On the Estate of Hagnias
Isaeus
Isaeus. Forster, Edward Seymour, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1927 (1962 printing).
My opponent, thinking nothing of telling any lie whatever and considering that his own rascality does him no harm, dares to utter many calumnies against me, with which I will deal presently. In particular, he now alleges that Stratocles and I made a compact, when we were about to engage in the suit about the inheritance, though of those who had prepared to put in a claim we were the only persons for whom such a mutual agreement was impossible.
The daughter of Eubulides and the mother of Hagnias, in an action against me, since they were not claiming on the same grounds, might have made an agreement, that if one of them were successful, she should give a share to the defeated claimant; for the votes accorded to each of them would be placed in different urns. But with us it was quite otherwise; we stood in the same relationship and were making two separate claims, each to have half the estate; and when two claimants found their claims on the same grounds, only one voting urn is employed, so that it would be impossible for one to be unsuccessful and the other successful, but we both ran the same risk, so we could not possibly have made any compact or agreement about the inheritance.
But when Stratocles died before the actions claiming half the estate, which we were each bringing, could come on, and so there was no further question of his participating in the estate, nor had this child of his any title owing to the law, but the whole inheritance devolved upon me as next-of-kin, if I could defeat those who are now in possession, then and not till then does my opponent devise and invent these fictions, expecting easily to mislead you by these stories. That no such compact was possible but that all the details of procedure are already provided for, can easily be seen from the law. Please take and read it to the court.
Law
Does it appear to you that the law gives any liberty for a concerted arrangement? Or are not its provisions in an exactly contrary sense, since, even if a previous arrangement existed, it expressly ordains that each party shall bring an action for his own share, and prescribes a single voting-urn, when the two parties base their claims on the same ground, and makes this the system of adjudication? But my opponent, in spite of these legal provisions and the impossibility of a preconcerted arrangement, has had the impudence to invent this lie against all common sense.
But he has not stopped there; he has also invented the most inconsistent story possible, to which, gentlemen, please give your close attention. He declares that I agreed, if I won my case against the present possessors of the estate, to give the child a half-share of the inheritance. Yet if the child had any right to a share in virtue of his relationship, as my opponent declares, what need was there for this agreement between me and them? For the half of the estate was adjudicable to them just as much as to me, if what they say is true.
If, on the other hand, they had no claim by right of kinship, why should I have agreed to give them a share, when the laws have given me the right of succession to the whole estate? Was it then impossible for me to make my claim without their consent? But the law gives full liberty to anyone who likes to make a claim, so that they could not possibly make this allegation. Did I then require some evidence from them material to my case, in default of which I was unlikely to secure the adjudication of the estate? No, I was claiming by right of kinship, not of testamentary disposition, so that I had no need of witnesses.
And indeed, if it was impossible for me to have made an arrangement with Stratocles in his lifetime; if his father did not bequeath the estate to him, since he never had any of it adjudicated to him; if it was unlikely that I should have agreed to give the child half the inheritance; and since you awarded me the estate by your adjudication and my opponents brought no action at the time and have never yet thought of disputing the estate—how can you believe their allegations to be true? In my opinion you cannot possibly do so.
Seeing that you might reasonably be astonished that they did not at the time bring a suit claiming half the estate, my opponent pretends that I was the cause of their not bringing a suit against the other parties, because I had agreed to give them a share and so they did not make the necessary deposit, while they allege that the laws forbade them to bring a suit against me on the ground that orphans may not bring actions against their guardians. Both these statements are untrue.
For my opponent could not point to any law which forbids him to bring a private action against me on behalf of the child; for no law exists which is opposed to such a proceeding, but, just as the law has granted the right to bring a public indictment against me, so it has created the opportunity either for me or the child to bring a private suit. Again, it was not because I agreed to give them a share that they failed to bring an action against the other parties who were in possession of the estate, but because they had absolutely no right to this money.
I am convinced that even had I agreed to let the child receive from me by the adjudication of the court a half of the inheritance, they would never have carried out this bargain or attempted to do so; they know perfectly well, that if, being outside the requisite degree of kinship, they had been in possession of anything which did not belong to them, they would have been easily deprived of it by the next-of-kin. For, as I said before, the law does not give any rights at all as next-of-kin to our children after us, but transfers them to the relatives of the deceased on his mother's side.
