Republic

I[*](Socrates narrates in the first person, as in the Charmides and Lysis; see Introduction p. vii, Hirzel, Der Dialog, i. p. 84. Demetrius, On Style, 205, cites this sentence as an example of trimeter members. Editors give references for the anecdote that it was found in Plato’s tablets with many variations. For Plato’s description of such painstaking Cf. Phaedrus 278 D. Cicero De sen.. 5. 13 scribens est mortuus.) went down yesterday to the Peiraeus[*](Cf. 439 E; about a five-mile walk.) with Glaucon, the son of Ariston, to pay my devotions[*](Plato and Xenophon represent Socrates as worshipping the gods, νόμῳ πόλεως. Athanasius, Contra gentes, 9, censures Plato for thus adoring an Artemis made with hands, and the fathers and medieval writers frequently cite the passage for Plato’s regrettable concessions to polytheism—persuasio civilis as Minucius Felix styles it. Cf. Eusebius Praep. Evang. xiii. 13. 66.) to the Goddess,[*](Presumably Bendis (354 A), though, as the scholiast observes, Athena is ἡ θεός for an Athenian. For foreign cults at the Peiraeus see Holm, History of Greece , iii. p. 189.) and also because I wished to see how they would conduct the festival since this was its inauguration.[*](See Introduction.) I thought the procession of the citizens very fine, but it was no better than the show, made by the marching of the Thracian contingent. After we had said our prayers and seen the spectacle we were starting for town when Polemarchus, the son of Cephalus, caught sight of us from a distance as we were hastening homeward[*](Headed homeward is more exact and perhaps better.) and ordered his boy[*](A Greek gentleman would always be so attended. Cf. Charmides 155 A, Meno 82 B, Protagoras 310 C, Demosthenes xlvii. 36.) run and bid us to wait[*](The bounder in Theophrastus, Char. xi. (xvii.), if he sees persons in a hurry will ask them to wait.) for him, and the boy caught hold[*](Charmides 153 B, Parmenides 126 A, 449 B.) of my himation from behind and said, Polemarchus wants you to wait. And I turned around and asked where his master[*](Ipse, Cf. Protagoras 314 D; ipse dixit; Now you are not ipse, for I am he.—Shakes.) was. There he is, he said, behind you, coming this way. Wait for him. So we will, said Glaucon, and shortly after Polemarchus came up and Adeimantus, the brother of Glaucon, and Niceratus, the son of Nicias, and a few others apparently from the procession. Whereupon Polemarchus said, Socrates, you appear to have turned your faces townward and to be going to leave us. Not a bad guess, said I. But you see how many we are? he said. Surely. You must either then prove yourselves the better men[*](Cf. the playful threat in Philebus 16 A, Phaedrus 236 C, Horace, Satire i. 4. 142.) or stay here. Why, is there not left, said I, the alternative of our persuading[*](For the characteristic Socratic contrast between force and persuasion cf. 411 D, and the anecdote in Diogenes Laertius vii. 24.) you that you ought to let us go? But could you persuade us, said he, if we refused to listen? Nohow, said Glaucon. Well, we won’t listen, and you might as well make up your minds to it.

