To Philip

And the opportunity now serves you; for you would only be repaying the debt of gratitude which you owed them, but, because so much time has elapsed, they will credit you with being first in friendly offices. And it is a good thing to have the appearance of conferring benefits upon the greatest states of Hellas and at the same time to profit yourself no less than them.

But apart from this, if anything unpleasant has arisen between you and any of them, you will wipe it out completely; for friendly acts in the present crisis will make you forget the wrongs which you have done each other in the past. Yes, and this also is beyond question, that all men hold in fondest memory those benefits which they receive in times of trouble.

And you see how utterly wretched these states have become because of their warfare, and how like they are to men engaged in a personal encounter; for no one can reconcile the parties to a quarrel while their wrath is rising; but after they have punished each other badly, they need no mediator, but separate of their own accord. And that is just what I think these states also will do unless you first take them in hand.

Now perhaps someone will venture to object to what I have proposed, saying that I am trying to persuade you to set yourself to an impossible task, since the Argives could never be friendly to the Lacedaemonians, nor the Lacedaemonians to the Thebans, and since, in general, those who have been accustomed throughout their whole existence to press their own selfish interests can never share and share alike with each other.

Well, I myself do not believe that at the time when our city was the first power in Hellas, or again when Lacedaemon occupied that position, any such result could have been accomplished,[*](The following paragraphs betray a cynicism which is foreign to the Isoc. 4.See General Introd. p. xxxvi.) since the one or the other of these two cities could easily have blocked the attempt; but as things are now, I am not of the same mind regarding them. For I know that they have all been brought down to the same level by their misfortunes, and so I think that they would much prefer the mutual advantages which would come from a unity of purpose to the selfish gains which accrued from their policy in those days.[*](Cf.8 and Isoc. 4.17.)

Furthermore, while I grant that no one else in the world could reconcile these cities, yet nothing of the sort is difficult for you; for I see that you have carried through to a successful end many undertakings which the rest of the world looked upon as hopeless and unthinkable, and therefore it would be nothing strange if you should be able single-handed to affect this union. In fact, men of high purposes and exceptional gifts ought not to undertake enterprises which any of the common run might carry out with success, but rather those which no one would attempt save men with endowments and power such as you possess.

But I marvel that those who think that none of these proposals could possibly be carried out are not aware, either by their own knowledge or by tradition, that there have been many terrible wars after which the participants have come to an understanding and rendered great services to one another. For what could exceed the enmity which the Hellenes felt toward Xerxes? Yet everyone knows that we and the Lacedaemonians came to prize his friendship[*](The expression is loose. He means that the hatred for Persia under Xerxes changed to friendship under Artaxerxes when the Peace of Antalcidas was made. Cf. Sparta's “love” for Persia mentioned in Isoc. 12.102-103.) more than that of those who helped us to establish our respective empires.

But why speak of ancient history, or of our dealings with the barbarians? If one should scan and review the misfortunes of the Hellenes in general, these will appear as nothing in comparison with those which we Athenians have experienced through the Thebans and the Lacedaemonians.[*](Especially at the close of the Peloponnesian War. See Isoc. 14.31; Xen. Hell. 3.5.8.) Nevertheless, when the Lacedaemonians took the field against the Thebans and were minded to humiliate Boeotia and break up the league of her cities, we sent a relief expedition[*](Under Chabrias, against Agesilaus, 378 B.C. Xen. Hell. 5.4; Grote, Hist. ix. p. 343.) and thwarted the desires of the Lacedaemonians.

And again, when fortune shifted her favor[*](Thebes became the supreme power in Greece by the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) and the Thebans and the Peloponnesians were one and all trying to devastate Lacedaemon, we alone among the Hellenes formed[*](361 B.C.) an alliance with the Lacedaemonians and helped to save them from destruction.[*](In 362 B.C., when Epaminondas, at the head of the Thebans and their allies, including the Argives, Arcadians, Messenians, and the Eleans, marched on Sparta to destroy her, the Athenians dispatched Iphicrates with an army of twelve thousand to the rescue. See Isoc. 8.105; Xen. Hell. 6.5.23 ff.; Grote, Hist. x. pp. 89 ff.)

So then, seeing that such great reversals are wont to occur, and that our states care nothing about their former enmities or about their oaths or about anything else save what they conceive to be expedient for themselves, and that expediency is the sole object to which they give their affections and devote all their zeal, no man, unless obsessed by utter folly, could fail to believe that now also they will show the same disposition, especially if you take the lead in their reconciliation, while selfish interests urge and present ills constrain them to this course. I, for my part, believe that, with these influences fighting on your side, everything will turn out as it should.

But I think that you can get most light on the question whether these cities are inclined toward peace with each other or toward war, if I review, not merely in general terms nor yet with excessive detail, the principal facts in their present situation. And first of all, let us consider the condition of the Lacedaemonians.

The Lacedaemonians were the leaders of the Hellenes,[*](The hegemony of Sparta lasted from the battle of Aegospotami, 405 B.C., to the battle of Leuctra, 371 B.C.) not long ago, on both land and sea, and yet they suffered so great a reversal of fortune when they met defeat at Leuctra that they were deprived of their power over the Hellenes, and lost such of their warriors as chose to die rather than survive defeat at the hands of those over whom they had once been masters.

Furthermore, they were obliged to look on while all the Peloponnesians, who formerly had followed the lead of Lacedaemon against the rest of the world, united with the Thebans and invaded their territory; and against these the Lacedaemonians were compelled to risk battle, not in the country to save the crops, but in the heart of the city,[*](Epaminondas (see 44 and note) actually entered Sparta. Xen. Hell. 7.5.11.) before the very seat of their government, to save their wives and children—a crisis in which defeat meant instant destruction,

and victory has none the more delivered them from their ills; nay, they are now warred upon by their neighbors[*](The Argives and the Messenians were allied with Philip against Sparta. See Dem. 6.9, 15.); they are distrusted by all the Peloponnesians[*](Besides the Argives and Messenians, also the Arcadians, the Megalopolitans, the Eleans, and the Sicyonians. Dio. Sic. 16.39.); they are hated by most of the Hellenes[*](Especially by the Athenians and the Thebans. Dem. 16.22-23.); they are harried and plundered day and night by their own serfs[*](The Helots.); and not a day passes that they do not have to take the field or fight against some force or other, or march to the rescue of their perishing comrades.

But the worst of their afflictions is that they live in continual fear that the Thebans may patch up their quarrel with the Phocians[*](Thebes was the principal enemy of the Phocians in the Sacred War, which was now drawing to a close. For this war see Grote, Hist. xi. p. 45.) and, returning again,[*](As in the campaign referred to in 44, which ended with the battle of Mantinea.) ring them about with still greater calamities than have befallen them in the past. How, then, can we refuse to believe that people so hard pressed would gladly see at the head of a movement for peace a man who commands confidence and has the power to put an end to the wars in which they are involved?