Antidosis

But instead of that they bring their sons to me and are ready to pay me money, and are rejoiced when they see them spending their days in my society,[*](Cf. Plat. Apol. 34a-b.) while the sycophants are the men who speak evil of me and hale me into court. And who more than these sycophants would like to see many of our citizens corrupted and depraved, since they know that when they live among such characters they wield great power,[*](Cf. Isoc. 8.131.) whereas when they fall into the hands of honorable and intelligent men, they are doomed to destruction?

Therefore these men are wise in seeking to do away with all studies which they consider will make men better, and so render them more intolerant of the depravities and intrigues of the sycophants. It is well for you, however, to take the opposite course and regard those pursuits as the best to which you see that these men are most inimical.

But I now find myself in a curious position; for I am going to be frank even if some will say that I shift my ground too easily. A little while ago I said that many good men had been misled about philosophy, and are consequently harshly disposed toward it. Now, however, I have assumed that the arguments which I have presented are so plain and evident to all that no one, it seems to me, can misapprehend its power or accuse me of corrupting my disciples or have any such feeling as I imputed to them a little while ago.

Nevertheless, if I am to speak the truth and say what has now come into my mind, I am of the opinion that while all those who are envious of my success covet the ability to think and speak well, yet they themselves neglect to cultivate it, some because they are indolent, some because they discredit their own powers, and some on other pretexts (and these are legion);

but when other men take great pains and show a desire to attain what they themselves covet, then they grow irritated, jealous, perturbed in spirit, and are much in the same state of mind as lovers are. Indeed, how could one more aptly explain their condition?

They envy the good fortune of those who are able to use words eloquently; yet they reproach the youth who aspire to win this distinction. There is no one of them who would not pray the gods to bestow the power of eloquence upon himself, first of all, and failing that, upon his sons and his own kin;

yet when men strive through work and study to accomplish for themselves what these people would like to have as a gift from the gods, they accuse them of going utterly astray. At one moment they make believe to mock at them as dupes and victims; and then again, for no reason at all, they change about and denounce them as adepts in grasping their own advantage.

When any danger threatens the city, they seek counsel from those who can speak best upon the question at issue and act upon their advice; but when men devote their efforts to preparing themselves to serve the state in just such crises, they think it proper to traduce them. And they reproach the Thebans and our other enemies for their ignorance;[*](No love was lost between Athens and Thebes, and to the Athenians the Thebans were proverbial for their stupidity. Cf. Plut. Mor. 995e: TOU\S GA\R *BOIWTOU\S H(MA=S OI( *)ATTIKOI\ KAI\ PAXEI=S KAI\ A)NAISQH/TOUS KAI\ H)LIQIOUS, MA/LISTA DIA\ TA\S A)DHFAGI/AS PROSAGOREU/OUSIN. Cf. Pind. O. 6.148-153; Cicero, De fato4; Horace, Epist. 2.1.241-244.) yet when men seek by every means to escape from that malady, they never cease maligning them.

But as a symptom, not only of their confusion of mind, but of their contempt for the gods, they recognize that Persuasion is one of the gods, and they observe that the city makes sacrifices to her every year,[*](Pausanias (Paus. 1.22.3) states that the worship of *PEIQW/ (Persuasion) was established in Athens by Theseus, and speaks of a statue of this goddess as once standing near the Acropolis. A special seat of honor was assigned to her priestess in the Theatre. See C.I.A. iii. 351.) but when men aspire to share the power which the goddess possesses, they claim that such aspirants are being corrupted, as though their desire were for some evil thing.

But what is most astonishing of all is that while they would grant that the mind is superior to the body, nevertheless, in spite of this opinion, they look with greater favor upon training in gymnastics than upon the study of philosophy.[*](Cf. the opening paragraph of Isoc. 4.1 and note.) And yet how unreasonable it is to give higher praise to those who cultivate the less than to those who cultivate the greater thing, and that too when everyone knows it was not through excellence of body that Athens ever accomplished any noteworthy thing, but that through wisdom of men[*](The rendering is here doubtful. Literally it is “through wisdom of a man.” Possibly Isocrates has in mind Pericles and the triumphs of Athens under his administration. Supporting the rendering “of a man” is Isoc. 7.11.) she became the most prosperous and the greatest of Hellenic states.

