On the Navy-Boards

Those who praise your ancestors, men of Athens, seem to me to choose an acceptable theme, which yet fails to do any real service to those whom they eulogize; for when they attempt to speak about achievements to which no words could possibly do justice, they earn for themselves the reputation of clever speakers, but leave their hearers with a lower estimate of the merits of those famous men. Indeed, I think the best testimony to their merits is the length of time that has elapsed, during which no other men have been able to surpass their achievements.

For my own part, however, I shall confine myself to pointing out how you can best prepare for war. For this is how things stand. Even if all of us who are to address you should prove capable speakers, you would, I am sure, be no better off; but if someone, whoever he may be, could come forward and point out convincingly the nature and size of the force that will be serviceable to the city, and show how it is to be provided, all our present fears will be relieved. This is what I will try to do, if only I am able, first giving you briefly my views about our relations with the Great King.

I admit that he is the common enemy of all the Greeks; yet I would not on that account advise you to undertake a war against him by yourselves apart from the rest, for I observe that the Greeks themselves are by no means common friends of one another, but that certain of them repose more confidence in the King than in some of their neighbors. From this state of things I conclude that it is to your interest to be careful that your grounds for entering on war shall be equitable and just, but to proceed with all the necessary preparations, making that the foundation of your policy.

For I believe, Athenians, that if there were clear and unmistakable signs of the King’s hostile intentions, the other Greeks would join with us, and would be deeply grateful to those who would stand up for them and with them against his attacks; but if we force on a war, while his aims are still obscure, I am afraid, men of Athens, that we shall be obliged to encounter, not only the King, but also those whom we are minded to protect.

For the King, suspending his designs—if he really intends to invade Greece—will distribute money among them and tempt them with offers of friendship, while they, anxious to bring their private quarrels to a successful issue and keeping that object in view, will overlook the common safety of all. Into such a welter of confusion and folly I beseech you not to plunge our country.

For indeed, as regards your policy towards the King, I see that you are by no means on the same footing as the other Greeks; for many of them it is, I suppose, possible to pursue their private interests and abandon the cause of their countrymen, but for you, even when wronged by them, it would not be honorable to exact such a penalty from the wrong-doers as to leave any of them under the heel of the barbarian.

But as long as this is so, we must take care that we are not involved in war at a disadvantage, and that the King, whom we believe to have designs against the Greeks, does not win the credit of appearing as their friend. How then can this be ensured? If we make it plain to all that our forces are already marshalled and equipped, but equally plain that our policy is founded on sentiments of justice.

To your rash advisers, who are so eager to hurry you into war, I have this to say, that it is not difficult, when deliberation is needed, to gain a reputation for courage, nor when danger is at hand, to display skill in oratory; but there is something that is both difficult and essential—to display courage in the face of danger, and in deliberation to offer sounder advice than one’s fellows.

I believe, men of Athens, that the war with the King is a difficult undertaking for our city, though any conflict which the war involved might prove easy enough.[*](In Dem. 9.52 he notes that the reverse would be the case in a contest with Philip.) Why so? Because the first requisites for every war are necessarily, I suppose, fleets and money and strong positions, and I find that the King is more fully supplied with these than we are; but for the actual conflict I observe that nothing is needed so much as brave soldiers, and of these we and those who share the danger with us have the better supply.

That is why I advise that we should not on any grounds be the first to plunge into war, but for the conflict we must be properly equipped from the start. If indeed there were one kind of force suitable for defence against Persians and another for defence against Greeks, then we might reasonably be suspected of marshalling ourselves against the King;

but when all preparation for war is on the same lines and the main objects of an armed force are the same—to be strong enough to repel the enemy, to assist one’s allies, and to preserve one’s own possessions-why, having open enemies enough, must we be looking out for another? Let us rather make our preparations against them, and then we shall defend ourselves against him too, if he ventures to molest us.

Moreover you are now calling on the Greeks to join you; but if you refuse to do their bidding—and your relations with some of them are not cordial—how can you expect any of them to answer your call? Because, you say, we shall warn them that the King has designs on them. But seriously, do you imagine that they cannot detect that for themselves? I am sure they can. But as yet their fear of Persia is subordinate to their feuds with you and, in some cases, with one another. Therefore your ambassadors will only go round repeating their heroics.[*](The ambassadors are compared to rhapsodists, the wandering professional reciters of epic poetry, whose art was falling into contempt in an age of wider education.)

But later on, if what we now deem probable comes to pass, surely no Greek community has such a good conceit of itself that when they see that you have a thousand cavalry and as many infantry as one could desire and three hundred ships, they will not come as our suitors, feeling that with such support their safety is assured. Therefore to invite them at once means that you are the suppliants and, if unsuccessful, have failed utterly, but to wait and at the same time complete your own preparations means saving them at their request, and being well assured that they will all join you.

Therefore, men of Athens, moved by this and similar considerations, I was unwilling to compose a confident oration or one of futile length, but I have been at very great pains to consider the best and speediest method of completing our equipment. I venture to think that you ought to hear my plan and vote for it, if it satisfies you. Now the first and most important step in our equipment, men of Athens, is that you should be filled with such resolution that everyone shall be willing and eager to do his part.

For you will notice, men of Athens, that whenever you have collectively formed some project, and thereafter each individual has realized that it was his personal duty to carry it out, nothing has ever escaped your grasp; but whenever you have formed your project and thereafter have looked to one another to carry it out, each expecting to do nothing while his neighbor worked, then nothing has succeeded with you.

But seeing you thus resolved and enthusiastic, I propose that the register of the twelve hundred[*](The wealthiest citizens (συντελεῖς).) should be filled up and enlarged to two thousand by the addition of eight hundred names; for if you fix on that number, I believe that you will get your twelve hundred persons, after striking out wards, orphans, settlers in colonies, joint holders of estates, and anyone otherwise ineligible.

Then I propose to divide these into twenty boards, as at present, each containing sixty persons. Each of these boards I would subdivide into five groups of twelve men, always attaching to the wealthiest man those who are poorest, to keep the balance. That is how I propose to arrange these persons; you will understand why, when you have heard the whole of the arrangement.

Now what about the war-galleys? I propose to fix the total number at three hundred, divided into twenty squadrons of fifteen ships each, assigning to each squadron five of the first hundred,[*](Ships of the first rate, apparently.) five of the second, and five of the third; and next to allot a squadron of fifteen to each board, and the board must assign three vessels to each of its own groups.

When these preliminaries are settled, I propose that your wealth also should be organized, and that as the ratable value of the country is six thousand talents, this sum should be divided into a hundred parts of sixty talents each, and that then five of these parts should be allotted to each of the twenty full boards, and that the board itself should assign one part, consisting of sixty talents,[*](i.e. by a tax on this fraction, one hundredth, of the whole ratable value. The actual cost of a trierarchy was from 40 minae to one talent. The value of a mina (=100 drachmae) is usually put at £4 and that of a talent at £240: but the actual value must have been much greater, as a drachma was the average wage of an artisan.) to each of its own five groups.

Thus, if you want a hundred war-galleys the cost of each will be covered by the sixty talents and there will be twelve trierarchs for each; if you want two hundred, there will be thirty talents to cover the cost and six persons to serve as trierarchs; if you want three hundred, there will be twenty talents for the cost and four persons to serve.