. In respect of the excellence or virtue of dogs or that of horses? Of horses. And do not also dogs when harmed become worse in respect of canine and not of equine virtue? Necessarily. And men, my dear fellow, must we not say that when they are harmed it is in respect of the distinctive excellence or virtue of man that they become worse? Assuredly. And is not justice the specific virtue of man?[*](The desired conclusion and all the idealistic paradoxes of Socrates, and later of Stoicism, follow at once from the assumption that justice, being the specific virtue of man, is human excellence generally, so that nothing is of import except justice, and no real wrong (or harm) can be done to a man except by making him less just (or wise, or good). Cf Apology 41 D, Crito 44 D. The ambiguity of ἀρετή is similarly used 353 and 609 B-D.) That too must be granted. Then it must also be admitted, my friend, that men who are harmed become more unjust. It seems so. Do musicians then make men unmusical by the art of music? Impossible. Well, do horsemen by horsemanship unfit men for dealing with horses? No. By justice then do the just make men unjust, or in sum do the good by virtue make men bad? Nay, it is impossible. It is not, I take it, the function[*](The special work (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 12, iv. 6. 14) is generalized as the idea of specific function, which after Plato and Aristotle retains a prominent place in the moralizing of the Stoics and in all philosophizing. See 351 D, 352 E, Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 10, Idea of Good p. 210, Diogenes Laertius vii. 103, Porphyr.De abstin. ii. 41, Courtney, Studies in Philosophy p. 125, Spencer, Data of Ethics 12.) of heat to chill but of its opposite. Yes. Nor of dryness to moisten but of its opposite. Assuredly. Nor yet of the good to harm but of its opposite. So it appears. But the just man is good? Certainly. It is not then the function of the just man, Polemarchus, to harm either friend or anyone else, but of his opposite. I think you are altogether right, Socrates. If, then, anyone affirms that it is just to render to each his due and he means by this, that injury and harm is what is due to his enemies from the just man[*](Xenophon approves the doctrine (Memorabilia ii. 6. 35, ii. 3. 14) and attributes it to Simonides (Hiero 2. 2). But Plato is not thinking specially of him. See on 332 p.) and benefits to his friends, he was no truly wise man who said it. For what he meant was not true. For it has been made clear to us that in no case is it just to harm anyone. I concede it, he said. We will take up arms against him, then, said I, you and I together, if anyone affirms that either Simonides or Bias[*](For the legend and the varying lists of the Seven Wise Men see Zeller i. 158, n. 2. No sage or saint could have taught unedifying doctrine. His meaning must have been right. Cf. 331 E, 332 B, Protagoras 345 D, Simplic. on Aristotle Physics 107. 30.) or Pittacus or any other of the wise and blessed said such a thing. I, for my part, he said, am ready to join in the battle with you.

Do you know, said I, to whom I think the saying belongs—this statement that it is just to benefit friends and harm enemies? To whom? he said. I think it was the saying of Periander or Perdiccas or Xerxes or Ismenias[*](Cf. Thompson, Meno xl.) the Theban or some other rich man who had great power in his own conceit.[*](It is a Socratic paradox that doing as one likes is not power or freedom unless one likes the good. Cf. Gorgias 467 A, 577 D.) That is most true, he replied. Very well, said I, since it has been made clear that this too is not justice and the just, what else is there that we might say justice to be?[*](Cf. Introduction pp. ix-x.) Now Thrasymachus,[*](Cf. Introduction.) even while we were conversing, had been trying several times to break in and lay hold of the discussion but he was restrained by those who sat by him who wished to hear the argument out. But when we came to a pause after I had said this, he couldn’t any longer hold his peace. But gathering himself up like a wild beast he hurled himself upon us as if he would tear us to pieces. And Polemarchus and I were frightened and fluttered apart, and he bawled out into our midst, What balderdash is this that you have been talking, and why do you Simple Simons truckle and give way to one another? But if you really wish, Socrates, to know what the just is, don’t merely ask questions or plume yourself upon controverting any answer that anyone gives—since your acumen has perceived that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them,[*](Cf. Gorgias 483 A, Aristotle Soph. El. 183 b 7. Socrates asked questions but did not answer, for he admitted that he did not know. For similar complaints cf. Xenophon Memorabilia i. 2. 36, iv. 4. 9, Theaetetus 150 C, Clitophon passim.) but do you yourself answer and tell what you say the just is. And don’t you be telling me[*](Thrasymachus objects to definition by substitution of synonyms (Cf. Clitophon 409 C). He demands an analysis of the underlying facts (338 D-E), such as is given in the later books.) that it is that which ought to be, or the beneficial or the profitable or the gainful or the advantageous, but express clearly and precisely whatever you say. For I won’t take from you any such drivel as that! And I, when I heard him, was dismayed, and looking upon him was filled with fear, and I believe that if I had not looked at him before he did at me I should have lost my voice.[*](For the fancy that to be seen first by the wolf makes dumb see Virgil Eclogues 9. 53, Theocr. 14. 22, Pliny, N.H. viii. 34, Milton, Epitaphium Damonis 27 nisi me lupus ante videbit.) But as it is, at the very moment when he began to be exasperated by the course of the argument I glanced at him first, so that I became capable of answering him and said with a light tremor: Thrasymachus, don’t be harsh[*](For similar irony Cf. Gorgias 461 C-D, 489 D.) with us. If I and my friend have made mistakes in the consideration of the question, rest assured that it is unwillingly that we err. For you surely must not suppose that while[*](For this type of a fortiori or ex contrario argument cf. 589 E, 600 C-D, Crito 46 D, Laws 647 C, 931 C, Protagoras 325 B-C, Phaedo 68 A, Thompson on Meno 91 E.) if our quest were for gold[*](Cf. Heracleitus fr. 22 Diels, and Ruskin, King’s Treasuries The physical type of wisdom, gold, Psalms xix. 10.) we would never willingly truckle to one another and make concessions in the search and so spoil our chances of finding it, yet that when we are searching for justice, a thing more precious than much fine gold, we should then be so foolish as to give way to one another and not rather do our serious best to have it discovered.

You surely must not suppose that, my friend. But you see it is our lack of ability that is at fault. It is pity then that we should far more reasonably receive from clever fellows like you than severity.And he on hearing this gave a great guffaw and laughed sardonically and said, Ye gods! here we have the well-known irony[*](Cf. Symposium 216 E, and Gomperz, Greek Thinkers iii. p. 277.) of Socrates, and I knew it and predicted that when it came to replying you would refuse and dissemble and do anything rather than answer any question that anyone asked you.That’s because you are wise, Thrasymachus, and so you knew very well that if you asked a man how many are twelve, and in putting the question warned him: don’t you be telling me, fellow, that twelve is twice six or three times four or six times two or four times three, for I won’t accept any such drivel as that from you as an answer—it was obvious I fancy to you that no one could give an answer to a question framed in that fashion. Suppose he had said to you, Thrasymachus, what do you mean? Am I not to give any of the prohibited answers, not even, do you mean to say, if the thing really is one of these, but must I say something different from the truth, or what do you mean? What would have been your answer to him?Humph! said he, how very like the two cases are! There is nothing to prevent, said I; yet even granted that they are not alike, yet if it appears to the person asked the question that they are alike, do you suppose that he will any the less answer what appears to him, whether we forbid him or whether we don’t? Is that, then, said he, what you are going to do? Are you going to give one of the forbidden answers? I shouldn’t be surprised, I said, if on reflection that would be my view. What then, he said, if I show you another answer about justice differing from all these, a better one—what penalty do you think you deserve? Why, what else, said I, than that which it befits anyone who is ignorant to suffer? It befits him, I presume, to learn from the one who does know. That then is what I propose that I should suffer. I like your simplicity,[*](In American, nerve. Socrates’ statement that παθεῖν due him is μαθεῖν (gratis) affects Thrasymachus as the dicasts were affected by the proposal in the Apology that his punishment should be—to dine at the City Hall. The pun on the legal formula could be remotely rendered: In addition to the recovery of your wits, you must pay a fine. Plato constantly harps on the taking of pay by the Sophists, but Thrasymachus is trying to jest, too.) said he; but in addition to learningyou must pay a fine of money. Well, I will when I have got it, I said. It is there, said Glaucon: if money is all that stands in the way, Thrasymachus, go on with your speech. We will all contribute for Socrates. Oh yes, of course, said he, so that Socrates may contrive, as he always does, to evade answering himself but may cross-examine the other man and refute his replies.