Do you mean to say, interposed Adeimantus, that you haven’t heard that there is to be a torchlight race[*](See Sterrett in AJP xxii. p. 393. The torch was passed down the lines which competed as wholes. Cf. Swinburne, Hymn of Man: Where the runners outwear each other, but running with lampless hands,No man takes light from his brother, till blind at the goal he stands. For the metaphorical transmission of the torch of life cf. Plato, Laws, 776 B, Lucretius ii. 79.) this evening on horseback in honor of the Goddess? On horseback? said I. That is a new idea. Will they carry torches and pass them along to one another as they race with the horses, or how do you mean? That’s the way of it, said Polemarchus, and, besides, there is to be a night festival which will be worth seeing. For after dinner we will get up[*](Rise from the table. This is forgotten.) and go out and see the sights and meet a lot of the lads there and have good talk. So stay and do as we ask.[*](In American, the colloquial Greek means be a sport.) It looks as if we should have to stay, said Glaucon. Well, said I, if it so be, so be it. So we went with them to Polemarchus’s house, and there we found Lysias and Euthydemus, the brothers of Polemarchus, yes, and[*](The particles single out Thrasymachus for ironical emphasis. Proclus in Tim. 3 E preserves them in his enumeration of the dramatis personae.) Thrasymachus, too, of Chalcedon, and Charmantides of the deme of Paeania, and Kleitophon the son of Aristonymus. And the father of Polemarchus, Cephalus, was also at home. And I thought him much aged, for it was a long time since I had seen him. He was sitting on a sort of couch with cushions and he had a chaplet[*](A companion picture to the fair vision of the youthful Lysis (Lysis, 207 A). The wreath was worn at the sacrifice.) on his head, for he had just finished sacrificing in the court. So we went and sat down beside him, for there were seats there disposed in a circle.[*](For the seats compare Protagoras 317 D-E, Cicero Laelius 1. 2 in hemicyclio sedentem.) As soon as he saw me Cephalus greeted me and said, You are not a very frequent[*](The language recalls the Homeric formula, πάρος γε μὲν οὔτι θαμίζεις, Iliad xviii. 386, Odyssey v. 88, Jebb on O.C. 672. Cephalus’ friendly urgency to Socrates is in the tone of Laches 181 C.) visitor, Socrates. You don’t often come down to the Peiraeus to see us. That is not right. For if I were still able to make the journey up to town easily there would be no need of your resorting hither, but we would go to visit you. But as it is you should not space too widely your visits here. For I would have you know that, for my part, as the satisfactions of the body decay,[*](Plato characteristically contrasts the transitory pleasures of the body with the enduring joys of the mind. Phaedrus 258 E. Anaximenes imitates and expands the passage, Stobaeus, 117. 5. Pleasures are not strictly speaking of the body, but in or relating to it. See my Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 45.) in the same measure my desire for the pleasures of good talk and my delight in them increase. Don’t refuse then, but be yourself a companion to these lads and make our house your resort and regard us as your very good friends and intimates. Why, yes, Cephalus, said I, and I enjoy talking with the very aged. For to my thinking we have to learn of them as it were from wayfarers[*](Much of this passage, including the comparison of old men to travellers, is copied by Cicero, De sen. 3 ff.) who have preceded us on a road on which we too, it may be, must some time fare—what[*](Cf. Horace, Epistles i. 11 Quid tibi visa Chios? The vague neuter and the slight anacoluthon give a colloquial turn to the sentence.) it is like—is it rough[*](Hesiod, Works and Days 290, says that the path of virtue is rough at first and then grows easy.) and hard going or easy and pleasant to travel. And so now I would fain learn of you what you think of this thing, now that your time has come to it, the thing that the poets call the threshold[*](This, whatever its precise meaning, was a familiar phrase like our One foot in the grave. Cf. Leaf on Iliad xxii. 60, xxiv 487; Hyperides (i. xx. 13) employs it without apology in prose.) of old age. Is it a hard part of life to bear or what report have you to make of it?

