De Garrulitate

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. VI. Helmbold, William Clark, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1939 (printing).

But these remarks are not to be regarded as an accusation against garrulity, but an attempt to cure it; for we get well by the diagnosis and treatment of our ailments, but the diagnosis must come first; since no one can become habituated to shun or to eradicate from his soul what does not distress him, and we only grow distressed with our ailments when we have perceived, by the exercise of reason, the injuries and shame which result from them. Thus, in the present instance, we perceive in the case of babblers that they are hated when they wish to be liked, that they cause annoyance when they wish to please,[*](Cf. 504 e, supra.) that they are laughed at when they think they are admired, that they spend their money without any gain, that they wrong their friends, help their enemies, and destroy themselves. Consequently this is the first step in curing the disease - by the application of reason to discover the shameful and painful effects that result from it.

And the second is that we must apply our reasoning powers to the effects of the opposite behaviour, always hearing and remembering and keeping close at hand the praises bestowed on reticence, and the solemn, holy, and mysterious[*](Cf. 504 a, 505 f, supra.) character of silence, remembering also that terse and pithy speakers and those who can pack much sense into a short speech are more admired and loved, and are considered to be wiser, than these unbridled and headstrong talkers. Plato,[*](Cf.Protagoras, 342 e.) in fact, commends such pithy men, declaring that they are like skilful throwers

of the javelin, for what they say is crisp, solid, and compact.[*](That is, they speak, as the acontist throws, with the sure aim which puts the adversary to rout with a single cast.) And Lycurgus,[*](Cf.Life of Lycurgus, xix. (51 d-e).) constraining his fellowcitizens from their earliest childhood to acquire this clever habit by means of silence, made them concise and terse in speech. For just as the Celtiberians[*](Cf. Diodorus, v. 33. 4.) make steel from iron by burying it in the earth and then cleaning off the large earthy accumulation, so the speech of Spartans has no dross, but being disciplined by the removal of all superfluities, it is tempered to complete efficiency; for this capacity of theirs for aphoristic speech and for quickness and the ability to turn out a neat phrase in repartee is the fruit of much silence.

And we must be careful to offer to chatterers examples of this terseness, so that they may see how charming and how effective they are. For example: The Spartans to Philip: Dionysius in Corinth.[*](Cf. Tryphon apud Spengel, Rhetores Graeci, iii. p. 202; Quintilian, viii. 6. 52; Dionysius the Younger upon being expelled from Syracuse (Cf. Moralia, 783 d) kept a school in Corinth. The expression is somewhat like saying, Remember St. Helena. ) And again, when Philip wrote to them, If I invade Laconia, I shall turn you out, they wrote back, If. And when King Demetrius[*](Cf.Life of Demetrius, xlii. (909 c); Moralia, 233 e. In Moralia, 216 b, Agis (the Younger?) makes the remark to Philip.) was annoyed and shouted, Have the Spartans sent only one envoy to me? the envoy replied undismayed, One to one.

And among the men of old also sententious speakers are admired, and upon the temple of the Pythian Apollo the Amphictyons inscribed, not the Iliad and the Odyssey or the paeans of Pindar, but Know thyself[*](Cf.Moralia, 408 e, 385 d, 164 b; Pausanias, x. 24. 1; Tryphon, l.c.; Plato, Charmides, 165 a.)

and Avoid extremes and Give a pledge and mischief is at hand,[*](Cf.Moralia, 164 b.) admiring, as they did, the compactness and simplicity of the expression which contains within a small compass a well-forged sentiment. And is not the god himself fond of conciseness and brevity in his oracles, and is he not called Loxias[*](As though derived from λοξός, slanting, ambiguous; and see Roscher, s.v. ) because he avoids prolixity rather than obscurity? And are not those who indicate by signs, without a word, what must be done,[*](Cf. Diogenes Laertius, vii. 66.) praised and admired exceedingly? So Heracleitus,[*](Diels, Frag. d. Vorsokratiker 5, i. p. 144, A 3 b.) when his fellowcitizens asked him to propose some opinion about concord, mounted the platform, took a cup of cold water, sprinkled it with barley-meal, stirred it with penny-royal, drank it up, and departed, thus demonstrating to them that to be satisfied with whatever they happen upon and not to want expensive things is to keep cities in peace and concord. And Scilurus,[*](Cf.Moralia, 174 f and Nachstädt’s note ad loc. ) king of the Scythians, left behind him eighty sons; when he was dying, he asked for a bundle of spearshafts and bade his sons take it and break it in pieces, tied closely together as the shafts were. When they gave up the task, he himself drew all the spears out one by one and easily broke them in two, thus revealing that the harmony and concord of his sons was a strong and invincible thing, but that their disunion would be weak and unstable.