Why, how, I said, my dear fellow, could anybody answer if in the first place he did not know and did not even profess to know, and secondly even if he had some notion of the matter, he had been told by a man of weight that he mustn’t give any of his suppositions as an answer? Nay, it is more reasonable that you should be the speaker. For you do affirm that you know and are able to tell. Don’t be obstinate, but do me the favor to reply and don’t be chary[*](Grudging. Cf. Laches 200 B.) of your wisdom, and instruct Glaucon here and the rest of us. When I had spoken thus Glaucon and the others urged him not to be obstinate. It was quite plain that Thrasymachus was eager to speak in order that he might do himself credit, since he believed that he had a most excellent answer to our question. But he demurred and pretended to make a point of my being the respondent. Finally he gave way and then said, Here you have the wisdom of Socrates, to refuse himself to teach, but go about and learn from others and not even pay thanks[*](Cf. Cratylus 391 B.) therefor. That I learn from others, I said, you said truly, Thrasymachus. But in saying that I do not pay thanks you are mistaken. I pay as much as I am able. And I am able only to bestow praise. For money I lack.[*](Socrates’ poverty (Apology 38 A-B) was denied by some later writers who disliked to have him classed with the Cynics.) But that I praise right willingly those who appear to speak well you will well know forthwith as soon as you have given your answer. For I think that you will speak well. Hearken and hear then, said he. I affirm that the just is nothing else than[*](For this dogmatic formulation of a definition Cf. Theaetetus 151 E.) the advantage of the stronger.[*](To idealists law is the perfection of reason, or νοῦ διανομή, Laws 714 A; her seat is in the bosom of God (Hooker). To the political positivist there is no justice outside of positive law, and law is the command of a political superior to a political inferior. Whatsoever any state decrees and establishes is just for the state while it is in force, Theaetetus 177 D. The formula justice is the advantage of the superior means, as explained in Laws 714, that the ruling class legislates in its own interest, that is, to keep itself in power. This interpretation is here drawn out of Thrasymachus by Socrates’ affected misapprehensions (cf. further Pascal, Pensees iv. 4, la commodite du souverain. Leibniz approves Thrasymachus’s definition: justum potentiori utile . . . nam Deus ceteris potentior!).) Well, why don’t you applaud? Nay, you’ll do anything but that. Provided only I first understand your meaning, said I; for I don’t yet apprehend it. The advantage of the stronger is what you affirm the just to be. But what in the world do you mean by this? I presume you don’t intend to affirm this, that if Polydamas the pancratiast is stronger than we are and the flesh of beeves[*](The unwholesomeness of this diet for the ordinary man proves nothing for Plato’s alleged vegetarianism. The Athenians ate but little meat.) is advantageous for him, for his body, this viand is also for us who are weaker than he both advantageous and just. You’re a buffoon,[*](The Greek is stronger—a beastly cad. A common term of abuse in the orators. Cf. Aristophanes Frogs 465, Theophrast.Char. xvii. (Jebb).) Socrates, and take my statement[*](Cf. 392 C, 394 B, 424 C, Meno 78 C, Euthydemus 295 C, Gorgias 451 A δικαίως ὑπολαμβάνεις, you take my meaning fairly. For complaints of unfair argument cf. 340 D, Charmides 166 C, Meno 80 A, Theaetetus 167 E, Gorgias 461 B-C, 482 E.) in the most detrimental sense. Not at all, my dear fellow said I; I only want you to make your meaning plainer.[*](This is the point. Thrasymachus is represented as challenging assent before explaining his meaning, and Socrates forces him to be more explicit by jocosely putting a perverse interpretation on his words. Similarly in Gorgias 451 E, 453 B, 489 D, 490 C, Laws 714 C. To the misunderstanding of such dramatic passages is due the impression of hasty readers that Plato is a sophist.) Don’t you know then, said he, that some cities are governed by tyrants, in others democracy rules, in others aristocracy?[*](These three forms of government are mentioned by Pindar, Pyth. ii. 86, Aeschines In Ctes. 6. See 445 D, Whibley, Greek Oligarchies, and Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 62.) Assuredly. And is not this the thing that is strong and has the mastery[*](κρατεῖ with emphasis to suggest κρείττων. Cf. Menexenus 238 D, Xenophon Memorabilia 1. 2. 43. Platonic dialectic proceeds by minute steps and linked synonyms. Cf. 333 A, 339 A, 342 C, 346 A, 353 E, 354 A-B, 369 C, 370 A-B, 379 B, 380-381, 394 B, 400 C, 402 D, 412 D, 433-434, 486, 585 C, Meno 77 B, Lysis 215 B, where L. and S. miss the point.) in each—the ruling party? Certainly. And each form of government enacts the laws with a view to its own advantage, a democracy democratic laws and tyranny autocratic and the others likewise, and by so legislating they proclaim that the just for their subjects is that which is for their—the rulers’—advantage and the man who deviates[*](On this view justice is simply τὸ νόμιμον (Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 4. 12; Cf. Gorgias 504 D). This is the doctrine of the Old Oligarch, [Xenophon] Rep. Ath. 2. Against this conception of class domination as political justice, Plato (Laws 713 ff.) and Aristotle Politics iii. 7) protest. Cf. Arnold, Culture and Anarchy, chap. ii.: We only conceive of the State as something equivalent to the class in occupation of the executive government etc.) from this law they chastise as a law-breaker and a wrongdoer.

This, then, my good sir, is what I understand as the identical principle of justice that obtains in all states —the advantage of the established government. This I presume you will admit holds power and is strong, so that, if one reasons rightly, it works out that the just is the same thing everywhere,[*](Thrasymachus makes it plain that he, unlike Meno (71 E), Euthyphro (5 ff.), Laches (191 E), Hippias (Hippias Major 286 ff.), and even Theaetetus (146 C-D) at first, understands the nature of a definition.) the advantage of the stronger.Now, said I, I have learned your meaning, but whether it is true or not I have to try to learn. The advantageous, then, is also your reply, Thrasymachus, to the question, what is the just—though you forbade me to give that answer. But you add thereto that of the stronger. A trifling addition[*](Cf. Laches 182 C.) perhaps you think it, he said. It is not yet clear[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) whether it is a big one either; but that we must inquire whether what you say is true, is clear.[*](For the teasing or challenging repetition cf. 394 B, 470 B-C, 487 E, 493 A, 500 B, 505 D, 514 B, 517 C, 523 A, 527 C, Lysis 203 B, Sophocles O.T. 327.) For since I too admit that the just is something that is of advantage[*](For Plato’s so-called utilitarianism or eudaemonism see 457 B, Unity of Plato’s Thought, pp. 21-22, Gomperz, ii. p. 262. He would have nearly accepted Bentham’s statement that while the proper end of government is the greatest happiness of the greatest number, the actual end of every government is the greatest happiness of the governors. Cf. Leslie Stephen, English Utilitarianism, i. p. 282, ii. p. 89.)—but you are for making an addition and affirm it to be the advantage of the stronger, while I don’t profess to know,[*](This profession of ignorance may have been a trait of the real Socrates, but in Plato it is a dramatic device for the evolution of the argument.) we must pursue the inquiry. Inquire away, he said. I will do so, said I. Tell me, then; you affirm also, do you not, that obedience to rulers is just? I do. May I ask whether the rulers in the various states are infallible[*](The argument turns on the opposition between the real (i.e. ideal) and the mistakenly supposed interest of the rulers. See on 334 C.) or capable sometimes of error? Surely, he said, they are liable to err. Then in their attempts at legislation they enact some laws rightly and some not rightly, do they not? So I suppose. And by rightly we are to understand for their advantage, and by wrongly to their disadvantage? Do you mean that or not? That. But whatever they enact[*](Cf. 338 E and Theaetetus 177 D.) must be performed by their subjects and is justice? Of course. Then on your theory it is just not only to do what is the advantage of the stronger but also the opposite, what is not to his advantage. What’s that you’re saying?[*](Τί λέγεις σύ; is rude. See Blaydes on Aristophanes Clouds 1174. The supspicion that he is being refuted makes Thrasymachus rude again. But Cf. Euthydemus 290 E.) he replied. What you yourself are saying,[*](Cf. Berkeley, Divine Visual Language, 13: The conclusions are yours as much as mine, for you were led to them by your own concessions. See on 334 D, Alc. I. 112-113. On a misunderstanding of this passage and 344 E, Herbert Spencer (Data of Ethics, 19) bases the statement that Plato (and Aristotle), like Hobbes, made state enactments the source of right and wrong.) I think. Let us consider it more closely. Have we not agreed that the rulers in giving orders to the ruled sometimes mistake their own advantage, and that whatever the rulers enjoin is just for the subjects to perform? Was not that admitted? I think it was, he replied. Then you will have to think,[*](Socrates is himself a little rude.) I said, that to do what is disadvantageous to the rulers and the stronger has been admitted by you to be just in the case when the rulers unwittingly enjoin what is bad for themselves, while you affirm that it is just for the others to do what they enjoined. In that way does not this conclusion inevitably follow, my most sapient[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 D.) Thrasymachus, that it is just to do the very opposite[*](Cf. Laches 215 E, Phaedo 62 E.) of what you say? For it is in that case surely the disadvantage of the stronger or superior that the inferior are commanded to perform.

Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, said Polemarchus, nothing could be more conclusive. Of course, said Cleitophon, breaking in, if you are his witness.[*](It is familiar Socratic doctrine that the only witness needed in argument is the admission of your opponent. Cf. Gorgias 472 A-B.) What need is there of a witness? Polemarchus said. Thrasymachus himself admits that the rulers sometimes enjoin what is evil for themselves and yet says that it is just for the subjects to do this. That, Polemarchus, is because Thrasymachus laid it down that it is just to obey the orders[*](τὰ κελευόμενα ποιεῖν is a term of praise for obedience to lawful authority, and of disdain for a people or state that takes orders from another. Cleitophon does not apprehend the argument and, thinking only of the last clause, reaffirms the definition in the form it is just to do what rulers bid. Polemarchus retorts: And (I was right), for he (also) . . .) of the rulers. Yes, Cleitophon, but he also took the position that the advantage of the stronger is just. And after these two assumptions he again admitted that the stronger sometimes bid the inferior and their subjects do what is to the disadvantage of the rulers. And from these admissions the just would no more be the advantage of the stronger than the contrary. O well, said Cleitophon, by the advantage of the superior he meant what the superior supposed to be for his advantage. This was what the inferior had to do, and that this is the just was his position. That isn’t what he said, replied Polemarchus. Never mind, Polemarchus, said I, but if that is Thrasymachus’s present meaning, let us take it from him[*](Socrates always allows his interlocutors to amend their statements. Cf. Gorgias 491 B, 499 B, Protagoras 349 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 18.) in that sense. So tell me, Thrasymachus, was this what you intended to say, that the just is the advantage of the superior as it appears to the superior whether it really is or not? Are we to say this was your meaning? Not in the least, he said.[*](Thrasymachus rejects the aid of an interpretation which Socrates would apply not only to the politician’s miscalculation but to his total misapprehension of his true ideal interests. He resorts to the subtlety that the ruler qua ruler is infallible, which Socrates meets by the fair retort that the ruler qua ruler, the artist qua artist has no sinister or selfish interest but cares only for the work. If we are to substitute an abstraction or an ideal for the concrete man we must do so consistently. Cf. modern debates about the economic man.) Do you suppose that I call one who is in error a superior when he errs? I certainly did suppose that you meant that, I replied, when you agreed that rulers are not infallible but sometimes make mistakes. That is because you argue like a pettifogger, Socrates. Why, to take the nearest example, do you call one who is mistaken about the sick a physician in respect of his mistake or one who goes wrong in a calculation a calculator when he goes wrong and in respect of this error? Yet that is what we say literally—we say that the physician[*](For the idea cf. Rousseau’s Émile, i.: On me dira . . . que les fautes sont du médecin, mais que la médicine en elle-même est infaillible. A al bonne heure; mais qu’elle vienne donc sans le médecin. Lucian, De Parasito 54, parodies this reasoning.) erred and the calculator and the schoolmaster. But the truth, I take it, is, that each of these in so far as he is that which we entitle him never errs; so that, speaking precisely, since you are such a stickler for precision,[*](For the invidious associations of ἀκριβολογία (1) in money dealings, (2) in argument, cf. Aristotle Met. 995 a 11, Cratylus 415 A, Lysias vii. 12, Antiphon B 3, Demosthenes. xxiii. 148, Timon in Diogenes Laertius ii. 19.) no craftsman errs. For it is when his knowledge abandons him that he who goes wrong goes wrong—when he is not a craftsman. So that no craftsman, wise man, or ruler makes a mistake then when he is a ruler, though everybody would use the expression that the physician made a mistake and the ruler erred.

It is in this loose way of speaking, then, that you must take the answer I gave you a little while ago. But the most precise statement is that other, that the ruler in so far forth as ruler does not err, and not erring he enacts what is best for himself, and this the subject must do, so that, even as I meant from the start, I say the just is to do what is for the advantage of the stronger.So then, Thrasymachus, said I, my manner of argument seems to you pettifogging? It does, he said. You think, do you, that it was with malice aforethought and trying to get the better of you unfairly that I asked that question? I don’t think it, I know it, he said, and you won’t make anything by it, for you won’t get the better of me by stealth and , failing stealth, you are not of the force[*](Cf. 365 D.) to beat me in debate. Bless your soul, said I, I wouldn’t even attempt such a thing. But that nothing of the sort may spring up between us again, define in which sense you take the ruler and stronger. Do you mean the so-called ruler[*](i.e., the one who in vulgar parlance is so; cf. τῷ ῥήματι, Plat. Rep. 340d.) or that ruler in the precise sense of whom you were just now telling us, and for whose advantage as being the superior it will be just for the inferior to act? I mean the ruler in the very most precise sense of the word, he said. Now bring on against this your cavils and your shyster’s tricks if you are able. I ask no quarter. But you’ll find yourself unable. Why, do you suppose, I said, that I am so mad to try to try to beard a lion[*](A rare but obvious proverb. Cf. Schol. ad loc. and Aristides, Orat. Plat. ii. p. 143.) and try the pettifogger on Thrasymachus? You did try it just now, he said, paltry fellow though you be.[*](καὶ ταῦτα = idque, normally precedes (cf. 404 C, 419 E, etc.). But Thrasymachus is angry and the whole phrase is short. Commentators on Aristophanes Wasps 1184, Frogs 704, and Acharn. 168 allow this position. See my note in A.J.P. vol. xvi. p. 234. Others: though you failed in that too.) Something too much[*](Cf. 541 B, Euthyphro 11 E, Charmides 153 D.) of this sort of thing, said I. But tell me, your physician in the precise sense of whom you were just now speaking, is he a moneymaker, an earner of fees, or a healer of the sick? And remember to speak of the physician who is really such. A healer of the sick, he replied. And what of the lot—the pilot rightly so called—is he a ruler of sailors or a sailor? A ruler of sailors. We don’t, I fancy, have to take into account the fact that he actually sails in the ship, nor is he to be denominated a sailor. For it is not in respect of his sailing that he is called a pilot but in respect of his art and his ruling of the sailors. True, he said. Then for each of them[*](Plato, like Herodotus and most idiomatic and elliptical writers, is content if his antecedent can be fairly inferred from the context. Cf. 330 C τοῦτο, 373 C, 396 B, 598 C τεχνῶν, Protagoras 327 C.) is there not a something that is for his advantage? Quite so. And is it not also true, said I, that the art naturally exists for this, to discover and provide for each his advantage? Yes, for this. Is there, then, for each of the arts any other advantage than to be perfect as possible[*](Pater, Plato and Platonism, p. 242, fancifully cites this for art for art’s sake. See Zeller, p. 605. Thrasymachus does not understand what is meant by saying that the art (= the artist qua artist) has no interest save the perfection of its (his) own function. Socrates explains that the body by its very nature needs art to remedy its defects (Herodotus i. 32, Lysis 217 B). But the nature of art is fulfilled in its service, and it has no other ends to be accomplished by another art and so on ad infinitum. It is idle to cavil and emend the text, because of the shift from the statement (341 D) that art has no interest save its perfection, to the statement that it needs nothing except to be itself (342 A-B). The art and the artist qua artist are ideals whose being by hypothesis is their perfection.)? What do you mean by that question? Just as if, I said, you should ask me whether it is enough for the body to be the body or whether it stands in need of something else, I would reply, By all means it stands in need. That is the reason why the art of medicine has now been invented, because the body is defective and such defect is unsatisfactory. To provide for this, then, what is advantageous, that is the end for which the art was devised. Do you think that would be a correct answer, or not?

