History of the Peloponnesian War

Alcibiades gave this advice to Tissaphernes and the king, whilst he was with them, both because he thought it best for them, and, at the same time, because he was further providing for his own restoration to his country; knowing that if he did not bring it to ruin, he would some time or other have means of persuading his countrymen, and returning to it. But the way in which he thought he should persuade them most easily was this, namely, by Tissaphernes' appearing to be in his interest.

And so it turned out; for when the Athenian soldiers at Samos found that he had great influence with him, [the plan was adopted,] to a certain extent, in consequence of Alcibiades having sent word to the most powerful individuals amongst them, to let it be mentioned to the most respectable people, that he wished to return home on condition of there being an oligarchy, and not that unprincipled democracy which had banished him; and after making Tissaphernes their friend, to enjoy his privileges as a citizen with them: but, at the same time, the trierarchs and the most influential Athenians at Samos were of themselves still more eager for abolishing the democracy.

This design therefore was first mooted in the camp, and thence spread to the city. Accordingly, certain individuals went over from Samos, and had an interview with Alcibiades; and when he held out that he would first make Tissaphernes their friend, and then the king, in case they were not under a democratical government, (for so the king would place greater reliance on them,) the aristocratical party amongst the citizens, who also suffered most at present, entertained many hopes of getting the government into their own hands, as well as of gaining the victory over the enemy.

Accordingly they went to Samos, and united in a club such men as favoured their views, openly representing to the people at large that the king would be their friend, and supply them with money, if Alcibiades were restored, and they were not governed by a democracy.

The multitude, though annoyed to a certain extent by these negotiations, remained quiet because of their abundant hopes of pay from the king; while those who were for establishing the oligarchy, after they had communicated their designs to the mass of the people, again considered the proposals of Alcibiades [*](καὶ σφίσιν αὐτοῖς κ. τ. λ.] Dobree, Göller, Poppo, and Arnold, agree in thinking that ἐν must be inserted before σθίσιν, without which the passage seems to them not fairly intelligible. But may not this be regarded as a dativus instrumenti ? which is certainly used sometimes with reference to persons, though less commonly than to things. One instance of it is given by Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 608, Obs. 3, from Soph. El. 226, ti/ni gar pot' a)\n, w(= fili/a gene/qla, pro/sforon a)kou/saim' e)/pos; and perhaps a second might have been added from the same play, v. 441, ei)/ soi prosqilw=s au)th=| dokei=Ge/ra ta/d' ou(n ta/foisi decasqai ne/kus. Matthiae, § 396, brings forward another undoubted instance from Eur. Heracl. 392, ἄνδρα γὰρ χρεὼν——οὐκ ἀγγέλοισι τοὺς ἐναντίους ὁρᾶν and another less certain one from Xen. Cyrop. One instance may also, I think, be quoted from Thucydides himself, though I am not aware that it ever has, viz. VIII. 82. 3, ξυνέβαινε δὲ τῷ ʼαλκιβιάδῃ τῷ μὲν τισσαφέρνει τοὺς ʼαθηναίους φοβεῖν, ἐκείνοις δὲ τὸν τισσαφέρνην. There seems therefore to be no sufficient reason why the same construction should not have been used here. If this be admitted, I would apply the same principle to two other passages of our author, of which I have before taken a different view, viz. I. 25, οὔτε κορινθίῳ ἀνδρ́ι προκαταρχόμενοι, and V. 38. 4, οὐκ ἄλλα ψηφιεῖσθαι ἢ ἃ σφίσι προδιαγνόντες παραινοῦσιν. With regard to the former, when I wrote the note on it, I had not seen the quotation with which Poppo corroborates Bloomfield's interpretation, and which puts it beyond a doubt, I think, that Arrian, at any rate, took the same view of it.) amongst themselves and the greater part of their associates. To the rest, then, they appeared advantageous and worthy of their confidence;

but Phrynichus, who was still general, was not at all pleased with them, but thought that Alcibiades (as was really the case) had no more desire for an oligarchy than for a democracy, or considered any thing else but how, by bringing the state to change its present constitution, he might obtain his recall by the invitation of his associates.

What they themselves, however, should most especially look to, was,

to avoid being rent by factions. That it was not for the king's advantage, when the Peloponnesians were now on an equality at sea, and held none of the least cities in his dominion, to incur trouble by siding with the Athenians, whom he did not trust, when he might have made the Peloponnesians his friends, by whom he had never yet been injured.

As for the allied states, again, to whom, forsooth, they had promised an oligarchy, because they themselves also would cease to be under a democracy, he well knew that neither those which had revolted would any the more on that account come over to them, nor those that were left be more staunch to them; for they would not wish to be slaves with either an oligarchy or a democracy, rather than to be free, under whichever of those two forms of govern ment they might obtain their liberty.