On the Peace

All those who come before you on this platform are accustomed to assert that the subjects upon which they are themselves about to advise you are most important and most worthy of serious consideration by the state.[*](Cf. a similar statement in Dem. 24.4.) Nevertheless, if it was ever appropriate to preface the discussion of any other subject with such words, it seems to me fitting also to begin with them in speaking upon the subject now before us.

For we are assembled here to deliberate about War and Peace, which exercise the greatest power over the life of man, and regarding which those who are correctly advised must of necessity fare better than the rest of the world. Such, then, is the magnitude of the question which we have come together to decide.

I observe, however, that you do not hear with equal favor the speakers who address you, but that, while you give your attention to some, in the case of others you do not even suffer their voice to be heard.[*](This expression is used in a similar connection in Isoc. 15.22.) And it is not surprising that you do this; for in the past you have formed the habit of driving all the orators from the platform[*](Plutarch (Plut. Phoc. 9) states that this happened in the case of Phocion.) except those who support your desires.

Wherefore one may justly take you to task because, while you know well that many great houses[*](This term is used of estates in Isoc. 8.117. Here it is used of both families and their estates. Cf. Isoc. 8.88.) have been ruined[*](By the casualties and expenses of war.) by flatterers[*](Demagogic leaders of the war party, later termed sycophants. See Isoc. 8.121 ff.) and while in your private affairs you abhor those who practice this art, in your public affairs you are not so minded towards them; on the contrary, while you denounce those who welcome and enjoy the society of such men, you yourselves make it manifest that you place greater confidence in them than in the rest of your fellow citizens.

Indeed, you have caused the orators to practice and study, not what will be advantageous to the state, but how they may discourse in a manner pleasing to you. And it is to this kind of discourse that the majority of them have resorted also at the present time, since it has become plain to all that you will be better pleased with those who summon you to war than with those who counsel peace;

for the former put into our minds the expectation both of regaining our possessions in the several states and of recovering the power which we formerly enjoyed,[*](As head of the Confederacy of Delos, which developed into the Athenian Empire. During the period of supremacy, which lasted from the close of the Persian Wars to the end of the Peloponnesian War, Athens frequently disciplined recalcitrant confederate states by expelling their citizens and settling Athenians on their lands. Such settlements were called cleruchies. When Athens formed the new naval confederacy in 378 B.C. it was expressly stipulated by her allies and agreed to by Athens that such abuse of power should not be repeated. But the jingoistic orators advocated nothing less than the restoration of the former empire with all its powers and practices.) while the latter hold forth no such hope, insisting rather that we must have peace and not crave great possessions contrary to justice,[*](The state which seizes and holds foreign possessions is a robber. Isocrates throughout this discourse proposes to make the moral code within the state the basis of her foreign policy.) but be content with those we have[*](A proverbial tag. Cf. Isoc. 1.29.)—and that for the great majority of mankind is of all things the most difficult.

For we are so dependent on our hopes and so insatiate in seizing what seems to be our advantage that not even those who possess the greatest fortunes are willing to rest satisfied with them but are always grasping after more and so risking the loss of what they have. Wherefore we may well be anxious lest on the present occasion also we may be subject to this madness.

For some of us appear to me to be over zealously bent on war, as though having heard, not from haphazard counsellors, but from the gods, that we are destined to succeed in all our campaigns and to prevail easily over our foes. But people of intelligence, when dealing with matters about which they have knowledge, ought not to take counsel—for this is superfluous—but to act as men who are already resolved what to do, whereas, in dealing with matters about which they take counsel, they ought not to think that they have exact knowledge of what the result will be, but to be minded towards these contingencies as men who indeed exercise their best judgement, but are not sure what the future may hold in store.[*](This some what wordy passsage in which the orator becomes the philosopher reflects a fundamental idea of his pedagogy: There can be no exact science or knowledge of what to do in all contingencies and relations of life; the best that we can do is to develop sound, not infalliable, judgement in dealing with them. See General Introd. p. xxvii, Isocrates, Vol. I., L.C.L., and Isoc. 15.184, note.)

You, however, do neither the one thing nor the other, but are in the utmost confusion of mind. For you have come together as if it were your business to select the best course from all that are proposed; nevertheless, as though you had clear knowledge of what must be done, you are not willing to listen to any except those who speak for your pleasure.

And yet, if you really desired to find out what is advantageous to the state, you ought to give your attention more to those who oppose your views than to those who seek to gratify you, knowing well that of the orators who come before you here, those who say what you desire are able to delude you easily—since what is spoken to win favor clouds your vision of what is best—whereas those who advise you without regard to your pleasure can affect you in no such way,

since they could not convert you to their way of thinking until they have first made clear what is for your advantage. But, apart from these considerations, how can men wisely pass judgement on the past or take counsel for the future unless they examine and compare the arguments of opposing speakers, themselves giving an unbiased hearing[*](Cf. Isoc. 15.21; Dem. 18.6.) to both sides?

But I marvel that the older men no longer recall and that the younger have not been told by anyone that the orators who exhort us to cling fast to peace have never caused us to suffer any misfortune whatsoever, whereas those who lightly espouse war have already plunged us into many great disasters. However, we have no memory for these facts but are always ready, without in the least advancing our own welfare, to man triremes, to levy war-taxes, and to lend aid to the campaigns of others or wage war against them, as chance may determine, as if imperilling the interests, not of our own, but of a foreign state.