If anyone will but review and recollect constantly these and similar instances, he may conceivably stop taking pleasure in foolish chatter. But as for me, that famous case of the slave puts me utterly to shame when I reflect what immense importance it

is to pay attention to what is said and to be master of our purpose. Pupius Piso, the orator, not wishing to be troubled, ordered his slaves to speak only in answer to questions and not a word more. Subsequently, wishing to pay honour to Clodius when he was a magistrate, Piso gave orders that he be invited to dinner and prepared what was, we may suppose, a sumptuous banquet. When the hour came, the other guests were present, but Clodius was still expected, and Piso repeatedly sent the slave who regularly carried invitations to see if Clodius was approaching. And when evening came and he was finally despaired of, Piso said to the slave, See here, did you give him the invitation? I did, said the slave. Why hasn’t he come then? Because he declined. Then why didn’t you tell me at once? Because you didn’t ask me that. So a Roman slave, but the Athenian slave while digging will tell his master

On what terms the truce is made,[*](Kock, Com. Att. Frag., iii. p. 473; Cf. 518 f - 519 a, infra.)

so great in all things is the force of habit. And of this let us now speak.

For it is impossible to check the babbler by gripping the reins, as it were; his disease must be mastered by habituation. In the first place, then, when questions are asked of neighbours, let him accustom himself to remaining silent until all have refused a response:

For counsel’s aim is not that of a race,[*](To see who can get to the goal first.)

as Sophocles[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag. 2, p. 312, Frag. 772 (Frag. 856 ed. Pearson, vol. iii. p. 63).) says, nor, indeed, is this the aim of

speaking and answering. For in a race the victory is his who comes in first; but here, if another makes a sufficient answer, it is proper to join in the approval and assent and so acquire the reputation of being a friendly fellow. But if such an answer is not made, then it is not invidious or inopportune both to point out the answer others have not known and thus to fili in the gap. And, in particular, let us be on our guard, when someone else has been asked a question, that we do not forestall him by taking the answer out of his mouth. For perhaps there are other times also when it is not seemly, another having been asked, to shoulder him aside and volunteer ourselves, since we shall seem to be casting a slur both on the man asked, as being unable to furnish what is demanded of him, and on the asker, as being ignorant of the source from which he can get help; and, in particular, such precipitancy and boldness in answering questions smacks of insolence. For one who tries to get in the answTer ahead of the man who is questioned suggests, What do you need him for? or What does he know? or When I am present, no one else should be asked about these matters. And yet we often ask people questions, not because we need an answer, but to elicit some friendly word from them, and because we wish to draw them on to friendly converse, as Socrates did with Theaetetus and Charmides.[*](Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 143 d, Charmides, 154 e ff.) So to take the answer out of another’s mouth, to divert another’s hearing and attract his attention and wrest it from some other, is as bad as to run up and kiss someone who wished to be kissed by somebody else, or to turn toward yourself someone who was looking at another; since, even if he who has been asked cannot give the

information, it is proper to practise restraint and conform oneself to the wish of the asker and thus to encounter with modesty and decorum the situation, an invitation, as it were, given to another. And it is also true that if persons who are asked questions make mistakes in their answers, they meet with just indulgence; but he who voluntarily undertakes an answer and anticipates another is unpleasant even if he corrects a mistake, and if he makes a mistake himself, he affords a malicious joy to one and all, and becomes an object of ridicule.