De Plantatione

Philo Judaeus

The works of Philo Judaeus, the contemporary of Josephus, volume 1. Yonge, C. D., translator. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1854.

Now, these are the contests of revelry while in youth and vigour, and, as one may say, in its prime; but the others are the deeds of that ancient and more old-fashioned sort. For the men of old time began every good action with perfect sacrifices, thinking that in that way the result would be most favourable to them; and even if the occasion required especial promptitude in action, still they did not begin till they had offered prayers and sacrifices. But in all cases waited, thinking that haste was not in every case better than slowness. For speed, which is not accompanied with forethought, is injurious, but slowness, when founded on good hope, is advantageous.

Knowing, therefore, that the use and enjoyment of wine require much care, they did not drink unmixed wine either in great quantities or at all times, but only in moderation and on fitting occasions. For first, of all, they offered up prayers and instituted sacrifices, and then, having propitiated the deity, and having purified their bodies and souls, the former with baths, and the latter with the waters of laws and of right instruction, they then turned their cheerful and rejoicing countenances to more luxurious food, very often not returning home but, walking about in the temples in which they sacrificed, in order that, by keeping in mind their sacrifices, and having a due respect for the place, they might enjoy what should be really a most sacred feast, doing no wrong either in word or deed.

And this, indeed, is what they say the word μεθύειν, to be drunk, derives its name from; because, μετὰ τὸ θύειν (after sacrificing) it was the custom of the men of old to drink great quantities of wine. And to whom could the manner of using unmixed wine described above be more appropriate than to wise men to whom the work to be done before drinking, namely, sacrificing, is so appropriate?

For one may almost say that no bad man can really perform sacrifices, not even if he were to bring the altar ten thousand oxen every day without intermission; for his most important and indispensable offering, namely his mind, is polluted. And it is impious for

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polluted things to come near to the altar.

This, now, is the second point of view in which this question may be regarded, by which we have shown that it is not inconsistent with the character of the wise man to get drunk. There is a third way of looking at this subject, which depends chiefly on the exceeding plausibility of an argument derived from etymology. For some persons think that drunkenness derives its name not merely from the fact of its being admitted after sacrifice, but also because it is the cause of relaxation (μέθεσις) to the soul.

But the reason of foolish men is relaxed so as to get strength for many sins; while that of those inclined to be sensible is relaxed, so as to enjoy freedom from care, and cheerfulness, and lightness of heart. For the wise man, when he is intoxicated, becomes more good-humoured than when he is sober; so that in this respect we should not be at all wrong in saying that he may get drunk.

And besides all this, we must likewise add, that we are not speaking of a stern-looking and sordid kind of wisdom, contracted by profound thought and ill-humour; but, on the other hand, of that wisdom which wears a tranquil and cheerful appearance, being full of joy and happiness, by which men have often been led on to sport and divert themselves in no inelegant manner, indulging in amusements suitable to their dignified and earnest character, just as in a well-tuned lyre one may have a combination uniting, by means of opposite sounds, in one melodious harmony.

At all events, according to the most holy Moses, the end of all wisdom is amusement and mirth, not such mirth as is pursued by foolish people, uncombined with any prudence, but such as is admitted even by those who are already grey, not only through old age alone, but also through deep thinking. Do you not see that he speaks of the man who has drunk deeply of that wisdom which is to be derived from a man’s own hearing and learning, and study; not as one who partakes of mirth, but who is actually mirth in itself?

This is Isaac, for the name Isaac being interpreted means "laughter," with whose character it is very consistent that he should have been sporting with "perseverance," which the Hebrews call Rebekkah. But it is not lawful for a private individual to

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behold the divine instruction of the soul, but the king may behold it, as one with whom wisdom has dwelt for a very long time, if we may not rather say that it dwells with him all his life. His name is Abimelech, who, looking out through the window with the well-opened and radiant eye of the mind, saw Isaac sporting with Rebekkah his wife.

For what employment is more suitable for a wise man than to be sporting, and rejoicing, and diverting himself with perseverance in good things? From which it is plain that he will become intoxicated, since intoxication contributes to good morals, and also produces relaxation and advantage;

for unmixed wine seems to increase and render more intense all the natural qualities, whether they be good or the contrary, as many other things do too. For money is to a good man a cause of good things, and to a bad man, as some one has said, it is a cause of bad things. And again, high rank makes the wickedness of a fool more conspicuous, but it renders the virtue of the just man more glorious. So also unmixed wine, being poured forth in abundance, makes the man who is the slave of his passions, still more subservient to them, but it renders him who has them under control more manageable and amiable.

Who, indeed, is there who does not know that of two opposite things, when one kind is suitable to most people, the other kind must of necessity be suited to some? As, for instance, white and black are two opposite colours: if white is suitable both to good and to bad things, then black must also be necessarily equally suitable to both, and not to one of the two alone. And, again, to be sober and to be drunk are two opposite things; accordingly, both bad men and good, as the ancient proverb says, partake of sobriety; therefore, also, drunkenness is suitable to both classes. Therefore the virtuous man will get drunk without losing any of his virtue by it.

But if, like persons before a court of justice, one must bring forward not only such proofs as are in accordance with the rules of art, but those too which have no connection with art, one of which is proof by testimony, we will then produce many sons of physicians and philosophers of high repute to give evidence, not by words alone, but also by writings.

For they have left behind ten thousand commentaries entitled treatises on drunkenness; in which they consider

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nothing beyond the bare use of wine, without pursuing any investigation with respect to those who are accustomed to behave foolishly in their cups, and in fact omitting every thing which has reference to conduct under the influence of wine; so that it is very plainly confessed in their writings that drunkenness is the same as drinking wine freely. And to drink a superabundant quantity of wine on proper occasions is not unsuitable to a wise man; therefore we shall not be wrong if we say that a wise man may get drunk.

But since no one is ever inscribed on the rolls as a conqueror if he has contended by himself alone, for if he does this he appears only to be fighting with a shadow, and very naturally too; it follows that we must also produce the arguments of those who contend for the opposite side of the question, that by this means a most just judgment may be formed, and that the other side of the question may not be decided against through default.

And the first and the most powerful argument is this: if no one in his senses would entrust a secret which he wished to be kept to a drunken man, then a good and wise man will not get drunk. But before we collect all the other arguments in their order, it may be better to reply to each objection separately, in order that we may not appear to be too prolix, and consequently to be troublesome.

Some one then will say in opposition that, according to the argument that has been advanced, the wise man must never have a bilious attack, and never go to sleep, and above all must never die. But he to whom some of these things happens is either an inanimate being or a divine one; but beyond all question he is not a man at all. Imitating this perversion of the arguments, one may apply it equally to a bilious man, or to a sleeping man, or to a dying man; for no one in his senses would tell a secret to a man in any of these conditions, but it would be reasonable for him to tell it to a wise man, for the wise man is never bilious, never goes to sleep, and never dies.