And the cause of this condition of affairs is that, although you ought to be as much concerned about the business of the commonwealth as about your own, you do not feel the same interest in the one as in the other; on the contrary, whenever you take counsel regarding your private business you seek out as counsellors men who are your superiors in intelligence, but whenever you deliberate on the business of the state you distrust and dislike men of that character and cultivate, instead, the most depraved[*](The private morals of men like Eubulus, Callistratus (see Theopompus in Athen. 4.166e), and Philocrates (see Aeschin. 2.52) apparently left much to be desired.) of the orators who come before you on this platform; and you prefer as being better friends of the people those who are drunk[*](Aristotle (Aristot. Ath. Pol. 34) states that when, after the battle of Arginusae, 406 B.C., the Spartans made overtures of peace the demagogue Cleophon came before the Assembly drunk and prevented the Athenians from accepting the terms. With this paragraph should be compared Isoc. 15.316 and note.) to those who are sober, those who are witless to those who are wise, and those who dole out the public money[*](The reference is particularly to Eubulus, who caused to be set aside a portion of the public revenues (the “surplus” mentioned in Isoc. 8.82) as a “theoric” fund to be distributed to the people at the public festivals.) to those who perform public services[*](See Isoc. 8.128, note.) at their own expense. So that we may well marvel that anyone can expect a state which employs such counsellors to advance to better things.

But I know that it is hazardous to oppose your views[*](Cf. Socrates in Plat. Apol. 31e: “No man in the world can preserve his life if he honestly opposes himself to you or to any other people and attempts to prevent many unjust and lawless things from being done by the state.”) and that, although this is a free government, there exists no ‘freedom of speech’[*](The pride of Athens. See Hdt. 5.78; Eur. Hipp. 422.) except that which is enjoyed in this Assembly by the most reckless orators, who care nothing for your welfare, and in the theater by the comic poets.[*](The poets of the old comedy exercised an incredible degree of license in ridiculing everything, divine or human, particularly the foibles of the state. These comedies were given at the festival of Dionysus, when many visitors from other states were in Athens. Aristophanes himself says (Aristoph. Ach. 500 ff.) that he was attacked by Cleon for “abusing Athens in the presence of strangers.”) And, what is most outrageous of all, you show greater favor to those who publish the failings of Athens to the rest of the Hellenes than you show even to those who benefit the city, while you are as ill-disposed to those who rebuke and admonish you[*](Isocrates resents their attitude towards himself in the opening remarks of the Antidosis (Isoc. 15).) as you are to men who work injury to the state.

Nevertheless, in spite of these conditions, I shall not desist from what I had in mind to say. For I have come before you, not to seek your favor nor to solicit your votes, but to make known the views I hold, first, regarding the proposals which have been put before you by the Prytaneis,[*](The Senate of the Five Hundred was divided into ten committees of 50, each serving a tenth part of the year. Such a committee was called a prytany and its members prytaneis. The prytany formulated measures to be brought before the General Assembly.) and, second, regarding the other interests of the state; for no good will come of the resolutions which have now been made regarding the peace[*](See Introduction, p. 2, note c.) unless we are well advised also with regard to what remains to be done.

I maintain, then, that we should make peace, not only with the Chians, the Rhodians, the Byzantines and the Coans, but with all mankind, and that we should adopt, not the covenants of peace which certain parties[*](Eubulus, whose terms of peace were, apparently, not broad enough.) have recently drawn up, but those which we have entered into[*](The Peace of Antalcidas. See Isoc. 4.115, note a.) with the king of Persia and with the Lacedaemonians, which ordain that the Hellenes be independent, that the alien garrisons be removed from the several states, and that each people retain its own territory. For we shall not find terms of peace more just than these nor more expedient for our city.

But if I leave off speaking at this point, I know that I shall appear to put Athens at a disadvantage, if, that is to say, the Thebans are to retain possession of Thespiae and Plataea[*](See Isoc. 6.27, note.) and the other cities[*](Orchomenus (Dio. Sic. 15.79), Oropus (Dio. Sic. 15.76).) which they have seized contrary to their oaths,[*](When they agreed to the Peace of Antalcidas.) while we are to retire, under no compulsion to do so, from the territory which we now hold. But if you will only listen to me and give me your attention to the end, I believe that you will all impute extreme folly and madness to those who think that injustice is advantageous and who would hold in subjection by force the cities of others, failing to reckon with the disasters which result from such a policy.

On this point indeed I shall attempt to instruct you throughout my entire speech. But first let us discuss the question of peace and consider what we should desire for ourselves at the present juncture. For if we define this clearly and intelligently, we shall take better counsel in the light of this principle regarding our other interests[*](Their foreign policy in general.) as well.

Let me ask, then, whether we should be satisfied if we could dwell in our city secure from danger, if we could be provided more abundantly with the necessities of life, if we could be of one mind amongst ourselves, and if we could enjoy the high esteem of the Hellenes. I, for my part, hold that, with these blessings assured us, Athens would be completely happy. Now it is the war[*](The Social War.) which has robbed us of all the good things which I have mentioned; for it has made us poorer;[*](In Isoc. 7.9, he states that in the course of the war Athens had thrown away 1000 talents on mercenary soldiers alone. Demosthenes also bears witness to the poverty and embarrassment of Athens at this time. See Dem. 20.24; Dem. 23.209.) it has compelled many of us to endure perils; it has given us a bad name among the Hellenes; and it has in every way overwhelmed us with misfortune.

But if we make peace and demean ourselves as our common covenants[*](Of the Peace of Antalcidas.) command us to do, then we shall dwell in our city in great security, delivered from wars and perils and the turmoil in which we are now involved amongst ourselves, and we shall advance day by day in prosperity, relieved of paying war-taxes, of fitting out triremes, and of discharging the other burdens[*](See Isoc. 8.128 and note.) which are imposed by war, without fear cultivating our lands and sailing the seas and engaging in those other occupations which now, because of the war, have entirely come to an end.[*](Cf. Aristophanes, Isoc. 8.292 ff.)