Correct, he said. But how about this? Is the medical art itself defective or faulty, or has any other art any need of some virtue, quality, or excellence—as the eyes of vision, the ears of hearing, and for this reason is there need of some art over them that will consider and provide what is advantageous for these very ends—does there exist in the art itself some defect and does each art require another art to consider its advantage and is there need of still another for the considering art and so on ad infinitum, or will the art look out for its own advantage? Or is it a fact that it needs neither itself nor another art to consider its advantage and provide against its deficiency? For there is no defect or error at all that dwells in any art. Nor does it befit an art to seek the advantage of anything else than that of its object. But the art itself is free from all harm and admixture of evil, and is right so long as each art is precisely and entirely that which it is. And consider the matter in that precise way of speaking. Is it so or not? It appears to be so, he said. Then medicine, said I, does not consider the advantage of medicine but of the body? Yes. Nor horsemanship of horsemanship but of horses, nor does any other art look out for itself—for it has no need—but for that of which it is the art. So it seems, he replied. But surely,[*](The next step is the identification of (true) politics with the disinterested arts which also rule and are the stronger. Cf. Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 11. γε emphasizes the argumentative implication of ἄρχουσι to which Thrasymachus assents reluctantly; and Socrates develops and repeats the thought for half a page. Art is virtually science, as contrasted with empiric rule of thumb, and Thrasymachus’s infallible rulers are of course scientific. Ruler is added lest we forget the analogy between political rule and that of the arts. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics 244, Laws 875 C.) Thrasymachus, the arts do hold rule and are stronger than that of which they are the arts. He conceded this but it went very hard. Then no art considers or enjoins[*](It is not content with theoretic knowledge, but like other arts gives orders to achieve results. Cf. Politicus 260 A, C.) the advantage of the stronger but every art that of the weaker which is ruled by it. This too he was finally brought to admit though he tried to contest it. But when he had agreed—Can we deny, then, said I, that neither does any physician in so far as he is a physician seek or enjoin the advantage of the physician but that of the patient? For we have agreed that the physician, precisely speaking, is a ruler and governor of bodies and not a moneymaker. Did we agree on that? He assented. And so the precise pilot is a ruler of sailors, not a sailor? That was admitted. Then that sort of a pilot and ruler will not consider and enjoin the advantage of the pilot but that of the sailor whose ruler he is. He assented reluctantly. Then, said I, Thrasymachus, neither does anyone in any office of rule in so far as he is a ruler consider and enjoin his own advantage but that of the one whom he rules and for whom he exercises his craft, and he keeps his eyes fixed on that and on what is advantageous and suitable to that in all that he says and does.

When we had come to this point in the discussion and it was apparent to everybody that his formula of justice had suffered a reversal of form, Thrasymachus, instead of replying,[*](Thrasymachus first vents his irritation by calling Socrates a snivelling innocent, and then, like Protagoras (Protagoras 334), when pressed by Socrates’ dialectic makes a speech. He abandons the abstract (ideal) ruler, whom he assumed to be infallible and Socrates proved to be disinterested, for the actual ruler or shepherd of the people, who tends the flock only that he might shear it. All political experience and the career of successful tyrants, whom all men count happy, he thinks confirms this view, which is that of Callicles in the Gorgias. Justice is another’s good which only the naive and innocent pursue. It is better to inflict than to suffer wrong. The main problem of the Republic is clearly indicated, but we are not yet ready to debate it seriously.) said, Tell me, Socrates, have you got a nurse? What do you mean? said I. Why didn’t you answer me instead of asking such a question? Because, he said, she lets her little snotty run about drivelling[*](κορυζῶντα L. and S., also s. v. κόυζα. Lucian, Lexiphanes 18, treats the expression as an affectation, but elsewhere employs it. The philosophers used this and similar terms (1) of stupidity, (2) as a type of the minor ills of the flesh. Horace, Satire i. 4. 8, ii. 2. 76, Epictet. i. 6. 30 ἀλλ’ αἱ μύξαι μου ῥέουσι.) and doesn’t wipe your face clean, though you need it badly, if she can’t get you to know[*](Literally, if you don’t know for her. For the ethical dative cf. Shakespeare Taming of the Shrew, I. ii. 8 Knock me here soundly. Not to know the shepherd from the sheep seems to be proverbial. Shepherd of the people, like survival of the fittest, may be used to prove anything in ethics and politics. Cf. Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 431, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 2. 1, Suetonius Vit. Tib. 32, and my note in Class. Phil . vol. i. p. 298.) the difference between the shepherd and the sheep. And what, pray, makes you think that? said I. Because you think that the shepherds and the neat-herds are considering the good of the sheep and the cattle and fatten and tend them with anything else in view than the good of their masters and themselves; and by the same token you seem to suppose that the rulers in our cities, I mean the real rulers,[*](Thrasymachus’s real rulers are the bosses and tyrants. Socrates’ true rulers are the true kings of the Stoics and Ruskin, the true shepherds of Ruskin and Milton.) differ at all in their thoughts of the governed from a man’s attitude towards his sheep[*](Cf. Aristophanes Clouds 1203 πρόβατ’ ἄλλως, Herrick, Kings ought to shear, not skin their sheep.) or that they think of anything else night and day than the sources of their own profit. And you are so far out[*](This (quite possible) sense rather than the ironical, so far advanced, better accords with ἀγνοεῖς and with the direct brutality of Thrasymachus.) concerning the just and justice and the unjust and injustice that you don’t know that justice and the just are literally[*](τῷ ὄντι like ὡς ἀληθῶς, ἀτεχνῶς, etc., marks the application (often ironical or emphatic) of an image or familiar proverbial or technical expression or etymology. Cf. 443 D, 442 A, 419 A, 432 A, Laches 187 B, Philebus 64 E. Similarly ἐτήτυμον of a proverb, Archil. fr. 35 (87). The origin of the usage appears in Aristophanes Birds 507 τοῦτ’ ἄρ’ ἐκεῖν ἦν τοὔπος ἀληθῶς, etc. Cf. Anth. Pal. v. 6. 3. With εὐηθικῶν, however, ὡς ἀληθῶς does not verify the etymology but ironically emphasizes the contradiction between the etymology and the conventional meaning, simple, which Thrasymachus thinks truly fits those to whom Socrates would apply the full etymological meaning of good character. Cf. 348 C, 400 E, Laws 679 C, Thucydides iii. 83. Cf. in English the connexion of silly with selig, and in Italian, Leopardi’s bitter comment on dabbenaggine (Pensieri xxvi.).) the other fellow’s good[*](Justice not being primarily a self-regarding virtue, like prudence, is of course another’s good. Cf. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 a 3; 1134 b 5. Thrasymachus ironically accepts the formula, adding the cynical or pessimistic comment, but one’s own harm, for which see 392 B, Euripides Heracleid. 1-5, and Isocrates’ protest (viii. 32). Bion (Diogenes Laertius iv. 7. 48) wittily defined beauty as the other fellow’s good; which recalls Woodrow Wilson’s favourite limerick, and the definition of business as l’argent des autres.)—the advantage of the stronger and the ruler, but a detriment that is all his own of the subject who obeys and serves; while injustice is the contrary and rules those who are simple in every sense of the word and just, and they being thus ruled do what is for his advantage who is the stronger and make him happy in serving him, but themselves by no manner of means. And you must look at the matter, my simple-minded Socrates, in this way: that the just man always comes out at a disadvantage in his relation with the unjust. To begin with, in their business dealings in any joint undertaking of the two you will never find that the just man has the advantage over the unjust at the dissolution of the partnership but that he always has the worst of it. Then again, in their relations with the state, if there are direct taxes or contributions to be paid, the just man contributes more from an equal estate and the other less, and when there is a distribution the one gains much and the other nothing. And so when each holds office, apart from any other loss the just man must count on his own affairs[*](For the idea that the just ruler neglects his own business and gains no compensating graft cf. the story of Deioces in Herodotus i. 97, Democ. fr. 253 Diels, Laches 180 B, Isocrates xii. 145, Aristotle Pol. v. 8. 15-20. For office as a means of helping friends and harming enemies cf. Meno 71 E, Lysias ix. 14, and the anecdote of Themistocles (Plutarch, Praecept. reipub. ger. 13) cited by Goodwin (Political Justice) in the form: God forbid that I should sit upon a bench of justice where my friends found no more favour than my enemies. Democr. (fr. 266 Diels) adds that the just ruler on laying down his office is exposed to the revenge of wrongdoers with whom he has dealt severely.) falling into disorder through neglect, while because of his justice makes no profit from the state, and thereto he will displease his friends and his acquaintances by his unwillingness to serve them unjustly. But to the unjust man all the opposite advantages accrue.

