De Fuga Et Inventione

Because, I imagine, wickedness is an evil which can never end, but which is kindled and is never able to be [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 15. ) [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 20. ) [*](Leviticus x. 2. ) [*](Leviticus x. 3. ) [*](Psalm cxiii. 25. ) [*](Genesis iv. 15. )

But it was by all means necessary that different regions should be assigned to different things, the heaven to good things, the earth to what is evil; for the tendency of good is to soar on high, and if it ever comes down to us, for its Father is very bounteous, it still is very justly anxious to return again to heaven. But evil remains here, living at the greatest possible distance from the divine choir, always hovering around mortal life, and unable to die from among the human race.

This, too, one of the most eminent among the men who have been admired for their wisdom has asserted, speaking in a magnificent strain in the Theaetetus, where he says, "But it is impossible for evils to come to an end. For it is indispensable that there should always be something in opposition to God. And it is equally impossible that it should have its place in the divine regions; but it must of necessity hover around mortal nature and this place where we live; on which account we ought to endeavour to flee from this place as speedily as possible. And our flight will be a likening of ourselves to God, to the best of our power. And such a likening consists of being just and holy in conjunction with prudence." [*]( Plato. Theaetetus, p. 176. )

Very naturally, therefore, Cain, the symbol of wickedness, will not die, for wickedness must of necessity be always alive in the mortal race of mankind; so that the expression, "to die the death," is not incorrectly spoken of the homicide, for the reasons which have here been given.

And the expression, "not intentionally, but if God deliver him into his hand," is used with exceeding propriety with reference to those who commit an unintentional homicide; for it seems to Moses here, that our intentional actions are the fruit of our own mind and will, but that our unintentional actions proceed from the will of God. I mean by this, not our sins, but, on the contrary, those things which are the [*]( Plato. Theaetetus, p. 176. )

for it is not becoming for God himself to inflict punishment, as being the first and most excellent Lawgiver; but he punishes by the ministry of others, and not by his own act. It is very suitable to his character that he himself should bestow his graces, and his free gifts, and his great benefits, inasmuch as he is by nature good and bountiful. But it is not fitting that he should inflict his punishments further than by his mere command, inasmuch as he is a king; but he must act in this by the instrumentality of others, who are suitable for such purposes.

And the practiser of virtue, Jacob, bears his testimony in support of this doctrine of mine, where he says, "The God who has nourished me from my youth up, the angel who delivered me from all my evils." [*](Genesis xlviii. 15. ) For the more ancient benefits, those by which the soul is nourished, he attributes to God, but the more recent ones, which are caused by the errors of the soul, he attributes to the servant of God.

On this account, I imagine it is, that when Moses was speaking philosophically of the creation of the world, while he described everything else as having been created by God alone, he mentions man alone as having been made by him in conjunction with other assistants; for, says Moses, "God said, Let us make man in our image." [*](Genesis i. 26. ) The expression, "let us make," indicating a plurality of makers.

Here, therefore, the Father is conversing with his own powers, to whom he has assigned the task of making the mortal part of our soul, acting in imitation of his own skill while he was fashioning the rational part within us, thinking it right that the dominant part within the soul should be the work of the Ruler of all things, but that the part which is to be kept in subjection should be made by those who are subject to him.

And he made us of the powers which were subordinate to him, not only for the reason which has been mentioned, but also because the soul of man alone was destined to receive notions of good and of evil, and to choose one of the two, since it could not adopt both. Therefore, he thought it necessary to assign the origin of evil to other workmen than himself, —but to retain the generation of good for himself alone.

On which account, after Moses had already put in God’s mouth this expression, "Let us make man," as if speaking to several persons, he adds, as if he were speaking only of [*](Genesis xlviii. 15. ) [*](Genesis i. 26. )

for which reason the especial real man is spoken of with the article; for the words of Moses are, "The God made the man;" that is to say, he made that reason destitute of species and free from all admixture. But he speaks of man in general without the addition of the article; for the expression, "Let us make man," shows that he means the being compounded of irrational and rational nature.

In accordance with this he has also not attributed the blessing of the virtuous and the cursing of the wicked to the same ministers, though both these offices receive praise. But since the blessing of the good has the precedence in panegyrics, and the affixing curses on the wicked is in the second rank of those who are appointed for these duties (and they are the chiefs, and leaders of the race, twelve in number, whom it is customary to call the patriarchs), he has assigned the better six, who are the best for the task of blessing, namely, Simeon, Levi, Judah, Issachar, Joseph, and Benjamin; and the others he has appointed for the curses, namely, the first and last sons of Leah, Reuben, and Zabulon, and the four bastard sons by the handmaidens;

for the chiefs of the royal tribe, and of the tribe consecrated to the priesthood, Judah and Levi, are reckoned in the former class. Very naturally, therefore, does God give up those who have done deeds worthy of death to the hands of others for punishment, wishing to teach us that the nature of evil is banished to a distance from the divine choir, since even punishment, which, though a good, has in it some imitation of evil, is confirmed by others.

And the expression, "I will give thee a place to which he who has slain a man unintentionally shall flee," appears to me to be spoken with exceeding propriety; for what he calls a place is not a region filled by the body, but is rather, in a figure, God himself, because he, surrounding all things, is not surrounded himself, and because he is that to which all things flee for refuge.

It is proper, therefore, for him who appears to have been involuntarily changed to say that this change has come upon him by the divine will, just as it is not proper for him to say so who has done evil of his

Having now said thus much in a philosophical spirit with respect to involuntary offences, he proceeds to legislate concerning the man who rises up to attack another, or who treacherously plots his death, saying, "But if any one attacks his neighbour so as to slay him by treachery, and he flees to God," that is to say to the place which has already been spoken of under a figure, from which life is given to all men. For he says also in another passage: "Whosoever shall flee thither shall live."

But is not everlasting life a fleeing for refuge to the living God? and is not a fleeing from his presence death? But if anyone sets upon another, he by all means is committing iniquity by deliberate purpose, and that which is done with treachery is liable to be accounted among voluntary actions, just as, on the other hand, that which is done without treachery is not subject to blame.

There is nothing therefore of the wicked actions which are done secretly, and treacherously, and of malice aforethought, which we can properly say are done through the will of God, but they are done only through our own will. For, as I have said before, the storehouses of wickedness are in us ourselves, and those of good alone are with God.

Whosoever therefore flees for refuge, that is to say, whosoever accuses not himself, but God as the cause of his offence, let him be punished, being deprived of that refuge to the altar which tends to salvation and security, and which is meant for suppliants alone. And is not this proper? For the altar is full of victims, in which there is no spot, I mean of innocent and thoroughly purified souls. But to pronounce the Deity the cause of evil is a spot which it is hard to cure, or rather which is altogether incurable.