De Plantatione

so that it is necessary for us now to speak in a fitting manner about drunkenness; for we shall presently know the power also of that tree which gives rise to it. Afterwards, we will examine with accuracy what has been said by the lawgiver concerning drunkenness, but at present we will examine what determination others have come to on this subject.

Now, among many philosophers, this question has been investigated with no slight degree of pains, and the question is proposed in this manner, whether the wise man will get drunk? Therefore, to get drunk is a matter [*](Hosea xiv. 9. ) [*](Genesis ix. 20. )

But of those who have dealt with this proposition, some have said that the wise man never takes too much unmixed wine, and never behaves foolishly; for that the one is an error, and that the other is an efficient cause of error, and that both the one and the other is inconsistent with good conduct.

Others again have asserted, that to be overcome with wine is appropriate even to a virtuous man, but that to behave foolishly is inconsistent with his character. For that the wisdom which is in him is sufficient to resist those things which attempt to do him injury, and to destroy the innovations which they seek to produce in the soul, and that wisdom is endued with a power capable of extinguishing the passions, whether they be fanned by the impetuous gale of furious love, or kindled by abundant and heating wine, and that owing to this power it will always be superior to them. Since also of those who dive beneath a deep river or under the sea, some are destroyed from being ignorant of the art of swimming, but others who are possessed of this knowledge are very speedily saved; and, indeed, a great quantity of wine, inundating the soul like a torrent, sometimes weighs it down and precipitates it to the lowest depth of ignorance, but at other times is unable to part it, because it is supported and borne aloft by saving instruction.

Those again who have not sufficiently observed the greatness of this excess with respect to passion in the wise man, have pressed him down, when he was applying himself to the study of sublime things, from heaven to earth, as those men do who are seeking to catch birds, in order to involve him in disasters similar to their own; but others, seeing the great height of his virtue, have said that a wise man, if he indulges in wine beyond the bounds of moderation, will by all means cease to be master of himself, and will go astray, and will not only let his hands droop out of weakness, like those athletes do who are defeated, but will also droop his neck and his head, and stumble, and fall down, coming to the ground with his whole body.

Having then learnt this beforehand, the wise man will never of his own accord think fit to enter upon a

For he would not take a deadly poison unless the occasion compelled him very strongly to depart from life, as it might urge him to depart from his country. And at all events it is plain, that unmixed wine is a poison, which is the cause, if not of death, at least of madness, and why may we not pronounce madness to be death, since by it the most important thing in us dies, namely, the mind? But it appears to me that a man would without the slightest hesitation choose (if a choice was permitted him), that death which separates and disunites the soul and the body as a lesser evil in preference to that greater one—the alienation of the mind.

On this account, forsooth, men of old time called skill in the art of making wine madness (μαινομένη), and called the Bacchae who were carried away under the influence of wine, mad women (Μαινάδες), since wine is the cause of madness and folly to those who indulge in it insatiably.

Such then are, as it were, the prefaces of this discussion or investigation. Let us now go on to the other parts of this question which is divided into two heads as is natural; the one view affirming that the wise man will occasionally be drunk, and the other, on the contrary, insisting that he will not get drunk.

Now it is well to ruminate the arguments which are adduced in support of the former view, having first of all taken our beginning from this point, that of things some are homonymous, and others are only synonymous. And it is admitted that the being homonymous and the being synonymous are two opposite things, because homonymy is predicated of many subjects which have one common name; and synonymy is the application of many different names to one subject.

For instance, the name of dog is beyond all question a homonymy, inasmuch as it comprehends many dissimilar things which are signified by that appellation. For there is a terrestrial barking animal called a dog; there is also a marine monster with the same name: there is also the star in heaven, which the poets call the autumnal star, because it rises at the beginning of autumn,

Again there are other appellations which differ from one another, but still signify but one thing, as a shaft, a bolt, and arrow; for all these terms are applied to the weapon which is sent from the string of the bow against the mark; and again there are the words, oar, scull, and blade, to express the instrument used for propelling a vessel, of equal power with sails; for whenever a ship, by reason of a calm or of unfavourable winds cannot use its sails, then, those, whose business it is, sitting down as rowers, and stretching out their oars on each side like wings, compel it to proceed onwards as if borne on wings; and so the vessel being borne on the top of the waves, and rather running over them than cutting through them, hastens along with a speedy voyage, and speedily anchors in a safe harbour.

And again, a staff, and a stick, and a cane, are all different appellations of one subject with which we can strike, or support one’s self steadily, and on which one can lean, and do many other things besides. And we have enumerated these instances not for the purpose of making a long story, but in order that the matter under investigation may be more clearly understood.

The ancients called unmixed wine οἶνος, and also μέθυ. At all events, this latter name is used in very many passages of poetry, so that if those names are accounted synonymous which are applied to one subject, then οἶνος and μέθυσμα, and other words derived from them will differ in nothing but sound, and the being overcome with wine (οἰνου̃σθαι), and the being drunk (μεθύειν), are one and the same thing.

And both these words intimate a taking of too much wine, which nevertheless there may be many reasons for a good man not turning away from; and if he be overcome with wine he will also be drunk, being nevertheless not made in any respect the worse by his drunkenness, but remaining the same as if he had simply been well filled with wine.

We have now detailed one of the opinions concerning a wise man getting drunk: and the second is as follows:—

For they have made such a revolution as to bring reasons which were sound and healthy into incurable decay and destruction. And in the place of a vigorous and athletic habit, they have brought almost every thing into a state of disease; and in the place of a full, and strong, and sinewy body, they have rendered it weak, inducing an unnatural, and swollen, and sickly habit, filling it up with empty wind alone, which soon bursts by reason of the want of any power to keep it together, when it is extended in the greatest degree.

And the actions of created beings, which are most worthy of attention, and which were, as one may say, masculine actions, those also they have made disgraceful feminine instead, and discreditable instead of honourable, so that there are very few persons found, either in deed or in words, inclined to an imitation of the ancient manners.

Therefore, the poets and historians who lived in their time, and all other men who devoted themselves to literary studies, did not confine themselves to soothing and tickling the ears with rhythmical sounds, but, if there was anything broken, so to say, and relaxed in the mind, they roused it up, and whatever there was in it suited to their purpose they improved by initiation into natural philosophy and virtue. But the cooks and confectioners of our time, and those persons who are only artists of superfluous luxury, in the arts of dyeing and making perfumes, are always building up the outward senses with some new colour, or shape, or scent, or flavour, so as utterly to destroy the most important part of us, the mind.

And why do I mention these things? In order to show that the men of the present day do not use wine now as the ancients did. For now they drink eagerly without once taking breath, till the body and soul are both wholly relaxed, and they keep on bidding their cup-bearers to bring more wine, and are angry with them if they delay while they are cooling what is called by them the hot drink; and in a vile imitation of the gymnastic contests, they