I mean, of course, the one I was just speaking of, the man who has the ability to overreach on a large scale. Consider this type of man, then, if you wish to judge how much more profitable it is to him personally to be unjust than to be just. And the easiest way of all to understand this matter will be to turn to the most consummate form of injustice which makes the man who has done the wrong most happy and those who are wronged and who would not themselves willingly do wrong most miserable. And this is tyranny, which both by stealth and by force takes away what belongs to others, both sacred and profane, both private and public, not little by little but at one swoop.[*](The order of the words dramatically expressses Thrasymachus’s excitement and the sweeping success of the tyrant.) For each several part of such wrongdoing the malefactor who fails to escape detection is fined and incurs the extreme of contumely; for temple-robbers, kidnappers, burglars, swindlers, and thieves the appellations of those who commit these partial forms of injustice. But when in addition to the property of the citizens men kidnap and enslave the citizens themselves, instead of these opprobrious names they are pronounced happy and blessed[*](The European estimate of Louis Napoleon before 1870 is a good illustration. Cf. Theopompus on Philip, Polybius viii. 11. Euripides’ Bellerophon (fr. 288) uses the happiness of the tyrant as an argument against the moral government of the world.) not only by their fellow-citizens but by all who hear the story of the man who has committed complete and entire injustice.[*](Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1130 b 15 uses the expression in a different sense.) For it is not the fear of doing[*](The main issue of the Republic. Cf. 360 D, 358 E and Gorgias 469 B.) but of suffering wrong that calls forth the reproaches of those who revile injustice. Thus, Socrates, injustice on a sufficiently large scale is a stronger, freer, and a more masterful thing than justice, and, as I said in the beginning, it is the advantage of the stronger that is the just, while the unjust is what profits man’s self and is for his advantage.After this Thrasymachus was minded to depart when like a bathman[*](Cf. Theophrastus, Char. xv. 19 (Jebb), Tucker, Life in Ancient Athens, p. 134. For the metaphor cf. 536 B, Lysis 204 D, Aristophanes Wasps 483. Sudden, lit. all at once.) he had poured his speech in a sudden flood over our ears. But the company would not suffer him and were insistent that he should remain and render an account of what he had said. And I was particularly urgent and said, I am surprised at you, Thrasymachus; after hurling[*](Cf. Euripides Alcestis 680 οὐ βαλὼν οὕτως ἄπει.) such a doctrine at us, can it be that you propose to depart without staying to teach us properly or learn yourself whether this thing is so or not? Do you think it is a small matter[*](Socrates reminds us that a serious moral issue is involved in all this word-play. So 352 D, Gorgias 492 C, 500 C, Laches 185 A. Cf. 377 B, 578 C, 608 B.) that you are attempting to determine and not the entire conduct of life that for each of us would make living most worth while? Well, do I deny it?[*](Plainly a protesting question, Why, do I think otherwise? Cf. 339 D.) said Thrasymachus. You seem to, said I, or else[*](For the impossibility of J. and C.’s or rather see my note in A.J.P. vol. xiii. p. 234.) to care nothing for us and so feel no concern whether we are going to live worse or better lives in our ignorance of what you affirm that you know.

Nay, my good fellow, do your best to make the matter clear to us also: it will be no bad investment[*](κείσεται of an investment perhaps. Cf. Plautus, Rudens 939 bonis quod bene fit, haud perit.) for you—any benefit that you bestow on such company as this. For I tell you for my part that I am not convinced, neither do I think that injustice is more profitable[*](Isocrates viii. 31 and elsewhere seems to be copying Plato’s idea that injustice can never be profitable in the higher sense of the word. Cf. also the proof in the Hipparchus that all true κέρδος is ἀγαθόν.) than justice, not even if one gives it free scope and does not hinder it of its will.[*](Plato neglects for the present the refinement that the unjust man does not do what he really wishes, since all desire the good. Cf. 438 A, 577 D, and Gorgias 467 B.) But, suppose, sir, a man to be unjust and to be able to act unjustly either because he is not detected or can maintain it by violence,[*](Cf. 365 D.) all the same he does not convince me that it is more profitable than justice. Now it may be that there is someone else among us who feels in this way and that I am not the only one. Persuade us, then, my dear fellow, convince us satisfactorily that we are ill advised in preferring justice to injustice.And how am I to persuade you?[*](Thrasymachus has stated his doctrine. Like Dr. Johnson he cannot supply brains to understand it. Cf. Gorgias 489 C, 499 B, Meno 75 D.) he said. If you are not convinced by what I just now was saying, what more can I do for you? Shall I take the argument and ram[*](The language is idiomatic, and the metaphor of a nurse feeding a baby, Aristophanes Eccl. 716, is rude. Cf. Shakespeare, He crams these words into my ears against the stomach of my sense.) it into your head? Heaven forbid! I said, don’t do that. But in the first place when you have said a thing stand by it,[*](Cf. Socrates’ complaint of Callicles’ shifts, Gorgias 499 B-C, but Cf. 334 E, 340 B-C.) or if you shift your ground change openly and don’t try to deceive us. But, as it is, you see, Thrasymachus—let us return to the previous examples—you see that while you began by taking the physician in the true sense of the word, you did not think fit afterwards to be consistent and maintain with precision the notion of the true shepherd, but you apparently think that he herds his sheep in his quality of shepherd not with regard to what is best for the sheep but as if he were a banqueter about to be feasted with regard to the good cheer or again with a view to the sale of them as if he were a money-maker and not a shepherd. But the art of the shepherd[*](The art = the ideal abstract artist. See on 342 A-C. Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 a 8 ff. says that the function of a harper and that of a good harper are generically the same. Cf. Crito 48 A.) surely is concerned with nothing else than how to provide what is best for that over which is set, since its own affairs, its own best estate, are entirely sufficiently provided for so long as it in nowise fails of being the shepherd’s art. And in like manner I supposed that we just now were constrained to acknowledge that every form of rule[*](Aristotle’s despotic rule over slaves would seem to be an exception (Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 245.). But that too should be for the good of the slave; infra 590 D.) in so far as it is rule considers what is best for nothing else than that which is governed and cared for by it, alike in political and private rule. Why, do you think that the rulers and holders of office in our cities—the true rulers[*](See on 343 B, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1102 a 8. The new point that good rulers are reluctant to take office is discussed to 347 E, and recalled later, 520 D. See Newman, l.c. pp. 244-245, Dio Cass. xxxvi. 27. 1.)—willingly hold office and rule? I don’t think, he said, I know right well they do.

But what of other forms of rule, Thrasymachus? Do you not perceive that no one chooses of his own will to hold the office of rule, but they demand pay, which implies that not to them will benefit accrue from their holding office but to those whom they rule? For tell me this: we ordinarily say, do we not, that each of the arts is different from others because its power or function is different? And, my dear fellow, in order that we may reach some result, don’t answer counter to your real belief.[*](Cf. Gorgias 495 A. But elsewhere Socrates admits that the argument may be discussed regardless of the belief of the respondent (349 A). Cf. Thompson on Meno 83 D, Campbell on Soph. 246 D.) Well, yes, he said, that is what renders it different. And does not each art also yield us benefit[*](As each art has a specific function, so it renders a specific service and aims at a specific good. This idea and the examples of the physician and the pilot are commonplaces in Plato and Aristotle.) that is peculiar to itself and not general,[*](Hence, as argued below, from this abstract point of view wage-earning, which is common to many arts, cannot be the specific service of any of them, but must pertain to the special art μισθωτική. This refinement is justified by Thrasymachus’ original abstraction of the infallible craftsman as such. It also has this much moral truth, that the good workman, as Ruskin says, rarely thinks first of his pay, and that the knack of getting well paid does not always go with the ability to do the work well. See Aristotle on χρηματιστική, Politics i. 3 (1253 b 14).) as for example medicine health, the pilot’s art safety at sea, and the other arts similarly? Assuredly. And does not the wage-earner’s art yield wage? For that is its function. Would you identify medicine and the pilot’s art? Or if you please to discriminate precisely as you proposed, none the more if a pilot regains his health because a sea voyage is good for him, no whit the more, I say, for this reason do you call his art medicine, do you? Of course not, he said. Neither, I take it, do you call wage-earning medicine if a man earning wages is in health. Surely not. But what of this? Do you call medicine wage-earning, if a man when giving treatment earns wages? No, he said. And did we not agree that the benefit derived from each art is peculiar to it? So be it, he said. Any common or general benefit that all craftsmen receive, then, they obviously derive from their common use of some further identical thing. It seems so, he said. And we say that the benefit of earning wages accrues to the craftsmen from their further exercise of the wage-earning art. He assented reluctantly. Then the benefit, the receiving of wages does not accrue to each from his own art. But if we are to consider it precisely medicine produces health but the fee-earning art the pay, and architecture a house but the fee-earning art accompanying it the fee, and so with all the others, each performs its own task and benefits that over which it is set, but unless pay is added to it is there any benefit which the craftsman receives from the craft? Apparently not, he said. Does he then bestow no benefit either when he works for nothing? I’ll say he does. Then, Thrasymachus, is not this immediately apparent, that no art or office provides what is beneficial for itself—but as we said long ago it provides and enjoins what is beneficial to its subject, considering the advantage of that, the weaker, and not the advantage the stronger?

