On the Peace

Nay, we shall see our city enjoying twice the revenues[*](According to Demosthenes (Dem. 10.37-38) Athens before the peace had an income of 130 talents; after the peace of 400 talents.) which she now receives, and thronged with merchants and foreigners and resident aliens,[*](Foreigners, whether merchants or not, had to pay nonresident fees, cenika\ te/lh; resident aliens paid the metoi/kion of 12 drachmas per man and 6 per woman.) by whom she is now deserted. And, what is most important of all, we shall have all mankind as our allies—allies who will not have been forced, but rather persuaded, to join with us, who will not welcome our friendship because of our power when we are secure only to abandon us when we are in peril,[*](The reference is to the allies who revolted from Athens both during the Confederacy of Delos and during the New Naval League.) but who will be disposed towards us as those should be who are in very truth allies and friends.

Furthermore, what we are now unable to obtain through war and great outlay of money we shall readily secure for ourselves through peaceful embassies. For do not think that Cersobleptes will wage war with us over the Chersonese, or Philip[*](These are singled out because both Cersobleptes, now virtually master of the Thracian Chersonnes, and Philip, with his growing empire in the north Aegean, were giving Athens trouble at this time.) over Amphipolis,[*](See the opening of the Address to Philip, Isoc. 5.) when they see that we do not covet any of the possessions of other peoples. It is true that as things are now they have good reason to be afraid to make Athens a near neighbor to their dominions;

for they see that we are not content with what we have but are always reaching out for more. If, however, we change our ways and gain a better reputation, they will not only withdraw from our territory but will give us besides territory of their own. For it will be to their advantage to cherish and support the power of Athens and so be secure in the possession of their own kingdoms.

And, mark you, it will be possible for us to cut off from the region of Thrace enough land[*](This was done in 353 when the Athenians captured Sestos and settled colonists in this territory. See Dio. Sic. 16.34.3.) so that we shall not only have abundance ourselves but shall also be able to furnish adequate means of subsistence to those of the Hellenes who are in need and, because of their poverty, are now wandering from place to place.[*](For these wandering refugees and the problem they presented see Isoc. 5.120 and note.) For where Athenodorus[*](An Athenian citizen, he was a private in the sense that he had no official post. He was a free-lance captain of mercenaries who took service in Persia and later in the Thracian Chersonnese. What colony he founded is not known.) and Callistratus,[*](An Athenian orator who had much to do with the formation of the New Naval League, he was charged with treason and retired into exile to Thrace, where he had a part in the recolonization of Datus.) the one a private, the other an exile, have been able to found cities, surely we could gain possession of many such places if we so desired. And those who claim the right to stand at the head of the Hellenes ought to become leaders of such enterprises much rather than of war and of hireling armies,[*](See Isoc. 8.44-46.) which at the present time are the objects of our ambition.

Now as to the promises held out by the ambassadors,[*](Probably from the former allies with whom Athens was now at war.) what I have said is enough, although one might perhaps add many things to what I have said. But I think we should not go forth from this assembly, having merely adopted resolutions in favor of the peace, without also taking counsel how we shall keep it, and not do what we are in the habit of doing—namely, getting ourselves involved again in the same disorders after a short interval of time[*](Cf. Isoc. 5.8.)—and how we shall devise, not merely a postponement, but some means of permanent deliverance from our present ills.

But no such thing can come to pass until you are persuaded that tranquillity is more advantageous and more profitable than meddlesomeness,[*](Meddlesomeness, h( polupragmosu/nh, is used here and elsewhere in the speech as the opposite of h(suxi/a ( or swfrosu/nh, moderation, self-control). The latter contains the idea of quiet living and minding one's own business in private relations, and in foreign relations, of pursuing peace and avoiding aggression.) justice than injustice, and attention to one's own affairs than covetousness of the possessions of others. This is a theme on which none of the orators has ever made bold to address you. I, however, shall devote most of my discourse to this very subject. For I observe that happiness is to be found in these ways of life and not in those which we now follow.

But anyone who attempts to discourse on a subject out of the common and who desires to bring about a change in your opinions must needs touch upon many matters and speak somewhat at length, now reminding, now rebuking, now commending, and again counselling you. For hardly with all these aids can you be led to a better way of thinking.

For the matter stands thus. It seems to me that, while all men crave their advantage and desire to be better off than the rest, they do not all know the kind of conduct which leads to this end but differ from each other in judgement, some possessing a judgement which is sound and capable of hitting the right course of action,[*](Cf. Isoc. 12.30.) others one which completely misses their true advantage.[*](Advantage in the good sense, which works no disadvantage to others. Cf. Isoc. 3.2, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L.; Isoc. 15.275.)

And this is the very thing which has happened to our city; for we think that, if we sail the sea with many triremes and compel the various states to pay contributions[*](In the Confederacy of Delos the quotas paid to Athens to support the league were termed fo/roi, which, when Athens made it compulsory, came to have the invidious meaning “tribute moneys.” In the New Naval League, the term sunta/ceis, contributions, was substituted. Cf. Isoc. 15.123 and Isoc. 7.2.) and send representatives[*](To the Common Council of the allies, to\ koino\n sune/drion tw=n summa/xiwn, which met in Athens.) to Athens, we have accomplished something to the purpose. But in fact, we have been completely misled as to the truth; for of the hopes which we cherished not one has been fulfilled; on the contrary, we have reaped from them hatreds and wars and great expense. And this was to be expected;

for in former times as the result of such meddlesomeness we were placed in the utmost peril,[*](At the end of the Peloponnesian War, which was the end of the Confederacy of Delos and of the Empire of Athens.) while as the result of keeping our city in the path of justice and of giving aid to the oppressed and of not coveting the possessions of others we were given the hegemony by the willing consent of the Hellenes[*](In 478 B.C., when the Confederacy of Delos (see Isoc. 12.67 ff. and notes)was formed, Thucydides states that the Ionian Greeks came to Athens and asked her to take the hegemony. See i. 95, 96. Cf. Isoc. 4.72.)—considerations which now and for a long time past, without reason and with utter recklessness, we have treated with contempt.