Yes, indeed, Socrates, he said, I will tell you my own feeling about it. For it often happens that some of us elders of about the same age come together and verify[*](Lit. preserving. For the reverse Cf. Symposium 174 B. Cicero renders, similes cum similibus veteri proverbio facile congregantur. The proverb is ἧλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει Phaedrus 240 C, or, as in Lysis 214 A, Protagoras 337 D, Symposium 195 B, the reference may be to Homer’s ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον ἄγει θεὸς ὡς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Odyssey xvii. 218. Milton, Doctrine and Discipline of Divorce, x., The ancient proverb in Homer . . . entitles this work of leading each like person to his like, peculiarly to God, himself.) the old saw of like to like. At these reunions most of us make lament, longing for the lost joys of youth and recalling to mind the pleasures of wine, women, and feasts, and other things thereto appertaining, and they repine in the belief that the greatest things have been taken from them and that then they lived well and now it is no life at all.[*](The sentiment of the sensualist from Mimnermus to Byron; cf. also Simonides fr. 71, Sophocles Antigone 1165, Antiphanes, in Stobaeus 63. 12. For the application to old age Cf. Anth. Pal. ix. 127, Horace Epistles ii. 2. 55, and the ψόγος γήρως in Stobaeus, 116.) And some of them complain of the indignities that friends and kinsmen put upon old age and thereto recite a doleful litany[*](For such a litany cf. Sophocles O. C. 1235.) of all the miseries for which they blame old age. But in my opinion, Socrates, they do not put the blame on the real cause.[*](This suggests Aristotle’s fallacy of the false cause, Soph. El. 167 b 21. Cf. Philebus 28 A and Isocrates xv. 230.) For if it were the cause I too should have had the same experience so far as old age is concerned, and so would all others who have come to this time of life. But in fact I have ere now met with others who do not feel in this way, and in particular I remember hearing Sophocles the poet greeted by a fellow who asked, How about your service of Aphrodite, Sophocles—is your natural force still unabated? And he replied, Hush, man, most gladly have I escaped this thing you talk of, as if I had run away from a raging and savage beast of a master.[*](Allusions to the passage are frequent. Theon, Progymn. ii. 66 (Spengel), turns to the anecdote in an edifying χρεία. Ammianus Marcellinus xxv. 4. 2 tells us that the chastity of the emperor Julian drew its inspiration hence. Schopenhauer often dwelt on the thought, cf. Cicero Cato M. 14, Plutarch, De cupid. divit. 5, An seni p. 788, Athen. xii. p. 510, Philostr. Vit. Apoll. 1. 13.) I thought it a good answer then and now I think so still more. For in very truth there comes to old age a great tranquillity in such matters and a blessed release. When the fierce tensions[*](Cf. Phaedo 86 C, Philebus 47 A, Laws 645 B, 644 E σπῶσι.) of the passions and desires relax, then is the word of Sophocles approved, and we are rid of many and mad[*](Cf. Euripides I. A. 547 μαινομένων οἴστρων.) masters. But indeed in respect of these complaints and in the matter of our relations with kinsmen and friends there is just one cause, Socrates—not old age, but the character of the man. For if men are temperate and cheerful[*](For Sophocles as εὔκολος cf. Aristophanes Frogs 82, and on this quality, Laws 791 C.) even old age is only moderately burdensome. But if the reverse, old age, Socrates, and youth are hard for such dispositions. And I was filled with admiration[*](Cephalus prefigures the old age of the righteous, infra 612-613. There is then no parody of Antisthenes as Joel fancies.) for the man by these words, and desirous of hearing more I tried to draw him out and said, I fancy, Cephalus, that most people, when they hear you talk in this way, are not convinced but think that you bear old age lightly not because of your character but because of your wealth. For the rich, they say, have many consolations.[*](Cf. Teles. (Hense, pp.9-10), Philemon in Plutarch p. 358, Musonius, Stobaeus 117. 8. A fragment of Anaxandrides in Stobaeus Florileg. 68. 1 is almost a paraphrase of this passage. Thucydides ii. 44 says that honour, not money, is the consolation of old age.)

You are right, he said. They don’t accept my view and there is something in their objection, though not so much as they suppose. But the retort of Themistocles comes in pat here, who, when a man from the little island of Seriphus[*](Lit. the Seriphean of the anecdote, which, however, Herodotus (viii. 125) tells of another. Cicero Cato M. 8 Seriphio cuidam.) grew abusive and told him that he owed his fame not to himself but to the city from which he came, replied that neither would he himself ever have made a name if he had been born in Seriphus nor the other if he had been an Athenian. And the same principle applies excellently to those who not being rich take old age hard; for neither would the reasonable man find it altogether easy to endure old age conjoined with poverty, nor would the unreasonable man by the attainment of riches ever attain to self-contentment and a cheerful temper. May I ask, Cephalus, said I, whether you inherited most of your possessions or acquired them yourself? Acquired, eh? he said. As a moneymaker, I hold a place somewhere halfway between my grandfather and my father. For my grandfather and namesake[*](Cephalus, Lysanias, Cephalus, and so frequently.) inherited about as much property as I now possess and multiplied it many times, my father Lysanias reduced it below the present amount, and I am content if I shall leave the estate to these boys not less but by some slight measure more than my inheritance. The reason I asked, I said, is that you appear to me not to be over-fond of money. And that is generally the case with those who have not earned it themselves.