That was why, friend Thrasymachus, I was just now saying that no one of his own will chooses to hold rule and office and take other people’s troubles[*](κακά = troubles, miseres, 517 D. For the thought cf. 343 E, 345 E, Xen. Mem. 2.1.8, Hdt. 1.97.) in hand to straighten them out, but everybody expects pay for that, because he who is to exercise the art rightly never does what is best for himself or enjoins it when he gives commands according to the art, but what is best for the subject. That is the reason, it seems, why pay[*](Cf. 345 E, Aristot. Eth. Nic. 1134b 6.) must be provided for those who are to consent to rule, either in form of money or honor or a penalty if they refuse.What do you mean by that, Socrates? said Glaucon. The two wages I recognize, but the penalty you speak of and described as a form of wage I don’t understand.[*](Plato habitually explains metaphors, abstractions, and complicated defintions in this dramatic fashion. Cf. 352 E, 377 A, 413 A, 429 C, 438 B, 510 B.) Then, said I, you don’t understand the wages of the best men for the sake of which the finest spirits hold office and rule when they consent to do so. Don’t you know that to be covetous of honor and covetous of money is said to be and is a reproach? I do, he said. Well, then, said I, that is why the good are not willing to rule either for the sake of money or of honor. They do not wish to collect pay openly for their service of rule and be styled hirelings nor to take it by stealth from their office and be called thieves, nor yet for the sake of honor, for they are not covetous of honor. So there must be imposed some compulsion and penalty to constrain them to rule if they are to consent to hold office. That is perhaps why to seek office oneself and not await compulsion is thought disgraceful. But the chief penalty is to be governed by someone worse[*](Cf. Aristotle Politics 1318 b 36. In a good democracy the better classes will be content, for they will not be ruled by worse men. Cf. Cicero, Ad Att. ii. 9 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; Democr. fr. 49 D.: It is hard to be ruled by a worse man; Spencer, Data of Ethics, 77.) if a man will not himself hold office and rule. It is from fear of this, as it appears to me, that the better sort hold office when they do, and then they go to it not in the expectation of enjoyment nor as to a good thing,[*](The good and the necessary is a favorite Platonic antithesis, but the necessary is often the condicio sine qua non of the good. Cf. 358 C, 493 C, 540 B, Laws 628 C-D, 858 A. Aristotle took over the idea, Met. 1072 b 12.) but as to a necessary evil and because they are unable to turn it over to better men than themselves or to their like. For we may venture to say that, if there should be a city of good men[*](This suggests an ideal state, but not more strongly than Meno 100 A, 89 B.) only, immunity from office-holding would be as eagerly contended for as office is now,[*](The paradox suggests Spencer’s altruistic competition and Archibald Marshall’s Upsidonia. Cf. 521 A, 586 C, Isocrates vii. 24, xii. 145; Mill, On Representative Government, p. 56: The good despot . . . can hardly be imagined as conseting to undertake it unless as a refuge from intolerable evils; ibid. p. 200: Until mankind in general are of opinion with Plato that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it.) and there it would be made plain that in very truth the true ruler does not naturally seek his own advantage but that of the ruled; so that every man of understanding would rather choose to be benefited by another than to be bothered with benefiting him. This point then I by no means concede to Thrasymachus, that justice is the advantage of the superior. But that we will reserve for another occasion.[*](εἰσαῦθις lays the matter on the table. Cf. 430 C. The suggestiveness of Thrasymachus’ defintion is exhausted, and Socrates turns to the larger question and main theme of the Republic raised by the contention that the unjust life is happier and more profitable than the just.) A far weightier matter seems to me Thrasymachus’s present statement, his assertion that the life of the unjust man is better than that of the just. Which now do you choose, Glaucon? said I, and which seems to you to be the truer statement? That the life of the just man is more profitable, I say, he replied.

Did you hear, said I, all the goods that Thrasymachus just now enumerated for the life of the unjust man? I heard, he said, but I am not convinced. Do you wish us then to try to persuade him, supposing we can find a way, that what he says is not true? Of course I wish it, he said. If then we oppose[*](This is done in 358 D ff. It is the favorite Greek method of balancing pros and cons in set speeches and antithetic enumerations. Cf. Herodotus viii. 83, the διαλέξεις (Diels, Vorsokratiker ii. pp. 334-345), the choice of Heracles (Xenophon Memorabilia ii. 1), and the set speeches in Euripides. With this method the short question and answer of the Socratic dialectic is often contrasted. Cf. Protagoras 329 A, 334-335, Gorgias 461-462, also Gorgias 471 E, Cratylus 437 D, Theaetetus 171 A.) him in a set speech enumerating in turn the advantages of being just and he replies and we rejoin, we shall have to count up and measure the goods listed in the respective speeches and we shall forthwith be in need of judges to decide between us. But if, as in the preceding discussion, we come to terms with one another as to what we admit in the inquiry, we shall be ourselves both judges and pleaders. Quite so, he said. Which method do you like best? said I. This one, he said. Come then, Thrasymachus, I said, go back to the beginning and answer us. You affirm that perfect and complete injustice is more profitable than justice that is complete. I affirm it, he said, and have told you my reasons. Tell me then how you would express yourself on this point about them. You call one of them, I presume, a virtue and the other a vice? Of course. Justice the virtue and injustice the vice? It is likely,[*](Thrasymachus’s Umwertung aller Werte reverses the normal application of the words, as Callicles does in Gorgias 491 E.) you innocent, when I say that injustice pays and justice doesn’t pay. But what then, pray? The opposite, he replied. What! justice vice? No, but a most noble simplicity[*](Thrasymachus recoils from the extreme position. Socrates’ inference from the etymology of εὐήθεια (cf. 343 C) is repudiated. Injustice is not turpitude (bad character) but—discretion. εὐβουλία in a higher sense is what Protagoras teaches (Protagoras 318 E) and in the highest sense is the wisdom of Plato’s guardians (428 B).) or goodness of heart. Then do you call injustice badness of heart? No, but goodness of judgement. Do you also, Thrasymachus, regard the unjust as intelligent and good? Yes, if they are capable of complete injustice, he said, and are able to subject to themselves cities and tribes of men. But you probably suppose that I mean those who take purses. There is profit to be sure even in that sort of thing, he said, if it goes undetected. But such things are not worth taking into the account, but only what I just described. I am not unaware of your meaning in that, I said; but this is what surprised me,[*](Socrates understands the theory, and the distinction between wholesale injustice and the petty profits that are not worth mentioning, but is startled by the paradox that injustice will then fall in the category of virtue and wisdom. Thrasymachus affirms the paradox and is brought to self-contradiction by a subtle argument (349-350 C) which may pass as a dramatic illustration of the game of question and answer. Cf. Introduction p. x.) that you should range injustice under the head of virtue and wisdom, and justice in the opposite class. Well, I do so class them, he said. That, said I, is a stiffer proposition,[*](ἤδη marks the advance from the affirmation that injustice is profitable to the point of asserting that it is a virtue. This is a stiffer proposition, i.e. harder to refute, or possibly more stubborn.) my friend, and if you are going as far as that it is hard to know what to answer.

For if your position were that injustice is profitable yet you conceded it to be vicious and disgraceful as some other[*](e.g. Polus in Gorgias 474 ff., 482 D-E. Cf. Isocrates De Pace 31. Thrasymachus is too wary to separate the κακόν and the αἰσχρόν and expose himself to a refutation based on conventional usage. Cf. Laws 627 D, Politicus 306 A, Laws 662 A.) disputants do, there would be a chance for an argument on conventional principles. But, as it is, you obviously are going to affirm that it is honorable and strong and you will attach to it all the other qualities that we were assigning to the just, since you don’t shrink from putting it in the category of virtue and wisdom.You are a most veritable prophet, he replied. Well, said I, I mustn’t flinch from following out the logic of the inquiry, so long as I conceive you to be saying what you think.[*](Cf. on 346 A.) For now, Thrasymachus, I absolutely believe that you are not mocking us but telling us your real opinions about the truth.[*](περὶ τῆς ἀληθείας suggests the dogmatic titles of sophistic and pre-Socratic books. Cf. Antiphon, p. 553 Diels, Campbell on Theaetetus 161 C, and Aristotle Met. passim.) What difference does it make to you, he said, whether I believe it or not? Why don’t you test the argument? No difference, said I, but here is something I want you to tell me in addition to what you have said. Do you think the just man would want to overreach[*](In pursuance of the analogy between the virtues and the arts the moral idea πλεονεξία (overreaching, getting more than your share; see on 359 C) is generalized to include doing more than or differently from. English can hardly reproduce this. Jowett’s Shakespearian quotation (King JohnIV. ii. 28), When workmen strive to do better than well,They do confound their skill in covetousness, though apt, only illustrates the thought in part.) or exceed another just man? By no means, he said; otherwise he would not be the delightful simpleton that he is. And would he exceed or overreach or go beyond the just action? Not that either, he replied. But how would he treat the unjust man—would he deem it proper and just to outdo, overreach, or go beyond him or would he not? He would, he said, but he wouldn’t be able to. That is not my question, I said, but whether it is not the fact that the just man does not claim and wish to outdo the just man but only the unjust? That is the case, he replied. How about the unjust then? Does he claim to overreach and outdo the just man and the just action? Of course, he said, since he claims to overreach and get the better of everything. Then the unjust man will overreach and outdo also both the unjust man and the unjust action, and all his endeavor will be to get the most in everything for himself. That is so. Let us put it in this way, I said; the just man does not seek to take advantage of his like but of his unlike, but the unjust man of both. Admirably put, he said. But the unjust man is intelligent and good and the just man neither. That, too, is right, he said. Is it not also true, I said, that the unjust man is like the intelligent and good and the just man is not? Of course, he said, being such he will be like to such and the other not. Excellent. Then each is such[*](The assumption that a thing is what it is like is put as an inference from Thrasymachus’s ready admission that the unjust man is wise and good and is like the wise and good. Jevons says in Substitution of Similars; Whatever is true of a thing is true of its like. But practical logic requires the qualification in respect of their likeness. Socrates, however, argues that since the good man is like the good craftsman in not overreaching, and the good craftsman is good, therefore the just man is good. The conclusion is sound, and the analogy may have a basis of psychological truth; but the argument is a verbal fallacy.) as that to which he is like. What else do you suppose? he said. Very well, Thrasymachus, but do you recognize that one man is a musician[*](Cf. 608 E, Gorgias 463 E, Protagoras 332 A, 358 D, Phaedo 103 C, Soph. 226 B, Philebus 34 E, Meno 75 D, 88 A, Alc. I. 128 B, Cratylus 385 B. The formula, which is merely used to obtain formal recognition of a term or idea required in the argument, readily lends itself to modern parody. Socrates seems to have gone far afield. Thrasymachus answers quite confidently, ἔγωγε, but in δήπου there is a hint of bewilderment as to the object of it all.) and another unmusical? I do. Which is the intelligent and which the unintelligent? The musician, I presume, is the intelligent and the unmusical the unintelligent. And is he not good in the things in which he is intelligent[*](Familiar Socratic doctrine. Cf. Laches 194 D, Lysis 210 D, Gorgias 504 D.) and bad in the things in which he is unintelligent? Yes. And the same of the physician? The same. Do you think then, my friend, that any musician in the tuning of a lyre would want to overreach[*](πλεονεκτεῖν is here a virtual synonym of πλέον ἔχειν. The two terms help the double meaning. Cf. Laws 691 A πλεονεκτεῖν τῶν νόμων.) another musician in the tightening and relaxing of the strings or would claim and think fit to exceed or outdo him? I do not. But would the the unmusical man? Of necessity, he said.