For some have gone to such an extreme of folly as to hold the view that, while injustice is reprehensible, it is, nevertheless, profitable and advantageous in our lives day by day, and that, while justice is estimable, it is for all that disadvantageous and more capable of benefiting others than of helping those who practise it.[*](Cf. Isoc. 3.59; Plat. Rep. 392b.)

They fail to see that nothing in the world can contribute so powerfully to material gain, to good repute, to right action, in a word, to happiness, as virtue and the qualities of virtue.[*](Literally, virtue and its parts. The particular virtues mentioned by Isocrates are piety, justice, and moderation. See Isoc. 8.63.) For it is by the good qualities which we have in our souls that we acquire also the other advantages of which we stand in need.[*](Cf. Isoc. 15.290; Socrates in Plat. Apol. 30a-b: “I go about doing nothing else than trying to persuade you, young and old, not to care for your bodies nor for your possesssions before nor even as much as you care for your soul that it may be the best possible, saying to you that not from your possessons does virtue spring, but from virtue spring possessions and all other good things to makind in private and in public life.” For this as a sound principle of foreign policy see Isoc. 12.185 ff.) So that those who have no care for their own state of mind are unwittingly disparaging the means of attaining at the same time to greater wisdom and to greater well-being.

But I marvel if anyone thinks that those who practise piety and justice remain constant and steadfast in these virtues because they expect to be worse off than the wicked and not because they consider that both among gods and among men[*](Cf. Isoc. 3.2.) they will have the advantage over others. I, for my part, am persuaded that they and they alone gain advantage in the true sense, while the others gain advantage only in the baser sense of that term.

For I observe that those who prefer the way of injustice, thinking it the greatest good fortune to seize something that belongs to others, are in like case with animals which are lured by a bait, at the first deriving pleasure from what they seize, but the moment after finding themselves in desperate straits, while those who live a life of piety and justice pass their days in security for the present and have sweeter hopes for all eternity.[*](See Isoc. 1.39 and note.)

But if this is not wont to happen in all cases, nevertheless it does, for the most part, come out in this way. And it behoves intelligent men, since they cannot see clearly what will always be to their advantage, to show to the world that they prefer that which is generally beneficial. On the other hand, they are of all men most afflicted with unreason who concede that justice is a way of life more noble and more pleasing to the gods than injustice but at the same time believe that those who follow it will live in worse case than those who have chosen the way of evil.

I could wish that, even as to praise virtue is a facile theme, so it were easy to persuade bearers to practice it. But as things are I am afraid that I may be expressing such sentiments to no purpose. For we have been depraved for a long time by men whose only ability is to cheat and delude—men who have held the people in such contempt that whenever they wish to bring about a state of war with any city, these very men who are paid[*](That is, bribed to speak. See Isoc. 8.50 and note.) for what they say have the audacity to tell us that we should follow the example of our ancestors and not allow ourselves to be made a laughing-stock nor permit those Hellenes to sail the sea who are unwilling to pay us their contributions.

Now I should be glad if they would inform me what ancestors they would have us imitate. Do they mean those who lived at the time of the Persian Wars[*](See 75.) or those who governed the city before the Decelean War[*](This term is frequently used to denote the last decade of the Peloponnesian War, from the occupation of the fort of Decelea near Athens by the Spartans in 413 B.C. Cf. 84. During this period the affairs of Athens went from bad to worse.)? If they mean the latter then they are simply advising us to run the risk once again of being enslaved[*](As at the end of the Peloponnesian War. Cf. 78.);

but if they mean those who at Marathon conquered the barbarians, then they are of all men the most brazen, if, that is to say, they praise those who governed Athens at that time and in the same breath would persuade us to act in a manner contrary to theirs and to commit blunders so gross that I am at a loss what I should do—whether I should speak the truth as on all other occasions or be silent out of fear of making myself odious to you. For while it seems to me the better course to discuss your blunders, I observe that you are more resentful towards those who take you to task than towards those who are the authors of your misfortunes.

Nevertheless I should be ashamed if I showed that I am more concerned about my own reputation than about the public safety. It is, therefore, my duty and the duty of all who care about the welfare of the state to choose, not those discourses which are agreeable to you, but those which are profitable for you to hear. And you, for your part, ought to realize, in the first place, that while many treatments of all kinds have been discovered by physicians for the ills of our bodies, there exists no remedy for souls which are ignorant of the truth and filled with base desires other than the kind of discourse[*](Cf. Aesch. PB 378: yuxh=s nosou/shs ei)si\n i)atpoi\ lo/goi.) which boldly rebukes the sins which they commit,

and, in the second place, that it is absurd to submit to the cauteries and cuttings of physicians in order that we may be relieved of greater pains and yet refuse to hear discourses before knowing clearly whether or not they have the power to benefit their hearers.