On the Navy-Boards

In the same way I propose, men of Athens, that all ships’ gear now on loan should be valued and divided according to the inventory into twenty parts, and then that one part of the debtors liable for it should be allotted to each of the full boards, and that each board should assign an equal share to each of its own groups; and that the twelve members of the group should exact the same from the debtors, and so provide, fully equipped, as many galleys as they are severally responsible for.

That, I think, would be the best way of providing and organizing the money, the hulls, the trierarchs, and the calling in of the ships’ gear.[*](The following table may make this paragraph clearer. Column A represents the totals, B the boards, C the groups. ABCNo. of ships required300153No. of ships required200102No. of ships required10051No. of trierarchs12006012Capital represented (in talents)600030060 )

I now proceed to describe a clear and easy way of manning the ships. I suggest that the generals should divide the dockyards into ten areas, so arranging it that there may be dock-room in each for thirty ships, as close together as possible, and that when they have done this, they should apportion two boards and thirty galleys to each area, and then assign the tribes by lot to the areas.

And each brigade-commander[*](Each of the ten taxiarchs commanded the infantry belonging to his tribe.) must divide into three parts whatever area his tribe has taken over, and the ships in the same way, and then he must allot the thirds of his tribe in such a way that of the whole space of the dockyards each tribe may have one area and each third of a tribe a third of an area; so that you can know at once, if necessary, where each tribe and each third of a tribe is stationed, who are the trierarchs and what ships they have, and that so each tribe may have thirty ships and each third of a tribe ten. For if we can only get this started, any detail at present omitted (for it is perhaps difficult to provide for everything) will be discovered by the actual working of the plan, and we shall have a uniform system both for the whole navy and for every part of it.

But as regards money and a ready supply of it at once, I am aware that I am going to make a startling proposal. The proposal shall, however, be made, because I am confident that if you take the right point of view, it will be clear that I alone have told you the truth, as it is and as it will be. My view is that we ought not to talk about money now; for if we need it, we have a source of supply, abundant, honorable and fair; if we look for it at once, we shall fail so utterly to supply it now that we shall conclude that it is not even in reserve for our future use, but if we leave it alone, it will be there. What, then, is this supply, which is not now, but will be hereafter?

That sounds like a riddle, but I will explain. Look at the great city that lies around you, men of Athens. In that city there is wealth, I might almost say, equal to that of all the other Greek cities together. But that wealth is in the hands of men whose temper is such that if all our orators started a scare that the King is coming, that he is close at hand, that the report must be true, and if the orators were backed by an equal number of oracle-mongers, not only would they fail to contribute, but they would refuse to declare or acknowledge their wealth.

But if once they saw that what alarms them now as a mere rumor was actually taking place, none of them is so foolish that he would not be the first to pay his contribution; for who will choose to sacrifice life and property sooner than contribute a fraction to ensure his person and the remainder of his wealth? The money, I say, we have when it is really needed, but not before. Therefore I advise you not to seek it out, for the whole sum that you could raise, if you insisted on raising it, would be more ridiculous than nothing at all.

For consider; will anyone propose a tax of one per cent now? Then we get sixty talents. Or double it and make it two per cent? Still only a hundred and twenty talents. And what is that to the twelve hundred camels laden, as our friends here tell us, with the King’s treasure? Then would you have me assume that we shall contribute a twelfth of your wealth, or five hundred talents? But you would not submit to such a tax, nor if you paid up, would the money be sufficient for the war.

You must therefore make all your other preparations, but let the money remain for the present in the hands of its owners, for it could not be in better keeping, for the benefit of the State; but if ever the threatened crisis comes, then accept it as a voluntary contribution.

These proposals, men of Athens, are both practicable and honorable and advantageous, fit to be reported of you to the King and calculated to inspire him with no little alarm.

He knows that with two hundred galleys, of which we provided one hundred, our ancestors destroyed a thousand of his ships, and he will hear that we have three hundred of our own ready for sea, so that even if he were raving mad, he would scarcely think it a light thing to incur the hostility of our city. But indeed, if he bases his confidence on his wealth, he will find this too a less sure foundation than yours.