And how about the medical man? In prescribing food and drink would he want to outdo the medical man or the medical procedure?Surely not.But he would the unmedical man?Yes.Consider then with regard to all[*](Generalizing from the inductive instances.) forms of knowledge and ignorance whether you think that anyone who knows would choose to do or say other or more than what another who knows would do or say, and not rather exactly what his like would do in the same action.Why, perhaps it must be so, he said, in such cases. But what of the ignorant man—of him who does not know? Would he not overreach or outdo equally the knower and the ignorant? It may be. But the one who knows is wise? I’ll say so. And the wise is good? I’ll say so. Then he who is good and wise will not wish to overreach his like but his unlike and opposite. It seems so, he said. But the bad man and the ignoramus will overreach both like and unlike? So it appears. And does not our unjust man, Thrasymachus, overreach both unlike and like? Did you not say that? I did, he replied. But the just man will not overreach his like but only his unlike? Yes. Then the just man is like the wise and good, and the unjust is like the bad and the ignoramus. It seems likely. But furthermore we agreed that such is each as that to which he is like. Yes, we did. Then the just man has turned out[*](Cf. 334 A.) on our hands to be good and wise and the unjust man bad and ignorant. Thrasymachus made all these admissions not as I now lightly narrate them, but with much baulking and reluctance[*](Cf. Protagoras 333 B.) and prodigious sweating, it being summer, and it was then I beheld what I had never seen before—Thrasymachus blushing.[*](Cf. the blush of the sophist in Euthydemus 297 A.) But when we did reach our conclusion that justice is virtue and wisdom and injustice vice and ignorance, Good, said I, let this be taken as established.[*](The main paradox of Thrasymachus is refuted. It will be easy to transfer the other laudatory epithets ἰσχυρόν, etc., from injustice back to justice. Thrasymachus at first refuses to share in the discussion but finally nods an ironical assent to everything that Socrates says. So Callicles in Gorgias 510 A.) But we were also affirming that injustice is a strong and potent thing. Don’t you remember, Thrasymachus? I remember, he said; but I don’t agree with what you are now saying either and I have an answer to it, but if I were to attempt to state it, I know very well that you would say that I was delivering a harangue.[*](This is really a reminiscence of such passages as Theaetetus 162 D, Protagoras 336 B, Gorgias 482 C, 494 D, 513 A ff., 519 D. The only justification for it in the preceding conversation is 348 A-B.) Either then allow me to speak at such length as I desire,[*](So Polus in Gorgias 527 A.) or, if you prefer to ask questions, go on questioning and I, as we do for old wives[*](Cf. Gorgias 527 A.) telling their tales, will say Very good and will nod assent and dissent. No, no, said I, not counter to your own belief. Yes, to please you, he said, since you don’t allow me freedom of speech. And yet what more do you want? Nothing, indeed, said I; but if this is what you propose to do, do it and I will ask the questions. Ask on, then.

This, then, is the question I ask, the same as before, so that our inquiry may proceed in sequence. What is the nature of injustice as compared with justice? For the statement made, I believe, was that injustice is a more potent and stronger thing than justice. But now, I said, if justice is wisdom and virtue, it will easily, I take it, be shown to be also a stronger thing than injustice, since injustice is ignorance—no one could now fail to recognize that—but what I want is not quite so simple[*](Cf. 331 C, 386 B. Instead of the simple or absolute argument that justice, since it is wisdom and virtue, must be stronger, etc., then injustice, Socrates wishes to bring out the deeper thought that the unjust city or man is strong not because but in spite of his injustice and by virtue of some saving residue of justice.) as that. I wish, Thrasymachus, to consider it in some such fashion as this. A city, you would say, may be unjust and try to enslave other cities unjustly, have them enslaved and hold many of them in subjection. Certainly, he said; and this is what the best state will chiefly do, the state whose injustice is most complete. I understand, I said, that this was your view. But the point that I am considering is this, whether the city that thus shows itself superior to another will have this power without justice or whether she must of necessity combine it with justice. If,[*](Thrasymachus can foresee the implications of either theory.) he replied, what you were just now saying holds good, that justice is wisdom, with justice; if it is as I said, with injustice. Admirable, Thrasymachus, I said; you not only nod assent and dissent, but give excellent answers. I am trying to please you, he replied. Very kind of you. But please me in one thing more and tell me this: do you think that a city,[*](For the thought cf. Spencer, Data of Ethics, 114: Joint aggressions upon men outside the society cannot prosper if there are many aggressions of man on man within the society; Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, Chapter. VIII. 31: It (the loyalty of a thief to his gang) is rather a spurious or class morality, etc.; Carlyle: Neither James Boswell’s good book, nor any other good thing . . . is or can be performed by any man in virtue of his badness, but always solely in spite thereof. Proclus, In Rempub. Kroll i. 20 expands this idea. Dante (Convivio I. xii.) attributes to the Philosopher in the fifth of the ethics the saying that even robbers and plunderers love justice. Locke (Human Understanding i. 3) denies that this proves the principles of justice innate: They practise them as rules of convenience within their own communities, etc. Cf. further Isocrates xii. 226 on the Spartans, and Plato Protagoras 322 B, on the inconveniences of injustice in the state of nature, ἠδίκουν ἀλλήλους.) an army, or bandits, or thieves, or any other group that attempted any action in common, could accomplish anything if they wronged one another? Certainly not, said he. But if they didn’t, wouldn’t they be more likely to? Assuredly. For factions, Thrasymachus, are the outcome of injustice, and hatreds and internecine conflicts, but justice brings oneness of mind and love. Is it not so? So be it, he replied, not to differ from you. That is good of you, my friend; but tell me this: if it is the business of injustice to engender hatred wherever it is found, will it not, when it springs up either among freemen or slaves, cause them to hate and be at strife with one another, and make them incapable of effective action in common? By all means. Suppose, then, it springs up between two, will they not be at outs with and hate each other and be enemies both to one another and to the just? They will, he said. And then will you tell me that if injustice arises in one[*](The specific function must operate universally in bond or free, in many, two, or one. The application to the individual reminds us of the main argument of the Republic. Cf. 369 A, 433 D, 441 C. For the argument many, few or two, one, Cf. Laws 626 C.) it will lose its force and function or will it none the less keep it? Have it that it keeps it, he said.

