De E apud Delphos

Plutarch, in this essay on the E at Delphi, tells us that beside the well-known inscriptions at Delphi there was also a representation of the letter E, the fifth letter of the Greek alphabet. The Greek name for this letter was EI, and this diphthong, in addition to being used in Plutarch’s time as the name of E (which denotes the number five), is the Greek word for if, and also the word for the second person singular of the verb to be (thou art).

In searching for an explanation of the unexplainable it is only natural that the three meanings of EI (five, if, thou art) should be examined to see if any hypothesis based on any one of them might possibly yield a rational explanation; and these hypotheses constitute the skeleton about which is built the body of Plutarch’s essay. From it we gain some interesting delineations of character and an engaging portrayal of the way in which a philosopher acts, or reacts, when forced unwillingly to face the unknowable.

Plutarch puts forward seven possible explanations of the letter:

(1) It was dedicated by the Wise Men, as a protest against interlopers, to show that their number was actually five and not seven (EI = E, five).

(2) EI is the second vowel, the Sun is the second planet, and Apollo is identified with the sun (EI = E, the vowel).

(3) EI means if: people ask the oracle IF they shall succeed, or IF they shall do this or that (EI=if).

(4) EI is used in wishes or prayers to the god, often in the combination εἴθε or εἰ γάρ (EI = if or if only).

(5) EI, if, is an indispensable word in logic for the construction of a syllogism (EI = if).

(6) Five is a most important number in mathematics, physiology, philosophy, and music (EI = E, five).

(7) EI means thou art and is the address of the consultant to Apollo, to indicate that the god has eternal being (EI = thou art).[*](This explanation is accepted by Poulsen (Delphi, p. 149), but is open to very serious objections.)

Attempts to explain the letter have been also made in modern times by Göttling, Berickte der Sacks. Gesell. der Wiss. I. (1846-47) pp. 311 if., and by Schultz in Philologus (1866), pp. 214 if. Roscher, in Philologus (1900), pp. 21 if.; (1901), pp. 81 if.; (1902), pp. 513 if.; Hermes (1901), pp. 470 ff. (comment also by C. Robert in the same volume, p. 490), and the Philologische Wochenschrift (1922), col. 1211, maintains that EI is an imperative from εἶμι, go, addressed to the person who carne to consult the oracle, and that it means go on, continue into the temple. The value of this explanation is somewhat doubtful, since EI in this word (εἶμι) is a true diphthong, and so is not generally spelled with simple E except in the Corinthian alphabet. Although

Roscher cites a few examples from inscriptions in other dialects where the true diphthongal EI seems to be represented by simple E, his evidence is not convincing.

O. Lagercrantz, in Hermes, xxxvi. (1901) pp. 411 if., interprets the E as meaning ἦ he said. To this, of course, Roscher objects and suggests that Lagercrantz might have thought also of ἦ verily. Thus all the various possibilities of interpretation have in turn been suggested, and rejected by others.

W. N. Bates, in the American Journal of Archaeology, xxix. (1925) pp. 239-246, tries to show that the E had its origin in a Minoan character E associated with (\e (as is shown by the evidence of a Cretan gem in the Metropolitan Museum of New York) and later transferred to Delphi. Since the character was not understood, it, like other things at Delphi, came to be associated with Apollo. This character has been found on the old omphalos discovered in 1913 at Delphi in the temple of Apollo.[*](It might also be recorded that J. E. Harrison, in Comptes Rendus du Congres International d’Archeologie (Athens, 1905), thinks that the E was originally three betyl stones or pillars placed on a basis and representing the three Charites! Moreover, C. Fries, in Rheinisches Museum für Philologie, lxxix. (1930) 343-344, offers as nodi explicatio the fact that in Sumerian inscriptions E means house or temple, and so may be connected with Babylonian ritual (note the Chaldean in chap. iv.)!)

Interesting are the two coins reproduced in Imhoof-Blumer and P. Gardner, A Numismatic Commentary on Pausanias, plate x. nos. xxii. and xxiii. (text, p. 119), which show the E suspended between the middle columns of the temple. Learned scholars should note that the letter represented is E, not EI: therefore

such explanations as are based on the true diphthong are presumably wrong.

The title of the essay is included in the catalogue of Lamprias, where it appears as No. 117. It is not infrequently quoted or referred to by later writers. It has been separately edited by Bernardakis in the volume of essays in honour of Ernst Curtius, Leipzig, 1894. Of interest is also The Delphic Maxims in Literature, by Eliza Gregory Wilkins, Chicago, 1929.

(The persons who take part in the conversation are: Ammonius, Lamprias, Plutarch, Theon, Eustrophus, Nicander, and others whose names are not given.)

Not long ago, my dear Sarapion,[*](A poet living at Athens in Plutarch’s day; see Moralia, 396 d ff. and 628 a.) I carne upon some lines, not badly done, which Dicaearchus thinks Euripides[*](Nauck, Trag. Graec. Frag., Euripides, no. 969.) addressed to Archelaüs:

1. I will not give poor gifts to one so rich,
2. Lest you should take me for a fool, or I
3. Should seem by giving to invite a gift.

For he does no favour who gives small gifts from scanty means to wealthy men; and since it is not credible that his giving is for nothing, he acquires in addition a reputation for disingenuousness and servility. Observe also how, as far as independence and honour are concerned, material gifts fall far below those bestowed by literary discourse and wisdom; and these gifts it is both honourable to give and, at the same time, to ask a return of like gifts from the recipients. I, at any rate, as I send to you, and by means of you for our friends there, some of our Pythian discourses, an offering of our first-fruits, as it were, confess that I am expecting other discourses, both more numerous and of better quality, from you and your friends, inasmuch as you have not only all the advantages of a great city,[*](At this time Athens had been for several centuries a university city.) but you have also more abundant leisure amid many books and all manner of discussions.

It seems that our beloved Apollo finds a remedy and a solution for the problems connected with our life by the oracular responses which he gives to those who consult him; but the problems connected with our power to reason it seems that he himself launches and propounds to him who is by nature inclined to the love of knowledge, thus creating in the soul a craving[*](Cf.Moralia, 673 b.) that leads onward to the truth, as is clear in many other ways, but particularly in the dedication of the E.[*](Cf. 426 e, infra.) For the likelihood is that it was not by chance nor, as it were, by lot that this was the only letter that carne to occupy first place with the god and attained the rank of a sacred offering and something worth seeing; but it is likely that those who, in the beginning, sought after knowledge of the god either discovered some peculiar and unusual potency in it or else used it as a token with reference to some other of the matters of the highest concern, and thus adopted it.

On many other occasions when the subject had been brought up in the school I had quietly turned aside from it and passed it over, but recently I was unexpectedly discovered by my sons in an animated discussion with some strangers, whom, since they purposed to leave Delphi immediately, it was not seemly to try to divert from the subject, nor was it seemly for me to ask to be excused from the discussion, for they were altogether eager to hear something about it. I found them seats, therefore, near the temple, and I began to seek some answer myself and to put questions to them; influenced as I was by the place and the conversation itself, I remembered

what, when Nero was here some years ago, I had heard Ammonius and others discussing, when the same question obtruded itself in a similar way.