To Philip

Now as to the Argives, you will see that in some respects they are no better off than the Lacedaemonians, while in others their condition is worse; for they have been in a state of war with their neighbors[*](The Spartans.) from the day they founded their city, just as have the Lacedaemonians; but there is this difference, that the neighbors of the Lacedaemonians are weaker than they, while those of the Argives are stronger—a condition which all would admit to be the greatest of misfortunes. And so unsuccessful are they in their warfare that hardly a year passes that they are not compelled to witness their own territory being ravaged and laid waste.[*](This was done by the Spartans six years before this. Dio. Sic. 16.39.)

But what is most deplorable of all is that, during the intervals when their enemies cease from harrying them, they themselves put to death the most eminent and wealthy of their citizens;[*](The conflict between democracy and oligarchy, which raged with varying intensity in most of the Greek cities, in Argos was most bitter. In 371 B.C. occurred a massacre in which twelve hundred of the leading men were slain by the mob. Dio. Sic. 15.57-58; Grote, Hist. ix. p. 417.) and they have more pleasure in doing this than any other people have in slaying their foes. The cause of their living in such disorder is none other than the state of war; and if you can put a stop to this, you will not only deliver them from these evils but you will cause them to adopt a better policy with respect to their other interests as well.

And as for the condition of the Thebans, surely you have not failed to note that also. They won a splendid victory[*](Battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) and covered themselves with glory, but because they did not make good use of their success they are now in no better case than those who have suffered defeat and failure. For no sooner had they triumphed over their foes than, neglecting everything else, they began to annoy the cities of the Peloponnese;[*](Epaminondas invaded the Peloponnese in 369, 368, 366, 362, stirring up the cities there against Sparta. Dio. Sic. 15.62-75.) they made bold to reduce Thessaly to subjection;[*](By conquering Alexander of Pherae. Dio. Sic. 15.67.) they threatened their neighbors, the Megarians;[*](The Megarians sided with Sparta when Agesilaus invaded Boeotia in 378. Xen. Hell. 5.4.41.) they robbed our city of a portion of its territory;[*](The border town of Oropus, 366 B.C. Xen. Hell. 7.4.1.) they ravaged Euboea;[*](See Dem. 18.99.) they sent men-of-war to Byzantium,[*](One hundred ships under Epaminondas, 364 B.C. Dio. Sic. 15.78-79.) as if they purposed to rule both land and sea;

and, finally, they began war upon the Phocians,[*](Ten years, 356-346 B.C. See Isoc. 5.50.) expecting that in a short time they would conquer their cities, occupy all the surrounding territory, and prevail over all the treasures at Delphi[*](The Phocians met their expenses in the war from the rich treasures in the Temple of Apollo at Delphi.) by the outlay of their own funds. But none of these hopes has been realized; instead of seizing the cities of the Phocians they have lost cities of their own;[*](Orchomenus, Coroneia, Corsiae. Dio. Sic. 16.33-58.) and now when they invade the enemy's territory they inflict less damage upon them than they suffer when they are retreating to their own country;

for while they are in Phocian territory they succeed in killing a few hireling[*](The Phocian forces were composed mainly of mercenaries.) soldiers who are better off dead than alive, but when they retreat they lose of their own citizens those who are most esteemed and most ready to die for their fatherland. And so completely have their fortunes shifted, that whereas they once hoped that all Hellas would be subject to them, now they rest upon you[*](The war was concluded shortly after this by the intervention of Philip against the Phocians.) the hopes of their own deliverance. Therefore I think that the Thebans also will do with alacrity whatever you command or advise.

It would still remain for me to speak about our city, had she not come to her senses before the others and made peace; but now I need only say this: I think that she will join forces with you in carrying out your policy, especially if she can be made to see that your object is to prepare for the campaign against the barbarians.

That it is not, therefore, impossible for you to bring these cities together, I think has become evident to you from what I have said. But more than that, I believe I can convince you by many examples that it will also be easy for you to do this. For if it can be shown that other men in the past have undertaken enterprises which were not, indeed, more noble or more righteous than that which I have advised, but of greater magnitude and difficulty, and have actually brought them to pass, what ground will be left to my opponents to argue that you will not accomplish the easier task more quickly than other men the harder?