And is it not apparent that its force is such that wherever it is found in city, family, camp, or in anything else it first renders the thing incapable of cooperation with itself owing to faction and difference, and secondly an enemy to itself[*](Plato paradoxically treats the state as one organism and the individual as many warring members (cf. Introduction p. xxxv). Hence, justice in one, and being a friend to oneself are more than metaphors for him. Cf. 621 C, 416 C, 428 D, Laws 626 E, 693 B, Epistles vii. 332 D, Antiphon 556.45 Diels ὁμονοεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτόν. Aritotle, Eth. Nic. v. 11, inquires whether a man can wrong himself, and Chrysippus (Plutarch, Stoic. Repug. xvi.) pronounces the expression absurd.) and to its opposite in every case, the just? Isn’t that so?By all means.Then in the individual too, I presume, its presence will operate all these effects which it is its nature to produce. It will in the first place make him incapable of accomplishing anything because of inner faction and lack of self-agreement, and then an enemy to himself and to the just. Is it not so?Yes.But, my friend, the gods too[*](This is the conventional climax of the plea for any moral ideal. So Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1179 a 24, proves that the σοφός being likest God is θεοφιλέστατος. Cf. Democ. fr. 217 D. μοῦνοι θεοφιλέες ὅσοις ἐχθρὸν τὸ ἀδικεῖν; 382 E, 612 E, Philebus 39 E, Laws 716 D. The enlightened Thrasymachus is disgusted at this dragging in of the gods. Cf. Theaetetus 162 D θεούς τε εἰς τὸ μέσον ἄγοντες. He is reported as saying (Diels p. 544.40) that the gods regard not human affairs, else they would not have overlooked the greatest of goods, justice, which men plainly do not use.) are just.Have it that they are, he said. So to the gods also, it seems, the unjust man will be hateful, but the just man dear. Revel in your discourse, he said, without fear, for I shall not oppose you, so as not to offend your partisans here. Fill up the measure of my feast,[*](ἑστιάσεως keeps up the image of the feast of reason. Cf. 354 A-B, Lysis 211 C, Gorgias 522 A, Phaedrus 227 B, and Tim. 17 A, from which perhaps it becomes a commonplace in Dante and the Middle Ages.) then, and complete it for me, I said, by continuing to answer as you have been doing. Now that the just appear to be wiser and better and more capable of action and the unjust incapable of any common action, and that if we ever say that any men who are unjust have vigorously combined to put something over, our statement is not altogether true, for they would not have kept their hands from one another if they had been thoroughly unjust, but it is obvious that there was in them some justice which prevented them from wronging at the same time one another too as well as those whom they attacked; and by dint of this they accomplished whatever they did and set out to do injustice only half corrupted[*](For the idea cf. the argument in Protagoras 327 C-D, that Socrates would yearn for the wickedness of Athens if he found himself among wild men who knew no justice at all.) by injustice, since utter rascals completely unjust are completely incapable of effective action—all this I understand to be the truth, and not what you originally laid down. But whether it is also true[*](The main ethical question of the Republic, suggested in 347 E, now recurs.) that the just have a better life than the unjust and are happier, which is the question we afterwards proposed for examination, is what we now have to consider. It appears even now that they are, I think, from what has already been said. But all the same we must examine it more carefully.[*](Similarly 578 C. What has been said implies that injustice is the corruption and disease of the soul (see on 445 A-B). But Socrates wishes to make further use of the argument from ἔργον or specific function.) For it is no ordinary[*](Cf. on 344 D, ibid, pp. 71 f.) matter that we are discussing, but the right conduct of life. Proceed with your inquiry, he said. I proceed, said I. Tell me then—would you say that a horse has a specific work[*](See on 335 D, and Aristotle Eth. Nic. i. 7. 14. The virtue or excellence of a thing is the right performance of its specific function. See Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, i. p. 301, Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 48. The following argument is in a sense a fallacy, since it relies on the double meaning of life, physical and moral (cf. 445 B and Cratylus 399 D) and on the ambiguity of εὖ πράττειν, fare well and do well. The Aristotelian commentator, Alexander, animadverts on the fallacy. For ἔργον cf. further Epictet. Dis. i. 4. 11, Max. Tyr. Dis. ii. 4, Musonius apud Stobaeus 117. 8, Thompson on Meno 90 E, Plato, Laws 896 D, Phaedrus 246 B.) or function? I would. Would you be willing to define the work of a horse or of anything else to be that which one can do only with it or best with it? I don’t understand, he replied. Well, take it this way: is there anything else with which you can see except the eyes? Certainly not. Again, could you hear with anything but ears? By no means. Would you not rightly say that these are the functions of these (organs)? By all means.

Once more, you could use a dirk to trim vine branches and a knife and many other instruments.Certainly.But nothing so well, I take it, as a pruning-knife fashioned for this purpose.That is true.Must we not then assume this to be the work or function of that?We must.You will now, then, I fancy, better apprehend the meaning of my question when I asked whether that is not the work of a thing which it only or it better than anything else can perform.Well, he said, I do understand, and agree that the work of anything is that. Very good, said I. Do you not also think that there is a specific virtue or excellence of everything for which a specific work or function is appointed? Let us return to the same examples. The eyes we say have a function? They have. Is there also a virtue of the eyes? There is. And was there not a function of the ears? Yes. And so also a virtue? Also a virtue. And what of all other things? Is the case not the same? The same. Take note now. Could the eyes possibly fulfil their function well if they lacked their own proper excellence and had in its stead the defect? How could they? he said; for I presume you meant blindness instead of vision. Whatever, said I, the excellence may be. For I have not yet come[*](Platonic dialectic asks and affirms only so much as is needed for the present purpose.) to that question, but am only asking whether whatever operates will not do its own work well by its own virtue and badly by its own defect. That much, he said, you may affirm to be true. Then the ears, too, if deprived of their own virtue will do their work ill? Assuredly. And do we then apply the same principle to all things? I think so. Then next consider this. The soul, has it a work which you couldn’t accomplish with anything else in the world, as for example, management, rule, deliberation, and the like, is there anything else than soul to which you could rightly assign these and say that they were its peculiar work? Nothing else. And again life? Shall we say that too is the function of the soul? Most certainly, he said. And do we not also say that there is an excellence virtue of the soul? We do. Will the soul ever accomplish its own work well if deprived of its own virtue, or is this impossible? It is impossible. Of necessity, then, a bad soul will govern and manage things badly while the good soul will in all these things do well.[*](For the equivocation Cf. Charmides 172 A, Gorgias 507 C, Xenophon Memorabilia iii. 9. 14, Aristotle Eth. Nic. 1098 b 21, Newman, Introduction Aristotle Politics p. 401, Gomperz, Greek Thinkers (English ed.), ii. p. 70. It does not seriously affect the validity of the argument, for it is used only as a rhetorical confirmation of the implication that κακῶς ἄρχειν, etc. = misery and the reverse of happiness.) Of necessity. And did we not agree that the excellence or virtue of soul is justice and its defect injustice? Yes, we did. The just soul and the just man then will live well and the unjust ill? So it appears, he said, by your reasoning.

But furthermore, he who lives well is blessed and happy, and he who does not the contrary.Of course.Then the just is happy and the unjust miserable.So be it, he said. But it surely does not pay to be miserable, but to be happy. Of course not. Never, then, most worshipful Thrasymachus, can injustice be more profitable than justice. Let this complete your entertainment, Socrates, at the festival of Bendis. A feast furnished by you, Thrasymachus, I said, now that you have become gentle with me and are no longer angry.[*](For similar irony cf. Gorgias 489 D, Euthydemus 304 C.) I have not dined well, however— by my own fault, not yours. But just as gluttons[*](Similarly Holmes (Poet at the Breakfast Table, p. 108) of the poet: He takes a bite out of the sunny side of this and the other, and ever stimulated and never satisfied, etc. Cf. Lucian, Demosth. Encom. 18, Julian Orat. ii. p. 69 c, Polyb. iii. 57. 7.) snatch at every dish that is handed along and taste it before they have properly enjoyed the preceding, so I, methinks, before finding the first object of our inquiry—what justice is—let go of that and set out to consider something about it, namely whether it is vice and ignorance or wisdom and virtue; and again, when later the view was sprung upon us that injustice is more profitable than justice I could not refrain from turning to that from the other topic. So that for me the present outcome of the discussion[*](Hirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 4, n. 1, argues that διαλόγου here means inquiry (Erorterung), not the dialogue with Thrasymachus.) is that I know nothing.[*](For the profession of ignorance at the close of a Socratic dialogue Cf. Charmides 175 A-B, Lysis 222 D-E, Protagoras 361 A-B, Xenophon Memorabilia iv. 2. 39. Cf. also Introduction p. x.) For if I don’t know what the just is,[*](Knowledge of the essence or definition must precede discussion of qualities and relations. Cf Meno 71 B, 86 D-E, Laches 190 B, Gorgias 448 E.) I shall hardly know whether it is a virtue or not, and whether its possessor is or is not happy.