Against Meidias

And indeed I can see no comparison between my own conduct and that of those others. In the first case it will be proved that the judge took no thought or concern for you or for the laws, but was privately induced by a sum of money—I cannot say how much—to drop his action. In the same way the man who was struck by Polyzelus was privately squared, laughed in his sleeve at you and your laws, and never even prosecuted his assailant.

Such statements, then, are quite in point if one wishes to accuse those men today, but as a defence of Meidias against my indictments they are the very last pleas that should be urged. For my conduct was clean contrary to theirs. It will be proved that I never got, or tried to get, any advantage for myself, but religiously observed, and have now restored to your keeping, the task of avenging the laws, the god, and your interests. Do not then allow him to make these statements, or if he persists, do not give him credence as if his plea were just. If he finds that this is your fixed determination, he will have nothing to say, not a word.

For what sort of pretext, what decent and moderate excuse, can he show for his conduct? Anger? Possibly that will be his plea. But whereas in cases where a sudden loss of self-control has impelled a man even to inflict a wanton insult, it is open to him to say that he has acted in anger; if, on the other hand, he is detected in a continuous course of law-breaking, spread over many days, surely this is far from a mere fit of anger and he stands convicted of a deliberate policy of insult.

Very well; since he has clearly done what I accuse him of, and has done it by way of insult, we must now consider the laws, gentlemen of the jury, for it is in accordance with the laws that you have sworn to give your verdict. Observe, moreover, that the laws treat the willful and insolent transgressors as deserving more resentment and a heavier punishment than other classes of offenders.

First then, all the laws of damage—to take these first—order the offender to pay the amount twice over if the damage is willful, but only once if it is involuntary. This is reasonable, because, while the injured party is in any case entitled to relief, the law does not ordain that the resentment against the aggressor should be the same, whether his act is voluntary or involuntary. Again, the laws of homicide punish willful murder with death, perpetual exile, and confiscation of goods, but accidental homicide they treat with much consideration and charity.

It is not only in these, but in all cases, that the laws may be seen to be severe against premeditated outrages. For how is it that if a man who has lost his case fails to pay, the law thereupon is not content with a private suit for ejectment, but directs the imposition of a further fine to the treasury? Or again, how is it that if a man takes from another by mutual consent a sum of one, two, or ten talents, and then fraudulently withholds it, the State has no concern with him; but if a man, taking something that would merit only a trifling fine, keeps it back by force, then the laws direct the jury to impose an additional fine for the treasury equal to that paid to the private owner?

The answer is that the legislator regarded every deed of violence as a public offence, committed against those also who are not directly concerned. For force belongs to the few, but the laws to all alike; and the man who agreed to the transaction can right himself privately, but the victim of violence needs relief at the hands of the State. On this principle, for the actual assault the law grants everyone the right to prosecute, but makes over the whole of the fine to the State. The legislator considered that the State, as well as the injured party, was wronged by the author of the outrage, and that his punishment was sufficient compensation for the victim, who ought not to make money for himself out of such wrongs.