Panegyricus

But this is how the matter stands: If the barbarian strengthens his hold on the cities of the coast by stationing in them larger garrisons than he has there now, perhaps those of the islands which lie near the mainland, as, for example, Rhodes and Samos and Chios, might incline to his side; but if we get possession of them first, we may expect that the populations of Lydia and Phrygia and of the rest of the up-country will be in the power of our forces operating from those positions.

Therefore we must be quick and not waste time, in order that we may not repeat the experience of our fathers.[*](In the Persian Wars.) For they, because they took the field later than the barbarians and had to abandon some of their allies,[*](The Ionians in Asia Minor. See Hdt. 5.103.) were compelled to encounter great numbers with a small force; whereas, if they had crossed over to the continent in time to be first on the ground, having with them the whole strength of Hellas, they could have subdued each of the nations there in turn.

For experience has shown that when you go to war with people who are gathered together from many places, you must not wait until they are upon you, but must strike while they are still scattered. Now our fathers, having made this mistake at the outset, entirely retrieved it only after engaging in the most perilous of struggles; but we, if we are wise, shall guard against it from the beginning, and endeavor to be the first to quarter an army in the region of Lydia and Ionia,

knowing that the King holds sway over the people of the continent, not because they are his willing subjects, but because he has surrounded himself with a force which is greater than any of those which they severally possess. So whenever we transport thither a force stronger than his, which we can easily do if we so will, we shall enjoy in security the resources of all Asia. Moreover, it is much more glorious to fight against the King for his empire than to contend against each other for the hegemony.

It were well to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages and not continue all their days in wretchedness. For sufficient is the time that is past, filled as it has been with every form of horror;[*](Cf. the picture of distress in Isoc. Letter 9.8-10.) for many as are the ills which are incident to the nature of man, we have ourselves invented more than those which necessity lays upon us, by engendering wars and factions among ourselves;

and, in consequence, some are being put to death contrary to law in their own countries, others are wandering with their women and children in strange lands, and many, compelled through lack of the necessities of life to enlist in foreign armies,[*](The hireling soldiers in Greece were becoming a serious problem. See Isoc. 5.96, 120, 121; Isoc. Letter 9.9.) are being slain, fighting for their foes against their friends. Against these ills no one has ever protested; and people are not ashamed to weep over the calamities which have been fabricated by the poets, while they view complacently the real sufferings, the many terrible sufferings, which result from our state of war; and they are so far from feeling pity that they even rejoice more in each other's sorrows than in their own blessings.

But perhaps many might even laugh at my simplicity if I should lament the misfortunes of individual men, in times like these, when Italy has been laid waste,[*](By Dionysius I. See Dio. Sic. 14.106 ff.) when Sicily has been enslaved,[*](The Sicilian cities, Selinius, Agrigentum, and Himera, were surrendered to the Carthaginians by Dionysius. See Dio. Sic. 13.114.) when such mighty cities have been given over to the barbarians,[*](By the Treaty of Antalcidas.) and when the remaining portions of the Hellenic race are in the gravest peril.

I am amazed at those who hold power in our states,[*](The same complaint against the leading statesmen is made in Isoc. Letter 9.8.) if they think that they have occasion to be proud when they have never been able either to propose or to conceive a remedy for a situation so momentous; for they ought, if they had been worthy of their present reputation, to have dropped all else, and have proposed measures and given counsel about our war against the barbarians.

Perhaps they might have helped us to get something done; but even if they had given up before gaining their object, they would, at any rate, have left to us their words as oracles for the future. But as things are, those who are held in highest honor are intent on matters of little consequence, and have left it to us, who stand aloof from public life,[*](For Isocrates' aloofness from public life see Isoc. 5.81; Isoc. 12.9-10; Isoc. Letter 1.9; Isoc. Letter 8.7; and General Introd. p. xix.) to advise on matters of so great moment.