[*](Aristotle makes a similar observation, Eth. Nic. iv. 1.20, Rhet. i. 11. 26, ii. 16. 4. For nouveaux riches, γενναῖοι ἐκ βαλλαντίου, see Starkie on Aristophanes Wasps, 1309.) But those who have themselves acquired it have a double reason in comparison with other men for loving it. For just as poets feel complacency about their own poems and fathers about their own sons,[*](Cf. Theaetetus 160 E, Symposium 209 C, Phaedrus 274 E, with Epaminondas’ saying, that Leuctra and Mantineia were his children.) so men who have made money take this money seriously as their own creation and they also value it for its uses as other people do. So they are hard to talk to since they are unwilling to commend anything except wealth. You are right, he replied. I assuredly am, said I. But tell me further this. What do you regard as the greatest benefit you have enjoyed from the possession of property? Something, he said, which I might not easily bring many to believe if I told them.[*](Cf. Walter Scott’s Be a good man, my dear; nothing else will give you any comfort, when you come to lie here. Perhaps the earliest positive expression of faith in future life and judgement for sin is Pindar’s Second Olympian. See Rohde’s Psyche and Adam in Cambridge Praelections. The Epicureans and sometimes the Stoics unfairly reprobated Plato’s appeal here to this motive, which he disregards in his main argument and returns to only in the tenth book. Cf. 363 C-D, 386 B, 613 E ff., also 496 E, 498 D, 608 D.) For let me tell you, Socrates, he said, that when a man begins to realize that he is going to die, he is filled with apprehensions and concern about matters that before did not occur to him. The tales that are told of the world below and how the men who have done wrong here must pay the penalty there,[*](Cf. 498 C and Pindar Ol. ii. 64. But 500 D, there is the realm of Platonic ideas.) though he may have laughed them down[*](Cf. Gorgias 523 A, 527 A.) hitherto, then begin to torture his soul with the doubt that there may be some truth in them. And apart from that the man himself[*](The conclusion logically expected, is more credulous, shifts to the alternative preferred by Plato. ὥσπερ marks the figurative sense of nearer. καθορᾷ is not takes a more careful view of it (Goodwin) but wins a glimpse, catches sight of those obscure things, as a sailor descries land. So often in Plato. Cf. Epin. 985 C. Sir Thomas Browne, Christ. Morals, iii. 22 And having been long tossed in the Ocean of the world, he will by that time feel the draught of another. Waller on the Divine Poems—The Soul's Dark Cottage, batter'd and decay'd,Lets in new light through chinks that time has made . . . Leaving the old, both worlds at once they viewThat stand upon the threshold of the new. Rabelais, iii. 21 Aussi les anges, les heroes, les bons demons (selon la doctrine des Platonicques) voyans les humains prochains de mort comme deport très sceur et salutaire—les saluent les consolent, parlent avec eux et ja commencement leur communicquer art de divination.) either from the weakness of old age or possibly as being now nearer to the things beyond has a somewhat clearer view of them. Be that as it may, he is filled with doubt, surmises, and alarms and begins to reckon up and consider whether he has ever wronged anyone.

Now he to whom the ledger of his life shows an account of many evil deeds starts up[*](Polyb. v. 52. 13, and for the thought Iamblichus, Protrepticus 127 A, Job iv. 13-14. Tennyson, Vastness ix.—Pain, that has crawl’d from the corpse of Pleasure, a worm which writhes all day, and at nightStirs up again in the heart of the sleeper, and stings him back to the curse of the light.) even from his dreams like children again and again in affright and his days are haunted by anticipations of worse to come. But on him who is conscious of no wrong that he has done a sweet hope[*](The better hope of the initiated, often mentioned in connection with the mysteries, blends with the better hope of the righteous (Isocrates i. 39, iv. 20, viii. 34, Schmidt, Ethik der Griechen, ii. 73), and in the conclusion of the Pindar passage almost becomes the hope against which Greek moralists warn us. Cf. Pindar Nem. xi. in fine, Sophocles Antigone 615, Thuc. 2.62, Thuc. 3.45.) ever attends and a goodly to be nurse of his old age, as Pindar[*](Pindar, Fragment 214, L.C.L. Edition.) too says. For a beautiful saying it is, Socrates, of the poet that when a man lives out his days in justice and piety

1. sweet companion with him, to cheer his heart and nurse his old age, accompanies