He is bringing, they say, gold in plenty. But if he disburses it, he will look in vain for more; for even springs and wells have a way of failing, if one draws from them constantly and lavishly. But he will hear that our resources consist of the ratable value of our country, and how we can fight in defence of it against invaders from his land, those ancestors of his who fought at Marathon best know; but as long as we are victorious, there is surely no prospect of money failing us.

Again, what frightens some of you—that his wealth will attract a large mercenary army—does not strike me as true. For although I believe that many Greeks would consent to serve in his pay against the Egyptians and Orontes[*](Egypt had been in revolt for many years, and in 363 most of the satraps of western Asia, including Orontes, satrap of Mysia, joined in the rebellion. Agesilaus, Iphicrates and Chabrias were among the Greek generals who took part on one side or the other.) and other barbarians, not so much to enable him to subdue any of those enemies as to win for themselves wealth and relief from their present poverty, yet I do not think that any Greek would attack Greece. For where would he retire afterwards? Will he go to Phrygia and be a slave?

For the objects at stake in a war against the barbarian are nothing less than our country, our life, our habits, our freedom, and all such blessings. Who, then, is so desperate that he will sacrifice himself, his ancestors, his sepulchres, and his native land, all for the sake of a paltry profit? I cannot think that there is such a man. Moreover, it is not even to the King’s advantage that mercenaries should beat the Greeks, for the men who shall beat us have been his masters long ago.[*](i.e. by beating us they will show that at any time they could have beaten him.) No; his object is not, after destroying us, to find himself in the power of others, but to rule all the world, if he can, or if not, at least those who are now his slaves.

Now, if anyone expects the Thebans to take our side, it is difficult to speak to you about them, because you have such a hearty dislike of them that you would not care to hear any good of them, even if it were true; but yet, when dealing with grave matters, one must not on any pretext pass over an important consideration. For my part, I believe that the Thebans are so little likely to join the King in an attack on Greece that they would pay a large sum, if they had it,

to get a chance of expiating their former sins against the Greeks.[*](Their Medism during the Persian wars.) If, however, some think that the Thebans are fated always to be on the wrong side, at any rate you all know this, that if the Thebans stand by the King, their enemies are bound to stand by the Greeks.

I believe, then, that the cause of justice and those who defend it will prove stronger than the traitors and the barbarian against all opposition. Therefore I say that we must not be unduly alarmed, nor must we be tempted to commence hostilities. And indeed I cannot see that any of the other Greeks have reason to dread this war.

For who of them does not know that as long as they were of one mind and regarded the Persian as their common enemy, they could count on many advantages, but ever since they thought of him as a friend to fall back on and were torn asunder by their own private quarrels, they have suffered such disasters as no one would have devised for them even in an imprecation. If that is so, are we to fear this man, whom fortune and the voice of Heaven proclaim to be an unprofitable friend and an auspicious foe? Never! Yet let us do him no wrong either, both in our own interests and in view of the unrest and disloyalty of the other Greeks.

If indeed we could attack him with unanimity, all banded against one, I should not count it wrong in us to do him wrong.[*](A curious piece of casuistry.) But since this is impossible, I suggest that we ought to be careful not to give the King an opportunity to pose as the champion of the other Greeks; for as long as you remain quiet, any such action on his part would excite suspicion, but if you are the aggressors, he will seem naturally anxious to befriend the rest, because they are hostile to you.

Do not, then, expose the weakness of the Greeks by issuing a summons which they will not obey and declaring a war which you cannot wage; but in quietness and confidence go on with your preparations, and be content that this report of you be brought to the King’s ears, not (Heaven forbid!) that all the Greeks, including the Athenians, are helpless, terrified and distracted—that is far from being the case—

but that if falsehood and perjury were not as disgraceful in the eyes of the Greeks as they are respectable in his, you would long ago have marched against him; that as it is, you will not for your own sakes do this, but you pray to all the gods that he may be smitten with the same infatuation as were his ancestors of old. And if it comes into his mind to reflect on this; he will find that your resolutions are not carelessly taken.

He knows that the wars we fought against his ancestors have made our city prosperous and powerful, but that the policy of inaction that she once pursued gave her no such supremacy over any of the other Greek states as she enjoys today. And indeed he sees that the Greeks stand in need of a peacemaker, whether voluntary or involuntary, and he knows that in that character he would himself appear to them, if he tried to stir up war. Therefore he will find the reports that reach him easy to understand and easy to believe.