On the Crown

As for myself, I was convinced, presumptuously, perhaps, but convinced I was, that there was no one more competent either to make sound proposals, or to carry them into effect, or to conduct an embassy diligently and honestly: and therefore I took my place in every field of action. Read Philip’s letters.

(Philip’s Letters are read)

To these straits had my policy, Aeschines, reduced Philip: and such was then the language uttered by a man who had hitherto lifted his voice vauntingly against Athens. And for that reason I was deservedly decorated by the citizens. You were present, but said nothing in opposition; and Diondas, who arraigned the grant, did not get the fifth part of the votes. Please read the decrees which were then by that acquittal validated, and which Aeschines never even arraigned.

(The Decrees are read)

These decrees, men of Athens, exhibit the same wording and phrasing as those proposed formerly by Aristonicus, and now by Ctesiphon. Aeschines did not prosecute them himself, nor did he support the accusation of the man who did arraign them. And yet if there is any truth in his present denunciation, he might then have prosecuted Demomeles, the proposer, and Hypereides, with more reason than Ctesiphon,

who can refer to these precedents, to the decision of the courts, to the observation that Aeschines himself did not prosecute persons who made the same proposals, to the statutory prohibition of repeated prosecution in such cases, and so forth; whereas at that time the issue would have been tried on its merits without such presumptions.

On the other hand, at that time, I imagine, there was no chance of doing what he does now, when out of a lot of old dates and decrees he selects for slanderous purposes any that nobody knew beforehand or would expect to hear cited today, transposes dates, substitutes fictitious reasons for the true reasons of transactions, and so makes a show of speaking to the point.

That trick was not possible then. All speeches must have been made on a basis of truth, within a short time of the facts, when the jury still remembered details and almost knew them by heart. That is why, after shirking inquiry at the time when the events were recent, he has returned to the issue today, expecting, I suppose, that you will conduct a forensic competition rather than an inquiry into political conduct, and that the decision will turn upon diction rather than sound policy.

Then he resorts to sophistry, and tells you that you must ignore any opinion of himself and me which you brought with you from home; and that, as, when you cast up a man’s accounts, though you anticipate a surplus, you acquiesce in the result if the totals balance, so you must now accept the result of the calculation. Every dishonest contrivance, you will observe, is rotten to the core.

By his ingenious apologue he has admitted that we are both here as acknowledged advocates—I of our country, he of Philip; for if such had not been the view you take of us, he would not have been at pains to convert you.

I shall prove without difficulty that he has no right to ask you to reverse that opinion—not by using counters, for political measures are not to be added up in that fashion, but by reminding you briefly of the several transactions, and appealing to you who hear me as both the witnesses and the auditors of my account. We owe it to that policy of mine which he denounces that, instead of the Thebans joining Philip in an invasion of our country, as everyone expected, they fought by our side and stopped him;

that, instead of the seat of war being in Attica, it was seven hundred furlongs away on the far side of Boeotia; that, instead of privateers from Euboea harrying us, Attica was at peace on the sea-frontier throughout the war; and that, instead of Philip taking Byzantium and holding the Hellespont, the Byzantines fought on our side against him.

Do you see any resemblance between this computation of results and your casting up of counters? Are we to cancel the gains to balance the losses,[*](The metaphors here are taken from calculations on the abacus, where subtraction of counters from one side of the board would serve instead of addition to the other. Instead of showing the gains of Athens side by side with her losses, Aeschines would record only the adverse balance.) instead of providing that they shall never be forgotten? I need not add that other nations have had experience of that cruelty which is always observable whenever Philip has got people under his heel, whereas you have been lucky enough to enjoy the fruits of that factitious humanity in which he clothed himself with an eye to the future. But I pass that by.

I will not shrink from observing that any man who wished to bring an orator to the proof honestly, and not merely to slander him, would never have laid such charges as you have alleged, inventing analogies, and mimicking my diction and gestures. The fate of Greece, forsooth, depended on whether I used this word or that, or moved my hand this way or that way!

No; he would have considered, in the light of actual facts, the means and resources possessed by the city when I entered on administration, and those accumulated by me when at the head of affairs; and also the condition of our adversaries. If I had impaired our resources, he would have proved that the fault lay at my door: if I had greatly increased them, he would have spared his slanders. As you avoided this test, I will apply it; and the jury will see whether I state the case fairly.

For resources, the city possessed the islanders—but not all, only the weakest, for neither Chios, nor Rhodes, nor Corcyra was on our side; a subsidy of forty-five talents, all collected in advance; and not a single private or trooper apart from our own army. But what was most alarming to us, and advantageous to the enemy, Aeschines and his party had made all our neighbors, Megarians, Thebans, and Euboeans, more disposed to enmity than to friendship.

Such were the means of the city: and I defy anyone to name anything else. Now consider those of our antagonist Philip. In the first place, he was the despotic commander of his adherents: and in war that is the most important of all advantages. Secondly, they had their weapons constantly in their hands. Then he was well provided with money: he did whatever he chose, without giving notice by publishing decrees, or deliberating in public, without fear of prosecution by informers or indictment for illegal measures. He was responsible to nobody: he was the absolute autocrat, commander, and master of everybody and everything.

And I, his chosen adversary—it is a fair inquiry—of what was I master? Of nothing at all! Public speaking was my only privilege: and that you permitted to Philip’s hired servants on the same terms as to me. Whenever they had the advantage of me—and for one reason or another that often happened—you laid your plans for the enemy’s benefit, and went your ways.

In spite of all these drawbacks, I made alliance for you with Euboeans, Achaeans, Corinthians, Thebans, Megarians, Leucadians, and Corcyraeans: and from those states there was assembled a foreign division of fifteen thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry, not counting their citizen-soldiery. I also obtained from them in money the largest subsidy I could.

When you talk about fair terms with the Thebans, Aeschines, or with the Byzantines and the Euboeans, and raise at this time of day the question of equal contributions, in the first place, you must be unaware that of that famous fleet of three hundred galleys that fought for Greece[*](that fought for Greece: at Salamis, 480 B.C.) in former days, our city supplied two hundred; and that she did not show any sign of complaining that she was unfairly treated, or impeaching the statesmen whose advice she took, or airing her dissatisfaction. That would have been discreditable indeed! No, she gave thanks to the gods that, when all the Greeks alike were encompassed by a great peril, she had contributed twice as much as all the rest to the common deliverance.

Secondly, when you grumble at me, you are doing an ill turn to your fellow-citizens. Why do you tell them today what they ought to have done then? You were in Athens and at the Assembly: why did you not offer your suggestions at the time—if indeed they could possibly be offered during an imminent crisis, when we had to accept, not all that we wanted, but all that the conditions allowed? There was a man lying in wait who was bidding against us, and was ready to welcome any allies we drove away, and pay them into the bargain.

If I am accused today for what was actually done, suppose that, while I was haggling over nice calculations, these cities had marched off and joined Philip—suppose he had become suzerain o f Euboea, Thebes, and Byzantium— what do you think these unprincipled men would have done or said then?