2. Hope, who chiefly rules the changeful mind of mortals.

I must admit, said I, that it is not easy to disbelieve Simonides. For he is a wise and inspired man.[*](The Platonic Socrates ironically treats the poets as inspired but not wise because they cannot explain their fine sayings. Apology 22 A-B, Ion 542 A. He always assumes that the utterances of the wise men must be true. Theaetetus 152 B, Phaedrus 260 A, Laws 888 E, Euthydemus 280 A. But they are often obscure, and he reserves for himself the right of interpretation (335 E). Since the poets contradict one another and cannot be cross-examined they are not to be taken seriously as authorities. Protagoras 347 E, Meno 71 D, Lysis 214-215, Hippias Minor 365 D.) But just what he may mean by this you, Polemarchus, doubtless know, but I do not. Obviously he does not mean what we were just speaking of, this return of a deposit[*](Owing to the rarity of banks reddere depositum was throughout antiquity the typical instance of just conduct. Cf. 442 E, Mayor on Juvenal Satire 13. 15, Herodotus. vi. 86, Democr. fr. 265 Diels, Philo, De spec. leg. 4. 67. Salt was a symbol of justice because it preserves ἃ παραλαμβάνει: Diogenes Laertius viii. 35. Earth is iustissima tellus because she returns the seed with interest. Socrates’ distinction between the fact of returning a deposit, and returning it rightly is expressed in Stoic terminology: ut si iuste depositum reddere in recte factis sit, in officiis ponatur depositum reddere, Cicero De fin. iii. 18.) to anyone whatsoever even if he asks it back when not in his right mind. And yet what the man deposited is due to him in a sense, is it not? Yes. But rendered to him it ought not to be by any manner of means when he demands it not being his right mind. True, said he. It is then something other than this that Simonides must, as it seems, mean by the saying that it is just to render back what is due. Something else in very deed, he replied, for he believes that friends owe it to friends to do them some good and no evil. I see, said I; you mean that[*](Adam insists that the meaning of μανθάνω ὅτι here and everywhere is it is because.) he does not render what is due or owing who returns a deposit of gold if this return and the acceptance prove harmful and the returner and the recipient are friends. Isn’t that what you say Simonides means? Quite so. But how about this—should one not render to enemies what is their due? By all means, he said, what is due[*](In the Greek the particles indicate slight irritation in the speaker.) and owing to them, and there is due and owing from an enemy to an enemy what also is proper for him, some evil. It was a riddling[*](Cf. Lysis 214 D, Charmides 162 A, Theaetetus 152 C, 194 C, Alc. II. 147 B. The poet, like the soothsayer, is inspired, but only the thinker can interpret his meaning. Cf. 331 E, Tim. 72 A. Allegory and the allegorical interpretation are always conscious and often ironical in Plato.) definition of justice, then, that Simonides gave after the manner of poets; for while his meaning, it seems, was that justice is rendering to each what befits him, the name that he gave to this was the due. What else do you suppose? said he. In heaven’s name! said I, suppose[*](Socrates often presents an argument in this polite form. Cf. 337 A-B, 341 E, Gorgias 451 B, Hippias Major 287 B ff., Thompson on Meno 72 B.) someone had questioned him thus: Tell me, Simonides, the art that renders what that is due and befitting to what is called the art of medicine.[*](Socrates tests ambitious general definitions by the analogy of the arts and their more specific functions. Cf. Gorgias 451 A, Protagoras 311 B, 318 B. The idiomatic double question must be retained in the translation. The English reader, if puzzled, may compare Calverly’s Pickwick examination: Who thinks that in which pocket of what garment and where he has left what entreating him to return to whom and how many what and all how big?) What do you take it would have been his answer? Obviously, he said, the art that renders to bodies drugs, foods, and drinks. And the art that renders to what things what that is due and befitting is called the culinary art? Seasoning to meats. Good. In the same way tell me the art that renders what to whom would be denominated justice. If we are to follow the previous examples,[*](Similarly Protagoras 312 A.) Socrates, it is that which renders benefits and harms to friends and enemies. To do good to friends and evil to enemies,[*](Simonides’ defintion is reduced to the formula of traditional Greek morality which Plato was the first to transcend not only in the Republic infra, 335 D-336 A, but in the Crito 49 B-C. It is often expressed by Xenophon (Memorabilia ii. 3. 14, ii. 6. 35) and Isocrates (i. 26). But the polemic is not especially aimed at them. Cf. Schmidt, Ethik, ii. 313, 319, 363, Pindar, Pyth. ii. 85, Aeschylus Choeph. 123, Jebb, introduction to Sopocles Ajax, p. xxxix, Thumser, Staats-Altertumer, p. 549, n. 6, Thompson on Meno 71 E.) then, is justice in his meaning? I think so. Who then is the most able when they are ill to benefit friends and harm enemies in respect to disease and health? The physician. And who navigators in respect of the perils of the sea? The pilot. Well then, the just man, in what action and for what work is he the most competent to benefit friends and harm enemies? In making war and as an ally, I should say. Very well. But now if they are not sick, friend Polemarchus, the physician is useless to them. True. And so to those who are not at sea the pilot. Yes. Shall we also say this that for those who are not at war the just man is useless?

