De Fuga Et Inventione

Philo Judaeus

The works of Philo Judaeus, the contemporary of Josephus, volume 2. Yonge, C. D., translator. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854.

She also confirmed her statement by another passage in scripture of the following purport: "Behold, I have set before thy face life and death, good and evil." [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 15. ) Therefore, O all-wise man, good and virtue mean life, and evil and wickedness mean death. And in another passage we read, "This is thy life, and thy length of days, to love the Lord thy God." [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 20. ) This is the most admirable definition of immortal life, to be occupied by a love and affection for God unembarrassed by any connection with the flesh or with the body.

Thus, the priests, Nadab and Abihu, die in order that they may live; taking an immortal existence in exchange for this mortal life, and departing from the creature to the uncreated God. And it is with reference to this fact that the symbols of incorruptibility are thus celebrated: "Then they died before the Lord;" [*](Leviticus x. 2. ) that is to say, they lived; for it is not lawful for any dead person to come into the sight of the Lord. And again, this is what the Lord himself has said, "I will be sanctified in those who come nigh unto me." [*](Leviticus x. 3. )"But the dead," as it is also said in the Psalms, "shall not praise the Lord," [*](Psalm cxiii. 25. )

for that is the work of the living; but Cain, that shameless man, that fratricide, is no where spoken of in the law as dying; but there is an oracle delivered respecting him in such words as these: "The Lord God put a mark upon Cain, as a sign that no one who found him should kill him." [*](Genesis iv. 15. ) Why so?

Because, I imagine, wickedness is an evil which can never end, but which is kindled and is never able to be [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 15. ) [*](Deuteronomy xxx. 20. ) [*](Leviticus x. 2. ) [*](Leviticus x. 3. ) [*](Psalm cxiii. 25. ) [*](Genesis iv. 15. )

v.2.p.207
extinguished; so that the lines of the poet may well be applied to wickedness— And she is of no mortal race, But an immortal foul disgrace. Immortal, indeed, as to the life among us on earth, since with reference to the life with God it is lifeless and dead, and as some one has said, more worthless and odious than dung.

But it was by all means necessary that different regions should be assigned to different things, the heaven to good things, the earth to what is evil; for the tendency of good is to soar on high, and if it ever comes down to us, for its Father is very bounteous, it still is very justly anxious to return again to heaven. But evil remains here, living at the greatest possible distance from the divine choir, always hovering around mortal life, and unable to die from among the human race.

This, too, one of the most eminent among the men who have been admired for their wisdom has asserted, speaking in a magnificent strain in the Theaetetus, where he says, "But it is impossible for evils to come to an end. For it is indispensable that there should always be something in opposition to God. And it is equally impossible that it should have its place in the divine regions; but it must of necessity hover around mortal nature and this place where we live; on which account we ought to endeavour to flee from this place as speedily as possible. And our flight will be a likening of ourselves to God, to the best of our power. And such a likening consists of being just and holy in conjunction with prudence." [*]( Plato. Theaetetus, p. 176. )

Very naturally, therefore, Cain, the symbol of wickedness, will not die, for wickedness must of necessity be always alive in the mortal race of mankind; so that the expression, "to die the death," is not incorrectly spoken of the homicide, for the reasons which have here been given.

And the expression, "not intentionally, but if God deliver him into his hand," is used with exceeding propriety with reference to those who commit an unintentional homicide; for it seems to Moses here, that our intentional actions are the fruit of our own mind and will, but that our unintentional actions proceed from the will of God. I mean by this, not our sins, but, on the contrary, those things which are the [*]( Plato. Theaetetus, p. 176. )

v.2.p.208
punishment of our sins;

for it is not becoming for God himself to inflict punishment, as being the first and most excellent Lawgiver; but he punishes by the ministry of others, and not by his own act. It is very suitable to his character that he himself should bestow his graces, and his free gifts, and his great benefits, inasmuch as he is by nature good and bountiful. But it is not fitting that he should inflict his punishments further than by his mere command, inasmuch as he is a king; but he must act in this by the instrumentality of others, who are suitable for such purposes.

And the practiser of virtue, Jacob, bears his testimony in support of this doctrine of mine, where he says, "The God who has nourished me from my youth up, the angel who delivered me from all my evils." [*](Genesis xlviii. 15. ) For the more ancient benefits, those by which the soul is nourished, he attributes to God, but the more recent ones, which are caused by the errors of the soul, he attributes to the servant of God.

On this account, I imagine it is, that when Moses was speaking philosophically of the creation of the world, while he described everything else as having been created by God alone, he mentions man alone as having been made by him in conjunction with other assistants; for, says Moses, "God said, Let us make man in our image." [*](Genesis i. 26. ) The expression, "let us make," indicating a plurality of makers.

Here, therefore, the Father is conversing with his own powers, to whom he has assigned the task of making the mortal part of our soul, acting in imitation of his own skill while he was fashioning the rational part within us, thinking it right that the dominant part within the soul should be the work of the Ruler of all things, but that the part which is to be kept in subjection should be made by those who are subject to him.

And he made us of the powers which were subordinate to him, not only for the reason which has been mentioned, but also because the soul of man alone was destined to receive notions of good and of evil, and to choose one of the two, since it could not adopt both. Therefore, he thought it necessary to assign the origin of evil to other workmen than himself, —but to retain the generation of good for himself alone.