History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

And he begged them to make up their minds to this view of the case-that they would not have the worse as regarded forces, and that with respect to resolution, it would be intolerable if they should not determine, Pelopolnnesians and Dorians as they were, to get the better of Ionians, and islanders, and a mixed rabble of men, and to drive them out of their country.

After this, when a favourable opportunity presented itself; he led them a second time against the enemy. Now Nicias and the Athenians thought, that even if the Syracusane should not wish to commence an engagement, it was necessary for themselves not to permit their wall to be carried past their own: for by this time the enemy's work had all but passed the termination of the Athenian lines; and if it went on any further, it was at once all the same to them, whether they were continually fighting and victorious, or did not fight at all;

and therefore they advanced to meet the Syracusans. Gylippus led his heavy-armed further beyond the fortifications of the two parties than before, and so engaged them, posting his cavalry and dart-men on the flank of the Athenians, in the open space where the works connected with both walls terminated.

During the battle, the cavalry charged the left wing of the Athenians which was opposed to them, and routed it; and in consequence of this the rest of the army also was defeated by the Syracusans, and driven within their lines.

The following night they had time to build up to the Athenian works, and to pass them; so that now they could no longer be stopped by the enemy, while they deprived them, even if victorious, of all chance of investing the city in future.