Consider first the exploits of Alcibiades.[*](For the career of the brilliant, unscrupulous Alcibiades see Grote, Hist. vi. pp. 301 ff., vii. 49 ff., and Plut. Alc.) Although he was exiled from Athens[*](He was exiled on the charge of having profaned the Eleusinian Mysteries.) and observed that the others who had before labored under this misfortune had been cowed[*](For example, Themistocles.) because of the greatness of the city, yet he did not show the same submissive spirit as they; on the contrary, convinced that he must attempt to bring about his return by force, he deliberately chose to make war upon her.[*](By stirring up and aiding, through his great personal influence and his sagacity, all the enemies of Athens in the Peloponnesian War.)

Now if one should attempt to speak in detail of the events of that time, he would find it impossible to recount them all exactly, and for the present occasion the recital would perhaps prove wearisome. But so great was the confusion into which he plunged not only Athens but Lacedaemon and all the rest of Hellas as well, that we, the Athenians, suffered what all the world knows;[*](The defeat at Aegospotami, and after that the rule of the “thirty tyrants,” and later the “decarchy.”)

that the rest of the Hellenes fell upon such evil days that even now the calamities engendered in the several states by reason of that war are not yet forgotten;[*](Under the rule of the decarchies described in Isoc. 4.111 ff.) and that the Lacedaemonians, who then appeared to be at the height of their fortune, are reduced to their present state of misfortune,—all on account of Alcibiades.[*](Isocrates does not much exaggerate the mischief he wrought in Greek affairs generally.)

For because they were persuaded by him to covet the sovereignty of the sea, they lost even their leadership on land; so that if one were to assert that they became subject to the dominion of their present ills[*](For this play of words— a)rxh/“beginning,” a)rxh/“dominion” — cf. Isoc. 4.119, Isoc. 3.28, Isoc. 8.101.) when they attempted to seize the dominion of the sea, he could not be convicted of falsehood. Alcibiades, however, after having caused these great calamities, was restored to his city, having won a great reputation, though not, indeed, enjoying the commendation of all.[*](At length Alcibiades fell out with Athens' enemies, and began to intrigue in her favor; and so effectively did he work that his services were recognized at home and he was welcomed back to take again a leading part in the life of Athens, 408 B.C. There appears to have been no open opposition to his return. The many who distrusted him probably thought him less dangerous at home than in exile.)

The career of Conon,[*](See Isoc. 4.142 ff.) not many years later, is a counterpart to that of Alcibiades. After his defeat in the naval engagement in the Hellespont,[*](The battle of Aegospotami.) for which not he but his fellow commanders were responsible, he was too chagrined to return home; instead he sailed to Cyprus, where he spent some time attending to his private interests.[*](See Isoc. 9.52 ff.) But learning that Agesilaus had crossed over into Asia with a large force[*](See 86, 87, and Isoc. Letter 9.13-14.) and was ravaging the country, he was so dauntless of spirit

that, although he possessed no resource whatever save his body and his wits, he was yet confident that he could conquer the Lacedaemonians, albeit they were the first power in Hellas on both land and sea; and, sending word to the generals of the Persian king, he promised that he would do this. What need is there to tell more of the story? For he collected a naval force off Rhodes, won a victory over the Lacedaemonians in a sea-fight,[*](Battle of Cnidus, 394 B.C. There is a dramatic significance in the fact that Conon fought in the battle of Aegospotami which gave Sparta the supremacy and in the battle of Cnidus which took it from her.) deposed them from their sovereignty, and set the Hellenes free.[*](From Spartan rule.)

And not only did he rebuild the walls of his country,[*](He restored the walls which had been torn down as one of the terms imposed upon Athens after the battle of Aegospotami. Xen. Hell. 4.8.9 ff.) but he restored Athens to the same high repute from which she had fallen. And yet who could have expected that a man whose own fortunes had fallen so low would completely reverse the fortunes of Hellas, degrading some of the Hellenic states from places of honor and raising others into prominence?

Again, there is the case of Dionysius[*](Dionysius, the Elder, tyrant of Syracuse, 406-367 B.C.)(for I desire you to be convinced by many instances that the course of action to which I am urging you is an easy one). He was a person of small account among the Syracusans in birth,[*](See Dio. Sic. 13.96.) in reputation, and in all other respects;[*](Yet Isocrates once wrote to him a most respectful letter ( Isoc. Letter 1).) yet, being inspired by a mad and unreasoning passion for monarchy, and having the hardihood to do anything which advanced him to this goal, he made himself master of Syracuse, conquered all the states in Sicily which were of Hellenic origin, and surrounded himself with a power on both land and sea[*](A navy of three hundred and ten ships, Dio. Sic. 14.42, and an army of a hundred thousand men more or less, Dio. Sic. 2.5.) greater than any man before his time had possessed.