De E apud Delphos

Plutarch

Plutarch. Moralia, Vol. 5. Babbitt, Frank Cole, translator. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1936 (printing).

That the god is no less a philosopher than a prophet Ammonius seemed to all to postulate and prove correctly, with reference to this or to that one of his several titles[*](Cf. 393 b, infra; Cornutus, chap. xxxii.; von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, i. 543 (p. 123); and Apollo in the Index thereto.); that he is the Pythian (Inquirer) for those that are beginning to learn and inquire; the Delian (Clear) and the Phanaean (Disclosing) for those to whom some part of the truth is becoming clear and is being disclosed; the Ismenian[*](Plutarch’s attempt to connect Ismenian with ἰδ-- (οἶδα) can hardly be right.) (Knowing) for those who have knowledge; and the Leschenorian (Conversationalist) when people have active enjoyment of conversation and philosophic intercourse with one another. Since, he wrent on to say, inquiry is the beginning of philosophy, and wonder and uncertainty the beginning of inquiry,[*](Cf. Plato, Theaetetus, 155 d.) it seems only natural that the greater part of what concerns the god should be concealed in riddles, and should call for some account of the wherefore and an explanation of its cause. For example, in the case of the undying fire, that pine is the only wood burned here, while laurel is used for offering incense; that two Fates have statues here,[*](Cf. Pausanias, x. 24. 4.) whereas three is everywhere the customary number; that no woman[*](Cf. Euripides, Ion, 222.) is allowed to approach the prophetic shrine; the matter of the tripod; and the other questions of this nature, when they are suggested to persons who are not altogether without mind and reason, act as a Iure and an invitation to investigate, to read, and to

talk about them. Note also these inscriptions[*](Cf.Moralia, 164 b, 408 e, 511 a.) here, Know thyself and Avoid extremes, how many philosophic inquiries have they set on foot, and what a horde of discourses has sprung up from each, as from a seed! And no less productive of discourse than any one of them, as I think, is the present subject of inquiry.

When Ammonius had said this, Lamprias, my brother, said, As a matter of fact, the account that we have heard is simple and quite brief. For they say that those wise men who by some are called the Sophists were actually five in number: Chilon, Thales, Solon, Bias, and Pittacus. But when Cleobulus, the despot of the Lindians, and later Periander of Corinth, who had no part or portion in virtue or wisdom, but forcibly acquired their repute through power and friends and favours, invaded this name of the Wise Men, and sent out and circulated throughout Greece certain sentiments and sayings very similar to those famous utterances of the Wise Men, these, naturally, did not like this at all, but were loath to expose the imposture or to arouse open hatred over a question of repute, or to carry through a contest against such powerful men; they met here by themselves and, after conferring together, dedicated that one of the letters which is fifth in alphabetical order and which stands for the number five, thus testifying for themselves before the god that they were five, and renouncing and rejecting the seventh and the sixth as having no connexion with themselves. That this account is not beside the mark anyone may realize who has heard those connected with the shrine

naming the golden E the E of Livia, Caesar’s wife, and the bronze E the E of the Athenians, while the first and oldest one, made of wood, they still call to this day the E of the Wise Men, as though it were an offering, not of one man, but of all the Wise Men in common.