By no means.There is a use then even in peace for justice?Yes, it is useful.But so is agriculture, isn’t it?Yes.Namely, for the getting of a harvest?Yes.But likewise the cobbler’s art?Yes.Namely, I presume you would say, for the getting of shoes.Certainly.Then tell me, for the service and getting of what would you say that justice is useful in time of peace?In engagements and dealings, Socrates.And by dealings do you mean associations, partnerships, or something else?Associations, of course.Is it the just man, then, who is a good and useful associate and partner in the placing of draughts or the draught-player?The player.And in the placing of bricks and stones is the just man a more useful and better associate than the builder?By no means.Then what is the association[*](Justice (the political art) must be something as definite as the special arts, yet of universal scope. This twofold requirement no definition of a virtue in the minor dialogues is ever able to satisfy. It is met only by the theory worked out in the Republic. Cf. Unity of Plato’s Thought, p. 14.) in which the just man is a better partner than the harpist as an harpist is better than the just man for striking the chords?For money-dealings,[*](Justice is more nearly defined as having to do with money or legal obligations—the common-sense view to which Aristotle inclines.) I think.Except, I presume, Polemarchus, for the use of money when there is occasion to buy in common or sell a horse. Then, I take it, the man who knows horses, isn’t it so?Apparently.And again, if it is a vessel, the shipwright or the pilot.It would seem so.What then is the use of money in common for which a just man is the better partner?When it is to be deposited and kept safe, Socrates.You mean when it is to be put to no use but is to lie idle[*](Interest is ignored. Aristotle, Eth. Nic. 1120 a 9, splits hairs on this.)?Quite so.Then it is when money is useless that justice is useful in relation to it?It looks that way.And similarly when a scythe is to be kept safe, then justice is useful both in public and private. But when it is to be used, the vinedresser’s art is useful?Apparently.And so you will have to say that when a shield and a lyre are to be kept and put to no use, justice is useful, but when they are to be made use of, the military art and music.Necessarily.And so in all other cases, in the use of each thing, justice is useless but in its uselessness useful?It looks that way.Then, my friend, justice cannot be a thing of much worth[*](A virtue is presumably a good. A defintion that makes justice useless is ipso facto refuted. This line of argument is a standardized procedure in the minor dialogues. Cf. my Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 78. The argument continues: The arts are faculties of opposites. The fallacy is intentional, as in Hippias Minor 365, where it is argued that the voluntary lie is better than the involuntary. This impressed Aristotle, who met it with his distinction between habit and faculty (ἕξις and δύναμις). Cf Topics, vi. 12. 6, Eth. Nic. v. 1. 4, vi. 5. 7, Met. 1046 b, Unity of Plato’s Thought, n. 38.) if it is useful only for things out of use and useless. But let us consider this point. Is not the man who is most skilful to strike or inflict a blow in a fight, whether as a boxer or elsewhere, also the most wary to guard against[*](The shift from the active to the middle here helps Plato to his transition from guarding to guarding against.) a blow?Assuredly.Is it not also true that he who best knows how to guard against disease is also most cunning to communicate it and escape detection?I think so.

But again the very same man is a good guardian of an army who is good at stealing a march[*](The play on the Greek word recalls Shakespeare’s If you do take a thief . . . let him show himself what he is and steal out of your company, Much Ado, III. iii.) upon the enemy in respect of their designs and proceedings generally.Certainly.Of whatsoever, then, anyone is a skilful guardian, of that he is also a skilful thief?It seems so.If then the just man is an expert in guarding money he is an expert in stealing it.The argument certainly points that way.[*](The qualified assent here marks the speaker’s perception that something is wrong. But often it expresses modesty or is a mere mannerism. Cf. 399 D, 401 D, 409 C, 410 A, 553 E, etc.)A kind of thief then the just man it seems has turned out to be, and it is likely that you acquired this idea from Homer.[*](Plato playfully follows the fashion of tracing all modern wisdom to Homer. Cf. Theaetetus 152 E.) For he regards with complacency Autolycus,[*](A snapper-up of unconsidered trifles (Winter’s Tale, IV. iii. 26), whom Homer celebrates (Hom. Od. 19.395). The naivete of Homer’s amoral standpoint (Cf. Odyssey xiii. 290 ff.) tickles Plato’s sense of humor, and he amuses himself by showing that the popular rule help friends and harm enemies is on the same ethical plane. So in the Euthyphro, popular piety is gravely reduced to a kind of καπηλεία or retail trade in prayer and blessings. Cf. also Dio Chrys. Or. xi. 315 R., and modern laments over the Decay of Lying.) the maternal uncle of Odysseus, and says

he was gifted beyond all men in thievery and perjury.