It would be possible to bring together many more contradictions than the above in the views of these people, but that is a task for those who are younger than I and who are free from anxiety about the present occasion. For example, one might put the following questions on this very subject: Suppose the case of men who, having inherited large fortunes from their ancestors, used their wealth, not to render themselves serviceable to the state, but to outrage their fellow-citizens and to dishonor their sons and their wives; would anyone venture to put the blame upon the authors of their wealth instead of demanding that the offenders themselves be punished?

Again, suppose the case of men who, having mastered the art of war, did not use their skill against the enemy, but rose up and slew many of their fellow-citizens; or suppose the case of men who, having been trained to perfection in the art of boxing or of the pancration, kept away from the games and fell foul of the passers-by; would anyone withhold praise from their instructors instead of putting to death those who turned their lessons to an evil use?[*](The same point is made in Isoc. 3.3-4. Cf. Aristot. Rh. 1355b.)

We ought, therefore, to think of the art of discourse just as we think of the other arts, and not to form opposite judgements about similar things, nor show ourselves intolerant toward that power which, of all the faculties which belong to the nature of man, is the source of most of our blessings. For in the other powers which we possess, as I have already said on a former occasion,[*](Cf. Isoc. 4.48.) we are in no respect superior to other living creatures; nay, we are inferior to many in swiftness and in strength and in other resources;

but, because there has been implanted in us the power to persuade each other and to make clear to each other whatever we desire, not only have we escaped the life of wild beasts, but we have come together and founded cities and made laws and invented arts; and, generally speaking, there is no institution devised by man which the power of speech has not helped us to establish.

For this it is which has laid down laws concerning things just and unjust, and things honorable and base; and if it were not for these ordinances we should not be able to live with one another. It is by this also that we confute the bad and extol the good. Through this we educate the ignorant and appraise the wise; for the power to speak well is taken as the surest index of a sound understanding, and discourse which is true and lawful and just is the outward image of a good and faithful soul.

With this faculty we both contend against others on matters which are open to dispute and seek light for ourselves on things which are unknown; for the same arguments which we use in persuading others when we speak in public, we employ also when we deliberate in our own thoughts; and, while we call eloquent those who are able to speak before a crowd, we regard as sage those who most skilfully debate their problems in their own minds.

And, if there is need to speak in brief summary of this power, we shall find that none of the things which are done with intelligence take place without the help of speech, but that in all our actions as well as in all our thoughts speech is our guide, and is most employed by those who have the most wisdom.[*](253-257 are quoted from Isoc. 3.5-9.) But without reflecting at all on these truths, Lysimachus has dared to attack those who aspire to an accomplishment which is the source of blessings so many and so great.

But why should we be surprised at him when even among the professors of disputation[*](The “eristics.” Cf. Isoc. Letter 5.3 ff. See General Introd. p. xxi. In this passage, as well as in Isoc. Letter 5.3 ff., he may be resenting the criticisms of the Aristotelians. See Blass, Die attische Beredsamkeit ii. p. 65.) there are some who talk no less abusively of the art of speaking on general and useful themes than do the most benighted of men, not that they are ignorant of its power or of the advantage which it quickly gives to those who avail themselves of it, but because they think that by decrying this art they will enhance the standing of their own.

I could, perhaps, say much harsher things of them than they of me, but I refrain for a double reason. I want neither to descend to the level of men whom envy has made blind nor to censure men who, although they do no actual harm to their pupils are less able to benefit them than are other teachers. I shall, however, say a few words about them, first because they also have paid their compliments to me; second, in order that you, being better informed as to their powers, may estimate us justly in relation to each other;

and, furthermore, that I may show you clearly that we who are occupied with political discourse and whom they call contentious are more considerate than they; for although they are always saying disparaging things of me, I shall not answer them in kind but shall confine myself to the simple truth.