In the first place, then, Glaucon, the brother of Hagnias, would have come forward, against whom they could not urge a claim of closer relationship; on the contrary, they would have been clearly shown to be outside the requisite degree of kinship. Next, if Glaucon had been unwilling to come forward, the mother of Hagnias and Glaucon would have done so, since she possessed a claim of kinship to her son,[*](Not as his mother but as her son's cousin.) and so, if she had engaged in a suit against those who possessed no title as next-of-kin, she would clearly have been awarded half the estate by you, since justice and the laws have given her a right to it.
These, then, are the reasons why he did not bring an action, and it was not because he was prevented from doing so by me or by the laws; and these are the pretexts which he has invented for resorting to these vexatious proceedings against me, and it is upon the basis of them, that having brought a public indictment against me and slandering me, he hopes to obtain money and to deprive me of my guardianship. He thinks that he is managing very cleverly in employing these devices, because, if he is unsuccessful, he will lose nothing of his own, whereas, if he can carry out his wishes, he will henceforward be able to squander the child's property as well with impunity.
You must, therefore, not listen to his arguments nor tolerate his utterance of them, nor allow the custom to grow up of bringing public actions about matters for which the laws have prescribed private suits. For the rights of the case are perfectly simple and easy to understand. After dealing briefly with them and leaving them stored in your memory, I will then turn to the rest of my defence against the charges brought against me.
What then are the rights of the case and how do I define them? If my opponent declares that part of Hagnias's estate belongs to the child by right of kinship, let him bring an action before the archon claiming the half, and, if you decide in his favor, let him take it; for thus the laws ordain. But if he does not claim on these grounds but alleges that I agreed to give the child a share—though I declare that there is not a word of truth in his allegation—let him bring an action, and, if he can prove that I made such an agreement, let him secure the execution of it; for that is only right.
But if he declares that the child cannot either claim a share from me at law or sue me for breach of contract,[*](An action claiming property was described as πρός τινα, an action for breach of contract as κατά τινος.) let him name the law which prohibits this, and, if he can indicate it, let the child in these circumstances, too, receive the share of the estate. If, again, he contends that there is no need to have the half-share adjudicated or to go to law with me at all, but that this share already belongs to the child, let him make an application to the archon for its inclusion in the lease of the orphan's estate and let the lessee exact from me this portion as belonging to the child.
Such are the essential rights of the case, and such the provisions of the laws, which do not, thank heaven, oblige me to submit to criminal trials in matters about which they have instituted private suits nor to run any personal risk because I refuse to share with the child this estate, which I received by your verdict when I won my case against those who were in possession. If I were holding any property which admittedly belonged to the child and had maladministered it to his detriment, then he would be justified in bringing this criminal charge against me, but not, by heaven, when it is a question of my own property.
That my adversary has in this matter acted entirely unjustly, and that otherwise he has never spoken a word of truth, but has cleverly devised the whole plot from motives of self-interest, uttering calumnies, misinterpreting the laws and seeking to get the better both of you and of me contrary to justice—of all this, by heaven, you are, I think, well aware and all alike understand; and so I do not know what more I need say.
I notice, gentlemen, that most of his speech is taken up with a discussion of my fortune and of that of the child; he represents the circumstances of the child as embarrassed, while he attributes to me a position of wealth and accuses me of baseness on the ground that I cannot bring myself to provide any of the four daughters of Stratocles with a dowry, although, according to his account, I am in possession of the child's property.
I should like to deal with this point; for he hopes by his arguments to arouse in your minds a prejudice against me regarding the fortune which has accrued to me, and a feeling of pity in favor of the children, if they can be represented to you as reduced to poverty. You must not, therefore, be left in any ignorance on these points but must have an exact idea of them, so that you may understand that here, too, my opponent is lying, as he has lied about everything else. For, gentlemen, I would admit myself to be the basest of all men, if it could be shown that the affairs of Stratocles were left in a state of embarrassment at his death and that I, being myself in easy circumstances, gave not a thought to his children.
But if he left them a fortune more considerable and better secured than my own and sufficient to endow his daughters fittingly without sensibly diminishing his son's wealth, and if I am so managing the property as greatly to increase it, surely I cannot reasonably be blamed for not giving them my own money as well; I rather deserve to be praised for preserving and increasing their fortune. That these statements are true, I shall easily prove to you.