Exordia

For I observe that often you hate, not those who are to blame for your troubles, but those who have most recently made mention of them to you.[*](Cf. Dem. 1.16.) Nevertheless, although I am so precisely measuring this hazard, I still think that I must put all other subjects aside and confine myself to saying what I think is the best advice about the present situation.

I should have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with that benevolence which you are accustomed to practise toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at rectifying the woes of others than you are at taking to heart the troubles which befall yourselves. Someone may perhaps say, of course, that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the State—to have deliberately chosen to assume many risks for the sake of sheer justice with no thought of selfish advantage. Now, while I for one believe this reputation which prevails concerning the State to be true and desire it to be, yet I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise as much foresight in their domestic affairs as in those of strangers, so that you may show yourselves to be not only men of goodwill but sensible also.

Perhaps it really is the duty, men of Athens, of one who wishes to recommend some measure to you to attempt to speak in such a way that you will find it possible to hear him to the end; but otherwise his duty is to leave aside all other themes and discuss only those matters you are considering, and these as briefly as possible. For I do not think it due to any lack of speeches that now once more you observe all your affairs to be in a muddle, but the reason is that some are orating and playing politics for their own gain, and others, who have so far not given evidence of this offence, are more concerned to be thought good speakers than that some concrete good may be effected by what they say. As for me, that I may not unwittingly do the opposite of what I myself say is right, and say more about other matters than about those of which I have risen to speak, I shall disregard all other topics and endeavor to tell you forthwith what I recommend.

I think that you would rightly pay attention, men of Athens, if any man should promise to demonstrate that in the matters you are considering justice and expediency coincide. Now I believe that I shall do this without difficulty if you on your part will comply with a very slight request of mine. Let none of you, according as one or another has an opinion about the present situation, be positive that he is right in all his conclusions; but, if it turns out that something be said against these, let him consider it, listening to all the points patiently, and then, if some suggestion seems to have been rightly made, adopt it. For the measure that succeeds will belong no less to you who adopted it than to him who proposed it to you. Surely the first step toward sound deliberation is not to have reached a decision before you have heard the discussions upon which you should base your decision. For the occasion and the method of ratifying your resolutions and of deciding in the first instance what seems expedient are not the same.[*](A measure was often debated several times before being ratified. Debate should be leisurely, ratification prompt and decisive: Dem. Ex. 21. 3.)