History of the Peloponnesian War

Thucydides

Thucydides. The history of the Peloponnesian War, Volume 1-2. Dale, Henry, translator. London: Heinemann and Henry G. Bohn, 1851-1852.

For as they had but a scanty supply of water, and that not close at hand; and, moreover, as the sailors from time to time went out to gather firewood, they were cut off by the Syracusan horse, which had the command of the country. For a third part of their cavalry had been posted by the Syracusans in the small town in the Olympieum, with an eye to the troops on Plemyrium, to prevent their marching out to commit ravages.

Meanwhile Nicias learned that the rest of the Corinthian ships also were sailing to the island, and sent twenty vessels to watch for them, with orders to be on the look-out for them about Locri, Rhegium, and the approaches to Sicily.

Gylippus, on the other hand, was at once building the wall across Epipolae—making use of the stones which the Athenians before had thrown down along the line for their own use—and leading out continually the Syracusans and their allies, and drawing them up before the works; while the Athenians formed their line against them.

When Gylippus thought it a favourable opportunity, he commenced the attack; and, having closed in battle, they fought in the space between the works, where the cavalry of the Syracusans was of no use.

When the Syracusans and their allies had thus been defeated, and had taken up their dead under truce, and after the Athenians had erected a trophy, Gylippus called his army together, and said, that

the fault was not theirs, but his own; for he had deprived them of the benefit of their cavalry and dart-men by his arrangements for the battle, which he had made too far within the works: wherefore he would now lead them again to the charge.